B. THE FASCIST OCCUPATION (1941-1944) - Part 01

B. THE FASCIST OCCUPATION (1941-1944)

1. According to Minister Averov

Averov wrote: During the “first round” (1942-1944), EAM-ELAS was or at least could have easily been the sole master in Greece and not demand any compromises...

In the course of the “second round” (December 1944), it was possible for EAM-ELAS to complete takeover. It could have accomplished this in the early days. And maybe also between December 14 and 18, especially if it did not undertake a major military action against EDES in Epirus 500 kilometres away from Athens where the main battle was taking place...

Why was action taken against EDES, and why were some of the most qualified (capable) ELAS units and some of the most talented commanders engaged?

One more thing to mention is another chance that the CPG missed out on.

The CPG could indeed have taken over prominent and perhaps dominant functions in the political life of the country had it abandoned the tragic collision in December 1944. At the end of 1944 it found itself in the government. It had allies in all strata of the population... It had penetrated into all the pores of society, and its opponents were weak and divided. Its political arrangement provided advantages: concrete, reliable and, over time, perhaps decisive...

It is hard for a person to understand why the CPG missed out on all those extraordinarily favourable chances in taking power…? (Αβεροφ: Φοτια και Τσεκουρι, p. 171 (second Greek edition, 1975).)

2. Unusual events

The ELAS Voden Macedonian battalion was formed on June 16, 1944. (The ELAS Lerin Kostur Macedonian Battalion was formed a little later, on July 20, 1944.)

- Why so late? Why were these battalions not formed earlier?

News of an all Macedonian military unit appearing, and that an all Macedonian revolutionary army was being created, traveled fast in the Macedonian villages and excited the Macedonian youth. From the first day its formation was announced the battalion grew fast by the day. By late July, six complete units were formed all equipped with weapons, uniforms and various support workshops, support workers and a broad-based organization. The battalion numbered over seven hundred and fifty volunteer fighters.

Then the ELAS Tenth Division command ordered:

- Do not accept any more volunteers into the battalion!

One cannot help themselves but ask:

- What exactly could that mean? Why did ELAS command do that?

Just four months after its formation, the Macedonian Battalion maneuvered its way to escape an armed clash with Greek ELAS units sent to disarm and disband it. (The same happened to the ELAS Lerin-Kostur Macedonian Battalion. It too came close to having an armed conflict with the ELAS Greek units.) The Voden battalion, led by me (Pavle Rakovski), was forced to leave its military and political activities in Greek occupied Macedonia and cross over to the other (Yugoslav) part of Macedonia, where it continued the fight against the fascist forces. But:

- Why was all this needed? What really happened?

These were unusual but specific events. Their nature, as well as the order in which they were carried out, clearly speaks about the specificity of the conditions in which they originated, about the

specificity of the reasons that caused them. I confess: I am far from understanding this - to think that “imported” dogmatism could have some role in all this...

3. The CPG was first to raise the NOB (National Liberation War) flag

This is what was said in one of the capitalist publications:

“Greece’s triple occupation was fierce, inhuman, bloody and chilling. The occupiers not only grabbed the national treasure of the country, but also planned to use Greece as a strategic staging point for their expansionist goals. This explains the dense occupation of the land and the conversion of Crete into a strongly fortified fortress.

This dilemma was brought before the Greek people: Be subdued and become slaves, or engage the occupiers in a fierce and bloody, but honest, struggle of life and death for freedom and national independence.

The national liberation struggle flag was first raised by the Communist Party of Greece (CPG). The working class party (CPG) and the most advanced force of the working people, faithful to its policy of defending national interests, took on the main role of becoming the driving force in organizing the national resistance in Greece, i.e. the struggle against the triple occupation of the country…” (Στα αρµατα, στα αρµατα, Χρονικον της εθνικης αντιστασης 1940-1944, εκδοσης ΠΛΕ, 1967, p. 21.)

This is what Colonel Hamont (Enks), member of the British military mission, wrote in his report to Major Stevens (Tom Brown), Special Envoy of the British General Staff for the Middle East: “After our withdrawal from Greece the only significant political forces in the country were the Communist Party and the Liberal Party. The former (CPG) possessed great experience and combat ability since the time of the Metaxas dictatorship, when it was forced to act illegally. On the contrary, the Liberal Party was weakened. Immediately after the German penetration into Greece, the Communist Party took the initiative to organize the Resistance

Movement and asked the civil parties to co-operate with it...” (Στα αρµατα, στα αρµατα, p. 67)

On March 13, 1944, London Radio officially recognized that:

- “The Communists, in their eternal honour, were the first to cast themselves in the patriotic struggle...” (Ibid., p. 78)

Now let us take a closer look at events.

