III THE COURCE AND PROBLEMS OF A SAGA - Part 01

III THE COURCE AND PROBLEMS OF A SAGA

(Naum Peiov: “Macedonians and the Civil War in Greece”, Institute of National History edition, Skopje, 1968.)

At the time when I was writing this book, only a few books existed in the Socialist Republic of Macedonia that dealt with the specifics, the role and contribution of Macedonian people in the Greek Civil War. This is why Naum Peiov’s work is very important, as a first attempt, to provide insight into the Civil War in Greece and to highlight the Macedonian contribution to it, which is of particular interest.

My aim here is not to engage in some kind of book review to show peculiarities characteristic of it; this has already been done by Academician Mihailo Apostolski in the preface to the book. My intention here is to contribute to the discussion on the material already presented by the author. Of course, I will only deal with the more important moments and provide my personal opinion…

Silence about a crime is equally as strong as the crime itself

On page 6 in his book Peiov wrote: “The Macedonian position, role and contribution in this war was belittled, silenced or falsified by many ‘friends’ and ‘enemies of the Macedonian people’…”

That is correct. In less than twenty years after the Greek Civil War ended, the Greek public and the public beyond Greece was literally flooded with various versions of the story, written by both our “friends” and “enemies”, which very much complicated things for us. This was their attitude toward us all along; we could not expect anything different from them. The best thing for us to do then, we thought, was to keep silent. Why were we silent?

As is well-known, about three hundred thousand Macedonian people, from the youngest to the oldest, actively participated on the Democratic side of the titanic struggle that pitted the domestic and international reactionaries against the democratic forces in Greece. As is also well-known, that over 3,500 Macedonian women were drafted to work on the frontlines in Vicho, building trenches and bunkers to protect the partisans from enemy artillery and aerial bombardment. Many Macedonian women and girls were also drafted, through several mobilizations, and, after a short preparation, sent to fight at the frontlines. About 8,000 Macedonian orphan children, who had lost their parents to the war, were also collected and sent to friendly European socialist countries that were willing to take them. The first partisan woman to be convicted by a military tribunal and executed was a Macedonian. Her name was Mirka Ginova and she fought to liberate Greece. Over ten thousand Macedonian fighters were killed at the front lines. Peiov named 179 of them and the Macedonian villages from which they came. According to official statistics, taken during the 1940 and 1951 censuses in Greece, the Macedonian population had significantly declined or halved. It was recorded that 46 Macedonian villages were completely destroyed during the Civil War and were not mentioned in the 1951 census. This kind of destruction was comparable to the devastation experienced during the Spanish anti-fascist war and during the Vietnamese war against imperialism and neo-colonialism.

But, here we are, twenty years later, still not talking about it, and allowing others to minimize our experience until it’s forgotten. Our sacrifices, the Macedonian people’s interests, it seems, are not of any political significance, not even important enough to speak about them. Our own silence, unfortunately, belittled our cause and demeaned our great Macedonian contribution in the struggle for freedom against the Greek and international reactionaries. This, in itself, is a crime against the Macedonian people.

Naum Peiov was one of the very first authors in our country to give importance to the events and problems experienced during the Greek Civil War and to the Macedonian contribution, regardless of how it was viewed. Taking this first step was of great significance which ended the unjustified silence...

About the beginning of the Greek Civil War

On page 9, Peiov concluded that: “The December clash in Athens between ELAS and the Greek forces in exile, aided by English troops, ended with the famous Varkiza Treaty, signed on February 12, 1945. And this was the beginning of the Greek Civil War”.

When speaking about the Greek Civil War it is necessary to remember the following:

- According to the well-known division of spheres of influence between the Great Powers, Greece was left in the English sphere of influence.

- England preferred to have the Greek bourgeoisie as its partner to protect its interests in Greece and rejected the persistently bridged CPG, EAM and ELAS friendship.

- The fascist occupation and terror in Greece gave birth to the people’s revolution which inevitably led to the political left CPG, EAM and ELAS increasing its power and influence.

- Under the then conditions in modern Europe and in the world, England could not just send troops to conquer Greece, as it had once conquered its colonies.

- The safest option for England was to take Greece from the CPG, EAM and ELAS through a successfully organized civil war with help from the Greek reactionaries. And as is well-known, England did exactly that.

