IV. ABOUT THE BOOK “EGEISKI BURI” (AEGEAN STORMS) - Part 01

IV. ABOUT THE BOOK “EGEISKI BURI” (AEGEAN STORMS) BY VANGEL AIANOVSKI -OCHE

(Critical Remarks)

1. A joyous event

In the fall of 1975, Vangel Aianovski’s book “Aegean Storms” was published by the Institute of National History in Skopje. The book was about the Aegean (Greek occupied) Macedonian people’s participation in the national liberation war. In any case, the appearance of the book was a joyous event. The book came out six to seven decades after the war started and, above all, it was about the tens of thousands of our people who lost their lives and became separated from their friends and loved ones. It was about the young Macedonian people who wasted their youth fighting in a disastrous war and not to mention the tens of thousands of Macedonians who lost their homes and properties.

Of course, every new book about our people’s struggle in that war is an addition to our accumulated knowledge. And it must be said that, so many years later, our knowledge of that war is still inadequately poor at best...

2. Good reviews

According to its reviews, the most valuable thing about Aianovski’s book was its stunningly rich material, its ability to capture many things that had to do with the many activities in our ranks, and even with those in the enemy camp. So, like I said, its publishing was a joyous event. So, with joy in my heart, I began to read it.

According to Aianovski, the CPG disbanded the Macedonian anti-fascist organization (MAO) and closed down its organ, the Macedonian newspaper “Tsrvena Zvezda” (Red Star) in October 1943. It then reorganized Voden District and appointed Dzhodzho Urdov as CPG District Committee organizational secretary for the city Voden, while Vangel Aianovski, Risto Kordalov, etc., followed by the names of about fifty other activists and communists, both men and women, were given various party and other functions in the resistance movement... (“Aegean Storms”, p. 99.)

The above appointments were made for the city Voden. But, according to Aianovski, there were also many Macedonian activists and communists who worked in Voden Region outside of the city, such as Trifun Shindev and Risto Bukovalov from Teovo, Lena Dumova and Dimitar Limbov from Vladovo, Tomo Mihailov from Gugovo... followed by a long list of people’s names and villages, which ended with Risto and Lazo Camchev from Subotsko… (Ibid. p. 100.)

Aianovski invested a great deal of effort compiling these lists, yet, at the same time, neglected to mention other and more important activities… For example he failed to mention that a few months later, in the summer of 1944, activists Georgi Atanasovski-Blazhe and Pavle Rakovski-Gotse, both members of the CPG regional committee for the Macedonian Tresino and Meglen Regions, on their own initiative and, of course following a decision made by the regional committee, conducted mobilization activities in the surrounding Macedonian villages and created the ELAS Macedonian Voden battalion. Ianovski himself was mobilized in that battalion yet he failed to provide any details. The very creation of this first purely Macedonian battalion composed of Macedonian volunteers consisting of six armed rebel units with about 750 fighters had and will have a great historical and political significance which appears to be the most significant revolutionary action ever taken in Voden Region. Yet, here we have Aianovski scarcely saying anything about it…

As for the involvement of the Macedonian youth in the struggle in Voden Region, Aianovski wrote:

Among the Macedonian youth who took action in the anti-fascist struggle, mentioned by Aianovski, included were Tashko Hadzhiianov, Lambro Urdov, Georgi Tsironkov... and about twenty other names of young people from the city Voden. These were followed by the names of young Macedonians from Voden Region including Mirka Ginova from the village Rosilovo, Panaiot Bozhinov and Vani Indinakov from the village Mesimer and so on. Other young people mentioned included Todor Simovski-Laki from the village Izvor, who worked in Voden Region as EPON organizational secretary... (Ibid. p. 101.)

Naturally, this was a good overview that covered the Macedonian activists and bearers of the Macedonian anti-fascist liberation movement at the end of 1943...

3. The reactionaries and NOF

Regarding the capitulatory Varkiza agreement, made between the CPG-EAM on one side and the Plastiras Greek government on the other, on February 12, 1945, Aianovski wrote: An English army unit composed of 364 soldiers, among whom were many blacks, carrying the symbols “ES-E”, arrived in Voden on March 4, 1945. Among other things, the unit had 13 tanks and 24 transport trucks. The soldiers were housed in the barracks of the former Greek army Thirteenth Regiment, located in the western part of the city... A gendarmerie force of about 100 people was pulled out of Solun to join the English force. Leading the gendarmes was Ioannis Bafas, Dictator Metaxas’s former personal bodyguard... As per their agreement, various pro-fascist elements including collaborators of the occupier, who had earlier fled and hid in the south in Greece, began to return to Voden. Included among them was Hristos Ioanou, Greek Army Colonel and PAO leader, Athanasios Pegios, a Monarcho-fascist MP, etc. The list contained the names of several merchants, Monarchists, a major, a lawyer, a colonel and so on...

