REPORT - Part 01

REPORT

“The four comrades from the main leadership were located in four different places. Comrade Dzhodzho was located in Kaimakchalan, Comrade Pavle Rakovski in Paiak, Comrade Keramitchiev in Vicho and Comrade Mincho (Fotev) in Gramos in Epirus. I took statements from all four who were characteristically in agreement with the points as they applied to each of their areas separately...”

Other than that, Mitrevski has also long and widely spoken about the above-mentioned basic points. In the fourth point, among other things, he wrote:

“4) After the last negotiations and cooperation that I had with Comrade Zahariadis and other CPG comrades, it was jointly determined as to how we would cooperate in our merging with the CPG. All points were well-covered. Had these points been genuinely accepted by the CPG, the problem would have been solved, and we would have been back to work in our respective areas.

The points on which our work basically collapsed were:

a) The military question. There is no doubt that Comrade Zahariadis was in complete agreement with the preservation of the Macedonian groups as completely separate units, without any thought of merging them with the Greek units. Each area, however, would share a common Headquarters for both groups. Zahariadis clearly said to me that both Macedonian and Greek units would exist in the first phase so that we could establish a Macedonian army with its own headquarters. Now the CPG comrades, who hold Party positions in various areas, endeavour to dismantle the Macedonian groups, and they demand that the Macedonian partisans join the Greek units. In other words, there would be no Macedonian groups...” (Aegean Macedonia in the national liberation war, vol. III, doc 171, pp. 378, 380 and 381.)

In the fifth point, among other things, Mitrevski wrote:

“5) Another issue with which our people did not agree was the way the Party set up the NOB (National Liberation War) paramilitary cadres in the common CPG party leaderships and other political organizations... They expressed aspirations for changing the party and in general NOF’s managerial staff with their own people who care very little for NOF. They are striving, not for NOF’s empowerment, but for its weakening, so that tomorrow it may de facto disperse, as was the case with the old SNOF...”

On November 21, 1946, at the extraordinary meeting of the Secretariat, i.e. of NOF’s Presidency, held in the village Turie, Lerin Region, Mitrevski together with Skotidas, CPG representative and DAG general, delivered the final agreement point by point as issued by a directive from above.

According to what was agreed:

Mitrevski was co-opted member of the CPG Provincial Bureau for Macedonia-Thrace, and made an instructor of NOF.

Dzhodzho was co-opted member of DAG Headquarters for Central and Western Macedonia and a representative of NOF.

Mincho Fotev was co-opted member of the EPON Provincial Bureau, and a representative of NOMS.

Keramitchiev, Rakovski and Vera were co-opted to lead the NOF secretariat.

The NOF Presidents at the district boards were to assume the functions of instructors in their districts, and others would be selected to take their place.

NOF was to be placed under the CPG leadership, which would be realized directly and through Mitrevski.

The NOF military units were to be placed under DAG command as separate Macedonian units...

This agreement, as it was well-known, was well played by the Greek side. The Macedonian military formations were withdrawn from Macedonia and sent deep into the Greek south, where they were destroyed... The NOF leadership itself was also destroyed through the NOF Congress and via the NOF Central Council 1st Plenum, when NOF’s current leadership was replaced with a “new anti-Macedonian leadership” consisting mainly of Greek Supremacists.

It is true that “Rakovski himself, as well as other NOF leaders, wrote about the CPG defaulting on this agreement in their reports”. But there is more. It was said that: “If the agreement was given only as a directive, then it means that there could not have been a place for objections!” But all this is a kind of verbal acrobatics that supports a false claim. What were these often talked about objections…? Condemning the act “of being played” means asking

for consistency in the application of the agreement, i.e. supporting it, and not objecting to it.

17.

Kiriazovski wrote: “The change in Pavle Rakovski’s attitude towards the CPG is very indicative. While in his previous articles he blames the CPG for pursuing a genocidal policy against the Macedonian people, in this article (referring to the “Aegean Storms” critical review) he says quite the opposite - that the CPG cannot, in principle, be an enemy of the Macedonian people!” (p. 293)

“On the one hand, Pavle Rakovski argues that the CPG could not be an adversary of the Macedonians, and on the other hand he claims that the CPG liquidated the more prominent Macedonian activists. To substantiate this, he says the CPG, among others, liquidated the following: Giorgi Kalkov, Dzhodzho Urdov, Atanas Koroveshov... The examples he gives are arbitrary, since the said comrades died heroically in battle fighting the Monarcho-fascists!” (p. 294.)

