THE SERBIAN STATE IN THE PROGRAMS OF THE POLITICAL PARTIES OF SERBIA TO THE DA - Part 01

THE SERBIAN STATE IN THE PROGRAMS OF THE POLITICAL PARTIES OF SERBIA TO THE DAYTON ACCORD

Note

Excerpts from Momchilo Subotich’s works published in “Political Review”, Belgrade in the year (XVIII), V, Vol.12, No. 4/2006, p. 809-828; only parts relating to several major parties were taken, i.e. the Socialist Party of Serbia and the Serbian Radical Party.

The Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS) was the dominant political force in Serbia in its ten years during the pluralist era. Its power and influence, particularly that of its president Slobodan Milosevic, strongly reflected on the other Serbian regions - in the Republic of Srpska Krajina and Republika Srpska. At the “Congress of unification” of the SKS SSRNS (July 16, 1990), SPS won all multi-party elections in the said period: four times the republican parliament elections (1990, 1992, 1993 and 1997) and three times the federal Parliament elections (May 1992 and December 1992 and 1997).

In the SPS program fundamental provisions, from October 1990, the party advocated the preservation of the “idea for people’s self-government of the Serbian people” to which, during the late 19th century, the Serbian socialists gave new support, infusing it with the idea of socialism. Similarly: “It protects and expands anti-fascist and liberal NOB values and those from the Socialist Revolution, because they fit in the deepest and brightest Serbian mainstream historical tradition and those of the other Yugoslav peoples in their struggle for freedom and independence and in the continuation of the long struggle of the labour movement. The Socialists and Communists brought new social forces on the scene, liberated Yugoslavia and created a federal state and a socialist community.” (Program Foundations of the Socialist Party of Serbia - Basic definitions, Belgrade, October 1990, p. 4.)

Bringing about libertarian traditions and universal human values to society, SPS, in its first document, “stands for a society in which people are free and equal to each other in all spheres of social life. In

this sense, socialism is just another term for the largest reach of democracy.” (Ibid, p. 6.)

In the area of national and state policy, SPS highlighted its political choices as follows: 1) United Serbia; 2) relation with the parts of the Serbian people outside of Serbia; 3) national equality, federalism; 4) resolve the crisis in Kosovo and Metohija.

Starting with a single Serbia, the document says that in Serbia “the inherent powers of the state should be carried out by the authorities of the Republic and the entire territory, which will provide equality to all citizens in the Republic and efficacy and rationality to the state government.” This means that “the autonomous provinces in Serbia cannot be states, but can have a form of territorial autonomy, for which the Serbian Constitution provides guarantees to those rights as autonomous expressions of specific national, historical and cultural characteristics of those regions.” (United Serbia. Ibid, p. 34.)

When it comes to the treatment of the Serbian people outside of Serbia, SPS stated that it will constantly monitor the conditions of life and the development of those Serbian people in the other republics and abroad and will liaise with their political, cultural and other organizations.

SPS is consistently advocating for national equality and federalism, in accordance with international and domestic law, and is of the belief that nations which are united in a common state must have the right to self-determination and secession, and that the new constitution should establish the possibility for forming autonomous provinces and territories that have their own special cultural and historical continuity. Here, it was thinking of the autonomy of the Serbians in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. SPS advocates that the Yugoslav state, as a modern federation, must have equal rights for all its citizens and federal units. The citizen Council of the Federal Assembly should be represented by all citizens of Yugoslavia and decided in accordance with the democratic principle of “one citizen - one vote”, and the Council of federal units is to be formed and decided by similar matching principles.

Regarding the issue of resolving the crisis in Kosovo and Metohija, SPS sees it as a “national priority, an ethical, historical and national issue of the Serbian people and an inseparable part of Serbia.”

In determining the national equality and faster economic development in Kosovo and Metohija, SPS is committed to working to halt the evictions, to provide for the return of displaced Serbians and Montenegrins and to allow migration of citizens who want to live and work in Kosovo and Metohija. The SPS will “do everything in its power to make the full story about Kosovo and Metohija known to the world, including the consequences of the causes of Albanian chauvinists and separatists.” (Solving the crisis in Kosovo and Metohija, p. 39.)