Soon after that, a number of Monarcho-fascist organizations were formed in Voden, such as EPEN, VEN and others, and were joined by the worst reactionaries and occupier collaborators including the likes of Hristos Vazdaris, Ioanis Prichimlis, etc. (Ibid. p. 204.)

He did a good job with the reporting. The political committee’s decision to send him to Voden in December 1944 to report on what was happening on the ground was quite correct. Aianovski was a truly pedant worker. It was not surprising that his book was packed with so much detail.

But, despite the strong opposition from the reactionaries in Voden and Voden Region, NOF was still struggling successfully. Aianovski wrote:

A number of NOF prisoners were helped by members of NOF to escape from a Greek prison during the night of November 3, 1945. The task to organize and carry out the escape was entrusted to Atanas Papa-Atanasov, who at the time was in prison. With help from Vangel Goglev, a hole was punched through the prison wall through which all fifteen NOF members escaped. They were later transferred to Kaimakchalan, where they joined a NOF Partisan init... (Ibid. p. 181.)

This unit was composed mainly of fighters from the former ELAS Macedonian Voden Battalion which, as is well-known, was part of the Aegean Brigade and was disbanded later when the brigade was disbanded. Aianovski wrote:

The NOF unit was composed of the following comrades: Risto Kordalov, commander of the squad, his deputy Tushi Keramitchiev, and unit commissar Risto Shorev. Active fighters in the unit were: Aleko Tsrvenkov, Nushi Kolkotronov, Geli Kordalov, Goni Lisichkov... etc., a total of twenty-two, all from the city Voden. The remaining, up to seventy-one, were from the villages Baovo, Strupino, Kronzlevo, etc., followed by the names of several villages in Voden Region.

Every fighter, to the last one, was meticulously cited by name, surname, and village of origin. And when the unit grew into a battalion, Aianovski was pedant with the same kind of detail. Aianovski wrote:

We named the battalion “Macedonian battalion”. It consisted of complete units. The battalion’s leadership consisted of Risto Kordalov, Tushi Keramitchiev and Risto Shorev. The unit commanders were Atanas Papa-Atanasov, Vangel Goglev and Kolio Baovcheto (Kolio Proshev). Included among the active fighters were Aleko Tsrvenkov, Goni Lisichkov, and so on, a total of twenty-nine from the city Voden. The rest, up to 123 fighters, were also listed by name, surname and village of origin. On top of that Aianovski added that this list was not complete, there were probably “many who were not mentioned” because “part of these comrades were already in the Battalion at the time of its formation (i.e. when Aianovski wrote his report), and part of them joined later, which made it difficult for him to fully cover the entire battalion’s formation... (Ibid. p, 188.)

Of course, this was a good overview for the 1945 Macedonian fighting force as well as for the reactionaries and the Macedonian People’s Democratic Liberation Movement in Voden and Voden Region...

4. Significant meaning

Milan Vuiaklia, in his lexicon of foreign words and expressions said that the words pedant, pedantity, pedantine (French: pedant, Italian: pedante) refer to people who exaggerate with their accuracy, who turn unimportant and insignificant things into significant ones of great importance.

Naturally everyone knew that all these people, be they Geli, Goni, Nushi, Tushi, Tomo, Tsano... were our people from Voden, Sobotsko, Sarakinovo, Ostrovo Regions, and so on, who had joined the struggle to fight. Apparently by citing all these details such as name, surname and village, Aianovski considered it to be a mark of something important. Otherwise, why do it? It looked like he exaggerated a bit so I decided to look over his lists.

I became tired after looking over the first thirty pages and gave up. Aianovski had marked the names of the same people fifteen times for various reasons.

Well, however, one cannot deny that these details have some sort of meaning and weight.

5. Autobiography

Everyone who knew Aianovski knew that he did not write the book himself. The material was his but it was written by an intellectual who followed his instructions and wishes.

The impressions however were Aianovski’s because no one else would have presented them the way that they were not.

Aianovski also took charge in the manner in which events were described. He exercised his unlimited freedom to manipulate events to fit his agenda and that’s how Aianovski compiled his beautiful autobiography; by throwing mud on others…

With help from documents of that time and by looking at events in which I directly participated, I will try to bring light to the weak side of Aianovski’s interesting work...