Rakovski wrote: The Greek Communist Movement, i.e. the CPG is not and cannot, in principle, be an enemy of the Macedonian people. CPG members and cadres have been persecuted, arrested and sent to prison because they publicly defended the Macedonian people’s democratic rights and freedoms in the Greek state... The CPG and ELAS functionaries, who according to their orders were tasked to create a Macedonian unit on Ilinden, created a Macedonian battalion and could have created divisions… They cannot be an enemy of the Macedonian people...

However, it is a well-known historical fact that exponents of the domestic bourgeoisie and international anti-communism camps, the likes of Stavridis, Sargologos, Maximos, as well as Siantos and Zahariadis who stood at the head of the CPG were eventually exposed and expelled from the party. It is also well-known that they damaged the general Communist movement and the people’s revolution in Greece. The Macedonian and the Greek people’s interests, rights and freedoms suffered because of them. There are many abnormal and crisis situations in the CPG that attest to this. Discord in its ranks, divisions in its central leadership, open

betrayals, catastrophic defeats; the people’s revolution in Solun and in Macedonia in 1936, the defeat in Athens and in Greece in 1944, the defeat in Vicho and Gramos and in the rest of Greece in 1949...

The Macedonian people suffered immensely during ELAS and DAG because of these “Greek patriots”. The Macedonian political organizations MAO, SOF and SNOF were disbanded, NOF and its institutions the central agitation and propaganda department, the Macedonian theatre, choir, folk song and dance ensemble, brass band, teacher’s school, seminar… were all closed down. On top of that the Macedonian military formations consisting of the most elite Macedonian revolutionaries were eliminated and an unknown number of prominent individuals like Trpovski and Dzhodzho were killed by ambush. Shamardanov and Kalkov were killed in battle fighting heroically against the Monarcho-fascists, but from a bullet in the back. Petre Tanurov was shot in a court farce. Lazo Koroveshov and Tanas Markovski were killed by snipers. The first when he went to get his food from the cauldron and the second got a bullet in the head leading a Macedonian dance. Vasko Karadzha was captured in the CPG Provincial Bureau central branch in Solun. Instead of being welcomed by a Bureau official, he was welcomed by agents of the Asfalia. He was caught, handed over to the Gestapo and shot, Tanas Koroveshov died as a result of betrayal, etc. etc...

The communist movement, that is, the CPG, of course, is not and cannot be guilty of all of this. This is what I, Rakovski, believe and have expressed in my review...

18.

Kiriazovski wrote: “In order to put himself in the spotlight and cover up the real motives for his return from DAG to NOF, Pavle Rakovski said that this was done in order to remedy, as he said, the famous electrified situation that caused a wave of Macedonian fighters to “desert” from DAG because the top NOF leaders were oppressed. Rakovski argued that his influence was supposedly so strong that it caused the desertions at the time when the Macedonians were revolting because their leaders were suspended. As a result, Nikos Zahariadis was forced to accept him back into the NOF leadership. Rakovski said nothing about what kind of

“deserting” this was and when it took place. If he thinks of those who fled to Yugoslavia after his return to NOF, it doesn’t count; they deserted for other reasons. They did not flee to Yugoslavia like Rakovski insinuated, they fled because they did not agree with the CPG leadership’s policies with regards to the Macedonian question and with regards to Yugoslavia!” (P. 294-295.)

Rakovski wrote: It was March 1947. A group of NOF and AFZH activists were traveling towards Preval in Prespa not from the side of the river Bistritsa where the hill was long and quite steep, but from the Prespa plateau, where the uphill was flatter and easier to navigate. We were traveling straight up on foot and away from the road. When we arrived at Preval I passed out and fell unconscious. My comrades brought me back to consciousness by rubbing my face, neck and chest with snow...

On June 20, 1949, the KOEM resolution was adopted. I was again suspended from the NOF secretariat and sent to the Gramos front as an ordinary fighter. During the night of June 21 and 22, I left Prespa with a small group of fighters and set off for Gramos. Mincho Fotev was part of the same group. He was on his way to Gramos and, as a representative of KOEM-NOF, was expected to visit a number of units in Gramos. Along the way Fotev gave me his horse to ride and we alternately walked together. I happened to be riding the horse through a dangerous part of the road near “Helona” locality. Like everyone else, I too began to climb up the hill but not on top of the horse, it was too dangerous, on foot, running uphill, holding the horse by the reins. But soon I got very tired so I lay down and watched the flashing bullets flying over the horse and getting lost somewhere above us. The enemy was attempting to close off this passage because it led to the border with Albania (an escape route)... When I got to the top of the hill, I said to Fotev: “I had to sit down and rest because I almost fainted…!” Fotev said: “I saw you…!”