When we take all this into consideration, we can see a pattern emerging that would eventually lead to a civil war. For instance, there were many clashes in the course of 1943 between ELAS and EDES, ELAS and EKKA, ELAS and PAO, ELAS and IEE, ELAS and Anton Chaush, etc. ELAS stood alone on the political left and fought against all these organizations and groups which stood on the political right and which were openly tolerated by the German occupiers and secretly supported by the English. These were all Greek organizations helped by outsiders to fight against ELAS. But, as is well-known, ELAS finally defeated and destroyed them all in the autumn of 1944. Unable to defeat the CPG, EAM and ELAS on

the battlefield in Greece, the English and their creation, the Greek government in exile, found a way to tie their (CPG, EAM and ELAS) hands by having its agents in the CPG surrender ELAS to English command in the Middle East. Even that did not destroy them (CPG, EAM and ELAS) so the aforementioned clashes in the streets of Athens were instigated with aims at flaring up a unilateral civil war following the Varkiza and other agreements... All these events were in fact phases and forms of a single civil war organized by the English and their creation, the Greek government in exile, and assisted and enabled by the CPG top leaderships led by Siantos and Zahariadis.

I believe we will be more objective and will get closer to the historical truth, if we see and understand events the way they were.

Siantos’s CPG leadeship and its politics

It’s not about “ideal political confusion”

“Even though the resistance movement in the country, the EAM massive organization, and the ELAS armed forces were created by the CPG, and the Communists were the most effective fighters, the CPG leadership made major ideological and political mistakes leading to unprincipled compromises which contributed to its defeat…” (Ibid. p. 14.)

When Peiov wrote this in the introductory part of his book he was specifically thinking of Siantos’s CPG leadership. Peiov was referring to the widely accepted view that Siantos and his comrades made “mistakes” because they did not have a “clear view of the very nature of the national liberation struggle, namely, that they could not see that the national liberation could not be separated from the national democratic character of the uprising and the establishment of a democratic government and from the CPG leadership itself.” (Ibid. p. 14.)

Let us have a closer look at this: It is true that the CPG leadership consistently struggled, throughout the duration of the fascist occupation, for a “national liberation” of Greece through “national unity” with the bourgeoisie parties. All parties, organizations and

individuals agreed to form an “interim government of national unity and work together to liberate Greece through a national struggle and after the occupiers were driven out the people would have a choice to freely express what government they wanted.” (Ibid. p. 15, Peiov here quotes the CPG Central Committee Tenth Plenum.) But as is well-known, however, in the middle of 1944, when the Germans were preparing to leave Greece, while ELAS had already liquidated the forces of EDES, EKKA, PAO, IEE, ELAS and Anton Chaush, and was alone in all of Greece, the CPG leadership voluntarily handed over power to the bourgeois Greek government in exile, by recognizing it as the legitimate and sole government of Greece (in accordance with the Lebanon Agreement).

As is well-known, the CPG leadership fought hard within the same “national struggle, by all means possible, to prevent the Macedonian national liberation movement from developing. On top of that, the CPG looked to England to secure Greece’s northern borders. The need to secure the northern border was openly and publicly proclaimed during the CPG Central Committee Tenth Plenum. And as Peiov has correctly noted, this was an open claim and a Greek aspiration for expanding Greece’s territory beyond its current borders. Now if we really want to know exactly what the CPG leadership truly wanted from the “national struggle” all we have to do is carefully examine the sequence of events and what they led up to. Having done that we will realize that there is no “ideological and political mess” as was quoted on page 16 and it would be absolutely wrong to think that Siantos did not know what he wanted and how to get it. Remember:

- Siantos resigned as leader of the national liberation struggle for a people’s democratic government;

- Siantos rejects the offer for close cooperation with the Balkan national liberation movements, especially with Yugoslavia;

- Siantos fought against the Macedonian national liberation movement, declaring it a “crypto-fascist,” and “reactionary” movement.

- Siantos surrendered ELAS to the English and placed it under English command and control (Sarafis-Eddie declaration).

- Siantos recognized the English right to act as regulator and judge in the political quarrels with the political organizations EDES and EKKA and in military clashes with their military forces, that is, the right to interfere with and manage Greece’s internal affairs while Greece was still occupied (Plaka Agreement).

- Siantos voluntarily waved all claims to power in favour of the Greek bourgeois government in exile, recognizing it as the legitimate government of Greece (the Lebanon Agreement).

- Siantos accepted the Caserta Agreement, which not only paved the way for the return of the Greek government in exile and its fascist units, but also placed ELAS units under government command.

