SOURCES

SOURCES:

1. See indication in - Wells, The Outline of History, Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, Glimpses of World History, A. Vakalopoulos, Contemporary Problems of the Balkans, and Will Durant, World History of Culture.

2. Polybious, Historiae, Leipzig 1898

3. A. Vakalopoulos, op. cit., pp. 84ff, G. Rousos, Recent History of the Greek Nation.

4. Brief History of the Orthodox Churches of Bulgaria, Serbia and Romania, Moscow 1871

5. See- Ekdotike Athinon, Macedonia

6. E. Kofos, Nationalism and Communism in Macedonia, Thessaloniki 1964, pp. 185ff.

7. Douglas Dakin, The Greek Struggle in Macedonia 1897-1915, Thessaloniki 1966, and Dakin with K. Mazarakis-Ainian, E. Kofos and I. Diamantouros, The Macedonian Struggle, Athens 1985

8. L’improglio Macedonien, Paris 1907, pp. 50-51.

9. Op. cit., P.176.

10. Hellenism, 1903, p.717

S. SFETAS - K. KENTROTIS

SKOPJE IN SEARCH OF IDENTITY AND INTERNATIONAL RECOGNITION

Critical review of the MANU edition “Macedonia and its Relations with Greece”, Skopje, 1993

257 - INSTITUTE FOR BALKAN STUDIES, THESSALONIKI, 1994

(EXCERPTS, LAST 23 PAGES OF THE BOOKLET)

In April 1945 the Yugoslavs took advantage of the unstable political situation in Greece and, after the December events, created the organization NOF as a continuation of SNOF which, with the start of the civil war in Greece, joined the Greek communist movement. But soon Gotse’s (Ilias Dimakis) group, consisting of Keramidzhiev (Michalis Keramidzis) and Pascal Mitrevski (Paskalis Mitropoulos), began to distribute the thesis of unifying Greek Macedonia with Yugoslav Macedonia, causing serious difficulties for the leadership of the Communist Party of Greece, which was performing military operations mainly with Yugoslav assistance. (To this day there is no document found that would attest to the CPG officially agreeing to sell out Greek Macedonia to Tito in exchange for Yugoslav aid. However that is exactly what the Yugoslav leadership seemed to expect from the CPG in return for aid, to meet its aspirations at the expense of Greek Macedonia. This process was already legally initiated in Bulgarian Macedonia. The October 14, 1946 Agreement was signed by Joanidis-Rankovikj-Karaivanov (see E. Kofos, THE IMPACT OF THE MACEDONIAN QUESTION ON CIVIL CONFLICT IN GREECE 1943-1949 ATHENS 1989, p. 42), which simply regulated relations between NOF and the CPG. Regarding this question, Zahariadis, during the 7th Plenum, expressed himself like this: “…Speaking about the significance the Yugoslav factor had for us, we should not forget the following: Tito and his clique for years led a vile, disruptive war against us, mainly between the Slavo-Macedonian population. Bargaining with the Yugoslavs then meant that the war would stop and the Slavo-Macedonians would struggle along with us”. Indeed that was the agreement they reached

with Tito, and that point too was covered... See CPG 7th Plenum, same as above, p.173.)

Of course, after the Communist International decision for the existence of a “Macedonian nation” (1934) was made, the CPG theoretically recognized the Slavo-phones in Greece as a “Slavo-Macedonian minority”. But since 1935 it had abandoned the slogan “united and independent Macedonia”, which the Communist International had constructed in 1924 causing an internal rift in the party, which fully supported equality for minorities within Greece. After Tito’s clash with the Cominform (1948), the CPG leadership took the Soviet side and worked against Tito. Then, during the 5th Plenum (January 1949), it accepted the slogan “national rehabilitation and self-determination of the Macedonian people” to distance itself from Yugoslav Macedonia and from Tito.

“In northern Greece, the Macedonian (Slavo-Macedonian) people gave it their all and everything for the struggle and fought with full heroism and self-sacrifice which was admirable. There should be no doubt that, as a result of the victory of the people’s revolution and DAG, the Macedonian people would find their full national rehabilitation, exactly as they desire. And so they must spill their blood today to win. The Macedonian communists have always stood at the forefront of the struggle and our people. At the same time, the Macedonian communists should also be aware of the splitting and breaking actions that are led by foreign chauvinistic and reactionary elements to split the unity between the Macedonian (Slav-Macedonian) and the Greek people, a split that will serve only their common enemy, the Monarcho-Fascists and American imperialism…” (See 5th plenum of the Central Committee of the CPG (January 30 and 31, 1949) - Reports. CPG CC Edition, June 1949, p.16.)