This was the only necessary introduction. But here is the main thing I want to say:

As I mentioned earlier, when, in April 1948, the Macedonian central NOF agitation and propaganda department was stripped of its Macedonian staff and replaced with Grkomans (Greek-

Supremacists), I found myself at DAG Headquarters for Central and Western Macedonia, located in the village of Pevkofito, where I was appointed member of the Kamarila. A month to a month and a half later, after nothing had happened except for boredom and anticipation… I sat down and wrote a letter to DAG General Dimitrios Vlantas, then member of the CPG Central Committee Politburo. This same letter was taken out of context when it was published in Volume V of the edition “Aegean Macedonia in the National Liberation War”. In the letter I wrote that because I had heart problems and was prone to fainting spells, I didn’t think I would do well as a fighter with a rifle in my hand. There was danger that I would disappoint my fellow fighters and I would fail in my mission as a leading activist in the Macedonian national liberation movement. I begged Vlantas not to do this to me…

I was prepared to carry the rifle as well as be given the chance to work on the side of the Headquarters newspaper intended for Macedonian fighters, published in the Macedonian language, which would have enabled me to “shoot at the enemy with all the guns of the Macedonian fighters…”

Vlantas did not reply and neither did he take me back to NOF...

As I said, this letter was published… The first part of the letter, where I speak about my weakness and my BEGGING, it appears, was not touched at all... But the second part, in which I made my request, was redone... According to what was published, they claim that “Rakovski, in order to avoid the rifle, asked to ‘edit a single column’… But they avoided mentioning the one thing that angered, and perhaps frightened, the Greek “patriot” Vlandas, what I said about “convincing the entire Macedonian army” which, at the time was a majority, through the Macedonian language side of the newspaper, to fight with all its might, which prompted Vlandas to expel me...

But things were different than they seemed. Here is a sequence of events:

When Vlantas expelled me (Rakovski) I was not an official, but a simple editor, after which time I continued to work on the

Macedonian publications under the supervision of Kotsopoulos but only for a short time. After I had a few unpleasant run-ins with him I left.

A little later Mitrevski was returned from DAG. And:

On Zahariadis’s recommendation, during the NOF Central Council II Plenum, we were both re-appointed members of the NOF Central Council (then - Presidency).

It should be clear to anyone as to why Zahariadis did this given the circumstances...

As for those who “deserted”, I mean those who fled to Yugoslavia… there is nothing more to be said. It is well-known which leaders they were and how and why they found themselves in Yugoslavia where they remained...

19.

Kiriazovski wrote: “Pavle Rakovski blames the editors of the collections “Aegean Macedonia and the national liberation struggle” for a friendly twist and tendency to “beautify” Aianovski’s biography. As one of the editors, with full moral and professional responsibility, I stand behind everything written about Aianovski’s revolutionary activities and I think that the editors fulfilled their obligation to the man who remained faithful to his people…” (29).

Rakovski wrote: When considering the question of who and how TOMO was established, what happened at the convening of the first regional conference in Voden Region, as well as the recently mentioned removal of the “NOF organizing secretary” allegedly by a “Party Veto” at the pre-Congress meeting, we have to conclude that, from what was said in Aianovski’s “Aegean Storms” and in Kiriazovski’s “Chronology” (“Aegean Macedonia and the national liberation struggle”), that events have been invented and history has been re-written in order to satisfy one’s actions and tastes. It was not unusual to refer to Aianovski as the “NOF organizing secretary” in “Chronology” (p. 174 and 182), which also alleges that “requests” were made to remove him the first time by the “CPG Macedonian