6. Irresponsible manipulation of events

All throughout 1942 and 1943 I worked undercover in Voden, Voden Region as well as in the Meglen and Ostrovo Regions near the Voden Region borders. All that time this region was completely isolated and no information or news, not even from the Party, EAM, EPON, ELAS reserve, etc., was reaching us and neither was any information filtering outwards in any of the party and other newspapers. In other words information-wise MAO did not exist beyond the confines of Voden Region. The Greek leaders strictly confined it to Voden and soon after it was formed they decided to dissolve it. Aianovski wrote:

It was incomprehensible to the Germans how the Bulgarian court, through its emissaries the likes of Kalchev, was able to attract part of the Macedonian population in Kostur Region and throw it to fight against ELAS, and that this could not be achieved in the Macedonian population in Voden Region. In Kostur Region, in March 1943, for example, a number of villages were already armed

and operating under the directives of Italian lieutenant Raval and Bulgarian lieutenant Kalchev... (Ibid. p. 123.)

Of course, this comparison, which casts a shadow over the work of the Macedonians communists in Kostur Region, is completely wrong and unacceptable. The truth however is different: In September-October 1944, the Germans had left Greece. The railway and the road Solun-Voden-Bitola were important arteries for their withdrawal. In order to protect them while they were leaving, as early as May-June 1944, they formed and armed the “Ohrana” organization in Voden and then tried to arm the surrounding Macedonian villages, as a protection zone for the Voden junction and the Muarem pass, a very dangerous section on those roads. Indeed the Germans had great difficulties during that time and it was quite normal. At the same time however, the Macedonian communists in Kostur Region had already disarmed the counter-band units which voluntarily surrendered their arms. In short, Germans affairs were starting to go downhill in Kostur Region. However, and as Aianovski has pointed out, the Germans did succeed in arming several villages which dominated the military aspect over the Voden: iavoreni, Oshliani, Gugovo, Nisia, Teovo railway and road lines...

Why didn’t the Germans try to do this before?

Well, people do things if and when they are needed...

And as we said earlier, the Greek leaders made sure that the existence of MAO was limited to Voden, and was not allowed to develop any serious activities. Simply put, they made sure it remained a fictitious organization (as they did with IMRO (United) and as they had tried to do with SNOF in the past). In any case, they soon dissolved it. The newspapers “Red Star”, an organ of MAO, and “Bulletin” managed to come out several times in small circulations before they too were abolished...

How freely Aianovski manipulated events can be seen from this: As a former secretary of MAO, he did not fail to point out that: “It was the first Macedonian organization in Aegean Macedonia that called for a national liberation struggle...” (Ibid. p. 94.)

While before that, on page 46, he said: “In October 1932, EMEO (IMRO (United)) developed extremely lively activities in Voden Region. People were constantly dispersing revolutionary content calling on the Macedonian people to rise up and fight for the realization of their national rights, to unite and form a single independent Macedonian state…”

But he was wrong again. Namely, the founding conference for the establishment of IMRO (United) was convened in Voden in March 1934, immediately after the CPG had its Fifth CPG congress. (See: History of the Macedonian people, p, 3 and p. 266.)

Aianovski wrote: The “Red Star” was the first newspaper written in the (Macedonian) mother tongue... (“Aegean Storms”, p. 94), with Greek letters, which also does not correspond to the truth. Namely, in its time, much earlier, in the early thirties, from time to time “Rizospasis” printed correspondence material from Macedonia in the Macedonian language. Additionally, in 1930, the Lerin Party Organization, as an inserted issue (until the seventh issue), printed the Macedonian daily “Agricultural Flag”, while in Nestrom the newspaper “Nestorion”, a kind of amateur publication, published Macedonian folk songs and stories, riddles and other folk art... (See: History of the Macedonian people, book 3, p. 267.)

7. Incorrectness

Aianovski began the second part of his book with the conclusion that: NOF was formed in Voden Region and in other Macedonian regions in Aegean (Greek occupied) Macedonia in October 1946, as a massive political organization with strongly armed partisan units and became the bearer and leader of the Macedonian people’s entire political and military activities in the fight against the Monarcho-fascists. It was under these circumstances that the CPG leadership, faced by the pressure of reality, was forced not only to recognize NOF, but to actively cooperate with it... (Ibid. p. 231.)

Immediately after that Aianovski wrote:

However, Dzhodzho Urdov and Pavle Rakovski arrived on the scene... with news of a so-called agreement between NOF and the CPG, a very unclear and discretely reached agreement on cooperation and joint action between NOF and the CPG but under CPG and DAG directives.... Without consulting the Voden Region NOF District Committee, they immediately started negotiating with the CPG partisan leadership regarding the implementation of this agreement... The negotiations, however, failed because the CPG leadership in that district did not have any directives from its Centre, and Urdov and Rakovski were unable to explain and convey anything more specific about the details of the agreement, because they themselves were not directed to do this. Simply put, they were only tasked to bring the NOF partisan units to the CPG-DAG units... (Ibid. p. 232.)