With the fall of Crete on May 31, 1941, all of Greece was occupied. One day later, on June 1, 1941, the CPG Central Committee, at its Sixth Plenum, decided on the following:

“The Communist Party of Greece to call on the Greek people and all its parties and organizations to join the national liberation front... To organize a tireless struggle for the everyday needs of all the people and to start an armed resistance against the occupiers. The Party, i.e. each individual communist should, in time, be properly orientated and adapt to important events which change and will change every day and fast, to organize the forces of the popular uprising for the national and social liberation of Greece...” (To KKE ap'to 1931-1952, p. 105.)

After many contacts with individuals and politicians from all civil parties and organizations, the founding conference of the coalition “National Liberation Front” (EAM) came to a close on September 27, 1941. Representatives of the Communist Party, of the Socialist Party E.L.D. (Ελληνικη λαϊκη δηµοκρατια, (Greek People’s Democracy)) and the Agricultural Party attended. The establishment of EAM, with a well-defined program, was announced on September 28, 1941:

- Liberation of the nation from today’s foreign yoke and emergence of the country’s full independence.

- Immediately after the expulsion of the foreign occupiers a temporary government to be formed from the EAM coalition. The government’s sole task will be to conduct elections for a constituent

assembly in which, the people as the true host, will declare the way in which the country wants to be governed.

- Destroy all reactionary attempts to impose solutions that are contrary to the wishes of the people by all means available to the EAM and its organizations, and defend the basic right of the Greek people.

To achieve these goals EAM will engage and fight:

- Against all issues that the Greek people encounter on a daily basis under foreign occupation conditions and guide the Greek people’s struggle to meet all demands, as well as provide resistance against looting which is systematically carried out by the foreign occupiers.

- Maintain high morale and the liberating spirit of the Greek people.

- Systematically scrutinize the treacherous role of today’s government and any other similar government in the future.

- Ensure possible co-operation with other nations fighting against the Axis powers and coordinate the struggle of the Greek people with the struggle of those nations.

- Organize the people’s forces based on adopted rules which are part of the founding resolution.

- Start collecting voluntary contributions, membership fees, and so on, from Greek patriots, in order to provide the necessary funds required for leading the national liberation struggle. (Στα αρµατα, στα αρµατα, pp. 567-568.)

4. Facts of capital importance

This is the historic truth which has been at rest for three and a half decades. Today, it is not difficult to identify a few basic things that are of capital importance, to how this program was realized:

First, the EAM Coalition was founded by the Leftist parties which were led by the Communist Party of Greece.

All bourgeois parties, from the centre down to the far right (mainly representatives of the capitalist oligarchy) canceled their participation. They remained idle supposedly waiting for “better times” or placed themselves in the service of the occupiers. According to Colonel Eddie Myers, head of the British military mission in Greece: “It seems that most of the more important royal officers received orders from the Greek government in exile to stay in Athens and not join any of the democratic resistance organizations...” (Eddie Myers, Ελληνικη περιπλοκη, p. 103, Στα αρµατα, στα αρµατα, p. 22.)

The EAM founding document contained seven points. The founding parties were struggling to keep the door open right from the start: “The EAM coalition will equally include any party or organization that will work for the successful realization of EAM’s goals. We will not be examining the past or future political orders for a liberated and independent Greece of those organizations wanting to be admitted into the EAM coalition. Their belief in the necessity of the National Liberation Front - EAM, their honesty and their honesty towards it, i.e. their acceptance of EAM principles, will be enough for them to be considered...” (Στα αρµατα, στα αρµατα, p. 567.)

As is well-known, this did not help. The bourgeois parties and politicians remained outside the EAM sphere, one party went with the Germans, the other went with the English, and both worked against EAM...

Second, the occupiers, following Goering’s barbarian comments “Europe will die so that Germany can live!” (KOMEP, number 5/1943, editorial article) monstrously robbed Greece turning it into wasteland and bringing death everywhere. Hundreds of thousands of innocent people of all ages (especially in the big cities) suffered a terrible slow death from hunger. At the same time mass executions and destruction took place all throughout Greece. The Germans demolished the countryside in Kandinos, Crete, as well as executed en masse the population in the villages Pedrivoli, Skines, Alikianos, Furnes (the exact number of victims is unknown). In the Macedonian cities Drama and Doxat and the surrounding villages,

the Bulgarians killed over three thousand anti-Fascists in a three day rage. The village Krmsko in western Macedonia was destroyed to the ground and all men over the age of 15 were shot. In total 165 people were killed. Later, during a second German raid, the rest of the villagers were shot. This time 315 people were killed. The Nigrita Region villages Gorno and Dolno Krushovo were razed to the ground and all men over 15 years old were shot. In total 222 people were killed. The same thing happened in the vicinity of the city Kukush in the villages Musgali, Kodzha Oglari and Murazli. The villages were razed to the ground, and all men over 15 years were shot. In total 96 people were killed. (Στα αρµατα, στα αρµατα, p. 550.)