Bureau” in November 1947, and the second time during the “NOF Central Council” pre-Congress meeting in January 1948. These so-called “requests”, however, are total fabrications. Vangel Aianovski was “suspended” shortly after the NOF asset was selected in May 1947, and afterwards, like I said before, continued to work as an instructor. Kiriazovski, however, insisted that it was not like that, as if he were there, and has used every opportunity to elevate Aianovski as the most important person in the Macedonian national liberation movement in Greek occupied Macedonia. In a recently published series of articles in the newspaper “Nova Makedonija”, about the struggle of the Macedonian people in Greek occupied Macedonia, as part of an educational and cultural plan, for example, Kiriazovski did not fail to mention that: “MAO, the Macedonian anti-fascist organization in Voden Region, after requests were made by the Macedonian people, and after the CPG District Committee for Voden Region approved it, was formed in April 1942. The founder and leader of MAO was Vangel Aianovski-Oche. The goal of the organization was, in addition to fighting for the expulsion of the occupiers, to fight for the acquisition of national rights for the Macedonian people. MAO developed a wide range of activities and achieved major successes in involving the Macedonian people in the struggle. MAO also issued its own newspaper called ‘Tsrvena Dzvezda’ (Red Star)...” The truth, however, is that MAO was established by the Greek leaders, exactly the same way MRO (United) was established. When the Greeks saw that MAO functioned well, unlike the stillborn fictional MRO (United), and was being transformed into a dynamic revolutionary organization (despite being constrained in Voden) the Greeks liquidated it... This is proof that MAO was yet another “Greek project” that had served its useful purpose before it was killed… But, contrary to the evidence provided, Kiriazovski continued to insist that “Aianovski was one of the most important leaders of NOF”. He said this in his “Chronology” three times as well as twice in Aianovski’s biographical data (p. 59 and 85) and once at the end of the book, together with the biographies of CPG and NOF leaders. He did not do this for anyone else. It was a conscious effort to impose Aianovski into the consciousness of the uninformed readers, especially in the CPM, and more widely, as an important, and most precisely, as the most important leader of all, a true revolutionary in Greek occupied Macedonia. This friendly affection has come to the

fore by the fact that Kiriazovski tried to “beautify” Aianovski’s biography at the cost of violating the dignity of his own profession as a historian. He did this in volume V, volume VI and other volumes of “Aegean Macedonia and the national liberation struggle”.

Written on p. 117, Volume II, in the extensive collection of original documents on the history of the Macedonian people “Aegean Macedonia in the national liberation war”, among other things about Aianovski’s biographical information, was:

“He was a communist from the pre-war period…” But the truth is, about which Aianovski wrote in his book “Aegean Storms”, that he signed a police declaration and became a renegade. He condemned all communist activities as treasonous… Unfortunately Kiriazovski is silent on that.

It was also said that: “Aianovski was appointed Assistant Commissar of the Aegean Brigade in November 1944!” But what was not said is that, as a result, he only participated in the brigade’s parade in front of the Political Committee on November 18, 1944. After that he was withdrawn and sent to Voden to monitor and report on the situation there. This explains why Aianovski was not in the Headquarters’ composition when the Brigade entered into action against the Balisti. But, of course, nothing was said about that either.

It was said that: “TOMO, the ‘Secret Macedonian Liberation Organization’, was formed in Voden Region in January 1945, and led by Aianovski until the First District Conference, held on April 28, 1945…” But nothing was said about Aianovski’s own reports contradicting that… This information too was consciously ignored...

It was said that: “Aianovski became secretary of the NOF District Committee for Voden Region in the spring of 1945, after that he became member of the Executive Board and organizational secretary of the NOF Main Board for Aegean Macedonia…!”

It is true that Aianovski, at my recommendation, was appointed first president, i.e. Secretary of the first TOMO District Committee, at

the TOMO-NOF district conference on June 20, 1945. It is also true that during the reorganization of the NOF staff structure as per the Agreement with the CPG, in November 1946, Aianovski became member of the NOF Executive Board with the position of instructor in Voden Region. But it is not true that he became an organizing secretary of NOF because after the election he was suspended and continued to work as an instructor. This explains why Aianovski never took part in any of the Secretariat working meetings, and his signature did not appear in any of the Secretariat documents.

20.

Kiriazovski wrote: “Pavle Rakovski not once, and by no accident, has emphasized that NOF has never been independent and was influenced and managed by the CPM (CPY)... What is the goal and in whose interest is this misinformation being spread by him..?” The above statement was quoted in the journal “Istoria” on page 293.

Simply unbelievable! “O kosmos tohi timbano, ke mis krifo kamari!” (A drum beats to the world, and we make a secret of it!) This is how the neighbouring people around Greece are expressing themselves as to what was happening... Let us now list a few more important facts:

The withdrawal of the ELAS Macedonian battalions to the People’s Republic of Macedonia, with the consent of the CPM (CPY) of course, was no secret to anyone...

