PART THREE AFTER THE ATTACKS

PART THREE AFTER THE ATTACKS

MASSACRES

The Gemidzhii did not want to create victims out of innocent people and did everything in their power to minimize their numbers. However, a very important question arises from all this. The Gemidzhii were well aware of how the Ottoman authorities had reacted to the Armenian occupation of the bank in Tsari Grad, where they committed terrible violence against the innocent Armenian population. Did the Gemidzhii not think that by destroying capitalist properties in Solun (regardless of sparing innocent people) they would create terrible panic and destruction in one of the most important cities in the Ottoman Empire, which would lead to Ottoman retaliation against the Macedonian people, similar to the massacres perpetrated against the Armenian population? There is nothing in the memoirs of the surviving Gemidzhii that would answer this question. Believing that the Macedonian Revolutionary Organization would not be able to raise a general uprising and achieve the results it was looking for, the Gemidzhii regularly highlighted the grave consequences that the population would suffer. The Gemidzhii believed that, with their personal self-sacrifice and without mass participation, they could achieve more than the MRO could with the broad masses. It seems that the Gemidzhii did not take into consideration the large scale retaliation the Ottomans would take against the Macedonian population when they unleashed their actions on Solun.

It is not that important to know what the Gemidzhii thought and what predictions and assumptions they made. They had a mission and their mission needed to be carried out. The Ottoman authorities, on the other hand, used the Gemidzhii actions as a pretext to attack and compromise the Macedonian Revolutionary Organization in order to break its ability to rise against the Sultan and the Ottoman regime in Macedonia.

As we said earlier, the casualties resulting from the Gemidzhii actions were few. The casualties resulting from the Ottoman retaliations, however, were many, not as many as the retaliation against the Armenians but still many. The biggest victims of Ottoman retaliation for the “small” pogroms committed by the Gemidzhii in Solun were the Macedonian people associated with the Exarchate Church. The Vardar and Kufal neighbourhoods suffered the greatest damage. Besides the massacres, hundreds of houses were also robbed and many women were wounded. We don’t know, and we will never know, exactly how many Macedonians were killed. “It was very difficult,” wrote Steg, “to determine the exact number of those who died on April 29 and 30. The estimates varied between 35, a figure which the Ottoman Vali had given us, to more than 300, which is more correct, a figure given to us by the Europeans, mainly by the Germans and Austrians who lived in the western parts of the city where the Exarchate population lived.”

The official figure of 35 to 40 was derived from the number of people buried in the Exarchate cemetery, which seemed like a “very small” number to many people including Steg. Steg personally counted 20 bodies. Some Ottoman officers were claiming that 112 Exarchates had been killed. This figure seemed more probable. Regarding this Steg wrote: “…It is impossible to determine the precise figures. It will be impossible even after the investigations are completed because we have no idea how many people were arrested and imprisoned. It is also very difficult to find out what happened to the bodies that were not taken to the cemetery, and it is certain that not all were taken there. Here is an example: According to the statement given in their consulates, one Italian and one German person saw how the Albanians broke the door of an Exarchate Church and killed the priest who was there. I was assured that no bodies belonging to priests were taken to the cemetery...” (Report from the French Consulate in Solun, May 7, 1903.)

Here is what Steg, the French consul, personally saw and heard right after the Gemidzhii attacked Solun. As we mentioned earlier, during the night of April 29, 1903, after the first explosions were heard, Steg and the other consuls immediately went out looking for the city Vali. Around midnight Steg returned to his consulate and remained

there until dawn because it was dangerous for him to move around the city streets during the night.

“In the morning,” wrote Steg, “I took a car to visit our facilities and see had what happened the night before. There was great excitement in our hospital on the other side of the Ottoman bank divided by a narrow street. The crew of the “Guadalquivir” located in the hospital, successfully localized the fire on the neighbouring wing of the bank and by doing so saved our institution.

A little further down the same block, two young men, barricaded in a house next to the German school, were throwing bombs at the policemen and soldiers who had them surrounded. One of the boys managed to escape, the other was killed. His body, which I saw being loaded onto a wagon, was a body of a young man 20 to 22 years old. He was dressed in miserable European clothes, the type that were common to all the criminals who were caught or killed that night and the next day.

Arrests and searches were carried out all night long. A number of criminals defended themselves by throwing bombs at the authorities. Some were killed on the run. These struggles lasted until the afternoon of April 30. The last one was in a house near the institution of the merciful sisters. This one caused a lot of excitement in our nuns and in the “Guadalquivir” crew, who thought they were the targets of the conspirators.

While doing my duty working in the city, this day alone I saw at least 15 garbage carts loaded with two or three dead bodies. I had reason to be afraid that this repression would turn, at least in some places, into a massacre. When I returned to the hospital around 4:30 a.m., a Frenchman approached me and told me that three refugees had been massacred in his house (by Ottoman authorities) in the presence of his family. I took him in my car with me, as well as an Italian man who was also a witness and drove them to Vali’s lodge.

