SOLUN RESOLUTION FOR UPRISING - RELATIONS WITH DELCHEV

SOLUN RESOLUTION FOR UPRISING - RELATIONS WITH DELCHEV

After almost three years of preparation and ups and downs, the Gemidzhii were finally ready to act. But during one fateful moment! They were ready to act exactly at the time when the general uprising was expected to start in Macedonia.

The Supreme Committee, which in front of Europe saw itself as an expression of the interests of the oppressed Macedonian population and wanted to play a decisive role in the liberation struggle in Macedonia, decided for the second time to raise an “Uprising” in Macedonia. The first time it raised the “Melnik Uprising” in 1895. On September 23, 1902, Supreme Committee Commander T. Saev’s Chetniks killed several spies in the village Zheleznitsa, Gorno Dzhumai Region, which prompted the Ottoman army to attack the village and start a conflict. With this began the so-called historical

supreme actions, known as the “Upper Dzhumaisko Uprising”. These actions, with many breaks in between, lasted until mid-November 1902. The largest number of Supremacists to come out of Bulgaria and join the battles was 400. The conflict encompassed about 30 Macedonian villages from several regions, half belonging to Dzhumai Region, and dragged them into the fighting. The armed actions were led by well-known supremacist officers headed by Supreme Committee Vice President General Tsonchev.

The “uprising”, as expected, was soaked in blood. And even though the Great Powers intervened in earlier conflicts, this time they did nothing. The High Port (Ottomans) promised that it would respond less violently to any movement in Macedonia through its regular army and use minimum force. But in the end it broke that promise. About 15 villages were destroyed, robbed and burned down, 45 people were killed, hundreds were tortured, 110 women were raped and about 2,000 people fled across the border. The entire population in the region covered by the supremacist uprising, during the fighting and later, was placed under a very difficult situation.

Naturally, Gotse Delchev, Giorche Petrov, Iane Sandanski, Dimo Hadzhi Dimov and many other MRO leaders were outraged and sharply opposed this disastrous supremacist policy towards Macedonia and especially this supremacist infiltration and preparation to start fires in various places in Macedonia. Unable to prevent the supremacist instigated uprising, the MRO invested all its forces and energy to limit it and minimize its severity and consequences for the Organization and for the population. Thanks to MRO’s quick reaction and the perception of a good part of the population involved in the uprising, the supremacists were stopped from expanding the fire. The Supremacists and their associates had lied and misinformed the Macedonian people in this region and, in large part, they were forced to rise. The supremacist killings and assaults provoked the Ottoman army to respond by attacking the villages which in turn forced the people to defend themselves or run away. Accordingly, the Macedonian participation in this supremacist uprising did not consciously and voluntarily join the supremacist troops in some form resistance but joined them to defend themselves against the Ottoman attacks. (K. Bitoski, 237/283; Manol Pandevski, The Ilinden Uprising in Macedonia 1903, Skopje 1978, 19-30.)

The “Gorno-Dzhumai Region Uprising”, similar to the “Melnik Uprising” of 1895, did cause damages to the Macedonian national liberation struggle. Linking the failure of the Ilinden Uprising with the negative influence of the Supremacist “Gorno-Dzhumai Region Uprising”, Dimo Hadzhi Dimov, in his famous article entitled “The Ilinden Uprising and lessons learned…”, among other things, wrote: “The Ilinden Uprising failed because it was previously compromised by another, an artificial ‘uprising’ called ‘Dzhumaisko’... But the sins of the ‘Dzhumaisko uprising’ are not the only ones. This artificial uprising, however, was directed against the Internal Organization and created the conditions for failure… and at the same time embraced the idea that this was a supremacist insurrection. The authors of the ‘Dzhumaisko’ adventure, who acted on behalf of the Bulgarian government and the Bulgarian court, as they did in 1895, gave the Ottomans all the trump cards and later gave them to the Serbians and Greeks, who always viewed Macedonia with greed. It gave them the idea that the Macedonian population was simply an instrument for implementing internal policies by an internal state actor and, consequently, plans should be made and measures taken to eradicate the internal actor. So, the “Gorno-Dzhumai Region Uprising” was a blow not to the Ottomans, but to Macedonia itself and to its ideals...”