In the end, Siantos signed the Varkiza Agreement to disarm and dismantle ELAS all across the country, except for some ELAS auxiliary units in Athens which were later attacked and defeated by a joint force consisting of government and English units.

Siantos did all this to save Greece. He demanded “national unity” with the bourgeoisie at all costs because he believed that England would only support this kind of national Greek government and with its backing would save Greece. Only England would support Greece’s integrity, help to expel the Bulgarians from Eastern Macedonia, diminish all Macedonian demands, and secure Greece’s northern borders. (Peiov obtained this information from the book: “Forty years of CPG struggle 1918 to 1958”, CPG Central Committee, selected documents, p. 504.)

It was never the intention of the CPG during the national liberation struggle to take power and install a people’s democracy in Greece. It should not have been and it was not practical for the CPG to take power given the circumstances of the “day”. Such a task would have obviously been directed against the bourgeoisie and would have ruined Greece’s friendship with England. On top of that Greece would have had to cooperate with the national liberation movements of its northern neighbours which would have prevented any strategic

securing of its borders. In such a scenario Greece would have been forced to make concessions to the Macedonian people, which would have threatened Greece’s territorial integrity. Siantos clearly anticipated all this and resolutely opposed it. Siantos refused to carry out any sort of internal socialist revolution that would be in favour of the Greek people and the minorities living in Greece. Siantos also refused to cooperate with any of the other people’s revolutions. This tells us that, in Siantos’s view, the people’s interests were not his most important priority during this historical moment. Siantos accepted his task to save Greece and with all his energies committed his forces to carry out a “national struggle” through “national unity” with the bourgeoisie who were supported by the English. He did this because the Greek national interests of the “day” were the most important thing that the situation imperatively required of him, the CPG and the Greek people to fight and defend. The Siantos CPG leadership had countless chances during the struggle to take power and install a people’s democracy in Greece but he insisted that this be done “after the war was over.” He insisted on waiting for the ultimate goal to install socialism… later. “…Today, the party of the proletariat, the Communist Party of Greece, is fighting for national liberation, and later, after the war it will fight for a people’s democracy.” (CPG Central Committee proclamation, June 2, 1943, issued on the occasion of the Third International dissolution.)

The Third CPG Conference held in October 1950, which ended with the “culmination of lessons learned and conclusions made during the decade from 1940 to 1950”, proclaimed Siantos a traitor to the people’s revolution. This, in part, was what was adopted: “G. Siantos consciously betrayed the revolution…” (See: “CPG from 1931 to 1952”, CPG Central Committee edition, p. 219.)

It is true that attempts were made to challenge the veracity of this conclusion. But the facts are the facts. In the history of the Greek labour movement Siantos will be remembered as the first great-Greek, carrier of the Greek national bourgeoisie “Megali Idea” (Greater Greece), and traitor to the people’s interests. Siantos managed to get to the highest level in the CPG and became its leader during Greece’s most crucial historical moment. He then betrayed the people and turned them into victims with huge material and human losses and untold suffering that has not ceased to this day...

About the Varkiza agreement

“With the December uprising, one page was closed in our history and another was opened. This was a transition, a turn in the road, a crisis... The uprising did not succeed and neither was the movement squashed. These were the basic elements in the December clashes…” announced the CPG Central Committee during its Twelfth Plenum held in June 1945.

Peiov confirmed that the political right did sign the Varkiza Agreement. Why? “The political right was fully aware of its strength. Namely, that the forces on the side of the revolutionary movement were so strong that if it tried to put them down it would be defeated. The political right, by signing the Varkiza Agreement, accomplished that task without having to fight…” explained Peiov on page 38.

However, what really happened was not as simple as Peiov put it. The political right did not agree with the details of the Varkiza Agreement but signed it anyway because it gave it the means to triumph over the resistance movement, i.e. to disarm and dissolve the entire ELAS military force all throughout Greece. “The Varkiza Agreement required ELAS to lay down its weapons... This was a means of disarming the movement and constitutes unconditional capitulation…” (See: “Chronicle of the Struggle”, CPG Central Committee, 1952, pp. 48-49.) And that’s what the December disturbances were all about…

These were not “mistakes” made but an indisputable betrayal.