This was happening until the end of 1941.

Atrocities such as these did not end until the Germans were forced to leave Greece. Of course, it is impossible to think that the people in Greece would have allowed themselves to be destroyed. So, the Communist Party’s call “Στα αρµατα, στα αρµατα” (to arms, to arms), in the national liberation front, for the purpose of liberating themselves, was inevitable and a historical moment to “resist”, i.e. the determination of the Greek people to fight for their survival and freedom.

Neither the atrocities committed by occupiers nor the underground activities carried out by the British could prevent EAM from turning itself into a mobilizing force attracting massive popular support all across the Greek state.

Even enemy testimonies attest to that and have special significance.

According to a German report on the political situation in Greece dated July 6, 1943: “Ninety percent of the Greeks are unilaterally unfriendly to the Axis forces and are ready for an open uprising. EAM with its combat organizations appears to be the main bearer of the overall resistance movement against the Axis Powers... From a political point of view, EAM has a leading role and because it is very active and acting under a coordinated leadership, poses the greatest danger to the occupying forces.” (Στα αρµατα, στα αρµατα, p. 27.)

This is what Marshal Wilson (a commander in the Allied Forces in the Middle East) wrote on page 66 in his book - Greek Edition “Οκτω ετη περαν των θαλασσων”: “EAM is organizing strikes and demonstrations all across the Greek state, forcing the Germans to abandon their plans for mobilizing Greeks to work in Germany...” (Στα αρµατα, στα αρµατα, p. 539.)

Third, the task set out for the Party by the CPG Central Committee during its 6th plenum that “everyone, especially communists”, were required to “organize all forces of the popular uprising to aid in the national and social liberation of Greece” was not carried out consistently.

a) It is true that 90% of all Greeks were hostile to the occupiers and were ready for an open armed uprising. But the masses were directed to take their anger on the occupiers through countless strikes, demonstrations and uneven battles in the streets. An armed struggle was not enforced.

It is also true that all was not lost and that the CPG-EAM leadership did achieve significant victories against the occupiers through the general strikes and massive demonstrations. Especially, with the strikes in 1943 when many Greeks were mobilized to dig trenches at the fronts and work in the fields and the factories of the occupiers. This stifled their progress as well as the Bulgarian-Fascist expansion in Macedonia.

But, of course, even with the largest unarmed masses, the possibility of achieving a decisive victory over the occupying forces and the liberation of the country was not possible.

This is what was said in the Party edition “Στα αρµατα... Χρονικον της εθνικης αντιστασης”, in connection with this:

“One could notice that not enough attention was paid to the armed struggle. It was not organized and promoted adequately, although for this there were possibilities, i.e. objective favourable conditions...” (Ibid., p. 24.)

b) The second part of the task, the “social liberation of Greece”, for which forces of the popular uprising were to be organized, was completely neglected. But there was more to it than that. On behalf of the CPG Central Committee, the Party’s top leadership made the following announcement:

“While waiting for the ultimate goal - socialism, the party of the proletariat, the Communist Party of Greece - is today fighting for national liberation, and then, after the war is over, it will fight for a people’s democracy...” (CPG Central Committee proclamation delivered on July 2, 1943, after the dissolution of the Comintern. See: “Στα αρµατα ..., p. 567.)

So, Greece’s social liberation struggle was suspended and postponed until after the war ended.

But then, less than six months later, the CPG leadership, through its Central Committee Tenth Plenum, held January 1944, made a request from the Allies to support Greece’s “strategic security” on its northern borders. This means that Greece was preparing to expand, occupy and annex new foreign territories... (CPG Central Committee Declaration made during its Tenth Plenum. See: “Στα αρµατα ...” p. 586. And Σαραντα χρονια του ΚKE, p. 505.)

Fourth, the program task which provided for possible cooperation with other nations fighting against the Axis powers and coordinating the struggle of the Greek people with the struggle of those nations was realized quite inconsistently and scandalously.