Armed supremacist action in Macedonia spurred the great powers, especially Russia and Austro-Hungary, as the “most interested” parties in the events in Macedonia, to speed up the preparation for reforms, hoping that in this way they would calm down the revolutionary atmosphere in Macedonia and ease the turbulent events. The Great Powers were all categorical against violating the status quo in Macedonia, i.e. they were against any serious changes in this part of the Balkans and hence, more or less, were against the Macedonian revolutionary movement. In other words, they were against an internal uprising and against an external intervention to start an uprising.

On top of the facts mentioned above, which were well-known to all those who played an important role in the MRO, the new Central Committee decided to start an uprising in Macedonia anyway. The main initiator for this uprising was Ivan Garvanov. Garvanov, like

the rest of the Supreme Committee, did not want Macedonia liberated and becoming an autonomous state. He wanted to create the right conditions for Macedonia to be annexed by Bulgaria. Therefore, he did not see the upcoming uprising as an act that would have contributed to the liberation of Macedonia, he understood this to be a wider armed action, a continuation of the ‘Dzhumaisko uprising’ that was provoked by the Supreme Committee, which would exacerbate the Macedonian question even further. More precisely, he worked within the framework of the policy built in Sofia which foresaw clashes, pressures, rattling, propaganda and the like, creating the necessary atmosphere for the forthcoming “liberation” (and occupation) of Macedonia by the Bulgarian army.

It is not surprising that Garvanov and his companions exacerbated the uprising, even though they knew in advance that the MRO was not ready and conditions for an uprising were not even at their minimum. In the circular letter he sent out on January 6, 1903, Garvanov called for a Solun Congress to take place. The letter was sent out, more or less, immediately after the suppression of the Gorno-Dzhumaisko supremacist uprising, but also after another important event. Namely, in December of the same year, members of the Belgrade, Sofia and Vienna governments visited Count Lamsdorf, Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs. Count Lamsdorf firmly ordered the Bulgarian government in the name of his imperial government, as well as in that of Vienna, not to allow any changes to take place in this part of the Balkans and asked the representatives of the Macedonian immigrants in Bulgaria and those of the MRO (Dr. Tatarchev and Hristo Matov) who he had met to take care to end all “disorders” in Macedonia. They were told that Russia and Austria-Hungary, with the help from the other major powers, would solve the Macedonian question through reforms.

On the question: “What will the Great Power do should an uprising take place in Macedonia?” Lamsdorf and the other Great Power representatives all unanimously said: “We will allow the Ottomans to stifle it!” Those factors in the Macedonian movement whose heart was in the interest of the Macedonian people found it hard to accept this; the direction the Great Powers had taken. The Macedonian revolutionary movement had developed legally and in accordance with historically established law. Its aims were to liberate

Macedonia and therefore the MRO found it very difficult to subordinate itself and work in the interest of external factors, even if those external factors were Great Powers. It is true that the MRO saw the uprising as a means of realizing its liberation program but not as a timely objective. It was completely normal to think that the uprising would take place… but only when the conditions inside were right. The uprising would begin when the necessary internal conditions were met and when there would be minimum foreign interference. The history of the Balkan Liberation Movements have taught us that the Balkan peoples (Serbs, Greeks, Bulgarians) expelled the Ottoman authorities during a time of great political turmoil in Europe in which even the Ottomans participated, and with the help of the Great Powers, especially with Russian help. But, when the uprising in Macedonia was decided, Europe was at peace and all the powers in Europe were on the Ottoman side. Relations were such that it was clear to everyone that the streams of blood the Macedonian people would spill would never touch any of the Great Powers and none of them would stand firmly on Macedonia’s side. For their own interests Russia and the other Great Powers were determined not to allow the Macedonian people to succeed in liberating themselves. Of course both Garvanov and Anastas Lozanchev, president of the Bitola District Committee, as well as other factors, knew this very well but went ahead with starting the uprising.