The Vali said he had all the city quarters surrounded where murders had taken place that morning. He advised and persuaded the Ottoman “Bashibozuks”, army and police to establish order, and

warned them that anyone using “excessive” force would be severely punished.

“But even though the Vali had done whatever he could,” wrote Steg, “still it was necessary to tell him that the abuses continued and needed to be stopped without delay. From asking the witnesses what they saw I understood that people were being killed in the streets after they were arrested. I also understood that around 5 o’clock, an Ottoman officer encircled the streets and forbade the killing or beating of the captured prisoners, ordering his men to use weapons only against those who resisted arrest or carried weapons or bombs. These orders were respected and, after this, I don’t think there were any more such killings.” (Ibid.)

The need for Steg and the other consuls to find the Ottoman Vali and personally report to him and warn him of the violence and massacres committed was not because they just found out such crimes were being committed, but because a crime was committed in a Frenchman’s home. The consuls were well aware of the crimes committed against the Macedonians by the Ottoman authorities but felt it was not their concern. This time, however, a crime was committed in the home of one of their own which was considered great insolence, but also a dangerous threat to the lives of foreign citizens.

The house in which H. Michelle and the Italian Badetti were living was located in the “Vardar” neighbourhood. This neighbourhood was inhabited largely by Macedonians belonging to the Exarchate Church. On April 30, 1903, around 3 pm, two people, being pursued by gendarmes and soldiers, entered Michelle’s yard in order to save themselves from their angry pursuers. Michelle yelled at them to leave the yard because his house was not a “refuge for rebels”, but they refused to leave being well aware that they would be caught and killed. Then some of the tenants of the house called the police. The police, accompanied by fifty gendarmes armed with revolvers and Albanians armed with sticks, entered the yard and first killed a sixty-year-old homeless man who often slept there. One of the two intruders ran into Michelle’s apartment where his family and some relatives were staying. In pursuit of him, the gendarmes broke into the apartment, abducted and killed the man on the spot. They then,

with rifles and revolvers in hand, took him out to the street and paraded him around. While looking for the other man, they again broke into Michelle’s apartment and found the man dressed in an apron with a plate of salad in his hand, pretending to be the French family’s cook. The man was hoping that the Frenchman’s Christian charity would not allow him to hand him over to the bloodthirsty beasts. About this Michelle wrote: “All the gendarmes in one voice asked me if I knew the man and when I told them that I did not know him, they massacred him here in my apartment in the presence of my family. Everyone was horrified and overcome by fear. Then, after that, we left our house and hid in the quarters of “St. Nicholas”…” (Annex to the May 7, 1903 French Consulate Solun report.)

In response to being constantly questioned by the authorities, who, like angry tigers lashed at them questioning them as to who they were and where they had come from, also fearing that they would become victims “of gendarme anger”, the residents of the home decided to hoist a French flag in the yard in order to protect themselves.

We should mention at this point that the two men who were massacred were not assassins or rebels, and were not even carrying weapons. They were “guilty” solely because they did not want to fall into the hands of the police and the “Bashibozuks” and be killed.

The other consuls in Solun also made certain assumptions when determining the number of slain and massacred Macedonians. Di Rivel, the Italian general consul, in his report to his Foreign Minister Admiral Morin, said he believed that less than 100 Macedonians were killed, probably 70-80. Di Rivel too witnessed many garbage wagons each carrying 2 to 3 dead bodies. There were rumours, however, that more than 300 people were killed during the days of the repressions but, according to Di Rivel, there was no evidence of this. N. Bilioti, the English general consul in Solun said that, according to the bodies buried in the Exarchate cemetery, 30-32 people had been killed. Bilioti did not provide any information about the numbers and who they were killed by, the military or police, but, according to him, one thing was certain – this was not a slaughter. (Turkey No. 1 (1904), Doc 123.) Steg agreed with the English

consul’s conclusion. He wrote: “As much as I regret what happened, it can still be argued that the incidents were relatively minor and that we should all be happy that they did not result in heavy losses. The Muslim population was set aside during the repressions and the army performed its duty without massacring people, for which it should be commended. Without a doubt, this outcome was primarily due to the directives sent from Tsari Grad, where it was understood what kind of favour the Ottoman Empire would receive if it went wild to counterbalance the horror of the assassinations in the eyes of the European public.”