Around mid 1943, CPG representatives Tilemahos Ververis and Andreas Dzhimas contacted representatives of the Yugoslav and Albanian Communist Parties for the purpose of cooperating. An agreement was reached to create a people’s revolutionary union encompassing the three countries and to formulate a political and military plan of action. According to a document written in French (a copy of which exists at AM Skopje), among other things, the establishment of a common Balkan general staff was envisaged. This is what Yugoslav representative Svetozar Vukmanovich-Tempo, a CPY Central Committee delegate in Macedonia, wrote in a report dated July 25, 1943, to the CPM Central Committee: “This

is to inform you that among the delegates of the Supreme Headquarters of Greece, Albania and Yugoslavia, an agreement has been reached to create a Balkan headquarters…” (Sources for the Liberation War and Revolution in Macedonia, 1941-1945 Volume 1, Second Edition, p. 169.)

However, the agreement was soon cancelled by the Greek side. Siantos’s leadership unexpectedly, and for reasons that we can only speculate on, changed its mind and canceled the cooperation agreement, i.e. the already signed agreement was declared null and void.

This is what Svetozar Vukmanovich - Tempo wrote:

“...I met with the secretary of the Greek party and I discussed with him the overall situation regarding the conclusions we reached on June 25 (1943). They have annulled all the conclusions regarding the creation of a Balkan headquarters and regarding the cooperation between our parties, especially regarding Macedonia...” (This letter was sent to Tsvetko Uzunovski, CPM Central Committee secretary, dated August 25, 1943, published in Volume 1, Second Edition, from Sources for the Liberation War and Revolution in Macedonia, pp. 236-244.)

Instead of joining the communist Balkan revolutionary alliance, Siantos’s CPG leadership turned to the English. On July 5, 1943, Siantos’s CPG leadership signed an agreement with the British military mission, to place ELAS under the command of British General Staff for the Middle East. (S. Sarafis: O ELAS, p. 130.) British officers, mainly Intelligence Service agents, occupied posts in ELAS supreme headquarters as well as in all larger ELAS unit headquarters. Of course, they lost no time in creating their own extended networks consisting of well paid domestic spies, and they successfully did this with ease and with little to no resistance. According to information provided by Vasilis Bardzhotas, member of the CPG politburo: “All large units, divisions and groups of divisions were actually placed in the hands of the Intelligence Service...” (V. Μπαρτζιωτας, N πολιτικη στελεχων του ΚΕΕ στο καιρο της Εθνικης αντιστασης, Νεος Κοσµος, αρ. 9/1950.) (Again “an adversity that afflicts the CPG”.)

Fifth, there was not a single word about the Macedonian people living in Greece in the CPG Central Committee Sixth Plenum, i.e. in the EAM founding program documents. The Macedonian people, as a distinct non-Greek nation and as the largest national minority in the Greek state, were completely ignored. In other words their involvement in the liberation struggle and their democratic rights and freedoms in the liberated new Greece were silently omitted... It was like the Macedonians did not exist in the Greek state!

This was the road the Siantos CPG leadership took in regards to the Macedonian people, which was explained and justified by “the then conditions”. Siantos’s leadership did not mistreat the Macedonians but, given the conditions, it did not provide any revolutionary consistency or democratic rights for them either. It was understood that only after a people’s democracy and a people’s government was installed in Greece would the CPG recognize the rights and freedoms of the Macedonian people. Therefore, the Macedonians were obliged to fight for the victory of a people’s democracy. For now they would have the opportunity to fight in the ranks of the Greek national resistance organizations (EAM, ELAS, EPON, etc.) under the Greek name and flag as Greeks.

There was no formal agreement about anything. In fact whatever was agreed was agreed informally under ordinary conversations between the Greek and Macedonian communists and activists. The Macedonian communists then passed on this information to the Macedonian people and everyone placed their trust behind the CPG which assured them in ordinary conversations that, after they achieved victory, their rights would be recognized and they would be equal to the Greeks.

However, events and action taken have clearly shown the Party and its Marxist principles to be a good thing, but the people (on both sides) running the Party were the ones deciding what deeds to do and therefore cannot remain blameless for what they did...

When all the neighbouring nations were fighting against the occupiers, each for their own freedom, it was inevitable that the Macedonian people would do the same through their own anti-

fascist liberation movement by creating Macedonian organizations such as SNOF and later NOF.

But instead of “welcoming” the Macedonians as allies, Siantos’s CPG leadership resolutely started an open frontal struggle against the Macedonian communists and against the Macedonian anti-fascist movement in general with aims at discrediting and destroying the Macedonian leaders and stifling the Macedonian movement...