And here Aianovski underlined:

As mentioned above, NOF in Voden Region (under Vangel Aianovski-Oche’s leadership) had established good cooperation with the CPG. Our partisan units closely worked with the CPG partisan units, and the headquarters of these units conducted all the actions and operations with previous consultations and coordinated interaction, so that the movement, in terms of our cooperation, developed without any difficulty... (Ibid. p. 232.)

However, all this was destroyed:

“When Dzhodzho Urdov and Pavle Rakovski proposed to the CPG leaders that the NOF partisan units join the CPG units, they gladly accepted and immediately implemented the proposal. But despite the fact that the NOF units were much larger, the merger was carried out in such a way that the NOF units were broken up and attached to the CPG units. Facing responses from the NOF military cadres, who found themselves oppressed by the CPG fighters, Urdov and Rakovski then ordered the NOF military leaders to separate themselves from the CPG units and re-create their own units…”

Aianovski then concluded:

“This Urdov and Rakovski move caused a great disturbance and many compromises on both NOF and the CPG…” (Ibid. p. 232.)

There should be some documentation about what Aianovski said about this insolent and irresponsible act in the CPG files (Κεντρικη καθοδηγηση), or in the NOF central leadership files. Unfortunately, this and the emphasis on... Urdov and Rakovski’s clumsiness, which Aianovski described, does not correspond to the truth. Things were somewhat different:

a) “After the last negotiations and cooperation I had with Comrade Zahariadis and with the other responsible CPG comrades, a common position on which the cooperation and merging with the CPG would be built, was determined... Zahariadis completely agreed to keep the Macedonian groups entirely separated... Only the headquarters in each area was to be combined...”

This was documented in one original document of that time, dated September 13, 1946. Paskal Mitrevski, who at the time was at the helm of the NOF central leadership, wrote the document. (See: “Aegean Macedonia at the National Liberation War”, volume 3, document number 171, p. 380.)

b) “...We found ourselves with Comrade Panos from the Macedonian Bureau (CPG). We created a headquarters for Paiak-Kaimakchalan with 6 members led by Stathis, consisting of three Macedonians and three Greeks. Our comrades were Kordalov, Kosta Gechev, and Kosta Uchitelot (the teacher)...

We also created a Party Commission at Paiak-Kaimakchalan consisting of seven people. Only two were Macedonians. They were Tasho Aianov and Kosta Getsev. If we had another person we would have appointed him or her as well...

We had three units at the two mountains with an equally shared command. Each unit was to have Macedonian groups and one or two Greek groups. We formed a mixed group of Macedonians and Greeks in Kaimakchalan...”

The above information was obtained from another source document from that time. It was included in a report written by Dzhodzho Urdov and Pavle Rakovski, dated August 31, 1946, addressed to Paskal Mitrevski. (See: “Aegean Macedonia in the national liberation war”, Vol. 3, Doc 164, p. 366.)

Mitrevski confirmed receipt of the above report when he wrote: “The four comrades from the main leadership are located at four different points. Comrade Dzhodzho is located at Kaimakchalan, Comrade Pavle Rakovski is located at Paik, Comrade Keramitchiev is located at Vicho and Comrade Mina is located at Gramos, Epirus. I received reports from all four….” (Ibid. p. 378.)

c) Published under number 168, on p. 372-375 in the collection “Aegean Macedonia in the national liberation war”, volume 3, was a letter from Pavle Rakovski to Paskal Mitrevski, informing him that CPG officials do not respect the principles under which the Macedonian and Greek Partisan units were united in Kaimakchalan and Paiak Mountains. Among other things the report said:

“...At Kaimakchalan, Panos... from the CPG Macedonian Bureau, while writing a report said that - seeing the correct ideological-psychological position of the Macedonian masses and acting dialectically... let us see what we can do... that would best help the general struggle. And we did the thing about which we already wrote you. It is understandable, this act was in line with the CPG’s “attitude”, as it was presented by Comrade Panos regarding the problems of arranging co-operation and the formation of groups. After that, the three of us came to Paiak Mountain to arrange things there too. We were surprised to find out that the CPG here wanted to break up the Macedonian units so that they could enter the Greek units... Considering the attitude of the Party as it had been put forward to you, this was unacceptable. We did not recognize that there was a question about the dissolution of the Macedonian units. But Panos insisted. He was pressuring us as much as he could, speaking solely about the discipline of the Party and its “responsibilities”. Finally, he agreed to do what we did in Kaimakchalan... We will inform you of what we did another day, as soon as our cadres arrive and join us at our office. There was another surprise the next day. In his attempt to inform them,

