CONCLUSION

CONCLUSION

As we have seen, the Solun assassinations, from their echoes in Europe and their consequences in Macedonia, were the most extreme event in the period before the Ilinden Uprising. Almost all authors who have dealt with and deal with the history of the Macedonian national revolutionary movement have approached the Solun assassinations as a separate subject. The many authors who have tried to evaluate the Gemidzhii actions, in some way, were no doubt impressed by the heroism of these young men but have not been in a position to be objective.

The Gemidzhii believed that with their individual armed actions they could possibly influence, even force Europe to intervene in Macedonia, and once it did it would naturally favour the liberation movement. Unfortunately, as we have found out, those beliefs were cunningly unrealistic. It was understandable but very naïve for the Gemidzhii to have had such beliefs. More specifically, they falsely believed that by destroying the material wealth of a country, they would be able to challenge its government and that the same country would intervene in their favour. “There is, indeed, a great dose of naivety and incomprehensible contradiction in the faith that guides the Gemidzhii bombs against the Europeans. They are expecting freedom from European intervention, they very well know that the revolutionary movement in Macedonia has no power to deal with

the Ottoman Empire alone, but believed European intervention would be more easily and promptly provoked by terror against the same Europeans, through a struggle that by nature would stir up disgust in the Europeans. This provocation, the Gemidzhii believed, could be prompted through ‘anarchist’ attacks...” (H. Silianov, 260.)

Developing their revolutionary circle under the influence of anarchist ideas and adopting a terrorist doctrine as their guide for action, the Gemidzhii could not resonate any differently. They thought that what the Macedonian Revolutionary Organization could achieve with tens of thousands of casualties, they could achieve on their own by sacrificing their own lives. They did not think much about the consequences of their actions and what they could bring about against others, but they knew that those consequences would be severe. Their belief was strictly, “We will answer for our own actions!” which turned out to be incorrect.

The Gemidzhii did not take advice or listen to what Delchev, Gruev and the other Macedonian revolutionary leaders told them, especially when they were asked to postpone their actions and trigger them as part of and within the Uprising. The revolutionary leaders had their own justification for that. But the Gemidzhii thought that such a delay had certain risks associated with it which could ruin their plans. They blew up the Ottoman bank in Solun early in order to reduce those risks. One risk was that their tunnel might be discovered if they waited too long. Another risk was that their dynamite might not function if it was exposed to moisture underground for too long. On top of that the Europeans, as we saw, began to write about Macedonians preparing for an uprising, making the Ottoman authorities nervous, which could have led to the discovery of their plans. The authorities began to escalate their vigilance, but thanks, among other things, to their secrecy and to the Macedonian revolutionary attitude towards the Gemidzhii, their plans were kept a secret to the end. One thing that is strange about all this is that the Ottoman authorities did not suspect a tunnel being dug under the Solun bank even after they discovered the tunnel under the Ottoman bank in Tsari Grad (Constantinople) not so long ago.

The Ottoman city crews digging up the street above their tunnel in Solun was another reason which made the Gemidzhii nervous and which led them to decide to blow up the bank early.

The bottom line is that the Gemidzhii not only had different ideas about how to conduct the struggle for freedom but refused to allow themselves to be restricted by outside forces. Their main goal was to prepare and execute their own plans when it suited them best. They did not know or bother to find out when the Uprising was going to take place mainly because they did not believe that the Organization was capable or ready for such a feat. We should clarify something at this point. When Gotse Delchev asked the Gemidzhii to delay their actions he did not think of an Uprising, but of other things. He himself, at that time, did not know that an early Uprising was being planned. All Delchev was concerned about was that their actions be coordinated with those of the MRO leadership. The Gemidzhii too did not have a definite schedule of when to start their actions. Their success, almost exclusively depended on their ability to find money and dynamite. If they had done that, they would have enacted their plans a lot sooner. In any case, the pressure put on the Gemidzhii by the Organization to delay their actions literally had no effect.

However, as it turned out, the Gemidzhii were ready to act only a few months before the Uprising began. Wider interests now dictated that they delay their plans, regardless of the prospects and the possibility that their plans would fail completely. But for Ortse, Kirkov, Mecheto... that would be “not death” (as they had promised each other for the liberation of Macedonia), but betrayal of the ideals that they swore to serve under. They, who like moles dug the soil out of the tunnel with their own fingernails, whose will for the liberation of Macedonia was boundless, who were determined to sacrifice themselves for the cause, when after all this effort they were ready to jump into action, there was no force on earth that could stop them from “committing the assassinations”. They blindly believed in their work and in the results of their self-sacrifice. They imagined that Europe “would” intervene and before their eyes imagined seeing European warships arriving in the port of Solun. They “imagined” an autonomous Macedonia in which the Sultan’s tyranny was abolished, and yesterday’s humiliated and oppressed people boldly marched forward into freedom and progress!