Unfortunately the CPG leadership did not see the Varkiza Agreement as a betrayal, and in its distortion of things, declared it a great victory for the democratic forces. This was definitely self-deception and a verbal smoke screen, a shameful way to hide the treachery committed by Siantos and his people at the helm of the CPG. They knowingly signed an agreement designed to liquidate ELAS. A person today must have some kind of blinders on not to be able to see things for what they truly were, especially if one takes into account that:

- The Greek government in exile, with its entire military force, could hardly handle the few remaining ELAS units in Athens, without help from the English, and that:

- It was not easy for the English to engage the ELAS forces in a long-running war in Greece. The English involvement in the December conflict was short-lived and was quickly regulated by the Varkiza Agreement. In other words it did not create much public attention. So, by surrendering the ELAS forces to the English, Siantos did England a great favour. It first disarmed and dissolved the majority of the forces and then allowed the Greek government, with English help, to defeat the ELAS forces in Athens. With ELAS out of the picture the Greek government, again with English assistance, began to create its own army, police and gendarmerie as well and the famous armed gangs which began to attack the democratic organizations all throughout Greece unhindered.

Those who speak about the CPG leadership “making mistakes” are in error. The CPG did not make any mistakes but intentionally withdrew from the fight in Athens in order to sign the Varkiza Agreement. Even if ELAS lost the battle in Athens in December, it had the option of retreating from Athens and continuing the war anywhere within Greece. But the CPG decided to surrender all of its forces everywhere in Greece, via the Varkiza Agreement, and on top of that made no provisions in the agreement to safeguard the survival of the democratic movement in the country… (Naum Peiov: “Macedonians and the Civil War in Greece”, Institute of National History edition, Skopje, 1968, p. 38.)

This can only mean that, what the CPG did was an indisputable and obvious betrayal. Just one look at the events and one would be convinced of it. When the Germans left, it did not mean the “national struggle” was over. Being supported by England the “national government” had yet to make sure that the basic task of the “national struggle” was realized. This meant “establishing the full integrity of Greece by strategically securing all borders…” The Siantos CPG leadership consistently did everything it could in order to create the right conditions for this. Namely, Siantos refused to cooperate with the national liberation movements in the Balkans,

especially with Yugoslavia, because such cooperation would have prevented securing its northern border. Yugoslavia, through the Macedonians, could have jeopardized Greece’s territorial integrity. To avoid that, the CPG leadership systematically and by all means possible struggled to suppress the Macedonian national liberation movement in Greece because, as I said, it could have jeopardized the Greek position and the northern Greek border.

As is well-known, ELAS was not created by the Siantos CPG leadership, but came about as a result of the Fascist occupation and the need of the people to protect themselves from being pillaged and terrorized. But, no sooner had these resistance groups begun to grow than Siantos’s CPG leadership and the English quickly stepped in to put them under their control. In the meantime Siantos made sure that the Greek government in exile was recognized as the legitimate government of Greece and paved the way for it, along with its fascist military units and its masters, the English, to freely return to Athens after Greece was liberated by ELAS. Siantos made sure that ELAS would not block the English and their armed forces from marching in the streets of Athens and all over Greece. And, as it turned out, after the Germans left Greece, ELAS became dispensable. Because ELAS was a people’s army, its very existence posed danger to the “national government”. The provoked clash in Athens was staged to prove that ELAS was indeed dangerous and needed to be disarmed and dissolved. Siantos made sure that much was accomplished.

This is exactly what happened. No CPG blunders… No CPG mistakes… Only calculated betrayals…

Zahariadis’s CPG leadeship and its politics

Three characteristic cases

a) According to Peiov, four and a half months after the Varkiza Agreement was signed, the CPG Central Committee Twelfth Plenum concluded the following:

“Greece is the only country in Europe from the camp of the victors where fascists, collaborators of the occupier, quislings and traitors

are, once again, suppressing democracy. The resistance movement has found itself under fierce persecution. Hundreds of people have already been killed and the killings continue. Tens of thousands are in jail. Hundreds of thousands have been exiled. This is the hallmark of political adventurism which drives the country and has turned it into a disaster...” (Ibid. p. 33.)

During the same Plenum Zahariadis said:

“The reactionaries and those on the political right who follow, support and tolerate them, after taking solid positions with foreign aid, after the December events, have taken the following line:

- They bend the people’s will and force them to leave their homes by applying wild terror, which surpasses every precedent in the history of our country.