The creation of the Political Commission for Aegean Macedonia in Bitola, led by representatives of the CPM Central Committee, cannot be a secret. It happened publicly in front of the people of Bitola and in front of the world, and a program declaration was published...

The political commission organized protest rallies with the Macedonians in Bitola who had fled Greek occupied Macedonia. I was there with them.

On November 18, 1944, a representative from NOV and POJ General Headquarters for Macedonia gave the then newly formed

Aegean Brigade a battle flag. The flag was presented in front of the Political Committee and a large number of spectators. The event ended with the battalions and the brigade parading in front of the Political Committee and in front of the people of Bitola...

In April 1945, the Political Committee ceased to exist and was replaced by the NOF Central Executive Board for Aegean Macedonia, which was constituted on April 23, 1945 by the CPM Central Committee. NOF’s activities were managed by the CPM Central Committee through its representatives (Pekar and Minchev). Almost every report generated by this leadership regarding the situation in Greek occupied Macedonia was published in the edition “Aegean Macedonia in the National Liberation War”. Sadly the editorial board did not specify to whom these NOF reports were directed. Were they naively making an attempt to hide something that was commonly known? Everyone knew about our frequent visits to the field and about our returning to Skopje for meetings with members of the main leadership. By that I am saying everyone who was interested in all of Skopje and Bitola knew about us, including the CPG representatives who resided in Skopje. Even the report content itself unambiguously showed to whom those reports were directed...

According to published documents, as early as June 1943, Tempo took a trip to central Greece in order to reach a military and political alliance agreement for a joint Balkan Headquarters with the CPG and ELAS, which apparently was achieved. But the Greek side abandoned this agreement in August 1943… only because of Macedonia…

Also, according to published documents of that time, in September 1943, a representative of the CPM Central Committee met with a representative of the CPG and managed to reach an agreement in which, among other things, the Greek side was to issue a Macedonian newspaper, in the Macedonian language, and create separate Macedonian partisan units. But this agreement too was not implemented by the Greek side...

The fact that Macedonian people, at different times and in different places, had to fight in order to create various organizations against

the will of the CPG, tells us that our Greek friends took extraordinary preventive measures to stifle the Macedonian anti-fascist revolutionary forces to keep them divided and isolated in their districts and from other districts, so that they could be easily controlled and suppressed.

The fact that, due to the rapid spread of Macedonian organizations and due to the Greek side dismantling them is irrefutable proof of the CPG leadership’s chauvinistic attitude towards the Macedonian national liberation movement and towards the Macedonian people in general...

This can also be seen from the fact that, Greek “party officials”, i.e. “Greek patriots” were placed in charge of the Macedonian districts where they worked to develop anti-Macedonian activities to which the CPG Central Committee Politburo was later forced to admit. In its explanation the CPG admitted that these people were “adventurous and chauvinistic greater-Greece elements!”

The CPG Central Committee Politburo sent a confidential letter addressed to the ELAS 28th Brigade Commissar ordering him to order the ELAS Macedonian battalion to travel south and ultimately be attacked and disarmed because it posed a danger... And that is exactly what happened. While the Macedonian battalion was fighting against the Germans on Bigla Mountain it was attacked by partisan units from the ELAS 28th Brigade...

The battalion did not fight back. It disengaged from the battle against the Germans and, in order to avoid bloodshed, withdrew from Greek occupied Macedonia and crossed over the border into the now Republic of Macedonia. As soon as the battalion crossed the border its command wrote a letter explaining its departure and rejected Greek claims as to why it was attacked and what had happened.

Being unable to defeat NOF despite all its efforts, the Greek side took a different approach. At a CPG Bureau for Macedonia and Thrace meeting, held on December 26 and 27, 1945, for the first time Zahariadis spoke about the Macedonian national liberation movement and publicly said that NOF was a people’s democratic

organization with which he needed to co-operate. According to LAIKI FONI from December 28, 1945, Zahariadis said: “We go shoulder to shoulder with the Slavo-Macedonians against the domestic Monarcho-fascists and against the counter-band autonomists and their foreign backers who encourage and finance them both…”

At the same time our Greek comrades and Party leaders led this new and different campaign in the press, a campaign of friendship and solidarity with the Macedonian people, they continued with their hostile campaign against leading Macedonian Communists, the most conscious people and most active bearers of the Macedonian national ideals. The goal here was obvious. While pretending they were all for the Macedonian cause, they compromised, slandered and destroyed the most valuable Macedonian people, the leaders of the movement. And with their destruction they aimed to behead and defile the Macedonian national liberation movement until it was destroyed.