Steg, as well as some of the other consuls, showed their appreciation to the Vali for preventing a massacre in Solun. This appreciation was highlighted in a report sent to Delkase, Minister of Foreign Affairs in which Steg specifically pointed out: “But I must acknowledge the efforts of our general governor who kept away the Muslim population. His attitude was vigorous and correct, and the public opinion here is that a great evil was prevented. This, of course, was due mainly to his personal influence and personal examples of courage and determination, which he showed by traveling the streets in an open wagon countless times. The officer corps also demonstrated exemplary discipline and cold determination, and it cannot be held responsible, in its entirety, for the excesses which, in such circumstances, were inevitable.” (Report of the French Consulate in Solun, May 7, 1903.)

The general conclusion was that there were no mass massacres and murders even though it was impossible to precisely specify the number of Macedonians killed in the retaliations. The Ottoman authorities, this time, as they had always done, managed to hide the terror and the killings they had perpetrated mainly because the relatives of the victims, especially at such critical times, had nowhere to report their problems. For economic and political reasons, and due to the great uncertainty that reigned inside Macedonia in the recent months, many Macedonians went to live and work in Solun. The majority of these people, a large number of them, had no personal connections to the city so their disappearance was very difficult to detect, especially by the foreigners who lived there.

There were some people who did not believe the Ottoman figures that only 30 to 40 Macedonians had been killed during the Ottoman revenge killings in Solun. There were just as many people who did not believe that the figure was over 300. So it only seems appropriate to assume the figure to be somewhere in the range of say 100 to 120 people.

And while rightly so, Fahmi Pasha, the Vali of Solun, was given recognition for his contribution to the prevention of atrocities, it was the Ottoman army commanders who actually held back the police and the “Bashibozuks” from perpetrating large-scale massacres while hunting down the Solun assassins. It was also amazing that the Gemidzhii, with their grand plans and preparations to wreak havoc on this important city, were not discovered. The city bustling with foreigners and diplomats, a large Marine shopping centre, where the police and Hamid Pasha’s agents were always alert and vigilant suspected nothing. The incompetence of the authorities surprised everyone, especially the envoys and foreigners who were well aware that Macedonia was a boiling pot that could explode at any time, yet they suspected nothing. The foreigners were also aware of the cruelty the Ottoman authorities demonstrated towards the Macedonian population and that they suspected every single Macedonian of working for the Macedonian revolutionary movement, yet they believed the Macedonians were incapable of committing such acts.

There were “indications” that “something” was being prepared in Solun but, it seems, it was not that important to the foreigners and to the authorities to notice, or they were simply not familiar with what was going on. But whatever it was, it should have been very important to the police, especially after the discovery of the tunnel at the Ottoman Bank in Tsari Grad. Almost everyone who was aware of the existence of the Macedonian Revolutionary Organization and followed its revolutionary events in Macedonia should have guessed that anything was possible, not just in Tsari Grad but everywhere in Macedonia. The police naturally should have been the first to suspect such activities could be possible.

Hamid’s police force further showed its incompetence later by not taking appropriate measures even after rumours were flying

everywhere, including in some European newspapers, suspecting that the Macedonian revolutionaries were preparing attacks on various important institutions in Solun and other cities in Macedonia. More incompetent than that was the fact that no measures were taken to properly protect the Ottoman bank in Solun. The bank was well guarded from surface attacks but, it seems, they did not suspect an attack from underground. How was that even possible after their experience in Tsari Grad, after the authorities had discovered the underground tunnel there? How could they not suspect that the bank could be threatened from underground?

Everyone should have noticed that a large number of unemployed young people were moving into the city. Most did not deal with conspiratorial activities, however, there were also those who seemed suspicious, yet no one suspected them of anything. For example, the “barber shop” was rented for a short time then abandoned. A little later the “grocery store” next to it was rented by the same people. The same young men went in and out of both the “barbershop” and the “grocery store”. It should be underlined at this point that this neighbourhood was part of the Solun centre in which important European institutions were located. The neighbourhood in which the bank was located was known as the “Frank-Maalo” This neighbourhood housed a Catholic cathedral, a French hospital, a French-run female school, the American and Scottish missions, the Solun bank and a huge number of large merchant shops. Of course, the rent was expensive here. It was subsequently discovered that the rent for the “grocery store” was very high. The store was rented by Marko, in September 1902, who bought 20 Turkish liras worth of goods and did not purchase any more merchandise. When customers came in to buy goods they did not have Marko to give them the usual answer:

“We just ran out. We are expecting more but it’s tied up in the customs office. Come back tomorrow…”

Marko’s explanation seemed suitable and acceptable as long as it was not repeated too many times and too often.

To avoid being visited by the local authorities, the Gemidzhii paid their bills months is advance. As we have shown they did their best

to remain inconspicuous but there were some things they could not hide. For example, their frequent “grocery store” entry and exit. As much as they were careful they could not completely hide their “regular” visits.