Almost all historical arguments support the opinion that Garvanov’s initiative for convening the Solun Congress in January 1903, and his decision to start a general uprising in the coming spring, was a great conspiracy against the Macedonian National Liberation Movement. The manner in which the convention was convened, the profile of the majority of persons who attended it (appointed as opposed to being democratically elected), the people attending it, the arguments used by Garvanov to persuade the “delegates” to start an uprising early… all point to the fact and unequivocally confirm that the elements who wanted to start the uprising were well-aware that the aim of this uprising was not to liberate Macedonia, but for the Supreme Committee to create the right conditions for Bulgaria to annex Macedonia regardless of the bloodshed and destruction it would bring to the Macedonian people.

In order to win over the Congress Delegates, especially the reluctant ones, to vote for the uprising, the Central Committee declared that it “took into account the mood and interest of European diplomacy in regards our people’s work”, and that Garvanov himself had called on the French Ambassador to Tsari Grad, who reportedly said: “If an uprising starts in Macedonia, it will surely be given broad rights.” Garvanov also said: “If the uprising lasts for more than two weeks, Bulgaria will enter the war.” (H. Silianov, 197). These statements made by the Central Committee and by Garvanov, and presented to the Congress, were all lies. The French ambassador said no such thing and neither did the Bulgarian government promise to enter into a war.

Garvanov conveniently “forgot” to inform the Congress about what Count Lamsdorf had said and about the Great Power attitude towards an uprising in Macedonia. This information was widely circulated in Europe and should have been very familiar to all the Delegates. But, despite all this, the only representative to oppose an early uprising was L. Dimitrov from Seres Region, who reminded the Congress that Gotse Delchev and Iane Sandanski were also against such an uprising. Unfortunately, Gotse, Iane and many like them from the MRO, who were against an early upraising, were not invited to the Congress. Dimitrov also informed the Congress that the Great Powers did not want an uprising in Macedonia at this time. He also reminded them of the Russian Government’s argument and position, which categorically did not want “disorder” in Macedonia.

Even though the entire world did not want an early uprising in Macedonia, the Solun Congress decided to have one anyway. Great credit for this should be given to A. Lozanchev who, without asking any of the regional leaders, advocated for a general Macedonia wide uprising on behalf of the Bitola Revolutionary District. Later, during the MRO District Congress, held in Smilevo, some of the Delegates were strongly criticized for not exercising their own will to oppose him.

From the scanty documents available describing events that took place during the Congress, there was no indication that the actions of the Gemidzhii were even considered. S. Simeonov, however, wrote that the Congress was determined to “remove the actions of

the conspirators”. (St. Simeonov, 14-15). Garvanov was obliged to point out to the Gemidzhii the following arguments: “The uprising that was to be raised would fail if the intelligentsia did not lead the insurgents. And if the Gemidzhii acted there would be consequences for the intelligentsia; they would all go to prison and the uprising would be crushed.”

The Gemidzhii reportedly agreed to postpone their actions until after the uprising, but were not willing to give them up. However, the Central Committee did not agree with them and “wanted to take over everything and frustrate every action…”

Then, wrote Simeonov, it was decided to either kill or poison all the Gemidzhii but there was no one willing to do it. The Central Committee subordinate authorities “were disappointed with their leaders and fully sympathized with the Gemidzhii”. On the other hand, Garvanov and his men appeared to have come to the conclusion that it was too late to undertake such drastic measures to prevent the Gemidzhii from acting in Solun. Also, due to the nature of their work, the Gemidzhii were very cautious. They could not all be killed at the same time and those who survived would still act and do damage including blowing up the Bank. The dynamite was in the tunnel and was “waiting” to be activated.