Proof of this was delivered in February 1946, during the CPG Central Committee II Plenum. Despite the “nice things” the CPG press was publishing about the Macedonian people in general, the CPG officially treated the Macedonians NOT AS PART OF ANOTHER AND UNIQUE NATION, but as a “mass of people”, a “Slavophone population” which lived in Greek occupied Macedonia on the lands of the Greek state. During the II Plenum the CPG proclaimed that it will fight for “the recognition of rights and equality” as a Slavophone population, but without NOF’s leadership. And so the Party regional press (local) in Macedonia continued its hostilities against the NOF leadership, even after the II Plenum.

Zahariadis again turned to the Party press and began to promote his new tactics. Using the Macedonian people’s natural aspiration for freedom, he called on the Macedonian fighters to join the Greek revolutionary forces in a “unified struggle” led by the CPG. With his declarations, which turned out to be just empty words, Zahariadis recognized NOF and, like a kind of Trojan horse entering the wide door of a fortress, managed to take possession of it.

And as NOF fell into his hands, so did its military formations. They too fell into Zahariadis’s hands…!

This is not misinformation! This is our history… full of pain. It is not fair to blur and conceal the truth from the reader. Don’t let these false historians deceive you.

This is how things stand today regarding this problem...

21.

Kiriazovski wrote: “The claim that Oche (Aianovski) made that NOF was independent, and according to Pavle Rakovski that it was losing its independence because its leadership was at fault, is simple demagogy... It shows that Pavle Rakovski had given up on the very thing for which he himself had always advocated. The fact is that NOF, despite having been put under the leadership of the CPG in November 1946, managed to preserve its autonomy until its First Congress in January 1948. NOF’s autonomy was lost when Zahariadis managed to infiltrate NOF and place his own people in it, who then opposed the NOF leadership.” (p. 293.)

Rakovski wrote: It may look like that from the distance. This is the opinion of those people who were not participants in the events themselves and tend to think superficially. Saying that: “The NOF leadership is at fault for NOF losing its independence” strikes at the heart of all those who constituted that leadership. Otherwise, how can one talk about NOF’s independence at all. As a reminder: NOF was a mass Macedonian organization first led by communists and members of the CPM/CPY and then by the CPG. This means that NOF was never a separate and independent organization outside the two communist parties. NOF, in this (Greek occupied) part of Macedonia was always the subject of controversy between the CPG and the CPM/CPY, proof of which can be found in a number of published source documents of that time. NOF for certain periods was managed by one or the other communist parties. This says it all...

However, let us have a closer look at the newly made claim that “NOF managed to preserve its autonomy until its First Congress. Here are some specific events.

After establishing “unity” Paskal Mitrevski, then NOF National Bureau instructor, went to Skopje and stayed there for half a year while maintaining contact with the Greek CPG representatives at home. I have no idea what he was doing all that time. However, Mitrevski did not break his connections with the field.

While executing a “party directive” Rakovski and NOF’s central agitation and propaganda department,remained isolated for half a year, far from the NOF organizations, in Kotili or on the road through the liberated territories. All this time was wasted waiting to be told where to establish the department’s headquarters and start working. (Which turned out to be outside of Macedonia in Likorahi, Epirus...)

At the same time Keramitchiev and Vera were left alone for half a year and it is unknown under what kind of party directive they were working, i.e. where they were and what they were doing. Perhaps Keramitchiev will write about this in his memoirs...

Historically, this was the last check of the correctness of the famous Greek chauvinistic “theory” that claims that: “There is no Macedonian nation and therefore there can be no genuine Macedonian movement!” According to the same Greeks, these NOF people were not Macedonians but “adventurous elements” who were out there sowing seeds of discontentment in the peaceful ‘Slavophone’ villages. Remove them, neutralize them and everything will be fine and peaceful again. At the time of the unity agreement, the goal was to open a frontal attack, instigated by the leaders of the “split”, under the influence and pressure from the huge party authority… But that was not achieved... It did not come true. So now, immediately after the agreement, they tried to isolate the leaders to see what would happen… whether the NOF movement would fail or not...

As was said earlier, according to the “unity” agreement, the immediate secretariat of NOF was reduced to Keramitchiev,

Rakovski and Vera. This was their new assignment. They were tasked by the Party to carry out their assignments in a way that suited the Party. But even after six months of isolation, members of this secretariat still managed to come together for a meeting and, as we know, decided to choose Vangel Aianovski-Oche member of the secretariat responsible for organizational matters… which was done. But nothing became of Aianovski. The Party intervened and reversed the decision… Aianovski was then immediately dismissed...