During the 7th CPG Central Committee Plenum (May 10 to 18, 1950) Zahariadis explained that this decision was directed “against Tito who, also like the Monarcho-Fascists, suppressed the Macedonian people. Our perspective was not only to free ourselves from the Monacho-Fascists but also from Tito, who again threw the Macedonians under the imperialist yoke and imperialist exploitation”. (See: CPG Central Committee 7th Plenum, same as

above, p.175. After Tito’s clash with Stalin, the CPG took the same positions as the Cominform. Because of this, Pascal Mitrevski’s Slavo-phone group organized a desertion and left the Democratic Army and went to Yugoslavia where it propagated the spirit of defeat by claiming that the CPG sold out the struggle and that the “Macedonian” nation was spilling its blood in vain. This is the main reason why Zahariadis - according to his own claims - brought up the Macedonian Question during the 5th plenum and promised the Slavo-phones ministerial posts in the Interim Government. He wanted to cause interference in the Tito-phile NOF circles and provide support for the Slavo-phones on the eve of an impending battle for the capture of Lerin, where he was expected to install a partisan government. Regarding this issue Zahariadis said: “…Second, despite the fact that we were able to delay the proclamation of that work, which was basically correct, we scheduled the 5th plenum because we were under pressure. I say that, despite the fact that it did not correspond to our vested interests, we still emphasized the slogan. Why did we emphasize it? I understand this business and I will give you an explanation, as I understand it. Our wider interests were that in the broader framework that work then did not serve our interests. But, as a priority task before us then it was to ask that the battle for Vicho be won. Everything else was secondary. That thought was leading me when I proposed it when I wrote it and when I explained it. We had to activate all the Slavo-Macedonian forces to stop the desertion, to stop Tito’s agents from undermining us, to get in front of the political obstacle. Our priority was to remove all political obstacles because they posed immediate danger to our job. And we did stop the imminent danger...” See: CPG Central Committee 7th plenum, same as above, p. 175. After Zahariadis’s removal from the CPG (1956), the wider 7th Plenum of the CPG Central Committee (February 18 to 24, 1957) disqualified Zahariadis’s policy deeming it wrong and restored the old slogan of “the right to equality for the Slavo-Macedonians… in an inseparable unity with the Greek people”. See CPG Central Committee wider 7th plenum (February 18 to 24, 1957), CPG Central Committee Reports February 1957, p. 21.)

At the same time, many sharp criticisms were voiced at 5th Plenum. One of the sharpest criticisms was aimed at the heads of NOF who were accused of being organs of Yugoslavia and who were stripped

from their leadership positions. (See CPG Central Committee 5th plenum, same as above, p. 38)

During NOF’s Second Congress (March 25 to 26, 1949) the old slogan “United and Independent Macedonia within a Balkan Communist Federation” was adopted. (On February 15, 1949 the decisions of the NOF Central Committee 2nd Plenary Session were published in NOF’s “Nepokoren” publication which, among other things, said: “…the NOF Second Congress will be the Congress declaring NOF’s new programming principles, principles that are centuries-old desires of our people, to declare the unification of Macedonia into a single united, independent Macedonian state in a Democratic People’s Federation of the Balkan nations justified by this long bloody struggle...” See speech by Mitsos Partsalidis given during the CPG Central Committee 7th Plenum, same as above, p. 37-38. For the NOF 2nd Congress see V. Koitsev “Conclusions of the 2nd NOF Congress”; Dimokratikos Stratos, monthly military-political authority of the General Headquarters of the Democratic Army of Greece, May 1949 / t .5 / p. 316-318.)

This decision was aimed against Yugoslavia aspiring to create a united Macedonia within the Yugoslav federation. This turn of events had serious consequences in the sector of military operations. Yugoslavs responsible for defense closed the border, which until then had been used to supply the Greek communists. One part of the NOF Slavo-phones fled and went to Yugoslav Macedonia. After the defeat of the Greek communists in August 1949, the remaining followers of NOF followed the leadership of the CPG and relocated to Eastern Europe. Consequently, the fate of the Slavo-phones who participated in the Greek communist movement in the civil war was similar to the fate of the Greek communists. All those who moved to the Federal Socialist Republic of “Macedonia” became naturalized “Macedonians” and started to deal with the anti-Greek campaign. It was natural and expected of the Greek state to be extremely cautious. But one issue that kept the Skopje historians silent was that many of the Slavo-phones, during the occupation and civil war, had remained firmly annexed with Hellenism and even took arms and fought against NOF.