Comrade Panos told our cadres to disperse our units completely... We did not interrupt him to express our disagreement while he spoke. When he finished we took him aside and told him: This is not what we agreed to yesterday... He got upset and in a high tone of voice yelled out “unacceptable”. I noticed in particular the tone of voice with which he spoke to us... He sounded like a victor speaking to the vanquished or a master speaking to his servants! He did not show even a drop of respect for us, the same people who a minute ago he had called comrades....

While Dzhodzho looked concerned, I bitterly but courteously said to Panos that being angry was not a sign of strength but of weakness, that he should speak with some courtesy to us and to our secretary who represents all the people, and that this harshness is unnecessary and harmful and does not help our situation...

He did not seem to care and looked like nothing would come of it. But a few hours later he came back and told us that he agreed with what we asked but we could do nothing more...”

Further on in the letter, it was said that, after the appropriate orders were given to both Macedonian and Greek activists, the Greeks left. Panos and Dzhodzho were also preparing to leave. Panos was headed for Karaorman and Dzhodzho for Kaimakchalan. The next day Rakovski found himself at the central dispatch office. Rakovski wrote:

“The next day I found myself at the central dispatch office. The units were also there. I reported to Paskal Mitrevski the moment I found out that Stathis wanted to completely break up our units. I tried hard to explain to him how things led up to this. Mitrevski said: “I don’t know anything about this but when I asked Panos, after you had your quarrel with him, he told me what to do, so I will act according to his instructions. That is how I will act.” I said to him I am sorry but I cannot allow you to do anything more than what we decided with Comrade Panos! He then frantically said: “I am going to do what he instructed me…” I then left. As I was going away he yelled: “I am going to report you for knowingly sabotaging the situation!” The man, of course, was not guilty of anything and acted smartly. Only later I found out that he meant what he said…

especially when he began to call our people traitors, etc. At the end the position remained as it was. We fed them and they gave us all kinds of weapons that they could not use because they were defective. I did what was needed to be done and - quickly...”

The letter Pavle Rakovski wrote to Paskal Mitrevski, described above, was dated September 1, 1946, and sent from Paiak Mountain. This was how things were unfolding in Paiak. Of course, when Dzhodzho arrived in Kaimakchalan and saw that the agreement was not respected by the Greek side, he did not allow the Macedonian units to be dismantled. It doesn’t matter when Aianovski says these events took place, be it in October, the end of August or early September, what matters is that they are mentioned for the record. Unfortunately, as is the case with other events, like those involving the Macedonian activists in Kostur Region, Aianovski publicly belittles these NOF people, especially NOF’s direct leadership, and casts a negative shadow over their work.

8. Falsification

On pages 167 to 170 of his book “Aegean Storms”, Aianovski talked about TOMO’s (Secret Macedonian Liberation Organization) First District Conference which was attended by delegates from the city Voden and from the surrounding villages. According to Aianovski, the Conference was convened on April 28, 1945, and was personally opened by himself (Vangel Aianovski), and was presided over by Petre Popov (who died later) from Dolno Rodovo. Security for the Conference was provided for by a partisan unit. The Conference chairman presented the agenda as follows:

1. TOMO activity report. 2. Change of TOMO’s name to People’s Liberation Front (NOF). 3. Election of a NOF District Board for Voden Region.

For the first point, Aianovski spoke beautifully about the ideological aspects of our struggle, as a continuation of the Ilinden struggle, etc. He also referred to the CPG capitulation with the signing of the Varkiza Agreement, the split that occurred between the Greeks and Macedonians, and so on...

For the second point, Pavle Rakovski, representative of the Macedonians under Greece Political Committee, spoke. He welcomed the delegates and conveyed the Political Committee’s decision to form a single People’s Liberation Front (the text reads: National Liberation Front) in Aegean Macedonia and the need to change the name TOMO to NOF, which was accepted.

For the third point, Risto Kordalov spoke. He presented a proposed list of people for the first NOF District Board. The list was accepted.

These were the main topics discussed at the Voden Region first regional conference as described in Aianovski’s book “Aegean Storms”. In general, things had been set up in such a way as to look like Rakovski was a delegate of the political committee and a guest at this first district conference in Voden Region. Things were also set up so that the conference would appear to be organized, convened and implemented by Aianovski and Kordalov.