According to the “unity” agreement, NOF and its agitation and propaganda department was to act in accordance with party guidelines, working closely with the Party leadership and party organizations in Greek occupied Macedonia. The NOF agitation and propaganda department was to closely cooperate with the other corresponding party agitation and propaganda departments for its supply of necessary materials and paper. Anything above that would be taken care of by the Party leadership, that is, the Party organization.

The fact that “Nepokoren” (at that time nothing could be discussed about “Nova Makedonka” and “Bilten”) was published only five times all throughout 1947, undeniably and convincingly speaking about the anti-Macedonian character of that concern… The first time we printed only 100 copies in small format. The second time we printed 70 copies, of which 20 were sent to Voden where they were seized and destroyed by Gousiopoulos. The third time we printed 200 copies, the fourth time 300, and the fifth time 400 copies. That was it!

These are the facts... This is what Rakovski said about this:

The Macedonian national liberation movement in Greek occupied Macedonia was the subject of controversy, discussion and cooperation between the CPM/CPY and the CPG. Tempo was in Greece, Abas was in Solun and there were other similar contacts made over time. The various phases of the Macedonian liberation movement did not occur spontaneously or “independently”. It was a reflection of the engagement and activities in both the CPM/CPY and CPG. After NOF was formed, it operated for a year and a half

under the CPM/CPY’s leadership. NOF was also under the CPM/CPY leadership when it was transferred and placed under the CPG leadership. In other words, the Macedonian communists who stood at the helm of the Macedonian liberation movement always worked under the leadership of the CPM/CPY or CPG. This is how it was… But, of course, some call it misinformation and plain demagogy. And then when NOF was put under the CPG they spoke of losing its autonomy because the NOF leadership was somehow “at fault”. And that, I suppose, explains everything…

22.

After NOF was handed over to the CPG on November 21, 1946, it was completely cut off and isolated from the CPM/CPY. “Nepokoren” had no opportunity to receive or publish information about life and progress in the People’s Republic of Macedonia and Yugoslavia. But there was more to it than that. Before “unity” was established, anti-Macedonian acts had dramatically escalated and, as I mentioned earlier, they had led to severe political crimes perpetrated against the Macedonian people. Then it became clear to us that “there was no return for us no matter what happened”, which in fact meant “don’t wait for support from the CPM/CPY, no matter what happens…” Obviously, by doing this the CPM/CPY, in fact, not only surrendered NOF to Zahariadis, but literally destroyed all bridges, preventing any and all CPM/CPY interventions in support of NOF.

Just because the CPM/CPY remained silent on the issue, did not mean that it approved of Zahariadis’s anti-Macedonian-anti-Yugoslav policy. But, regardless of that, it was hard for the Macedonian communists and NOF leaders not to feel abandoned. It was hard for them to have sentimental views of things given the harsh reality they were under... (This is what Rakovski wrote in his critical review).

Following the same question, Kiriazovski wrote:

“With Mihailo Keramitchiev’s departure for Skopje to be treated and to work, where he is now, and with the withdrawal of some NOF regional activists from the “hot terrain”, including Aianovski,

it became clear”, Rakovski wrote,” that support and help from the CPM/CPY cannot be expected no matter what happens…” Here, too, Pavle Rakovski has aggressively attacked and defamed the CPM/CPY under the invented pretext that the Yugoslav leadership allegedly forced the NOF leadership to be handed over to Zahariadis and allegedly demolished the bridge between the CPM/CPY and NOF. Rakovski wrote: “The Macedonian communists and NOF leaders found this hard. They felt abandoned...” However, the truth is completely different. The CPM/CPY, in the spirit of their principled policy, never left the Macedonians and were not indifferent to what was happening in Aegean (Greek occupied) Macedonia. They repeatedly objected to the Greek leaders when their policy towards the Macedonian people was not correct and detrimental to the liberation movement itself. I will quote a small part of a letter from the CPY Central Committee sent to the CPG Central Committee from which it can be seen whether the CPY had abandoned the Macedonians or not:

“There were many reasons for dissatisfaction among the Macedonian people in Greek occupied Macedonia. They were not allowed to run their own affairs in the people’s government, they were not allowed to run their Macedonian units in DAG, they were not allowed to run their own Macedonian organizations and, their Macedonian national liberation movement was constantly compromised. The Macedonian cadres in Greek occupied Macedonia were discriminated against for having participated in the People’s Liberation Army in the FPRY. DAG refused to recognize the ranks they had achieved in the Yugoslav army, and the CPG refused to recognize their CPY Party memberships. All these negative acts, perpetrated by the Greeks, were certainly reasons for dissatisfaction among the Macedonians. But most of all, the Macedonian people were dissatisfied with the negative approach taken against the Macedonian National Question, especially during the CPG Central Committee’s V Plenum...” (History, No. 2/81, p. 295-296.)