Garvanov and his close associates from the Central Committee saw the Gemidzhii as obstacles and fundamentally harmful to their work. They were regarded as young men infected by some false teachings (socialism, anarchism) who tried to apply those teachings on Macedonian soil without understanding them. They treated them like “adventurers”, like people without a homeland and the like. And, most importantly, they were considered dangerous because their actions in Solun were jeopardizing, most of all, the Central Committee’s personal security.

* * *

Outside of the MRO Central Committee, the revolutionaries who belonged to the Gemidzii circle maintained good relations with the MRO and separately with its most authoritative member - Gotse Delchev. Even though the Gemidzhii did not want to have

connections with the people and with the MRO, that connection was maintained especially during critical times and when help was needed. Delchev was always ready to help and did help the Gemidzhii. The MRO, on the other hand, hardly requested the circle’s services except when the Central Committee was headed by Dr. Tatarchev in 1900. Tatarchev asked S. Merdzhanov, then leader of the Tdari Grad group, to appeal to the Exarchates to appoint his people teachers in the Macedonian cities in a manner proposed by the Central Committee. But a serious dispute emerged which became the principle cause in the deteriorating relations between the Gemidzhii and the MRO Central Committee. “Until that time,” wrote Shatev, “we did not have any relationship with the IMRO Central Committee, and we did not want to have any...” Mandzhukov in particular appeared to be against any kind of relations with the Central Committee. The Gemidzhii, according to Mandzhukov, had no point of contact with the Central Committee and did not want to have one either. And, therefore, there was no need to be in the service of the Central Committee. The MRO did its business one way, using separate methods of action, and the Gemidzhii did their business in another and quite different way.

But the question is: “What did the assassins and those in Tsari Grad think, as opposed to the Gemidzhii in Macedonia and in Solun, the centre of the revolutionary movement.” Merdzhanov’s group had little to do with Macedonia. As we have seen, shortly after the Tsari Grad failure the group collapsed. Merdzhanov and Sokolov were killed, and Mandzhukov cooperated with the Gemidzhii but in Bulgaria. He did not return to Macedonia. The Gemidzhii who were well-aware of the situation in Macedonia acted accordingly.

Widely humane in nature, Gotse Delchev appreciated everyone whom he believed was sincere in assisting the struggle for Macedonia’s liberation. He saw the Gemidzhii as contributing factors in the general effort to achieve “the great goal”. So he treated them with love and respect. We should mention here that, from a general point of view, Delchev expected Macedonia to be liberated when the internal political and material conditions were right and when the people were ready to rise. He saw the Gemidzhii as a contributing factor under these conditions and did not try to exclude them from the struggle. On the contrary.

Everyone who wrote about the Solun assassins, for understandable reasons, tried to find arguments to explain and “justify” the Gemidzhii contribution. In that they regularly mention Gotse’s attitude towards them, saying: “Gotse helped them… Gotse encouraged them… Gotse understood them…” etc. The same thing was said by the two surviving Gemidzhii, P. Shatev and T. Organdzhiev, in their memoirs. But even though B. Sarafov supplied the Gemdzhii with a considerable amount of material help, he did not make as much of an impression as Gotse did. The reason for this lies in the fact that all those who understood the problems associated with the liberation struggle and with the relationship between the Supreme Committee and the MRO, knew that Sarafov was prepared to help anyone who would “do something” against the Ottomans in Macedonia. Sarafov did this without taking into consideration what consequences this would have for the people and for the Organization. All Sarafov cared for was to do something violent in Macedonia. To shoot, to kill, to blow up things… to make a lot of noise so that it could be heard in Bulgaria and Europe.