SPS, on September 28, 1990, adopted its program commitments into the Serbian Constitution in which the Republic of Serbia is defined as a “democratic state for all its citizens who live in it, based on human and citizen rights and freedoms, the rule of law and social justice” (Constitution of the Republic of Serbia, Article 1) and for the autonomous provinces Vojvodina, Kosovo and Metohija “as forms of territorial autonomy” (Ibid, Article 6.) The Constitution stipulates that “the Republic of Serbia will maintain relationships with the Serbians living outside the Republic of Serbia for the sake of preserving their national and cultural-historical consciousness.” (Ibid, Article 72.)

In the course of 1990 and in the first half of 1991 - up until the separatist wars in Slovenia, and Croatia, the SPS consistently advocated for the survival of Yugoslavia as a “strong federation” and for the preservation of self-governing socialism. When the violent and anti-constitutional secession was started by the Slovenes and Croats, which started with the dissolution of Yugoslavia, the SPS and Serbian leadership and the Presidency of Yugoslavia took the stand that it was a violent and unilateral secession. Slobodan Milosevic represented this thesis at The Hague Conference on Yugoslavia in September 1991 and insisted that this secession was not supported; neither by international law nor by internal Yugoslav law - the 1974 Constitution prohibited such secessions.

The European mediators “overlooked” the fact that the administrative republic lines had neither ethnic nor historical foundations, but were the product of political arrangements where almost a third of the Serbian people were left outside of the borders of their native republic. Also, the existing republic borders were not determined by any legal act. (See Miodrag Jovichich, The right of peoples to self-determination (the idea and its realization), in: The Serbian question today, Second Congress of Serbian intellectuals, editor Vasilie Krestich, 1995, p. 81.)

The Serbian delegation, headed by Slobodan Milosevic at The Hague Conference, advocated for a “principled stand that all peoples and citizens must be equal and have the right to self-determination. If the Slovenes, Croats, Bosnian Muslims and Macedonians decided to secede from Yugoslavia the Serbian people too must have the same right in the territories in which a majority of them live and may decide to stay in a joint Yugoslav state.” (See Miodrag Jovichich, the right of peoples to self-determination (idea and its realization), in: The Serbian question today, Second Congress of Serbian intellectuals, editor Vasilie Krestich, 1995, p. 81.) This political stance was confirmed by the SPS leadership during the creation of the third Yugoslavia - when Serbia and Montenegro established a common state - Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, in order to maintain continuity and international subjectivity of the previous Yugoslavia. It found its place in the upcoming SPS document.

In the basics of the SPS program, adopted at the Second SPS Congress, on October 23 and 24, 1992, in the changed political and geopolitical constellations after the recognition of the new states from the territory of Yugoslavia, two issues surfaced regarding the national and state policy in the public. These were: The world in which we live and Yugoslavia (Chapter 9) and a United Serbia (Chapter 10)...

This allows for a common community with the Montenegrin people. With the preservation of Yugoslavia, the home of the Serbian people is preserved, which is an important guarantee for the protection of all other parts of the Serbian people. Presented here is a legitimate concern for the Serbians outside of Serbia to create an institutional

opportunity for a future Federal Republic of Yugoslavia which will join Krajina, the Republic of Srpska and Bosnia and Herzegovina... The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is a free federal republic... its federative character means that the united state retains all those features necessary to be a state, not just an association of sovereign states.” (Program basics of the Socialist Party of Serbia. Yugoslavia, a free, federal republic, Belgrade, October 1992, p. 35-36.) When we are talking about the conflicts in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, the SPS stands for a political solution with “direct negotiations with the people’s representatives in the conflict and, primarily, through direct expression of the citizens living in the disputed territories.” (International politics. ibid, p. 36.)

In the second part the commitment to a single Serbia is repeated, encompassing the provinces with a form of territorial autonomy. Here we can see the attitude taken towards the part of the Serbian people who live outside Serbia, and for that reason we emphasize that “the Socialist Party of Serbia is certain that there have been violations of the principles of international law when the Serbians from Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, who spent seven decades united with their brothers, were prevented from remaining in a joint Yugoslav state under the right of self-determination of peoples. The Socialists in Serbia will continue to support their rights and give them moral and material support. As for the remaining Serbians who were left with minority status throughout the big cities and isolated areas of the breakaway Yugoslav republics, as well as those who live as minorities in neighbouring countries... we will help them nurture their own cultural tradition to preserve their national identity, to become citizens of Serbia and Yugoslavia and to engage in the social life of their mother country.” (Attitude in the parts where Serbian people live outside of Serbia. Ibid, p. 39-40.)