This is not how things went however:

First, it is well-known that the Political Committee terminated its fictitious existence in the middle of April 1945. The NOF central leadership was constituted on April 23, 1945, and was led by Paskal Mitrevski. The NOF leadership consisted of Mitrevski, Urdov, Keramitchiev, Koroveshovski and Rakovski. NOF was yet to be created, so everyone was sent to the field to start building NOF’s foundations. Rakovski was in charge and was sent to Voden Region. It was decided to work in the field until May 25, 1945 and after that to return for a new meeting...

Second, it is well-known that before that, from January to mid-April 1945, Rakovski stayed at the base in the village Staravina. On his own time he visited Meglen Region (Karadzhova) several times to recruit fighters from the villages for the ELAS Voden Macedonian battalion. Rakovski wanted to find out for himself the mood of the people and to personally speak with the fighters in the battalion (which he later led to Vardar Macedonia). Even though it was expected, he was surprised at what he discovered. Namely, with all its might, the CPG was trying to hide the fact that the Macedonian people had their own movement, their own struggle, their own

military and their own political sense. On top of that, the CPG was telling the Macedonian people that Dzhodzho and Rakovski were renegades and what they were doing was dangerous. Later, after the battalion left for Yugoslavia, the CPG carried out a defamatory campaign telling the people that:

- Dzhodzho and Rakovski “sold out” the battalion for large amounts of money... They sold out your children! They are filthy traitors…! And so on...

A response was need urgently. We needed to respond to this defamatory propaganda and defend our political character as well as to explain to the people why we had to move the battalion. TOMO was born precisely because of this urgency.

We were urgently in need of a political organization right here where the battalion was born, in order to fight against the CPG’s defamatory and vitriolic propaganda. We needed to stop the attacks against us at the source before they spread to other areas and affected the struggle and the movement elsewhere. If we didn’t do that the propaganda would have expanded and deepened. Without a clear explanation from our side as to why the battalion was moved, the entire outcome would have been seen as a meaningless and dangerous adventure...

As an initiation to forming this new organization (TOMO), Rakovski inducted Dzhodzho as a member of TOMO’s political committee secretariat. No one else knew about it. And with NOF’s founding, Dzhodzho decided to keep silent about TOMO and carry on his work under NOF. Rakovski did the same. Indeed, this is how it was...

Third, sometime in late May 1945, as was previously decided, the NOF central leadership gathered for its next meeting. According to a written report, dated May 27, 1945, Rakovski, among other things, wrote: “We have decided to hold a district conference in June, next month, for the purpose of choosing a district board and to report on our progress...” (See: “Aegean Macedonia in the National Liberation War”, documents about the history of the Macedonian people, volume 2, document number 25, p. 56.)

In the next report, dated June 27, 1945, Rakovski, among other things, wrote: “On June 20, 1945, I called and held an on-site Conference, a few kilometres away from Voden. We did not have the success we were expecting. The invited delegates from Voden and Meglen Pole were absent. They did not make it to the meeting. Those from Voden were blocked, and those from Meglen Pole got their invitations too late because the courier had problems delivering them. However, 28 villages or 125 delegates were present. The groups held their key positions. The Conference went well. It was chaired by a white-haired old man from the Ilinden era. Here is the meeting agenda:

1. The international situation in general. - Hristo Andonovski. (Aianovski does not mention him or his presentation.)

2. Ideological content of our struggle, its leadership, and organizational issues. – Gotse (Rakovski). (Aianovski expropriated a good part of Rakovski’s presentation, as well as his role, and attributed them to himself.)

3. Economic issues. – Gele (Aianovski). (Not a word about this either.)

4. NOF District Board election. (This was done on Rakovski’s recommendation and not on Kordalov’s proposal as indicated by Aianovski. Kardalov at the time was not there.)

5. Miscellaneous.

The next morning everyone left to get back to their jobs, full of faith in the justice of our struggle, etc. (See: “Aegean Macedonia in the Second World War”, volume two, document number 47, page 91.)

Rakovski did not know the activists from the city Voden and always consulted with Dzhodzho about personnel issues relating to them. It was Rakovski who invited Aianovski to attend the conference and, on Dzhodzho’s recommendation, he was appointed first president of the NOF district committee for Voden Region. Dzhodzho made this

suggestion because he figured “it would make it easier for him to work in the field…”

If we are to believe Rakovski’s reports filed at that time, and there is no reason not to believe it, then we can see that there was no district conference held in Voden Region on April 28, 1945, about which Aianovski wrote. Therefore we can conclude that Rakovski never attended such a conference as a delegate and Aianovski made a mistake...