- They employ defamatory campaigns and unheard of falsifications to isolate the CPG, the popular avant-garde of the people, in an effort to smear the Party with accusations calling its leaders “killers”, “traitors”, “sold people” in order to isolate and destroy it.

- They employ chauvinistic and pathetic tactics to distract the people from their internal problems of their daily life by putting the blame outside so that they can lead an anti-people’s economic policy, imposing the full weight of the situation on the people and increasing their misery tenfold...” (Ibid. p. 37.)

Peiov wrote:

“The CPG leadership’s fatal mistake was based on the fact that, once it concluded that a ruthless and devastating war was being waged against the democratic forces in the country, not politically but primarily by military means, and knowing that the political right wanted to get rid of the democratic organizations and progressives throughout the country (by a unilateral civil war), the CPG continued to oppose this move by political means... (In other words the CPG was playing politics while a military war was waged against it.) The CPG membership was deceived by illusions that success could be achieved via a political struggle and an armed

struggle was unnecessary and even condemned. The CPG membership was led to believe that an armed struggle was the desire of the “class enemy” and was being provoked by “class provocateurs”, and so on. (Ibid. p. 37.) According to Peiov, the CPG “was supposed to revise its tactics of expectations” at the request of a “coalition government” and “free elections”. In the post Varkiza period however, in the then constellation and based on the attitude of the forces in Greece, it was clear that the conditions for “peaceful development”, “free elections” and a “coalition government” were excluded. (Ibid. p. 49.)

And that’s true. Yet the CPG leadership, headed by Zahariadis, continued to struggle with political means, proposing and demanding compromises and cooperation, a “coalition government” and “free elections”. In other words, the CPG was making empty demands that were not part of any agreement.

This, in effect, was “the fatal error” that Peiov was talking about…

b) With the terrorist orgy perpetrated by the political right against the democratic people, the civil war was slowly moving into a new phase: it began to turn from a one-sided war to a mutual one. This widened and deepened the economic chaos in the country. The bourgeois governments were falling one after the other, and the English, by changing governments and individuals, were trying to give the public new hope that the crisis would soon be over.

For its part, Zahariadis’s CPG leadership consistently and stubbornly demanded a “equitable democratic deal” with the English for a peaceful settlement of the Greek question, proposing the formation of a “coalition government” and “free elections”. Peiov rightly pointed out that Zahariadis used consistently intensified “armed resistance”, only as a “means of pressure”. The English, on their own terms, chose the liberals, headed by Temistokles Sofoulis, to take power. And so Zahariadis bravely fell into a trap: The CPG Central Committee Politburo supported Sofoulis. Regarding this, Peiov wrote: “The whole democratic world, both citizens and those who are in the armed forces, now have a supreme national debt by all means possible to prevent a coup by the Monarcho-fascist right, by listening to and following Sofoulis’s directives…” (Ibid. p. 52.)

Unfortunately it was Sofoulis who led the way for the political right to carry out the “election coup” and falsify the March 31, 1946 elections. And as Peiov rightly said: “To legalize the lawlessness and pave the way for the restoration of the monarchy and to re-strengthen the counterrevolution in Greece.” (Ibid. p. 53.) In this way, it has been once again shown that when bourgeois society is in crisis, when decisive measures need to be taken, and when class interests are at stake, the liberal bourgeoisie abandon “liberalism” and sincerely defend the bourgeois class and its interests.

“The CPG leadership seems to have forgotten this truth…” wrote Peiov.

c) Peiov wrote: “With Napoleon Zervas becoming Minister of Public Security in March 1947, and with the introduction of the massive harsh terror, all CPG and EAM organizations ceased to act openly (went underground). The armed struggle and the partisan units, as an objective, had the need to constantly grow: new fighters were coming from the ranks of the democratic organizations... In particular, the movement was gaining momentum after April 1947, after the royal general staff issued an order for the withdrawal of the royal army and gendarmerie from the field to the cities.” (Ibid. p. 66-67.)