In chapter 12 of the book “THE IDEA OF MACEDONIAN LIBERATION BETWEEN THE TWO WARS”, p. 87-90, there was talk about a “Macedonian national force” which was fighting for an independent Macedonian state in the period between the two world wars: VMRO and the Executive Committee of the Macedonian brotherhood, Federalists, VMRO (United). It particularly emphasizes the effort to unify the “Macedonian” forces in May 1924, and the decision of the Comintern in 1934, of the existence of the “Macedonian nation”, was regarded as the first international recognition of the “Macedonian national identity”. (p. 89)

However, the actual historical facts are different. After World War I it was mainly the Bulgarian VMRO organization led by Todor Aleksandrov and Aleksandar Protogerov, which strived to gain autonomy for Serbian and Greek Macedonia with aims at later annexing them to Bulgaria. While, in regard to Greek Macedonia, they were trying (unsuccessfully) to set back the implementation of the Greek-Bulgarian agreement on the exchange of population in the Serbian part of Macedonia, where a significant portion of the population had Bulgaro-phil feelings, they applied partisan warfare tactics (1920- 1924), and assassinations of government leaders in the Yugoslav state (1926-1933), as a reaction to the politics of the region and to the Serbia-nization promoted by Belgrade. (S. SVETAS, MAKEDONIEN UND INTERBALKANISCHEN BE ZIEHUNGEN (1920-1924). VEROFFENTLICHUNGEN DES INSTITUTS FUR GESCHICHTE OSTEUROPAS UND SUDOSTEUROPAS DER UNIVERSITAT MUNCHEN 1992, p.51-61, 89-127, 145-150, 187-197, 209-224 , 240-241. S. TROEBST, MUSSOLINI, MAKEDONIEN UND DIE MACHTE 1922-1930, KOLN-WIEN 1987.)

Since 1933, under the leadership of the VMRO, Ivan Mihailov propagated the thesis “United and Independent Macedonia” including the Bulgarian part of Macedonia. The VMRO political label “Macedonian” was absolutely a compromise for the Bulgarian national identity. A “United and Independent Macedonia” would be a second Bulgarian state. Federalists (T. bowls, F. Atanasov, N. Yurukov) that broke away from the VMRO in 1920/1921 propagated the idea of creating a federation of the South Slavs as a

way to resolve the Macedonian question. They used the term “Macedonian” for its geographical importance.

VMRO opposition was due in part to ideological and personal and, in part, to tactical reasons. The unification of these two organizations in 1924 followed Soviet diplomacy so that the United Bulgarian-Macedonian organizations, in cooperation with the Bulgarian Communist Party and with members of the Agrarian Party of Bulgaria would sweep to collect Tsankov’s government and establish a working class- Agricultural government in Bulgaria. Soviet diplomacy and the Communist International were trying to remove the Macedonian-Bulgarian organizations from pursuing Bulgarian nationalism and divert them to pursue the existence of a “Macedonian nation” torn apart between Greece, Serbia and Bulgaria and to promote the creation of a “United and Independent Macedonia within a Balkan Federation” in order to erode the Balkan states. The May 6, 1924 Manifesto (published in the first issue of LA FEDERATION BALKANIQUE (July 15, 1924)) signed by the Federalists and by VMRO, which proclaimed covert cooperation between the Bulgarian-Macedonian organizations in Soviet Russia and the declaration of a struggle against the “imperialist” Balkan countries in the name of “Macedonian-ism” and an independent Macedonia, was a creation of Soviet diplomacy. (Negotiations between VMRO Federalists and the Bulgarian Communist Party, which led Vienna to create a “United National Front” against Tsankov’s government was led by the Soviet agent of Communist International in Vienna, Dr. EFRAIM GOLDSTEIN. For his identity see: F. LITTEN “DIE GOLDSTAJN / GOLDSTEIN-VERWECHSLUNG ,. EINE BIOGRAPHISCHE NORIZ ZUR KOMINTERN- AKTIVITAT AUF DEM BALKAN”, SUDOST-EORS CHUNGEN, BD.L (1991), p. 245-250.)