Their excuses that they had come to Solun to idle away and spend their parents’ money having a good time was not convincing enough because they ate their meals mainly in modest restaurants owned by Macedonians. One of the Gemidzhii lived opposite the bank and they all lived in modest residences. The bank director did notice their movements but did not pay much attention. However, after what happened to the “Guadalquivir” and at the train station on April 28, 1903, the next morning the director reported his suspicions to the police commissioner and asked him to search the hotels and stores in the neighbourhood where the bank was located. (Ibid.)

“Do not be concerned, Mr. Director! The city is calm and the police are ready for anything!” he was assured by the police commissioner.

The commissioner was right when he said that the police were ready for anything. And despite the fact that there was only a small army present in Solun in those days, there were still enough forces in the city to protect the most important institutions such as the bank, the post office and other important buildings. Of course, the commissioner did not expect that the enemy would attack from under ground and did not know that these actions would be carried out by Macedonian suicide bombers. And the police commissioner did not fail to hear the persistent rumours that the goal of the revolutionaries was to blow up the Ottoman bank.

These “rumours” drove Steg to go to the Solun police station and make his “suspicions” known to the commissioner. Steg said:

“The blindness of the police allowed these kinds of things to be carried out in the immediate vicinity of the bank. The blindness of the police allowed such a large amount of dynamite to be brought into Solun by unknown suspicious persons who came and went without being noticed by your agents. These many unusual events, noticed by so many people, in the opinion of many, cannot be explained in any other way, except to say that: perhaps the police

were instructed to look the other way. Otherwise the revolutionaries would not dare take such action without heavy reprisals…”

Steg, with great reserve, then said: “I am not inclined to believe that the Ottoman authorities would be involved in such conspiracies, and I am sure that the Solun Vali and Hasan-Fehmi-pasha are not involved in such conspiracies. However, I find it necessary to point out to you that such rumours, I promise you, will be published by some newspapers, be it in the west or... in Bulgaria…” (Ibid.)

The inability of the police to expose the Macedonian revolutionaries was obvious. This can be explained by the fact that the Ottoman administration in Macedonia was completely disorganized. It is not like the Great Powers did not make recommendations to the Ottomans to reform their army and police, but it appears that these recommendations were either ignored or the administrators were incapable of implementing them. Now, it would appear, the same people who failed to expose the Gemidzhii in the first place were placed in charge of investigating their actions. One can now see why the authorities did not want to reveal the facts about the Gemizhii actions… because they wanted to hide their own mistakes. But that’s not how everyone saw the situation.

The way the Gemidzhii were organized and operated, it would have been hard for any police to fight against them. They did not belong to a large movement prone to breakdowns where information could be leaked to the authorities. The Gemidzhii were a small, isolated group of dedicated fighters who were determined to carry out their objectives at any cost. If they were caught during the planning period they could have been stopped but they were cautious. During the execution period, given their determination to fall in the battlefield at any given moment, their actions could not be undermined. Once they dug the tunnel and mined the foundation with dynamite, there was no force that could prevent them from blowing up the bank. There was a man on duty at all times in the grocery store ready to light the fuse and die in the explosion if necessary.

Outside of feeling frustrated and bitter about their actions, outside of their condemnation for the damages they had caused, most of the

people, including the foreign consuls in Solun, were quite impressed with the courage that the Gemidzhii showed. It was not entirely the fault of the Ottoman police for being unable to catch the Gemidzhii. It was more the will and courage of these young men who gave their lives for Macedonia’s freedom, than the incompetence of the police, which brought them this far. Here is what Steg wrote about that: “No doubt there will be plenty to say about the desperate courage they showed while committing their crimes. It is hard to fight people who are ready to sacrifice their lives for their cause. But, at the same time, this could only have been done through isolated cases as was done by one terrorist who made his way through the many foreigners in the city without being noticed. The terrorists were few and very determined and that is why they succeeded in doing what they did on April 28, 29 and 30, without being found by the police.” (Ibid.) But, at the same time, Steg and the others thought that the Ottoman authorities knew about the Gemidzhii and were allowing them to act so that it would give the Ottoman’s a reason to crush the entire Macedonian movement.

The first legal measure taken by the Ottoman authorities to “protect” the population of Solun was the introduction of a curfew. People were forbidden from moving around the city from sundown to sun up. The government also introduced measures to create a military court so that the assassins would have a speedy trial. The military court was opened on May 4, 1903, the same day that the Sultan introduced these measures. The same measures also dealt with issues arising from breaking the curfew. On top of that the general public was forbidden from taking part in arrests, house searches, large group gatherings, spreading rumours, spreading false news and the like. People were forbidden from entering Solun without justifiable reasons. (Makedonika, 63-64.)

These measures gave the impression that all those who were guilty of taking part in the Solun events would answer to the court by legal means and that the state would not allow innocent individuals to share in guilt by association. There was a lot of truth to how justice was served but the manner in which it was served was fierce, bloody and brutal.