Was this a delusion, a naïve belief in the impossible? Shatev, who saw the results of his own work, avoided speaking about it. Here is what T. Organdziev wrote about it:

“The Gemidzhii expressed the idealism and the sense of vengeance that every Macedonian wanted to express. The people will always admire and appreciate their self-sacrifice. There is no question that, as far as I am concerned, we inadequately set our ideals in the service of our people... We were under deep misconceptions, believing that personal heroism drove events in life. We did not give it much thought that we were a part of the people and that our work would be more fruitful only if it was connected with the people and part of their work. We did not understand Delchev who defined the popular mass uprising as the sole solution in the struggle against slavery and, instead of linking our work and subordinating it to the expected uprising, we lived with the illusion of moving forward, by ourselves, with our own personal heroism instead of letting the popular uprising solve the task that only a popular uprising can solve. By doing this, we made everyone’s work harder, the kind of work for which we were determined to sacrifice our lives. The Sultan’s authority became even more vigorous and ruthless after our actions, which gave rise to even greater persecution. And, at the same time, the European capitalists rebuilt the bank and replaced their ship. And so, by blowing up one bank and sinking one ship, we practically did nothing to affect European interest or to change the status quo at home.

Perhaps there would have been another outcome had we connected our work with the Ilinden Uprising and in line with the people in overthrowing the Sultan from power.

There were some people, honest people, who believed that the heroism and self-sacrifice of the Gemidzhii, through individual terrorist acts, as a method of struggling, would bring success to the Macedonian liberation struggle. But after the Solun assassinations, those beliefs melted away. The illusions that the European imperialist forces, touched by our self-sacrifices, would intervene also melted away... The meddling of imperial forces in Macedonia did lead to the replacement of the Sultan but with the monarchist-

capitalist cliques of the Balkan states and with the division of Macedonia between them.” (T. Organdzhiev, 123-124.)

There is no doubt that the leaders of the Macedonian Revolutionary Organization, who were preparing for the upcoming Uprising, were deeply dissatisfied with the Gemidzhii. It was easy to see that the “Solun assassinations” had a negative effect on the preparations for the Uprising. The MRO leaders certainly did not hide their dissatisfaction. Earlier we saw how Damian Gruev reacted during the Smilevo Congress. In their memoirs Tatarchev, Sandanski, Garvanov and almost all the other leaders, and they were not few, made their feelings known. And at the same time, they viewed the Solun assassinations as insignificant. But those events were not insignificant or too small to be ignored.

What we don’t know is how Anastas Lozanchev, chairman of the District Committee, reacted during the Smilevo Congress, who, as we mentioned earlier, was one of those leaders who had the highest merit for enforcing the uprising. In his later writings (1937), Lozanchev, in fact, like almost all the others who wrote about the Solun assassinations, expressed his admiration for the Gemidzhii and their work: “A group of young people who called themselves ‘Gemidzhii’, almost children, decided to die for the freedom of Macedonia. No matter which god they served, their ideals were their own - breaking the shackles of slavery in Macedonia... It was a great feat! It was great work! Where should we look for them in history? I believe there is no such heroism anywhere, such self-denial and such self-sacrifice...” (Anastas Lozanchev, Memoirs, 26-29 - INI, fig. IV, 68.)

When it comes to the Gemidzhii, a small distance in time was enough, for even those who could hardly forget the consequences of their actions suddenly came to the conclusion that everything for which they had been “reprimanded” at the time, faded away before the greatness of their spirits and before the tragedy of their deaths. There were numerous Macedonian revolutionaries, from the oldest to the newest history who, without thinking, sacrificed their lives when they were placed in a situation to seek freedom or death... But it was not the same with the Gemidzhii. They did not place themselves in a situation where they could choose freedom. Their

mission was to perform their tasks and die doing them. Death for them was not to be avoided but to be demanded. And they volunteered to find it. “This is how they expressed their love for their Macedonian homeland and gave their fellow countrymen the most outstanding example of self-sacrifice.” (Silianov, 262.)

With a sense of pride the Macedonian generations that follow remember the many famous and unknown heroes who unselfishly gave their lives for Macedonia’s freedom. They, of course, with a feeling of special piety are remembering those young Macedonians who, in the First and Second Ilinden, at the battlefield of their homeland gave their lives, feeling courageous and bold. Included among those are also the Gemidzhii who linked their young lives to their work, believing that they had no right to survive their action and their innocent victims. This is why they consciously and rebelliously rectified themselves before enemy guns or committed suicide.

Let us once again mention their names: “Ortse, Kosta, Dime, Vlado, Ilia, Tsvetko…”