Fourth, among other things, two new bulletins authored by Aianovski were placed in the collection of archival materials “Aegean Macedonia in the National Liberation War” (volume 2), and in the “Macedonian Archives” by editors Risto Kiriazovski and Todor Simovski. One was placed under order number 39 (page 75), and the other under order number 54 (pages 101-104). Both documents have no signature, but by the way they were received we know who sent them. Besides that the handwriting on the manuscripts is recognizable and belongs to Aianovski.

The first manuscript was entitled “Military Informant Bulletin of June 16, 1945”. The second was entitled “Newsletter”. Both were written on June 16, 1945, and were probably sent to various places.

The editors described the first manuscript as “information from Vangel Aianovski-Oche about the military-political situation in Voden Region”. The second, as “Informational bulletin about the organization TOMO and the situation in Voden Region”. In other words these two manuscripts contained documentation that was unverified and arbitrary.

And here is why: Among other things it was written: “Economic bulletin, 16.6.45. In the morning the Napoleon cost 12, and in the afternoon 9,000. Food items continue to be abundant. Goods are not hidden. The people are satisfied. I am sending you a series of newspapers with measures from Varvaresos, Minister of Finance, where you will see the economic situation of the entire country…” (Ibid. p. 102.)

Naturally this was Aianovski’s pedantic handywork written in those reports. TOMO had absolutely no reason to send a “series” of newspapers, with Varvaresos’s measures”, to anyone. Or for Aianovski to write things like this: “...there are good young men among our soldiers, from whom it is expected that many will be connected with our organization TOMO...” (Ibid. p. 103.) Or like this: “The number of Grkomani (Macedonians loyal to the Greek cause) in those villages is very small and efforts are being made to attract them into TOMO...” (Ibid. p. 104.)

However, these quotations generated from Aianovski’s written documents and from other documents of that time, also show something else: They show that Aianovski was a member of TOMO and, more interestingly, that Aianovski then knew nothing about the TOMO District Conferences held on April 28, 1945, when the name TOMO was replaced with the name NOF, as was “later” described by Aianovski in his book “Aegean Storms” with fixed dates and a lot of participant names and the like. The then Aianovski, even on June 16, 1945, wrote about “our organization TOMO”, but knew nothing about NOF. As long as, of course, Rakovski, a few days later would invite him to the June 20, 1945, district conference and appoint him the first president of NOF for Voden Region.

9. Conspiracy

And so it would appear that Aianovski, according to what he wrote in his book “Aegean Storms”, remained silent on the first NOF district conferences, held on June 20, 1945, in which he participated and was elected district president, and invented another, non-existent meeting, which he calls TOMO District Conference, held on April 28, 1945.

But that’s not all. This is just one element of a wider undertaking. Namely, Aianovski somehow, through frequent contacts with Kiriazovski and Simovski, reviewers of “Aegean Storms”, and editors of the above-mentioned extensive collection of archival materials, learned that there is no information as to how and who founded TOMO in Voden Region, so under his own initiative, or someone else suggested to him, to appoint himself founder and leader of TOMO, founded on January 20, 1945.

And he did exactly that...

In his book “Aegean Storms” Aianovski painted a really beautiful picture of TOMO’s activities under his leadership...

It is interesting to note at this point that even the composer - editor of the famous trial edition “Chronology” (published by the National Board of the Union of Fighters from the National Liberation War), has written the same fictional thing: Vangel Aianovski-Oche, on January 20, 1945, formed the political organization TOMO... A district conference of TOMO was convened on April 28, 1945, and so on...

Of course, if the then Aianovski of thirty years ago, who is so pedantic that he had to mention every small thing, founded a political organization under the name TOMO, he would certainly have left at least one written document about this great event. There are no dilemmas here. In the pile of archival material – Aianovski’s documents of that time, there should be such documents; reports, newsletters, meeting minutes… it was a very important event after all. Kiriazovski and Simovski would have found these documents and would have placed them in a comprehensive collection of archival materials and added them to the history of the Macedonian people.