As is well-known, DAG’s strong upsurge in the armed uprising during this period worsened the crisis in the bourgeois camp. In August 1947, under civil war conditions Greece was left without a government for almost two weeks. The English could not find a suitable person who could form a new government. Quite correctly, Peiov wrote: “There were no defensive objects (not yet built) in the cities where the royal army had withdrawn, so the morale in its ranks was very low, while the morale among the DAG fighters was high. However, DAG did not take advantage of the favourable conditions created during this period to decisively bolster the revolution.” (Ibid. p. 67.) Zahariadis’s CPG leadership and DAG did not use even the most favourable conditions, to take the offensive or conduct a broader mobilization outside of the cities or even in the cities, to create a large military force capable of restoring peace in the country and allowing the democratic movement to develop. The

CPG allowed this critical and decisive moment to pass it by, which gave its opponent the necessary time to gain strength and overcome the crisis. And by not bolstering its own forces, the CPG not only lost its opportunity to take power, but also never became a danger for its opponent. So, the question here is “why didn’t the CPG bolster its own forces while it had the chance and why did it leave the question of DAG reserves unsettled…?”

According to Peiov: Zahariadis and the CPG leadership were using the armed struggle for posturing purposes only:

- The armed uprising was still seen as a means not for a decisive victory over the enemy, but as a means to compel the enemy to compromise.

- As the centre of gravity shifted to the armed struggle, the CPG and EAM leaderships still existed legally. With that the revolutionary forces were divided: The leadership was not united in its position to demand concessions for the needs of the revolution.

- Because of this, the line regarding the direction of the struggle that needed to be taken was unclear. It was unclear for the leadership, for the masses and for the armed rebels.

- The spirit and tactics of ELAS were used, to a great extent, in order to save DAG’s forces…” (Ibid. p. 67-68.)

Even though all of this is true, it does not explain why Zahariadis preferred compromise and cooperation, and accordingly used DAG as a means of extricating this compromise instead of executing a decisive victory over its opponent - the English and the bourgeois government. When the opponent collapsed from the severe crisis exacted by the people’s resistance, instead of ending the crisis with a general offensive, Zahariadis continued to ask for an “equitable democratic agreement” with the English for a democratic settlement of the Greek question, waiting and expecting a compromise and operating legally.

About this Peiov wrote: “We don’t know what the CPG and DAG leaders thought then, but the fact is that the most favourable

conditions for starting an offensive were omitted... so the Monarcho-fascist regime could survive this, perhaps the most severe crisis in the civil war…”

However, the reason for Zahariadis holding out, as outlined in the three cases (a,b,c) mentioned earlier, and to the end of his leadership leading the CPG and the people’s revolution, lies in the fact that he was absolutely consistent with himself, that is, with his well-developed familial politics of the “Greek Axis” adopted at the Twelfth Plenum, and established at the CPG Seventh Congress. The starting points, i.e. the theses on the basis of which this was built, as well as the perfectly clear final goal of this policy and all the moves the Zahariadis CPG leadership made then, were quite clear. It is true and everyone knows that in all three cases, Zahariadis did the things he wanted to accomplish. It is simply incredible that Peiov did not see these actions as elements of a single policy, did not see their inner connection and sense… but instead he speaks of a “fatal mistake” in the first case, that the CPG “forgot the experience and role of the liberals” in the social crises, and that “we do not know what the CPG leaders thought...” as was in the third case.

The attitude of the Zahariadis CPG leadership towards the Macedonian national liberation movement (NOF) can be fully understood and properly evaluated only within the framework of Zahariadis’s “Greek Axis” politics. This is where that attitude emerged even though it was only briefly considered by Peiov, which was a serious omission on his part...

About the politics of the “Greek Axis”

It is well-known that during the Twelfth Plenum, held in June 1945, when the new CPG leadership, with Zahariadis at the helm, replaced Siantos and his CPG leadership, the CPG outlined its core foreign policy for the post-Varkiza period:

“In the foreign policy field... the CPG resolutely opposes any territorial claims from any side against Greece. The preservation of the country’s territorial integrity... is the primary task of every Greek patriot... The establishment of a fairly close allied friendly relationship with England and Soviet Russia... should serve as the

basis for a Greek democratic foreign policy... The Plenum proclaims: With the friendly support of our two great friends -England and Russia, our peaceful development depends on the brotherly accord and democratic cooperation with the northern Balkan democracies...” (“CPG from 1931-1952”, CPG Central Committee edition, p. 110-111.)

The CPG adopted this foreign policy based on Zahariadis’s report in which, among other things, he said: “A realistic foreign policy... should move between two basic poles: the European-Balkan pole with Russia as the centre, and the Mediterranean pole with England as the centre. A correct foreign policy is that which would constitute a ‘Greek axis’ that would bind these two poles in a way that would best serve Greek interests...” (CPG Central Committee Twelfth Plenum Resolution abstract and final report and speech given by Nikos Zahariadis, “Rigas”, 1945, p. 21.)