Rakovski wrote: Did that mean that I did not have the right to complain…? Did it mean that the CPM/CPY really did not abandon us…? However, like this and other similar letters I wrote and interventions I made, my complaints were screams in the desert that

fell on deaf ears. They brought us no result and no one knew about them. The Greek side completely ignored them… just as they ignored many of the agreements and documents they had signed! We were practically left on our own and without a spine...

And let us not forget that some people prefer not to speak about the issues Rakovski speaks and remain silent about the crimes perpetrated against the Macedonian people… Let us instead speak about and emphasize trivial issues such as those who fled to Yugoslavia and remained there, including Aianovski. And let us be brave about it without even the slightest concern for the dignity of the historical profession… One more thing: Kiriazovski has taken it upon himself to publicly declare me an anti-party element who spread the “harshest” and “most dangerous misinformation” against the CPM (CPY), only because I pointed out the fact that the agreement was not the work of the NOF leadership, of which I was a member, but the work of both the CPM (CPY) and CPG leaderships.

23.

Kiriazovski wrote: “Pavle Rakovski has admitted that the KOEM leaders passed a resolution against the CPY. But, in order to conceal the harmful consequences of that document, he invented some “arguments”. Namely, he claimed that the CPG never published a document that supported the Informburo condemnation of the CPY. This however is not true. In addition to the June 30, 1948 circular letter to the DAG political commissars, with which they were familiarized with the Informburo resolution which was then accepted by the CPG in 1949, along with some other documents with anti-Yugoslav content, there was the CPG Central Committee VI Plenum Resolution, during which the CPG spoke in favour of the Informburo resolution against Yugoslavia…” (p. 296.)

Rakovski wrote: Zahariadis founded KOEM on March 27, 1949, under which he collected all Macedonian military and political cadres. Less than three months later, on June 20, 1949, he called a KOEM meeting. He attended the meeting in person during which he outlined, in the form of a party document, his famous resolution against the Communist Party of Yugoslavia and against Tito, that is, against the CPM and the political leadership of the People’s

Republic of Macedonia. He then demanded that it be adopted and individually signed by everyone.

The CPG itself, however, never did publish, under its own name, such a document supporting the Informburo and condemning the CPY. The small regional KOEM organization was in no position to act on behalf of the CPG in this matter.

Something that needs to be pointed out here is that these “arguments” are not fiction. The CPG at that time, through the KOEM active, did not publish such a document under its own name. It did this in October 1949, a few months later - with the publication of the anti-Yugoslav resolution adopted during the CPG Central Committee VI Plenum held on October 9, 1949, a month and a half after DAG was defeated, and after Rakovski and the other NOF leaders were sent to prison... Another thing to point out here is that the circular letter from a year ago (June 30, 1948) was not published at all. This was a confidential letter and, of course, not all DAG commissars received it.

24.

As I said earlier, the CPG never did publish, under its own name, such a document supporting the Informburo and condemning the CPY. The small regional KOEM organization, however, was in no position to act on behalf of the CPG in this matter so why ask it to do this? It is likely that there was another purpose for this. According to logic and the actual facts, it was a provocation, a trap set to trap:

a) The Macedonian military and political cadres.

If the KOEM leaders were to refuse to sign the document, because of sympathies for the CPM/CPY, then they would come into collision with the CPG. Of course they could not have taken into account, and perhaps did not even know about the Tito-Stalin collision. A collision between KOEM and the CPG would certainly cause cleavage and confrontation within the CPG and DAG leaderships. This would inevitably lead to the disintegration of DAG units which would be catastrophic for DAG. Then Zahariadis could

blame KOEM as being the main and public trigger for the defeat of the people’s revolution and for the downfall of the Macedonian liberation movement. As an integral part, the KOEM leadership would then be labeled traitorous to both the Greek and the Macedonian people. And that, of course, would be enough to earn it its liquidation.