The decision of the Communist International (June 17 to July 8, 1924) about the Macedonian Question taken during the 5th Congress was also made in the same spirit.

“... Macedonia’s partition between Yugoslavia, Greece and Bulgaria has further strengthened the desire of the Macedonian people in the parts of their fractured homeland to unite and create a unique and independent Macedonia... The Congress of the 6th Conference of the

Balkan Communist Federation (STS: December 1923 in Moscow) -regarded the slogans “United and Independent Macedonia” and “United and Independent Thrace” as quite wholesome and truly revolutionary. The slogans for autonomy for parts of Macedonia and Thrace within the borders of the artificially created bourgeoisie with the Sevres Agreement, etc., should be rejected as opportunistic. They are tantamount to an agreement between the rich layers of the Macedonian and Thracian population and the ruling classes of the corresponding states. The Congress also emphasized that the revolutionary struggle of the Macedonian and Thracian people for their national and social liberation will be successful if it is conducted jointly with the revolutionary workers and peasants of every Balkan state...” (RESOLUTION ZU DEN NATIONALEN FRAGEN IN MITTELEUROPA UND AUF BALKAN -MAZEDONISCHE UND THRAZISCHE, INTERNATIONALE PRESSE-KORRESPONDENZ (BERLIN 1921- November 1923 and Vienna December 1923 - March 1926), No. 134, 1924 15:10, p. 1272-1273).

Communist International plans in 1924, to turn Bulgaria into a communist country and to destabilize the Balkans suffered a setback. (For a critical approach to these issues see Sfetas, same as above, p. 302-337, 362-372.)

However, Soviet interference in the Macedonian Question led to a political and ideological polarization of the Bulgarian-Macedonian movement. The Tsankov government began to clean out all the cadres who had cooperated with the Communists from VMRO. Those who survived created the VMRO (United) in October 1925, and acted mainly in accordance with the activities of the Communist International as a political and ideological antipode to Mihailov’s VMRO under the banner “United and Independent Macedonia within a Balkan federation”. The political impact of VMRO (United) in the Balkans was negligible because its headquarters was in Vienna and considered a communist organization by the Balkan states, which was developed mainly for propaganda purposes operating with its journalistic organs LA FEDERATION BALKANIQUE and “Makedonsko Delo” under the influence of the Bulgarian Communists. VMRO (United) pleaded for the national liberation of all oppressed nationalities in Macedonia. The term

“Macedonian people” meant all nationalities in Macedonia, but mainly the Bulgarians. In terms of Greek and Serbian Macedonia, VMRO (United) mainly condemned the national oppression of the Bulgarian people in Macedonia, both political oppression and economic exploitation of the Bulgarian population.

“If we look at the Bulgarian part of Macedonia, we will note that here too the situation is similar to the Serbian and the Bulgarian (translator’s note: ‘Bulgarian’- that’s what was written in the original text, it should read: ‘Greek’) part. The Macedonian Greeks and Turks, who once lived here, were expelled. The population that is living in that part of Macedonia, is of Bulgarian nationality, enjoys cultural rights, has schools, churches, etc., and that is the only difference between the position of the Macedonians in Bulgaria and the ones in Greece and Serbia”. (See VMRO (United) Memorandum from October 9, 1927 addressed to the President of the Congress for National Minorities in Geneva regarding the situation of the oppressed peoples in the Balkans, VMRO (United), documents and materials, Volume 1, Institute of National History, Skopje, 1991 p. 129-135 (here p. 134))

Dimitrov, who had significant influence on the VMRO (United), expressed himself similarly: “… the Bulgarian bourgeoisie is keeping Petrich District (Bulgarian Macedonia) under a strict and harsh regime in relation to the rest of Bulgaria, despite the fact that it considers the Macedonians from that region as a pure Bulgarian population, and is treated as an economic and political war zone. Outside of the language and culture being equal here, national oppression is apparent mainly through economic deprivation and political oppression of the Macedonian population...” (G. Dimitrov, AUSGEWAHLTE SCHRIFTEN, BD.2, 1921-1935, BERLIN ("OST") 1958, p.398-399.)