A few months later, in October 1945, under Zahariadis’s leadership, the same CPG Congress voted in favour of the “Greek axis”.

So, for a peaceful development of the country, through a brotherly accord and democratic cooperation with the northern neighbours, in addition to being supported by the USSR, the CPG made sure that the friendly presence and support of England was included because it was deemed very necessary. Like the Soviet Union, England was also called “a great friend” of Greece. And preserving Greece’s territorial integrity was proclaimed as the primary task of the CPG...

In time, the Bulgarian fascist occupation of Eastern Macedonia forced the Siantos CPG leadership to change its primary task. Instead of carrying out an internal socialist revolution in favour of the working people, Siantos’s primary task changed to carrying out a “national struggle” in “national unity with the bourgeoisie” for “maintaining Greece’s integrity and strategically securing Greece’s borders” at the expense of its northern neighbours, while struggling against the Macedonian national liberation movement developing inside the Greek (occupied) part of Macedonia. With the borders secured and the denouncing of closer co-operation with the Balkan peoples’ revolutions, especially with that of the Yugoslav peoples, the Siantos CPG leadership openly fought against the Macedonian

people from the Greek (occupied) part of Macedonia by firmly turning to the Mediterranean, i.e. to England. (According to Zahariadis’ own expression.)

Where this led to is very well-known.

The question is, what drove Zahariadis’s CPG leadership to again accept the “preservation of the Greek territorial integrity” as the primary task in the struggle, only four and a half months after the Varkiza Agreement was signed, and thus turning back to the Mediterranean pole with England and proclaiming that England’s friendly presence in Greece and its support were an indispensable factor in securing the country’s “peaceful development”?

The English were the primary reason why ELAS was disarmed and disbanded, and the resistance movement disabled. The English were the ones who financed the terrorist orgy of the plutocratic neo-fascists (unilateral civil war) who terrorized the democratic forces, and with a publicly open goal: To destroy the democratic people’s rights and freedoms. At the same time the CPG was very eager to proclaim England as Greece’s “great friend”, whose friendly presence and support would ensure a peaceful development in the country... This, in fact, looks unclear indeed. But only at first glance. Bearing in mind that, 19 months before this CPG foreign policy was established, the Second Session of AVNOJ, convened on November 29, 1943, established the People’s Republic of Macedonia as a federal state in the Yugoslav federation. Strongly influenced by this event the Macedonian people in the Greek (occupied) part of Macedonia began to quickly develop a huge revolutionary force with NOF at its helm. So, it is not difficult to see why the CPG reacted to these developments the way it did. At the time the CPG was already hostile towards NOF and naturally this hostility only escalated as a direct response to the events taking place in the People’s Republic of Macedonia as well as the events taking place at home in the northern part Greece.

This was not denied by the CPG leadership.

Zahariadis’s CPG leadership demanded England’s “friendly presence and support” because, as Zahariadis himself said at the

Twelfth Plenum, “it is necessary for Greece to secure its positions and borders in the north...” (“Forty years of CPG struggle”, 1918-1958, CPG Central Committee edition, p. 645.)

As the CPG Central Committee Politburo confirmed at its meeting on September 12, 1951 (in fact, this was confirmed countless times in party publications of the time), the CPG was afraid that, with help from NOF, “Tito was going to join Aegean (Greek occupied) Macedonia to Yugoslavia...” (“CPG from 1931-1952”, CPG Central Committee edition, p. 271.)

As for England…? England too had many reasons to be interested in how the disputed issues between Greece and its northern neighbours would be resolved. It was not just a singular issue for England of whether or not, the “Slavs” would reach the Mediterranean Sea through the Aegean Sea, or, as Zahariadis put it during the CPG Central Committee Twelfth Plenum, “the road that connects England with the Suez Mosul Petroleum, with India, and still further with China and the Pacific... With one of the most strategically sensitive and significant points… one of the most vital traffic arteries of the British Empire... A pillar of its world building...”

That is why Zahariadis and his leadership feared NOF and Tito, and had no confidence in the USSR. That is why Zahariadis and his leadership counted on English support as a sure way of securing the Greek state’s position and borders to the north. The policy of an “equitable deal”, understanding and co-operation with England (in the presence of CPG political supremacy over all bourgeois political parties) in itself seemed to have a basis and looked like a realistic policy. According to Zahariadis, this kind of policy “was before and now feasible...”