And, as is known, and mentioned earlier, Greek ELAS partisans attacked and tried to disarm the Macedonian partisans...

The Greeks were reacting in desperate panic inspired by fear from positive changes in Macedonian affairs, namely by the formation of ASNOM and the emergence of the People’s Republic of Macedonia as a Macedonian national state in the federal Yugoslav democratic composition.

5. A miracle of nature: “Slavophone Greeks”!

Our Greek comrades, writing about events of that time, forgot to mention the existence of the Macedonian people’s anti-fascist struggle or Siantos’s policy towards them and against their struggle. It was an intentional omission… The Greeks kept silent about the Macedonians and their affairs...

And because nothing was written about them, of course, the Macedonian people did not exist and their promised rights and freedoms in the Greek state also did not exist. But just because the Greeks were silent on the matter did not mean that the Macedonian struggle did not exist. Refusing to go away, the top people in the CPG had to reconsider their silence and rediscover that Macedonians indeed existed in the Greek state.

As is well-known, the Party’s top leadership, after years of persistent silence, finally, for the first time in December 1945, spoke up publicly about the Macedonian anti-fascist liberation movement (NOF). Zahariadis did this in Solun while speaking against the Macedonians… As for Siantos’s anti-Macedonian politics, many years later, the CPG Central Committee Politburo accepted the

explanation of what had happened at its meeting held on September 12, 1951.

“The CPG leadership then did not properly understand the Slavo-Macedonian movement. It did not adopt a clear position on the national and social liberation of the Slavo-Macedonians in the joint struggle with the Greek people. It felt that the leadership of the Slavo-Macedonian movement consisted of adventurous and chauvinistic greater Greek elements...” (Νεος Κοσµος, 10/1951. Το ΚΚΕ απο το 1931-1952, p. 269.)

This late recognition of its “mistakes” was launched by the CPG as a conclusion in the famous “conclusions” meeting with 72 Macedonians and CPG cadres. This meeting was prepared and personally convened by Zahariadis in the summer of 1951. These so-called “conclusions” were written by Zahariadis a few months later and formally accepted by the Politburo. Zahariadis did this in order to find fault in the Macedonian CPG cadres and for that fault to be accepted by the Politburo, so that the Zahariadis leadership could claim that the Macedonian national anti-fascist organization -NOF was a foreign and reactionary organization and that is why it was liquidated.

By acknowledging its “mistakes”, the Zahariadis leadership skillfully covered up the true state of affairs - the truth. Namely, it covered up the fact that it never did mention the Macedonian people as the largest minority of non-Greek people living in Greece in any of its party documents of that time, adopted during the CPG Central Committee plenums and during the one CPG conference held in the period during the National Liberation War (1941-1944). It was very careful to avoid even mentioning the Macedonians by their ethnic name. There was only one mention about some kind of “Slavo-Macedonians” and that was during its Eighth Plenum resolution held in January 1942. (Σαραντα χρονια του ΚΚΕ, p. 473.)

On July 20, 1943, “Rizospastis”, the central party authority newspaper, published the following in response to intensified pressure and demands from the Macedonian communists (cadres, members and supporters of the CPG):

“Macedonia, after the population exchanges, is as Greek as the Attica Region around Athens...”

It was made perfectly clear that no Macedonians or non-Greek people existed in Greece. One cannot even imagine a Macedonian or non-Greek person existing in Attica.

Three days before Rizospastis published the above article, on July 17, 1943, “Elevteri Elada”, EAM’s newspaper, with obvious nervousness, published the following:

“EAM, as the Piedmont for national liberation, proclaims that: Macedonia is and will remain Greek!”

So, having said that, they explained perfectly what they were working towards.

It was an unbelievable situation. The EAM Coalition, the political left led by the Communist Party of Greece, all fearing that Greece would lose Macedonia, did everything they could to suppress the Macedonian anti-fascist liberation movement. They did not want anyone to know anything or hear anything about any Macedonians or any kind of Macedonian anti-fascist movement.

But then, what about the so-called “Slavo-Macedonians”? Who were they? And what about them?

According to General Stefanos Sarafis, ELAS supreme commander: “They are all Greeks…” This is what he wrote in his famous book “O ELAS” after his visit to the village Perivoli, where he inspected the Second Battalion of the ELAS Twenty-Eight Brigade: “It is composed entirely of... Slavophone-Greeks.” (P. 331.)

