FINAL PREPARATIONS FOR THE SOLUN ATTACKS – ATTEMPTS TO DELAY

FINAL PREPARATIONS FOR THE SOLUN ATTACKS – ATTEMPTS TO DELAY

The dynamite sent through Kochani and Veles arrived in Solun in February 1903. Given that the tunnel was already dug, the Gemidzhii decided to set aside an amount of dynamite necessary to blow up the bank. The rest was allocated for other purposes. Eleven cans filled with dynamite were placed under the bank’s foundation. The fuse was connected to two cans and run through the tunnel all the way to the basement of the grocery store where it hung, waiting

to be lit. By the beginning of March 1903 the Gemidzhii were ready to blow up the Solun bank. Every day after that one of the Gemidzhii was present in the grocery basement monitoring the situation and, in the event of danger, ready to light the fuse.

During February and March 1903, most of the Gemidzhii were in Solun. Shatev and Mechev were also in Solun but illegally.

After fleeing Kratovo, P. Shatev could not return to Macedonia legally without being arrested. For some reason he was also illegal in Bulgaria. He stayed in Bulgaria for an entire year as an illegal immigrant without any documents. After sending the dynamite to Kochani he made plans to return to Solun but under a different name. Even if he wanted to get a passport under his own name he couldn’t because he was not registered anywhere in Bulgaria and the authorities would not issue him a passport. But, with the help of a fellow Macedonian and friend he did get his passport. His friend Manasov, whose credentials Shatev used, was a teacher in Kiustendil. So, through friends and connections, Shatev managed to get a passport with Georgi Manasov’s name and credentials but with his own picture and description. After receiving a visa from the Ottoman commissioner in mid-February, he arrived in Solun through Odrin. After that he was known to his friends and the authorities as Georgi Manasov, a name which, in a few months, would be found on the front pages of the European and world press.

Dimitar Mechev’s arrival in Macedonia and in Solun was more complicated and riskier than that of Shatev. Knowing his “stinginess”, his companions in Solun wrote to him and suggested that he buy new clothes, dress better and definitely travel in a second-class car. Mechev, unfortunately, did not buy the new clothes but did swallow “English salt” several times to upset his stomach and make himself look pale. He did not want to spend money on new clothes when he knew he was going to die soon. With very little camouflage, Mechev traveled through Skopje to Solun. His journey took him through Veles, his hometown, where a lot of people knew him and he was under a great risk of being discovered. For that reason his comrades in Solun took all sorts of measures to free him at the Solun railway station if he was caught by the police on the way. As it turned out, Mechev was traveling from

Skopje to Solun with the remains of the Russian Consul Grigori Shcherbin, who had been killed in Kosovska Mitrovitsa in March 1903. There was a large police presence at the Solun railway station as well as many senior civil servants and other consuls. Next to them were several Gemidzhii with dynamite and bombs in their pockets. It was a great temptation for them to start something, given the number of diplomatic representatives and civil servants gathered together in one place. This is what Kirkov said about this: “With only four Gemidzhii, each throwing a single bomb at the procession accompanying the body of the dead European and Ottoman consul, we could have done far greater damage than blasting the Bank and all the other acts involving dynamite. At that moment we regretted that Mechev was not arrested and that we were not given the opportunity to perform an unanticipated but highly tempting act.

We will never get another chance like this again…” said Kirkov with great pain in his soul. (Ibid, 333.)

Mechev arrived in Solun without any problems. In Skopje he was joined by Ismail Efendi, a translator from the Embassy in Skopje, who sat in the same car compartment as him. Ismail was also born in Veles and he knew Mechev. So in order to hide from Ismail, Mechev covered up part of his face, pretending to have a toothache. But to Ismail Efendi the man sitting next to him looked familiar and he suspected that it might be Mechev but refused to believe that a well-known “terrorist” from Veles would have the nerve to travel so freely in the Sultan’s train, let alone visit Veles where he was well known. He wouldn’t dare. At the same time Ismail did not have the nerve to speak to him. Ismail was one of those many people in the Ottoman state and in Europe who could not yet be convinced that there were people in Macedonia who were fanatically committed to liberating themselves and who were ready, at a moment’s notice, to sacrifice themselves for their homeland. Ismail calmly got off the train at the Veles station convinced that the man with whom he sat in the compartment could not be the well-known D. Mechev.