Here is what Shatev himself had to say about Delchev and his relationship with the Gemidzhii and their work:

“He (Gotse) fully adopted, supported and approved this kind of struggle (diversionary actions) because, primarily, it was against an early general uprising. An early uprising at that time when the Europeans were not ready to support one would not have yielded positive results. On the contrary, an early uprising would have torn apart the IMRO even more, and would not have prompted any kind of Great Power intervention. Gotse knew that. But, at the same time, with his true view of things, Gotse Delchev also foresaw a need to act and not just sit there. More than organizing and arming the population was needed. Gotse believed that by taking a series of systematic actions it would keep the Ottoman government in a tense situation. Eventually it would exhaust it. But care had to be taken so as not to severely impact domestic and foreign policy especially those of the Great Powers. Another means of this struggle was to intimidate the European capitalists who were engaged in Macedonia and Odrin by taking regular actions against the railroads, bridges and their trade facilities. This was not just an idea, or just Gotse

Delchev’s idea, it was an expression of everyone’s wishes and aspirations in IMRO...” (P. Shatev, 299-300.)

Authors need to closely link Gotse Delchev with the Gemidzhii and their actions especially when they write about the terrible consequences associated with the Solun assassinations. They want to prove that the “culprits” of creating the terrible situation in Macedonia and with the MRO after the Solun assassinations were not just the Gemidzhii but also the first person (Delchev) leading the MRO who helped the Gemidzhii and who approved their actions.

After all Delchev did help the Gemidzhii with their last preparations. The Gemidzhii ran out of money and they needed support for months. They also needed more dynamite but could no longer seek help from Sarafov. At that time (in the fall of 1902) Sarafov found himself abroad and without money. He telegraphed Mechev to send him 25 napoleons and promised that he would pay him back double the amount after he returned to Sofia. After some hesitation, the Gemidzhii decided to send Sarafov the money by draining their precious reserves. Mechev and Shatev went to the post office to do the job, however, Mechev who was famous among his comrades for his good housekeeping and austerity, counted the money ten times before surrendering it to the post office. He did not want to make a mistake, he said. He went to the post office three times before he finally surrendered the money. He did not want to part with it and kept making excuses for giving it away. This money belonged to the people and being the way he was, characterized by his high morals and revolutionary qualities, he could not easily give it up, even for Sarafov, to whom the Gemidzhii were indebted. Mechev truly believed that once the money left his hands (which were considered as a kind of treasury by the circle) he would never see it again, especially when it was needed the most. They did send Sarafov the money but Mechev could hardly reconcile himself. He fretted for about an hour after they left the post office.

Left without sufficient funds, the Gemidzhii turned to Delchev for help. Delchev told them that he would give them a lot of money if they promised not to rush their actions. The money would come from MRO’s Representative Office.

At that time Delchev and Petrov were no longer delegates of the Organization in Bulgaria. They were replaced by Tushe Delivanov and Dimitar Stefanov. After becoming leader of the MRO Central Committee, Garvanov would not allow authoritative people like Delchev and Petrov, who not only represented the Organization, but at that moment in time were in charge of the functions of the true Central Committee which had been arrested by the Ottomans. Delchev and Petrov’s replacements, Delivanov and Stefanov, had neither the experience nor the authority of their predecessors. But Delivanov, a longtime friend of Delchev, and Stefanov always worked under Delchev’s influence and at Delchev’s request gave the Gemidzhii 250 liras (obtained as ransom from the kidnapping of Miss Stone). For receiving this money the Gemidzhii were obligated to take no action for the next eight months. This was because the Organization was expecting to import a large quantity of rifles purchased from Greece, which were to be delivered through Solun.

At the time when the Gemidzhii were given the money and told to hold their actions, it was unknown when the uprising was going to take place. We can assume that if the guns were not expected in Solun, the money given to the Gemidzhii would not have been conditional and the Gemidzhii could have carried out their action when they thought it was appropriate. However, even though they were not ready at the time, they would be ready when, in principle, it was decided to start the uprising. The only thing that was not known was the day the uprising was going to start. That is why pressure was put on them to wait and adjust to the needs and interests of the Organization. In the meantime they could fully prepare and be ready to realize their plans.