This particular battalion, however, was the all Macedonian Lerin-Kostur battalion led by Ilia Dimovski-Gotse which later crossed over into the Republic of Macedonia.

Similarly, in the spirit of what “Rizospastis” published earlier, General Bakirdzhis, commander of the ELAS divisions in Macedonia, in his famous interview with “Laiki Foni”, a Party

newspaper, said that the fighters in the Macedonian ELAS divisions and the Macedonian people in general are “Bulgarphone Greeks!” (Zb. Aegean Macedonia in the National Liberation War, Volume 1, Doc. No. 191, page 522.)

So, according to “Rizospastis” there are no Macedonians in Macedonia only “Slavophone Greeks” and according to “Laiki Foni” the Macedonians in Macedonia are “Bulgarophone Greeks”.

The CPG-EAM tried to hold onto these absurd and impossible claims by forcing the Macedonian people to join Greek organizations.

Instead of allowing the Macedonian people to join their own Macedonian organizations, the CPG and EAM leaderships forced them to join Greek national organizations such as EAM, ELAS (reserves), EPON, EA, and others... This meant that:

The CPG in fact did not recognize the self-determination of the Macedonian people and as a result their national existence as Macedonians was denied and so was their right to organize themselves in their own revolutionary organizations, the right to create and join their own anti-fascist liberation struggle, and the right to fight for their own freedom as an equal and as an ally of the Greek people...

- They (CPG leadership) did not find the means to suppress the Macedonian anti-fascist liberation movement and when it erupted, to suppress it as the bearer expressing the uniqueness of the Macedonian nation...

- When the national council (Εθνικον Συµβουλιον) of democratic Greece convened in May 1944, somewhere in the liberated territory, it completely ignored the Macedonian people, that is, it treated them as a Greek people, and proclaimed the Greek character of Macedonia... (Aegean Macedonia in the National Liberation War, Volume 1, Doc. No. 104, page 407. See also Στα αρµατα..., p. 328.)

This was Siantos’s anti-Macedonian policy about which Zahariadis said nothing when he wrote about “mistakes” made. In fact, the

people who constituted the CPG leadership under Siantos, were the same people who constituted the CPG leadership under Zahariadis…

6. Who was Siantos?

On May 20, 1947, Siantos had a heart attack and died. Zahariadis, however, claimed that the intelligence service liquidated him because he was one of their agents and they feared that he was going to be discovered. They killed him to stop him from talking… (Ξενοκρατια, page 103.)

Three years later, during the Third CPG Conference, while analyzing Siantos’s policies during the fascist occupation, it was decided and declared that: “Georgios Siantos was a traitor who betrayed the revolution...” (Neos Cosmos, no. 10/1950. Το ΚΚΕ απο το 1931-1952, p. 219.)

Later, on April 3, 1973, Dimitrios Vlantas, a DAG general and member of the CPG Central Committee Politburo, said: “Siantos was a traitor from a long time ago. He was a traitor at least since 1932 when I was secretary of the Communist Youth of Macedonia and a member of the CPG District Committee. One day, the secretary of the District Committee asked me to find a house to hold a secret meeting. For such things I used the house of a businessman in Solun. He was my trusted contact. I asked him if we could bring seven people to a meeting. ‘Do you know them?’ he asked. ‘I know them,’ I replied. We started to assemble and, at one point, I saw the businessman making hand gestures for me to go to the kitchen. He looked angry and then said: ‘Comrade did you bring comrades or traitors here?’ ‘What traitors are you talking about?’ I asked. ‘That one there!’ he said while pointing at Siantos who I did not know at the time. ‘They call him Georgios Siantos,’ he said. “We served together in the same unit. Even then he was a spy – an informant,’ he concluded.”

This is also what Vlantas said: “Siantos was always a provocateur and, in my opinion, an intelligence service agent. This is how he managed to play his part - to suppress the national resistance

movement during the occupation and then, during the December events...” (Ξενοκρατια, p. 105.)

7. The attack on Siantos came to full expression

If Siantos was working for the “Asphalia” (intelligence service) and was put in the ranks of the CPG (he was certainly neither the first nor the last), then it is important to note the following:

- The CPG was damaged from the inside by the people the Metaxas fascist dictatorship managed to plant (To KKE απο το 1931-1952, p. 104). The Metaxas dictatorship arrested many of the CPG leaders and activists and sent them to jail. It is well-known that many CPG activists were imprisoned by the Asphalia and held at various prisons and camps. Imprisoned among them were also several hundred plants who worked for the Asphalia. Then, when the Germans arrived, these activists were handed over to the Gestapo. In the meantime the Asphalia allowed a certain number to “escape”. The most significant among them was Siantos who was then put in charge of the CPG during the fascist occupation, that is, during the national liberation struggle.