Towards the end of March 1903 the following Gemidzhii had gathered in Solun: Iordan Popiordanov-Ortse, Kosta Kirkov, Dimitar Mechev-Mecheto, Pavel Shatev (also known as Gorgi Manasov), Vlado Pingov, Ilia Trchkov, Georgi Bogdanov, Marko Boshnakov,

and the youngest in the circle Milan Arsov. It was a small group but big enough to attract the attention of the Ottoman police with their idleness in Solun. An official from the secret police named Panaiot Efendi, who in the past served in Veles, knew almost all the Veles Gemidzhii and frequently followed their movements on the Solun streets, wanting at all costs to know what these young men from Veles were up to in Solun. He was aware that they were not working or attending school so why were they still lingering in Solun? There were some who were saying that these boys were the sons of rich Veles parents, who were deliberately coming to Solun, beyond parental control, to devote themselves to the “easy” Solun life in the cafés and other entertainment localities. Having rich parents allowed them the luxury to spend a bit more carefree time, with no work, and if they did visit some stores and the like, they did it for company, conversation and entertainment, and not for any other reasons.

The image the Gemidzhii portrayed of themselves was successful and working for them. Both the police and the environment in which they circulated accepted them as such, and none of the relevant factors suspected them of doing anything more than “talking”. People thought of them as being “everything” except nobody thought or believed that they were dealing in conspiratorial activities. Even Panaiot Efendi believed that they were no more than playboys with nothing serious in their lives. Had the authorities looked a little deeper they would have discovered the truth. They would have discovered that these boys, spending time in all those café’s, were actually poor. They spent no money and could barely survive in Solun.

The Gemidzhii, however, were very careful not to cause suspicion among the authorities as they prepared to act. Their main goal was to blow up the Ottoman Bank, but they also had another very important goal: by their self-sacrifice to prove to Europe that this country could no longer tolerate slavery.

Preparations for blowing up the bank required the engagement of many people and assets. Keeping the grocery stocked and operational, digging the tunnel and acquiring the dynamite were not only risky tasks but required people, money and time. However, when all of this was done, the need for people was reduced to one

person to light the fuse and disappear without a trace and another person to board a ship. This person’s life could truly be in danger. But the Gemidzhii did not care about “their own” lives and were prepared to die for their country. So, instead of fleeing, the Gemidzii decided to use bombs to prove their point. About 70 to 80 primitive hand-made bombs were manufactured with the leftover dynamite and used for diversion on the ship. These bombs, which were triggered by igniting a fuse, did not have much effect in the open but were suitable for causing panic by their strong explosions. The Gemidzhii knew in advance that throwing these bombs in the streets of Solun against the army and police would not do much damage, except that they would create a panic in the city and the impression that people were being killed. If they wanted to kill people they would have manufactured iron bombs, the kind produced in the village Salbar workshop. They only had about ten of those bombs.

With the making of the bombs, all material preparations for acting were completed. The Gemidzhii in Veles expected that there would be a certain amount of dynamite left for them to “do something” in Veles and Skopje but there was none left for them.

The moment the Gemidzhii were ready to act, the question of “when to start the actions” was raised. It was obvious that they did not want to wait at all and wanted to light the fuse right away but they had promised MRO’s Foreign Representative Office that they would wait. It was not difficult for them to have made that promise at the time because they were not yet ready but now when everything was ready they started to become impatient. They were constantly overwhelmed by a sense of fear that something would go wrong and that the many years of effort and preparations would fail. On the other hand, the dynamite was sitting under the bank’s foundations in the soil and it was possible for moisture to get into it and render it inert. The Gemidzhii were constantly preoccupied with the uncertainty of what could happen tomorrow, so much so that it terrified them. Chatev admitted that they were constantly tense and nervous to a point where they could not even tolerate each other. “If we fail,” Ortse often said, “we should drown in shame”.