(See: “Book on the work of the Twelfth Plenum” edition, “Rigas”, p. 21.)

It is true that the terrorist orgy committed by the “criminally plutocratic neo-fascists” pushed the Zahariadis CPG leadership to say the following during the CPG Central Committee at the Second Plenum, held in February 1946:

“EAM should urgently take all organizational and technical measures to enable our people to reject the murderous terror and to frustrate the fascist plans of its exploiters... The state of a unilateral civil war conducted by plutocratic neo-fascists against the people must not be tolerated, and we should decisively respond to our enemies with the same fierce means, until we achieve our victory...” (“The CPG from 1931 to 1952 “, pp. 146-147.)

This, however, was done “without stopping EAM from proposing an equitable democratic agreement with England... but not by begging, because it was not in accordance with our national dignity...” (Ibid. p. 146.)

So, even after the CPG leadership armed the resistance movement, it did not cease to seek understanding and cooperation with England, and in this respect, as proof of its sincerity, was prepared to work with its enemy in Greece - the bourgeois political parties.

Peiov correctly observed: “The CPG’s position was to ‘strengthen the armed struggle’ but without the will to force a government take down and to take power, but to serve as a means of pressure, to force the government to withdraw its terror tactics and implement a peaceful parliamentary solution…” (Ibid. page 61.)

But Peiov was wrong when he claimed that “this attitude of the CPG leadership was in force until October 1947, when the CPG Central Committee Third Plenum was held and a clear course for the armed uprising was taken as follows: The American intervention in Greece closed the door for an agreement between the two opposing sides, as a result the Party was faced with the question of raising the people in an armed struggle…” (Ibid. p. 60-61.)

It is true what Peiov said, that the goal at the plenum was to: “Liberate the country and ensure its independence and democratic development.” An immediate task for that was to: “Create a greater free territory and to form a democratic government.” For that purpose, “the democratic army mobilized more people and grew in numbers, raised their morale, developed a general plan of attack, carried out constant offensive tactics, and expanded and increased its attacks…” (Ibid. p. 61.)

But, it is not true that Zahariadis’s CPG leadership abandoned the “Greek Axis” policy towards England… “Friendly support” from England was still necessary to successfully suppress all potential dangers to Greece’s position and northern borders (it was so at least in Zahariadis’s mind). Therefore Zahariadis did not declare war on the “foreign occupiers,” but continued to demand understanding and cooperation from them. The military measures provided for by the above-mentioned decision were intended to serve only as a means of exerting pressure to reach “an equitable settlement” and compromise. In fact, the very decision made at the Third Plenum, without any hesitation, was to make the point that: “The primary duty of every Greek patriot was to put all his forces to work for DAG and to believe that the decisive strength of the people and DAG would bring victory in their struggle against the foreign occupiers and their domestic servants. The more this pressure was applied the more it was surely possible to force them to agree on a democratic solution to the Greek question as proposed by EAM...” (See “The CPG from 1931 to 1952”, p. 167.)

The CPG’s calm and permissive policy and its continual desire to gain an “equitable deal” with England, as noted by the wider CPG Central Committee Sixth Plenum, held in March 1956, “objectively justified England’s interference in Greece’s internal affairs which weakened the Greek people’s resistance against the English occupiers. By doing this the CPG was in effect “spreading hesitation and indecision among its Party organizations all over the country, and especially in the cities”. During the Third Plenum the CPG concluded: “The work of the Communists and the rise of the people’s struggle in the cities are lagging behind... The imperative task of the Communists, without any delay, is to mobilize all forces and together with all the democratic people, overcome this lag…” (“CPG from 1931-1952”, p. 167.) Of course, the Third Plenum: “Decisively condemned all the hesitations and fluctuations which certain Communists had experienced in terms of continuing the implementation of the popular revolution...” (Ibid. p. 167.) But, as I said before, the leadership itself never did call for a war against the foreign occupiers, but continued to seek an “equitable deal”, and therefore continued to use DAG’s armed struggle, not to liquidate the foreign interventionists, but to force an agreement with these

foreigners. It is therefore not surprising that during the CPG Central Committee Fourth Plenum, held in July 1948, the CPG again stated: “The main fundamental weakness of the CPG... is that it failed to break the opportunistic permissiveness and fluctuation within the party organizations and, above all, in the cities...” (“CPG from 1931 to 1952”, p. 172.)