During this decisively critical and revolutionary time, all these people, i.e. the Asphalia, its bosses, the ministers, and the prime minister of the Greek government in exile, were all appointed, maintained and their activities financed by the English government. And, of course, they all worked to serve English interests in Greece.

For as long as Siantos was an agent of the Asphalia he and those around him made sure that all CPG-EAM policies, more or less, directly or indirectly, served English interests in Greece.

Here are some characteristic moments that the reader may find interesting:

First, the CPG Central Committee, during its 6th Plenum, held in July 1941, called on all the Greek people, their parties and organizations, to rise up in a national front against the occupiers. The CPG then separately set the following task only for the Party

and for each communist: “To organize the popular uprising forces for the national and social liberation of Greece…”

It was all normal, nicely formulated and well-suited for the historical moment. However, in the work done, the most important and revolutionary task of all was to organize the popular uprising for the national and social liberation of Greece… However this was not done. The actual uprising for the social liberation was not promoted but diluted as a secondary task and was carried out only systematically to undermine the occupier (strikes and demonstrations), but be harmless to English interests in Greece. In other words the struggle for the social liberation of Greece was completely and publicly abandoned...

Second, the EAM Coalition, i.e. the political left headed by the CPG leadership, succeeded in achieving wide national unity among the Greek people, the kind that never existed before. Never in their long history have the Greek people been united like this. Of the approximately eight million Greeks, over 70% of the voters who participated in the elections voted for EAM candidates (CPG) and elected members of the National Council...

Given its popularity and strong position among the Greek people why then did the CPG persistently and systematically propagate the need for “national unity” with its arch enemy the Greek government in exile which was formed, maintained and funded by the English? Why did the CPG persistently triy to raise the English creation’s authority and popularity among the people...?

Third, by mid-1943, an all people’s partisan war was already in progress on the ground. The ELAS partisan units, led mainly by the communists, were growing more numerous by the day...

So, why was there a need to put ELAS under English control and not under the control of the neighbouring peoples’ revolutionary alliance? According to Sarafis: “ELAS was placed under ‘allied military command’ headed by the British General Staff for the Middle East. All operations undertaken by ELAS were under the orders of General Staff…” (S. Sarafis, O ELAS, p. 120.) All orders from Supreme Headquarters were given by British officers and

delivered to each headquarters also by British officers. So ELAS units carried out their operations in accordance with orders given by British officers and British command. This is what famous Intelligence Service agent Christopher Montague Wunthouse (Chris), then deputy chief and head of the British military mission, competently and authoritatively said:

“If there were no British officers in the resistance movement in Greece, the history of not only Greece but also of Europe would have gone in a completely different direction... The presence of the British military mission in Greece prevented the Communists in 1943-1944 from placing Greece under their absolute control. If the communists had taken power when the Germans withdrew from Greece in September 1944, it would have been very difficult for us to seize it away from them in the eyes of the world...” (Secret Archives of the Wehrmacht, “To Vima”, June 11, 1963, Hristo Andonovski, Macedonians under Greece in the struggle against fascism, p. 214.)

Siantos’s maneuver to place ELAS under English control was of historical significance because it prevented it from joining the national revolutionary alliance in the Balkans.

Fourth, with the Treaty of Lebanon in May 1944, the CPG, EAM and ELAS voluntarily and formally renounced any attempts to seize power in Greece. At the same time they recognized the English-created Greek government in exile as the “legitimate government of Greece” and as the “government of national unity”.

But there was more…

They also agreed that ELAS could not be the national army of Greece and that a national army would be required in the near future. This responsibility was left to the Greek government in exile and to the English General Staff for the Middle East... And so was the fate of ELAS. They decided to disband ELAS. (See “Στα αρµατα, στα αρµατα...”, pp. 330-333.)

“The Treaty of Lebanon not only did not help and did not strengthen national unity, but helped the English imperialists and domestic

capitalist oligarchy to re-establish the old fascist regime and prevent the people from deciding their own destiny…” (“Στα αρµατα, στα αρµατα, Χρονικον της εθνικης αντιστασης”, page 31.)