If we analyze the psychological condition in which members of the Gemidzhii circle were found after they completed all their

preparations, keeping in mind the fact that they were ready to die even if they had a chance to save themselves, we will find that they were impatient but determined to wait for the right time before they acted. Unfortunately something happened that was about to change all that. One day the communal authorities were called in to repair a sour line running over the tunnel that the Gemidzhii had dug. As the workers began to dig and repair the city sewerage network the Gemidzhii became quite agitated. Even though the tunnel they dug was deep and the ability to detect it was small, they became disturbed. News that came from abroad was even more disturbing. Some newspapers, such as Le Temps and Die Zeit, were broadcasting reports that the Macedonian Revolutionary Organization was planning to attack various European companies in some of the larger Macedonian cities. Who was the source of this news being transmitted from Bulgaria was unknown. However, it alerted the Ottoman authorities to be even more vigilant. From that moment on, two weeks before the explosions, the Ottomans posted guards at the Ottoman Bank (Bank de Salonik), at the Austrian Post Office and at some other important buildings.

Watching the guards walking around the bank’s perimeter made of Gemidzhii laugh. The poor fools were standing on top of the dynamite. The Ottoman police, especially in the bigger cities, became quite vigilant but in no case did it occur to them that the Bank could be mined from underground. According to news reported in the west, the authorities were anticipating attacks, but these attacks were expected to take place on the surface (as opposed to underground). Now that the authorities were alerted of imminent attacks, even in the big cities, the Gemidzhii were not sure how much the police already knew so they could not longer afford to wait. They decided to act… to perform the last act for which they had waited for so long…

First, a concrete and definitive plan had to be made. Ortse Popiordanov and K. Kirkov, who were most familiar with the city, worked on the plan. Their plan was approved during the group’s meeting which also raised two important questions. One, whether to kill Hassan Fehmi-pasha, the Solun Vali and, two, whether to kill Ivan Garvanov, President of the MRO Central Committee? The proposal for killing the Vali was unanimously accepted - it was

decided that it would be done a few days after the explosions, because if it was done earlier it would cause raids, retaliation and arrests, during which some of the Gemidzhii would be killed. The task of killing the Vali was entrusted to Tsvetko Traikov in a suicide mission.

The proposal to eliminate Garvanov as retaliation for the loss of the 1,000 kg dynamite and for cutting short the possibility of expanding Gemidzhii actions in other Macedonian towns was declared useless because nothing could be achieved by it. The Gemidzhii figured that through their action in Solun it would make it impossible for the MRO Central Committee to exist in Solun anyway. The Gemidzhii also accepted the idea and promised to bring change to the MRO Central Committee composition to ideally include more active professional revolutionaries, and not just “officials and traders”.

* * *

The Gemidzhii were ready to act mid-April but they did not want to start without first forewarning the MRO and even Garvanov himself.

At exactly the same time Damian Gruev was freed from prison and arrived in Solun. He was informed by the MRO Central Committee that a resolution to start the uprising had already been reached. He was also informed about Garvanov’s motives for making that decision. Garvanov’s goal, naturally, was to persuade Damian Gruev that he was right in making that decision and succeeded in doing so. Garvanov had done such a good job that when Delchev came to Solun to meet with Gruev about postponing the start of the uprising, he was not able to convince him. Gruev thought that it was too late for changing the plans. (Memoirs - D. Gruev..., 23.) Delchev left Solun dissatisfied just before the Gemidzhii started their actions, and a few days later was killed in Banitsa.

Gruev said nothing in his memoirs about his meeting with Dimitar Mechev. Mechev, as mentioned earlier, was well acquainted with Gruev and now, just before the Gemidzhii began their actions, he wanted to meet with him urgently. He wanted to let him know what the Gemidzhii were preparing and that they were against an early uprising. Mechev did meet with Gruev at the “Vardar” hotel where

Gruev had taken residence and openly told him that the Gemidzhii circle was against a mass uprising, because he thought that it could not be organized well under the given conditions, and it would result in damaging not only the movement but also the general population. Mechev warned Gruev that the people were not armed, and that the rifles expected to come from Greece through Solun had not yet arrived. In short, Mechev told Gruev that the MRO was not ready to rise and lead a mass uprising. According to Garvanov, however, Gruev was convinced that 1,000 rifles were on their way and would arrive in Solun, and that Delchev had to calm him down encouraging him that the necessary arms would be found in time.

Mechev had also told Delchev the same thing. “That is why I am telling you, as I told Delchev,” said Mechev to Gruev, “we are determined to carry out our plan at all costs. Let our actions and other similar actions, carried out in the cities and against the railroads throughout Macedonia, keep the Ottoman government in constant tension, gradually exhausting its moral and material strength. These acts will also demonstrate to what extent the Great Powers will be ready and prepared to take the initiative for an intervention. At the same time the population will harden its revolutionary spirit without being exposed to great dangers.” (S. Simeonov, 14-15, P. Shatev, 342-343.)

The arguments that Gruev heard from Mechev were far more realistic and more convincing than those he had heard from Garvanov. These “arguments” made by Mechev were also the same arguments made by Delchev, Petrov and the “many other and more aware members of the Macedonian Revolutionary Organization”. (S. Simeonov, 15.) Gruev, however, had reconciled with the idea that the uprising would be taking place as planned here in Solun and decided to act on it. He then demanded that the Gemidzhii postpone their actions until after the uprising. This way they would be able to deliver a final blow to Europe. We don’t know if Gruev talked with Delchev about what to do with the Gemidzhii and their plans. After Delchev left Solun (he was there as an illegal), Gruev left for Bitola. From Bitola he went to his native village Smilevo and attended the Bitola Revolutionary District Congress.

Ortse officially notified Garvanov about the upcoming planned Gemidzhii actions. Here is how Hristo Kotsev, a witness to this event, described the scene:

“We were gathered (at the gymnasium) together one bright Saturday in order to discuss current events and exchange thoughts. Suddenly Garvanov’s assistant barged in and told Garvanov that an unknown person was looking for him. Garvanov went out and a little later came back. He told us that the unknown person was Ortse, leader of the anarchists, who came to tell him that the Gemidzhii had decided to act immediately. He tried to convince them that their actions would damage the movement. He told them that the Internal Organization had already decided to start an uprising in the summer. He also told them that the anarchist actions would be useless if the uprising did not succeed... But all the arguments made were in vain…”

“Did you happen to run out of money and you don’t want to tell me?” Garvanov asked Ortse, pretending that he did not pay serious attention to what Ortse had to say.

“Not at all! I came here to tell you something very serious. I came to tell you that we will start our actions immediately and to warn you to take necessary measures to protect yourself from the danger…” replied Ortse proudly and showed him a bomb that he had in his pocket.

Still not taking him seriously, Garvanov took out a dozen liras from his pocket and gave them to him. Ortse took the money and left.

“In the afternoon, one of the boys who hung around with them (Gemidzhii) came over and told us that these ‘crazy people’ had decided to act the next day. They decided to throw bombs on the train from Tsari Grad, which was arriving at the train station Sunday evening. In any case, to be safe, we collected all the materials from the archives and all the press materials in our possession and buried them in the gymnasium courtyard.” (H. Kotsev, Prelude to Ilinden, July 20, 1903 - Ilinden Sbonik 1903-1922, Sofia 1922, 48.)

Some of the information provided by Hristo Kotsev about the Gemidzhii, we can say without reservation, is incorrect. He claims that the 7 or 8 souls (Gemidzhii) were Sarafov’s people whom Sarafov had sent to Solun to prepare for these actions with prior MRO Central Committee permission. He claims that the Central Committee was responsible for them and gave them 50 liras per month. They were given six months to prepare and when they were ready they simply betrayed the Central Committee. Then, when Kotsev figured out that he had been lied to about the relationship between the Gemidzhii and the MRO, he began to blame the Gemidzhii for wanting to start the uprising early, which was also not true.

Gotse Delchev was categorically against the Gemidzhii acting independently. He considered them an integral part of the revolutionary movement and helped them precisely because of that. Delchev did not believe that those young and courageous revolutionaries would do something that would be against the interests of the MRO. Delchev considered them and their preparations as part of the general preparations for the demolition of Ottoman power in Macedonia and accordingly expected their actions to be in harmony with those of the Organization. Delchev’s contemporaries unambiguously confirm these views in their memoirs.

In the middle of January 1903, Delchev invited A. Kiprov, a close associate of the Gemidzhii, to the hotel “Batemberg” in Sofia and told him:

“You will come with me. We will not do madness. Whatever we do, we will do together. We should not deviate from the general plan…”

In a discussion regarding the pros and cons of having a mass uprising involving most of the population, Kiprov told Delchev that what the Organization could accomplish with many human casualties could be achieved more effectively with less casualties. Kiprov, in fact, developed the same uprising theory advocated by the Gemidzhii. Kiprov and Delchev had a long discussion about this, but when Delchev saw that he was not getting through to Kiprov he began to nervously pace in the room. Delchev then told Kiprov:

“Good! Do what you like. But tell your friends that they are driving me crazy.”

After talking to Delchev, Kiprov went to see Sarafov, who at that time was hiding in Sofia and was preparing a unit to leave for Macedonia. Kiprov also ran into Ortse and told him about the conversation he had had with Delchev. Sarafov’s advice to Kiprov was to “act and destroy regardless of time and space”.

“One cannot carry out a revolution by being prudent,” said Sarafov. “We have to fight against Ottoman tyranny by all possible means.” (Alexander Kiprov, Signal of the Revolution – Il. Ilinden, III, 24, Sofia, 1930.)

Explaining Delchev’s position regarding the Gemidzhii and their actions, Kiprov, among other things, wrote: “Delchev was sympathetic to our ideas, but would not deviate from the MRO’s general principles. He was always in opposition and looked for ways to ‘rein’ us in. But, at the same time, we were all his best friends. He loved Ortse, the hero of the Solun assassin...” (Ibid, 5.)

Delchev also met with Mechev in the same hotel, before he left Solun, however, he could not convince him to work with him and not independently.

There are some indications that would make us think that Delchev, when he met with Gruev in Solun, also met with the Gemidzhii. However, it is more probable that the Gemidzhii, being ready to start their actions, did not have the opportunity to meet with Delchev. After all, they were well aware of Delchev’s attitude and their eventual meeting could not have influenced anything. But, even though Delchev sympathized with their actions, he was a revolutionary very much conscious of all actions in the broader sense, and everything he did, he did in accordance with the revolutionary plan and in the interest of the people and the Organization. There was no need for Delchev to convince the Gemidzhii that the Organization was not yet ready to lead the people into a general uprising. He knew that better than them. But, at the same time, he did not believe that the Gemidzhii, through a small

number of isolated actions using dynamite, could yield important results and through them the people would be spared the terror and murders committed by the authorities.

Delchev and Petrov who opposed the “insufficiently prepared” general uprising, developed another theory: a “permanent (continuous) uprising”. They did their best and used their influence to reject the idea of a “classical” proclamation of an uprising in favour of continually attacking and terrorizing the Ottoman administrative authorities and institutions. This, they believed, under the current circumstances, was the most effective way of acting. Delchev advocated for launching parallel attacks. “While MRO’s armed units attacked the Ottoman army, the Gemidzhii would attack railway lines and state institutions...” But he had not forgotten to point out that this should always have been done away from the Christian population, in order not to subject it to persecution and cruelty from the authorities. “This is what Delchev preached,” wrote P. Iavorov, “because he was guided by the love of his people through every moment in his tumultuous life. He wanted the Macedonian population to live free more than he wanted Macedonia to be freed. Delchev was not prepared to sacrifice dozens of thousands of souls even if they belonged to proven Ottoman spies...” (P. K. Iavarov, Gotse Delchev, Sofia 1942, 74.)

Delchev worked tirelessly to organize the population and to prepare it for the uprising. In fact he was preparing the population to prepare itself for making great sacrifices. However, he was decisive against unnecessary and innocent victims. He accepted the use of terrorism but as a means within the liberation struggle, which had its place in space and time. That is why he did not agree with the Gemidzhii carrying out their action at a time when the Organization was not ready. He was aware of the harsh consequences of this and, it would appear, the Gemidzhii did not think about what would happen to them.