Up to 1934, VMRO (United) denied the existence of a “Macedonian nationality”. “In Macedonia there never was and there is no separate Macedonian nationality, as there was not, for example, a Swiss nationality. There were and there are certain nationalities who, in a smaller or larger analogy, live in Macedonia, as there are French, German, Italian and Romanian nationalities living in Switzerland, and as these four main nationalities constitute one geographical,

political and economic unity and carry the joint name Swiss people. The Bulgarians, Greeks, Turks, Vlachs, Albanians and Serbs, who are all born and live in Macedonia, constitute an assembled mosaic of people bearing the common name Macedonian people”. (Balkan Federation, No.131, 20.3.1930, p. 2869-2870 in K. Paleshutski: The Macedonian Question in Bourgeoisie Yugoslavia 1918 to 1941. Sofia 1983, p. 197.)

In February 1934, for political reasons, the Communist International made a decision to recognize the existence of a “(Slav) Macedonian nation”. After Hitler’s government came to power and because of the close ties between Milailov’s Bulgarian nationalist VMRO and Hitler-ist circles, the USSR wanted to deter the use of the Macedonian question by Nazi Germany in favour of the Bulgarian fascist circles. VMRO (United) and the Balkan Communist parties were invited to start, not only a political and ideological, but also a clear national struggle in favour of Macedonian-ism. It is worth mentioning that the Communist International decision about the existence of the Macedonian nation, characterized Macedonia as a military centre before the impending imperialist war and Bulgaria contesting her right to rule Petrich Region, with extensive claims made on all of Macedonia’s territory. Vlahov in his memoirs clearly wrote that the Communist International Executive Committee decision to promote the idea of a Macedonian nation was directly linked to the advent of Nazism in Germany. The Communist International Executive Committee ordered the leaders of the Balkan Secretariat of the Communist International, the Polish Veletski the the Czech Shmeral, to reach an appropriate decision. But since they were not familiar with the Macedonian Question, the text of the decision was mainly composed by Vlahov, a leading figure of VMRO (United). Vlahov was called on the negative reactions caused by the decision of the Communist International Executive Committee for highlighting the idea of a Macedonian nation, in the Bulgarian Communist Party (Kolarov, Stanke Dimitrov, V. Chervenkov) and in between the IMRO (United) cadres, who expressed doubt that the theory of a Macedonian nation could be a boomerang for the Organization. The corresponding preparatory discussions were attended by representatives of the Balkan communist parties who studied at the Communist University of National Minorities in Moscow. (See D. Vlahov, Memoirs, Skopje

1970, p. 356-358. Decision was published by the newspaper “Kathimerini”, 12/13/1992.)

VMRO (United) was forced to follow this new political line-up until 1936, when it disbanded. The decision made by the Communist International about the existence of a “Macedonian nation” was generally favourable for the Communist Party of Yugoslavia as well as for “Macedonian-ism” and saw an opportunity to win over Serbian and Bulgarian claims on Macedonia.

In itself it is understood why Skopian historiography up until 1990 had no negative attitude towards Alexandrov and Protogerov’s VMRO, and towards VMRO (United). The first was considered as a Bulgarian-chauvinist organization aiming to merge Macedonia with Bulgaria, while the second was considered a Bulgaro-phil organization with ideological and political weaknesses. It is by no accident that the top leaders of VMRO (United), like Vlahov who after 1944 accepted “Macedonian-ism” and occupied leading positions in the Federal Socialist Republic of “Macedonia” was soon afterwards accused of being a “Bulgaro-phil” and removed. In his speech to the First Congress of the Communist Party of “Macedonia” (19/12/1948), Lazar Kolishevski noted that “IMRO (United)’s position was not the same as that of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, regarding the national question”. (L. Kolishevski, Aspects of the Macedonian Question, 3rd edition, Skopje 1980, page 39.) In two letters to Kolishevski, one dated 05/12/1948, and the other in 1951, Vlahov expressed his opposition regarding the establishment of a basis for an anti-Bulgarian Macedonian nationality. Kolishevski’s indictment of VMRO (United) regarding its Bulgaro-phil character was rejected by the argument that the “Macedonians” literary language between the two World Wars was Bulgarian. See S. TROEBST, DIE BULGARISCH-JUGOSLAWISCHE KONTROVERSE UM MAKEDONIEN 1967-1982, MUNICHEN 1983, p.49 and “MIT IVAN KATARDZIEV-AUT DEN GIPFELPFADEN DER MAKEDONISCHEN GESCHICHTE”, CUDOST- FORSCHUNGEN, 47/1988, S. 255.)

The decision of the Communist International regarding the “Macedonian nation” remains a theoretical manifesto of the

Communist Parties in the Balkans without a reaction from the population.