Fifth, the Treaty of Caserta, signed in September 1944, paved the way for an English military invasion of Athens and other Greek territories abandoned by the Germans. This was not done to chase the Germans out but simply to occupy Greek territory, especially Athens. According to an official German document found in the archives published in Greece, there was an agreement between Churchill and Hitler to allow German troops to freely withdraw from Greece. This is what was published in the Athens newspaper “Ta Nea”: “The British fox achieved two purposes: Strengthened the German forces against the Russians and occupied Greece unhindered.” (“Ta Nea”, 14.1.1978, p. 12, “To Vivlion”.)

Naturally the English invaded Athens and other important strategic positions in Greece to prevent ELAS from taking them...

To further influence events in Greece, British General Skobi was proclaimed Supreme Commander of the Greek Armed Forces.

This meant that ELAS too was subordinated to him and to the English, and ELAS units had to act strictly under Skobi’s orders. In other words the English now controlled every aspect of ELAS.

This is what was said in the celebrated and well-known thesis compiled for the CPG’s 40th anniversary adopted during the CPG Central Committee Ninth Plenum, held in August 1958: “The Treaty of Caserta placed the Greek Armed Forces under English command and in General Skobi’s hands. The English decided to exclude ELAS from participating in the liberation of major cities, and important strategic regions such as Athens, Central and Eastern Macedonia, Epirus, etc. The most important strategic zones were given to the fascist organizations the likes of EDES, PAO, etc...” (See: Forty years of CPG, p. 715.)

Sixth, the provoked military clash in Athens in December 1944, was a well-staged ground for disarmament and disbanding, i.e. liquidating ELAS. Undoubtedly Siantos and Partsalidis had a lot to

do with it. With their signatures on the Varkiza Agreement (February 12, 1945), all ELAS units, all throughout Greece, except for some reserve units stationed in Athens, were disarmed and liquidated. The ELAS reserve units in Athens were attacked and defeated by the combined English and domestic reactionary forces.

“Georgios Siantos and Mitsos Partsalidis, the CPG Central Committee Politburo representatives who signed the Varkiza Agreement violated the requirement for the general unconditional amnesty given to all ELAS fighters and democratic forces by the Politburo. (This amnesty was given in order to protect the ELAS fighters and democratic forces in general, from English and domestic reactionary persecution). The Varkiza Agreement only called for the surrender of weapons. It seems that Siantos and Partsalidis deviated and were arbitrary on the question of the general and unconditional amnesty. They agreed to ‘unconditionally’ disarm the resistance movement, i.e. unconditional capitulation with no amnesty. On the one hand, this created opportunities for the English to restore the Monarcho-Fascists in power and to completely break down the people’s democratic forces in Greece, and on the other hand, constituted a serious obstacle to a rapid political and organizational consolidation of the people’s democratic forces…” (This assessment was made by the party edition “Χρονικον του αγωνα” 1878-1951, p. 49.)

Seventh, when we take into consideration that with the numerous strikes and demonstrations in the larger cities and across Greece, of the millions of people mobilized, 90 percent were categorically hostile to the occupiers and were ready for an armed uprising. Clearly, under these conditions, there were plenty of opportunities to create a huge revolutionary army that would have inflicted heavy blows on the occupying forces like it was done in Yugoslavia, China, Cuba, Vietnam etc. With an army like this, given its economic exhaustion, England would not have dared do what it did especially in a prolonged and dangerous revolution.

But, what can we say? “The mountain bore... a mole”. Thanks to Siantos’s CPG leadership and to the EAM coalition’s policies, only a small number of people, a few tens of thousands, out of the

millions who were ready to join the revolution, were recruited into ELAS...

According to Sarafis (p. 276): “ELAS forces at the time of the liberation numbered 48,940 soldiers, of whom 5,240 were officers...” These numbers do not include the ELAS forces in Athens or on the islands Samos, Mitilini and Crete. According to Hutas: “ELAS forces numbered 80,000 fighters”. Similar information was also given by E. Fotiadis and K. Tsolakas... (See: Andrikopoulos, Volume 2, p. 174.)

ELAS was quickly brought under English control so that it could be destroyed… This was yet another atrocity committed by the CPG… which “afflicts” it...

8. Anti-Macedonian practices

The Bulgarians, as allies of the Germans, by their San Stefano illusions, immediately took it upon themselves to protect the Macedonian population, especially those Macedonians who were imprisoned in the concentration camps by the Metaxas fascist dictatorship. Thousands were released by the Germans, over eight thousand from the island Chios alone, and were allowed to return home.

This chance was also given to 27 CPG activists from Macedonia, mostly Macedonians, imprisoned in the infamous Akronavplia prison. Among them were Tashko Karadzha, Lazo Trpovski, Andreia Chipov, Lazo Dimovski-Oshenski, Trpo Kalimanov...