But, Kiriazovski and Simovski, found no such significant documents in Aianovski’s archival material from the first half of 1945, other than the newsletters mentioned earlier…

And so we come to the conclusion that: The events surrounding TOMO and its establishment, as referred to in “Aegean Storms” and “Chronology”, have been redone and readjusted. Clearly, this was purposely done. But this was not the first time. Such a phenomenon has been observed many times over the years in our historiography of the national liberation movement in the Aegean (Greek occupied) part of Macedonia. This is about boosting one’s own contribution to the struggle. It is a fact that some of our people who, of course, were deserving participants of the movement, have become bitter about their own destiny which, by their own or someone else’s doing, for

one reason or another, were unable to fully participate in the movement, and found themselves pushed aside and finally dropped out of the movement. Some of them are now making a systematic effort through books, like “Aegean Storms” and “Chronology” to convince people that they were indeed the “soul of the Macedonian movement”. Unfortunately, by doing this, they are throwing mud on their comrades whose fate (in terms of a kind of natural selection) brought them to the front lines of the movement. There are no stories about their contributions in these books, not even of those who lost their lives for our cause. In fact many of them are even proclaimed “traitors”, as we will see further on in Aianovski’s book “Aegean Storms”... Even Naum Peiov, in his book “Macedonians and the Civil War in Greece” has left many of them out.

10. Throwing mud on others

Aianovski wrote: In Voden Region there were accusations made that the NOF leadership, with the NOF-CPG agreement, betrayed the expectations of the Macedonian people, and that this act was “a second Varkiza for the Macedonian people”... The Voden Region activists pointed out that it was a wrong move which would negatively reflect on the development of both the Macedonian liberation movement and the struggle against the Monarcho-fascists in Greece.” (Ibid. p. 233.)

However, it is a commonly known secret that the treaty was not NOF’s doing, it was a directive that came from above. The NOF leadership was informed after the fact and without discussion. Later, just after the establishment of unity, the Macedonian liberation movement received new forces and spread nationwide. This is how it was and was commonly understood. Aianovski knew this but decided to distort things and throw mud on others...

11. He was that which he was not

After the NOF-CPG agreement was signed, NOF was reorganized and consisted of a narrower leadership. Mitrevski was appointed co-member of the CPG Provincial Bureau. Dzhodzho Urdov was sent to DAG headquarters for Central and Western Macedonia. Young Mincho Fotev was appointed co-member of EPON Bureau for

Macedonia. The NOF Secretariat was reduced to three members, Kermadzhiev, Rakovski, and Vera, with Keramitchiev as the leader. At the same time all NOF district offices were reorganized. All previous presidents, almost without exception (among them Aianovski), were appointed instructors in their districts...

Aianovski however gave a different account about this. He wrote:

The new NOF leadership consisted of Paskal Mitrevski, former leader of NOF and, after the agreement, co-member of the CPG Provincial Committee for Macedonia, Mihail Keramitchiev, NOF political secretary, Vangel Ajanovski-Oche, etc., members of the leadership... (Ibid. p. 234.)

Here, as we can clearly see, Aianovski is making attempts to represent himself as something he was not. In fact it was Rakovski who, half a year later on May 20, 1947, approached the NOF asset, and took the initiative and responsibility to propose that Aianovski be elected as a new member of the NOF’s narrow leadership, which was then accepted.

Aianovski apparently said nothing about that… he was silent.

And yet, somehow indirectly, further down in his text, he denied himself. Namely, he slipped up and acknowledged that… “He was only an instructor in Voden Region...” (Ibid. p. 239.)

12. Inventions

In June 1947, Paskal Mitrevski, then member of the CPG Provincial Bureau, arrived with a directive from this bureau to immediately suspend Aianovski from the NOF leadership.

For his part for recommending Aianovski, Rakovski received a party reprimand. “You do not know him…” among other things, Rakovski was told. Aianovski was in question because of something he had done somewhere else...

Aianovski was again reduced to an instructor in Voden Region.

Therefore, since then, none of the leadership documents bear his signature.

Later, during NOF’s First Congress, held in January 13, 1948, Aianovski was not considered and did not even enter the list of candidates for the NOF leadership.

In September 1948, Aianovski abandoned the movement and fled to the People’s Republic of Macedonia...

Aianovski however said nothing about that… he was again silent. He was silent about “real” events but very loud about imagined and insignificant events… He wrote: “At the CPG’s pre-congressional central leadership meeting, the CPG... through its representatives Ioanidis and Stringos, members of the CPG Central Committee Politburo, demanded that Vangel Aianovski-Oche be removed, who at the time was NOF organizing secretary for Aegean Macedonia... This request... encountered a negative response from all present at the meeting, with the exception of Paskal Mitrevski, who fully supported the CPG Central Committee’s decision. CPG representatives Ioanidis and Stringos did not allow any further discussion on the issue, setting a party veto. But, despite the controversy that arose, the CPG decision was accepted...” (Ibid. p. 253.)

Here Aianovski exaggerated by redrawing (inventing) events, exaggerated for his own benefit. He did not participate in any such meeting. Here is what really happened: