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The Balkan Mega-ethnos: National Doctrines of Macedonia's Neighbours

S. SFETAS - K. KENTROTIS

Од Dimitar Mirchev · Дел 23 од 31 · Околу 28 минути

Читај на Македонски

S. SFETAS - K. KENTROTIS

SKOPJE IN SEARCH OF AN IDENTITY AND INTERNATIONAL RECOGNITION

Critical review of the MANU edition “Macedonia and its Relations with Greece”, Skopje, 1993

257 - THE INSTITUTE FOR BALKAN STUDIES, SOLUN, 1994

(EXCERPTS, THE LAST 15 PAGES OF THE BOOKLET IN THE THIRTEENTH CHAPTER)

Chapter thirteen (The Establishment of the Macedonian State in the Second World War, pp. 91-94) states that during the first days of the occupation, the Communist Party of Macedonia organized resistance which in 1943 and 1944 made considerable gains. Then, in accordance with the decisions of the Anti-Fascist Assembly for the People’s Liberation of Yugoslavia (29 11 1943 in the Bosnian town of Iaitse) and for the federalization of Yugoslavia, on August 2, 1944, the founding of the “People’s Republic of Macedonia” was proclaimed at the First Macedonian Assembly (ASNOM).

But historic events developed somewhat differently. It is well-known that the Bulgarian army at the time had occupied the Serbian part of Macedonia and was welcomed as a liberator with some sense of Bulgaro-phil euphoria during the first part of the occupation. The Slavic population that turned out had no communist views of a separate “Macedonian nation” or any idea of a Yugoslav federation. There was no Communist Party of “Macedonia” because the Communist Party of Yugoslavia’s decision from 1934 to create a “Macedonian” Communist Party found it was not possible. The local communists under the leadership of M. Shatarov broke away from the Communist Party of Yugoslavia and crossed into the Bulgarian Workers’ Party (Communists) under the slogan “one country, one party”. The subsequent resentment that developed against the Bulgarian occupying authorities was due to social (arbitrary, heavy taxation, contempt of local sentimentality) and not to national reasons. Unable to find favourable grounds, the resistance movement turned towards Josip Broz Tito in Yugoslav

Macedonia. Characteristic of this is the letter from Tito, dated January 16, 1943, addressed to the Local regional Committee for “Macedonia” of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia:

“Dear friends, from the material that you have sent us, it shows that you view the character and aim of our current people’s liberation struggle as deficient and wrong, but you have made a huge mistake. In general, it is an obvious weakness of the party organization, which is influenced by the anti-Party clique and by the activities of your previous leader (by which he means Shatorov - our note) and has yet to solidify organizationally and recover politically and become independent. The main characteristics of the party organization in Macedonia are: insufficiently and inconsistently implemented in accordance with the political line of our party, indecision about their implementation, organizational weaknesses and mistakes, loose and reluctant attitudes towards the collective, foreign, non-partisan and opportunistic elements within the party, setting restrictions on the issue of the liberation and independence of the Macedonian people, absence in the links with the acting masses, tolerance for autonomist tendencies in the organizational-party character, and autonomist tendencies of national character...” (See S. Vukmanovich-Tempo, A Revolution that Flows, U. 2. Zagreb 1982, p. 371-372.)

The Communist Party of “Macedonia” was founded under great difficulty, in February 1943, by Svetozar Vukomanovich-Tempo, one of Tito’s parliamentarians in Yugoslav Macedonia, but without having to change the situation. The armed resistance started developing only after Italy’s capitulation (September 1943) and when Germany’s defeat was discernible. This was when the CPY began its propagation of the older Communist International thesis on the existence of a separate “Macedonian nation” and with its plans to create a “Greater Macedonia” (which would consist of the Greek, Serbian and Bulgarian parts of Macedonia) under a Yugoslav federation. The expansionistic spirit was strongly manifested in the ASNOM proclamation as well as in the texts and public statements made by members of Parliament. The unification of all parts of Macedonia stood out like a “fair and strong” wish on the part of the Yugoslav federation. To achieve this goal, Skopje was asked to play the role of a “Macedonian shield”. After Tito’s clash with the

Cominform (June 1948) and after the defeat of the Greek communists in August 1949, the Yugoslav leadership temporarily abandoned its plans for a “final solution” of the Macedonian Question and concentrated on growing and strengthening the new national identity of the Slavic population in Yugoslav Macedonia and the elimination of any antagonistic effects.

The “Macedonia-zation” was not realized automatically. It was a procedure during which, in its first phase, the Yugoslav leaders began to eradicate all Bulgarian organizations that were opposed to the idea of Macedonian-ism. The “Macedonia-zation” was then based on an anti-Bulgarian basis and on a new form of Serbian rule in the region. (See Chrnushanov, same as above, p. 283-329.)

At the same time, many veterans of the VMRO were charged with being “Bugaromani”, supporters of Ivan Mihailov and sentenced to imprisonment or death, because they aspired, according to their indictment, to the succession of Yugoslav Macedonia, as an independent state, being placed under the auspices of the Great Powers, believing that it would make it easier to manage the unification of all parts of Macedonia as a united and independent state. Included among the victims of this was Chento, the first President of ASNOM. (For the trials that took place during the second half of the forties and the events thereafter, consult Ristevski’s most recent book “Tried for Macedonia” (1945-1985), Skopje (publication of “Vreme”) 1993. Today’s President Kiro Gligorov was for the non-entry of Yugoslav Macedonia into the future of the Yugoslav federation in 1943. See K. Paleshutski, “NATIONAL PROBLEM IN THE JUGOSLAV FEDERATION”, BULGARIAN ACADEMY OF SCIENCES / INSTITUT FOR BALKAN STUDIES (SOFIA), NATIONAL PROBLEMS IN THE BALKANS, SOFIA 1992, p. 96.20.)

At the same time, the Yugoslav leaders fielded questions about respecting the rights of the supposed “Macedonian” minority in neighbouring countries. Many references from the Yugoslav leadership, regarding this issue, clearly say that the regime established by Tito never showed much interest in a united Macedonia. Official historiography and social sciences in the former Socialist Federal Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia were mobilized

in one ethno genesis operation, which inevitably stumbled on a historical tradition and the cultural identity of most neighbouring nations. Skopje’s fresh national ideology relied on the assumption that “Macedonian people” in all three parts of the eponymous geographic area will match and that the Greek and Bulgarian parts of Macedonia are not free.

Chapter fifteen (THE MACEDONIAN LANGUAGE IN THE BALKAN LANGUAGE ENVIROMMENT, p. 105-111) and chapter sixteen (MACEDONIAN CULTURE, p. 113-119) talk about the morphological characteristics of the “Macedonian language”, about its affirmation in international science and about its literary production after 1944.

The term “Macedonian language” at the level concerning the Slavic linguistic idiom has created confusion. The true Macedonian language is the language of the ancient Macedonians, a Greek Doric dialect. The so-called “Macedonian language”, both in terms of morphology and structure, has many common features with the Bulgarian language. For example, the absence of the infinitive, the absence of descent, the use of the indefinite timing, member, the descriptive form of comparative, etc. Based on these facts the so-called “Macedonian language” could be characterized more as a Bulgarian idiom. (H. BRAUER, SLAVISCHE SPRACHWISSENSCHAFT, BERLIN 1961, Bulgarian Academy of Sciences (Institute of the Bulgarian Language. The common Bulgarian language of the past and today, /from the Bulgarian magazine “Bulgarian language” 1/1978/ Sofia , 1978.)

After 1945 a systematic effort was made to de-Bulgarize the Slavic idiom. The Serbian alphabet was adopted, the typical Bulgarian letter “ъ” was abolished and many Serbian words (government, role, reality, profession, floor) were adapted despite the fact that there were corresponding Bulgarian words. The instrumental locative Serbian language was adopted as an object of expressing verbs with the proposed “so” plus the appropriate word, something which was unnatural in this idiom (for example: upravljam drzhavom -upravuvam so drzhavata), the extension of the surnames from “ova” and “ov” were turned into “ovska” and “ovski”. (For the influence of the Serbian language see N. REITER “DIE

SERBISCHMAKEDONISCHE SYMBIOSE”, YUGOSLAWIEN, INTERNATIONSPROBELEME IN GESCHICHTE UND GENENWART. BEITRAGE, ZUM V. INTERNATIONALEN SUDOSTEUROPA - KONGRESS, GOTTINGEN 1984, p. 178-195.)

Similarly, it needs to be pointed out that the so-called “Macedonian language” is not unique and uniform, but there are many similar languages depending on the region. Several dialects from the region were used as a basis for creating a literary “Macedonian language” in the Federal Socialist Republic of “Macedonia”, because they were considered to be least influenced by the Bulgarian literary language. Despite raising the so-called “Macedonian language” to a literary level after 1944, and with the uptake of many Serbian words, it still remains a poor language.

Chapter fourteen (THE REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA FROM A MEMBER STATE OF THE YUGOSLAV FEDERATION TO A SOVEREIGN AND INDEPENDENT STATE, p. 95-104) deals with a modern view of the Macedonian Question, namely with the period after 1944 when, for the first time the so-called “Macedonians” gained their own state, and to today’s events with the secession of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia from the Yugoslav federation and its path to independence and international recognition.

The most important among the items to be made use of here, in relation to the post-war period, are as follows:

In the framework of a united Yugoslavia, the “Socialist Republic of Macedonia” will become known worldwide and the “Macedonian” nation will be recognized by the international community.

Because it became impossible for the republics to separate from the federal system, their people decided to free themselves by getting rid of that framework. The “Socialist Republic of Macedonia”, through a peaceful and democratic process, took the necessary steps which finally allowed it to gain its independence, as opposed to other Yugoslav republics which, even today, are trying through military means to assert their new status.

Significant elements of the liberation of the Republic of Macedonia from the Yugoslav federation and its departure on the path of parliamentary democracy were achieved through a referendum held on September 8, 1991. The referendum marked Macedonia’s independence and its constitution was promulgated on November 17, 1991.

The Constitution, which was the result of centuries of struggle by the “Macedonian” people for their national freedom, fully corresponded with the general principles of international law as well as with UN and CSCE decisions for a democratically organized society, acceptance of the parliamentary system of governance , peaceful coexistence with neighbouring countries, respect for personal and collective rights of all citizens, particularly the minorities, protection of cultural, ethnic, linguistic and religious customs of the citizens of this republic, etc.

Based on the expert opinion of the Badinter Arbitration Commission (K. Ioannou: The question of recognition of Skopje, Athens -Komotini 1992) for the Yugoslav crisis, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia had met all conditions set by the European Union on December 16, 1991 for the recognition of the Yugoslav republics. (The joint position of the foreign ministers in the last paragraph specifically stated: “... the community and its member-states require of the Yugoslav republic, before being recognized, to provide political and constitutional assurances that it will not make territorial claims against neighbouring member states of the community and that it would not propagate hostile propaganda against neighbouring member countries in the community, including the use of the name ‘Macedonia’ which implies territorial claims...”)

At the end of this chapter, two declarations were specifically mentioned by the Parliament of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. The first declaration, made on July 3, 1992, refers to the Lisbon decision made by European Union member states on June 27, 1992, which required this Republic to choose such a name, which would not include the term “Macedonia” in order to be recognized and to join the European Union. The second declaration,

made on July 29, 1992, referred to the Republic of Skopje’s decision to apply for admission into the UN.

From the particular findings and events listed in this chapter, one can make the following observations:

Writing about the first post-war multi-party elections of November 1990in this book was telegraphic. According to the election results (B. Timovski / S.Stefanovski Elections: 90. Political parties in Macedonia, Skopje, 1991), which were quietly announced, the extreme nationalist party VMRO-DPMNE (Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization-Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity) was the undisputed winner. The name and the political program of this organization were taken straight from the late 19th century. It was indeed no coincidence that this party, in a State Department report (PATTERNS OF GLOBAL TERRORISM: APRIL 1991, WASHINGTON p. 18), in 1991, was named a terrorist organization precisely because of its activities being based on the old VMRO from a century ago. Also, displayed in its central campaign poster, was a map of Macedonia’s entire geographical territory with the slogan: “Take its fate in your hands.” Even its pre-election manifesto categorically stated: “VMRO-DPMNE considers that the parts of the Macedonian nation that live under occupation in Greece, Bulgaria and Albania are not national minorities, but segments of the enslaved parts of the Macedonian nation, for a nation that has lived for ten centuries in its own homeland cannot be qualified as a national minority. VMRO-DPMNE feels there is immediate need for the spiritual, political and economic unification of the Macedonian people… and truly cares about the Macedonian people living enslaved in Greece, Bulgaria, Serbia and Albania...” (B. Timovski / S. Stefanovski, same as above, p. 137.)

During the Party’s First National Conference held in Prilep on April 6 and 7, 1991 it was decided that the next conference would be held in Solun and after that in Blagoevgrad (Macedonian Voice (ROCKDALE AUSTRALIA) No. 29, 04/23/1991). There is a hidden game behind this referendum which was not referenced in this chapter and that is that 68.32% of the registered and 95.09% of the voters made it clear that they wanted “the sovereignty of an autonomous Macedonia, with the right to participate in a union of

sovereign states in Yugoslavia”. But inside the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and outside, the first part of the referendum question was stressed, i.e. the autonomy of the “Republic of Macedonia”, which was interpreted as “independence” and the second part was under-stressed. Also, the Albanians from that country did not participate in the referendum. It was not until January 11 and 12, 1992 that they organized their own referendum where 99.86% demanded territorial and political autonomy. (LE MONDE, 18.1.1992.)

Despite the amendments and other changes made to the Constitution of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, it still maintained its irredentist character. The main accent is put on the disputed articles from the 1991 Constitution (3 and 49 with corresponding changes-additions, 68 and 74) with aims at acquitting the absence from conducting unfriendly propaganda and laying territorial claims by the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.

Here is a direct reference pointing to the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia’s expansionist aspirations found in the preamble of its Constitution: “... following in the state-legal traditions of the Krushevo Republic (1903) and in the historic decisions of the Anti-Fascist Council of the National Liberation of Macedonia (1944)...” ; the decisions that marked the creation of the “People’s Republic of Macedonia” within Federal Yugoslavia. Clearly, proclaimed with these decisions are the freedom and flexibility of all “brother Macedonians” beyond the artificial 20th century boundaries that shaped the Balkans.

Indicative of this is also the following excerpt from the “Report of the Organizing Committee of National Liberation of Macedonia” (ASNOM) in connection with the activities of the establishment to its first session (August 2, 1944).

“… At this instant, when all fighting forces in Macedonia are engaged in combat against the fascist occupiers, appealing to the other two segments of the Macedonian people to join the grand anti-fascist front, since it is the only way to win the right to self-determination and the path leading to the unification of the entire Macedonian nation in a free community of emancipated peoples of

Yugoslavia. The fighting Piedmont of Macedonia has fiercely proclaimed that it will not stint on support or sacrifice for the liberation of the other two segments of our nation and the universal unification of the entire Macedonian people. When we know that the fighting Piedmont of Macedonia is part of Tito’s Yugoslavia then it is obvious how great our support could be and how firm our desire is for the unification of our entire nation…” (THE UNIVERSITY OF “CYRIL AND METHODIUS”, FACULTY OF PHILOSOPHY AND HISTORY, DOCUMENTS ON THE STRUGGLE OF THE MACEDONIAN PEOPLE FOR INDEPENDENCE AND A NATION-STATE, VOL.2, 1985 SKOPJE, p. 607.)

Similarly, in the manifesto of the First ASNOM Session of the people of Macedonia (August 2, 1944) it characteristically says: “... In view of the centuries-old ideals of the people of Macedonia, the first Macedonian National Council proclaims to the entire world its just and resolute aspiration FOR THE UNIFICATION OF THE WHOLE MACEDONIAN PEOPLE on the principle based on the right to self-determination. This would put an end to the oppression of the Macedonian people in all its parts and would provide conditions for genuine solidarity and peace among the Balkan peoples…” (Ibid: DOCUMENTS, VOL.2, p. 635.)

The element of expansion is not essentially annulled with the amendments and partial amendments to Articles 3 and 49. It is possible, of course, by further amending Article 3 of the Constitution, that “the Republic of Macedonia will have no territorial claims against its neighbouring countries”, which will represent significant progress. But, essentially, it has more of a symbolic gesture, if this amendment is supported as such or otherwise by state obligations (mandatory rule of international law -JUS COGENS to not have territorial pretensions under illegal means, such as the use of violence or breach of international conventions).

Article 3 in relation to Articles 68 and 74, which also relates to border changes, fits into the logic that, if such a change in the border is made, it is made to merge and not to lose territory belonging to the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, as if all its territory under the Constitution is “indivisible” and “inviolable”. To this day,

the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia has not declared official recognition of the existing border with Greece.

In reference to Article 49 of the Constitution regarding minorities; “The Republic of Macedonia cares for the status and rights of the Macedonian people in neighbouring countries...” - Supplement and amendment on January 6, 1992, to say “that the Republic of Macedonia will not meddle in sovereign rights and will not interfere in the internal affairs of other countries” are also an essential lever for territorial claims at the expense of neighbouring countries. The unilateral and arbitrary Constitutional claim of the existence of “Macedonians” in neighbouring countries, when no such thing is recognized by international agreements, is essentially deemed as interference in the internal affairs of neighbouring countries with the motive of protecting the rights of the so-called “Macedonian” minority and, consequently, the said amendment - an amendment which is devoid of value and content.

Here we are specifically talking about the protection of personal and collective rights of the various minority groups in the Republic of Skopje - especially in some articles of the 1991 Constitution. Indicative in this book is the systematic reference of the role of international organizations (UN, CSCE, Council of Europe etc.). There is a clear effort to show that the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, in the framework of international legality, is applying the correct rules arising from its international obligations and in particular those that are quite agreeable with the latest understanding of the protection of minorities and human rights.

However, charges made by minority groups in the Republic against the practice applied by the Skopje state authorities, on their behalf, are daily and on a permanent basis. Indicative of the situation in the sector of minorities is a letter sent on June 18, 1993, from Nevzat Halili, President of the Albanian Party for Democratic Prosperity in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, to Kiro Gligorov, President of the Republic of Macedonia: “… decisions in the Macedonian Parliament are made by majority, on a national basis and anti-democratically, without achieving national consensus on core national issues. The electoral laws are creating problems. These laws are very unfavourable to the Albanians, if you take into

account the constituencies and the number of voters corresponding to one lawmaker. For an Albanian MP this corresponds to approximately 8,000 voters, while for a Macedonian MP it corresponds to 3,500 voters…” In all the cities of Macedonia, the regions carry only Macedonian names rather than names used by the inhabitants of the regions, even in cities where the Albanians are 50% or even 80% of the population, such as Tetovo, Gostivar, Debar, Kichevo, Struga, Krushevo, as in most parts of the city of Skopje. No city has an Albanian cultural centre or an Albanian name. There is only one Albanian-Turkish theater versus eight Macedonian professional theaters. The representation of Albanians in schools for secondary education is more than symbolic. There are no Albanian high officials in the court system or in any of the medical centres...” (Nova Makedonija, June 19, 1993.)

Member States of the European Union, on August 28, 1991 and again on September 3, 1991, established the Badinter Arbitration Commission. In the beginning it was decided that the Arbitration Commission would consist of five members headed by Badinter, President of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of France, while two out of its five members would be specified by the Federal Presidency of Yugoslavia. But the final composition turned out to be a little different; it was made up only of presidents of constitutional courts; Belgium, Germany, Italy and Spain. The work of this committee had some notable characteristics:

a) It did not clearly determine the issues of its diagnostic jurisdiction;

b) There was no obligation from the interested parties to comply with its decisions;

c) The Commission did not, according to the accepted tactics, do any research on the spot, nor question any witnesses;

d) It exclusively relied on only two European Union texts and sent only one question to the interested parties supposing the European Union text covered the recognition of individual Yugoslav republics;

e) The Commission actually did not resolve any disputes, leaving the political framework of the texts, which had consequences, to further complicate the situation.

In delivering his expert opinion, No.6 from January 11, 1992, regarding the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, the Arbitration Commission was of the opinion that:

1. Constitutional provisions obliged international recognition as a candidate country;

2. Unilateral statements made by officials from a recognized state have mandatory importance in international law. (A letter from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia from December 20, 1991, as well as additional data submitted with another letter from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia from January 11, 1992.);

3. It generally did not determine the meaning of “hostile propaganda”;

4. It finds the thesis that the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, since it renounced its territorial pretensions on its neighbouring countries, through corresponding amendments to the 1991 Constitution, satisfactory and that the use of the name Macedonia could not imply territorial claims against another state;

5. It does not take into consideration Greek reservations and opposition, or the opinions of the various minority groups from inside the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.

Following the Lisbon decision by Member States of the European Union on June 27, 1992, with negative consequences for the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, its expansionist policy was reinforced with the appropriation of the ancient Greek-Macedonian emblem, the Sun of Vergina with its sixteen rays, as the official flag of the Republic. In August 1992, the Parliament of Skopje officially confirmed a new emblem for the newly created Republic flag. There is nothing said about this in the book. This fact and events that

followed, to some extent, show that this move could have been interpreted as a tactical manoeuver by the Former Republic of Macedonia state leadership. In some future negotiations Skopje could take down this symbol, a fact that would be interpreted by the international community as a huge concession to Greek claims, which in effect would seem as if something was actually being “returned”, something which, to this day, has never been considered as part of the historical development of the Republic of Skopje. (See article: A. Sholjakovski, “State symbol as an international problem”. About the flag see: Nova Makedonija, 1,2,3/5, 1993. D Maleski “Compromise to achieve our goal”, Nova Makedonija, 01/19/1994.)

If we were to create a general overview of the development of the Macedonian Question from 1950 to today, we would be forming the following picture: Since the beginning of the 1950’s Tito’s “Macedonian” policy was concentrated on two points. First, the growing and strengthening of the “Macedonian” identity of the population in the Yugoslav part of Macedonia in order to offset the impact of antagonistic Bulgaria. Second, protect the “Macedonian” minority in the neighbouring countries. Even the claim to these minorities was a basic parameter of Tito’s management tactic for the development of Yugoslavia.

Belgrade and Skopje’s interest in the “Macedonian” minority in the neighbouring countries was a result of wanting to create more points of contention and tension between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, compared to the level of relations with Greece, which Yugoslavia had maintained. The tones between Belgrade and Athens were lowered when, with participation from Turkey, the Balkan trilateral agreement (1953-54) was signed to strengthen Yugoslavia and the West’s anti-Soviet policy.

Contrary to the central government in Belgrade, the local leaders of the “People’s” and later the “Socialist Republic of Macedonia” continued their sharp tone against Greece. The Greek part of Macedonia inevitably became a major subject of expansionist aspirations. Their aspiration was manifested in their need to emphasize all the characteristics fused in their national ideology, as well as historical roots, language and church. At the same time, they

were appropriately strengthening the arsenal of the national “Macedonian” ideology with the urgently necessary “great idea”.

This was required from the historians of this tiny state, to strengthen the “Macedonian” ethno genesis inside the state mainly through historical tradition and by the cultural identity of the neighbouring peoples. This was done by adopting and usurping every bit of foreign data and by disputing the origin of such data. The historical myth, i.e. unification of all parts of Macedonia, was necessary and needed to strengthen “Macedonian-ism” abroad, especially in the countries of the New World where the presence of people born in geographical Macedonia was especially pronounced.

The Slavo-phone emigrants from Macedonia became not only the recipients of the “Macedonian great idea” but also its primary carriers worldwide. Thanks mainly to the Slavo-phone communities abroad, the international community, during the period of postwar polarization, came into close contact with Skopje’s irredentist vision.

Strong nationalist tendencies began to develop in those communities in the late 1960’s which, at times were very different from Skopje’s official ideology. (Indicative of this is the Vergina Sun sixteen ray symbol, which become a subject of exploitation by “Macedonian” nationalist circles in Australia. See MACEDONIA. WEEKLY HERALD (KILMORE / VICTORIA), 15.9.1983.)

Following the general method of educating the post-war generations, in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and abroad, it is easy to identify the two axes around which the dogma of the “Macedonian” national ideology revolves. The first axis contains the appropriation of the cultural heritage from the entire geographical area of Macedonia and from the ancient Macedonians. This is done through the constant challenge of the Greek-ness of the ancient Macedonians (See school accessories from Skopje regarding the old period. B. Draskovich - I. Malek. History for 5th grade, Skopje 1987, p. 71, 74. S. Mladenovski, History for 1st grade, Skopje, 1992, p. 129-134,148,158) and their language. Maps that clearly separate Greek Macedonia from its body, throughout history, are also included which, in an indirect way, identify the inhabitants of the

Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia with the ancient Macedonians, with the geographical territory they ruled and also with their achievements. Based on the second axis of a “Macedonian” national ideology, post-war generations in the Republic of Skopje are raised with the sense that their Macedonia is freed in stages, by evolving first to the “Socialist Republic of Macedonia” and then to the “Republic of Macedonia”.

The other parts of Macedonia held by Greece, Bulgaria and Albania remain enslaved and should be freed in the future. (Draskovich-Malek, same as above p. 55, 67, 73, 77, 86, 94, 109, 112, 114. Mladenovski, same as above p. 212.)

In fact, all throughout the postwar period, propaganda activities by official and unofficial circles of the Republic of Skopje, inside and abroad, never ceased. This irredentist policy was implemented either directly by official statements made by political leaders, or indirectly with the distribution of maps of a united Macedonia, leaflets, calendars and general publications with an aggressive spirit against Greece, which challenges the Greek cultural heritage and Greek symbols.

Throughout this entire period, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia continued to fully abuse the name “Macedonia”. It has used every chance to turn Macedonia’s geographical meaning into a national meaning, a country whose main characteristic is destruction of the presence of the national, linguistic and religious minorities, which do not identify fully with the Slavic culture and with the “Macedonian” irredentist ideology. According to the last census (Detailed census data from 1991 in Skopje, see Stanovnishtvo, 3-4 / 1990 1-2 / 1991, Belgrade, p. 300-301 STATISTICAL OFFICE OF MACEDONIA: BASIC STATISTISTICAL DATA FOR THE POPULATON <SKOPJE <DECEMBER 1991, p. 14-16) conducted in the Republic of Skopje on March 31, 1991, the first largest nationality was that of the Albanians, which numbered 21.1% of the total population (427,313 people, total 2,033,964). Albanian political and spiritual leaders, however, vigorously denied these official numbers and talk about higher percentages, ranging from 35% to 40% (about 800,000) (M. ANDRELEVITCH, “RESURGENT NATIONALISM IN MACEDONIA”, REPORT

ON EASTERN EUROPE, VOL.2, No. 20, 17.5.1991, p.27). On the other hand many Albanians did not participate in the 1991 census because they disagreed with the manner of its implementation.

The official data from the 1991 census (the census of 1991 does not mention specifically the existence of other minority groups, such as Greeks, Bulgarians and others) also included other minority groups, such as Turks 4.7% (97,416), Roma (Gypsies) 2.73% (55,577), and Serbians 2.17% (44 159). (So, even though the Serbians are the fourth largest minority group, according to the official data from the 1991 census, they are not mentioned in the preamble of the 1991 Constitution, including the nationalities which enjoy equal rights, the “Macedonians”.)

By summarizing all of the above, one can draw the following conclusion:

1. Only today’s Greek Macedonia can be considered representative of the ancient historic Macedonia;

2. No “Slav-Macedonian ethno-genesis” had ever surfaced, not in the Middle Ages as a result of mixing ancient Macedonians with Slavs and establishing a “Slav-Macedonian state”, nor in the 19th and 20th century as a consequence of desire to differentiate the Slavo-phones from Macedonia from the Bulgarians, Greeks and Serbs;

3. The so-called “Macedonian nation” is a creation of the Communist International and Tito’s Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia rejected Bulgarian claims on the Yugoslav part of Macedonia through this artificial nationality, and propagated its expansionism on the entire geographic Macedonia;

4. Although the epilogue of the book emphasizes the need for Greece to become the incarnate of the new European policy in the Balkans and in relations between Athens and Skopje, so that they are not under the influence of historical stereotypes of the past, however, the real purpose of this book was to convince the international public opinion of its historical rights, based on the “glorious past” of the “Macedonian” nation, its special national

identity and its right to a separate and independent state. Based on this “historic psychosis” of Skopje’s, even if a political regularity is found in the dispute between Athens and Skopje, for which many attempts have been made in recent years within the European Union and the UN, to achieve consensus among historians of the Balkan countries for the historical aspect of the Macedonian Question, it would be an unfounded view.