Along with the establishment of the SRY, the Republic of Srpska Krajina and the Republic of Srpska are constituted, as a kind of battle of the Serbs west of the Drina for exercising the right to self-determination and statehood in their ethnic and historical space.

Because of its existence, Serbia has been exposed to ruthless sanctions. It is well-known that Serbia alone advocated for a democratic and political solution to the Serb-Croat-Muslim conflict.

However, Slobodan Milosevic, with the blockade on the Drina (August 1994) significantly weakened our bargaining and geopolitical position, which prevented the realization of all Serbians to exist and live in a single state. Participating in the defeat: Republika Srpska Krajina was left with Croatia because it was believed that it was a pledge to keep Kosovo and Metohija, and the establishment of the Republic of Srpska as an equal entity in Bosnia and Herzegovina, representing an achievement of national geopolitical optimum in the existing constellations of international forces...

The Serbian Radical Party (SRS) was established on February 23, 1991, with the unification of the Serbian Chetnik movement for most of the local board of the National Radical Party. Elected for President was Vojislav Shesheli with 489 out of 509 votes. In its Statute, SRS has emphasized that it is the “legal successor of the Serbian People’s Radical Party founded in 1881 and its activities are guided by its statute and program, adapted to change social circumstances.” (Statute of the SRS, Article 1, “Greater Serbia”, Belgrade, May 1991, p 8.)

In its electoral plan, Dr. Vojislav Shesheli’s party grew quickly into a political force present in all regions where Serbians lived. Given that the Serbian Chetnik movement did not “qualify” to be registered in the first multiparty elections, Dr. Vojislav Shesheli ran as an independent candidate in the presidential elections in December 1990 during which he received almost 100,000 votes. In just one year after that the SRS had become the second most important political party in Serbia. During the first parliamentary elections in the FRY, held on May 31, 1992, the SRS received 30 percent of the vote...

In the program declaration of 1991, as its main target of action, the SRS said that “it will recover a free, independent and democratic Serbian state in the Balkans which will include the entire Serbian population and Serbian lands, meaning that, within its borders it will contain the current Serbian federal units, Serbian Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbian Bosnia, Serbian Herzegovina, Serbian Dubrovnik, Serbian Dalmatia, Serbian Lika, Serbian Kordun, Serbian Bania, Serbian Slavonia and Serbian Barania.” (Program

Declaration of SRS “Greater Serbia”, no. 9, Belgrade, May 1991, p. 7-8.) 32) The Declaration was a kind of complement to the first radical program that dealt with a broader explanation of the Serbian political and national issue and insisted that it was part of a modified program of the 1881, Nikola Pasich’s Serbian People’s Radical Party and that it was going to be supplemented each year with a program declaration.

The SRS confirmed its program goals in subsequent programs enacted in 1994 and 1996. This was the only political party in Serbia which, since its establishment, kept the same political views regarding the resolution of the Serbian national question in various regions in the former Yugoslav state. When it came to the structure of the state, the SRS called for a national referendum to resolve that matter. It also called for the repatriation of various members of royal families including the Karadzordzevich, Petrovich and Obrenovich families...

Special attention was paid to the Kosovo and Metohija Declaration, with aims that this part of the Serbian state be kept in Serbia in order to save it from Albanian separatists and secessionists. In accordance with its program commitments, the SRS sacrificially supported the Serbians in Krajina and Republika Srpska in their struggle for autonomy and statehood.

Dr. Vojislav Shesheli has repeatedly pointed out that there are two possible scenarios for Bosnia and Herzegovina: either it will be preserved and will enter into the composition of a truncated Yugoslavia, or it will split up. Every other solution, as was pointed out, would lead to war. The Republic of Srpska Krajina must enter into the composition of a truncated Yugoslavia, and never again be part of Croatia, because this would flagrantly violate the right to self-determination for the Serbian people and they again would be subjected to massacre and persecution, which would be a continuation of the 1941 genocide. The leader of the radicals was reluctant to recognize the independence of Macedonia which, before the creation of the first Yugoslavia, was part of the Serbian state and he thought, considering claims made by its neighbours towards the Macedonian territory, the optimal solution for Macedonia was to be one of the units of the Yugoslav Federation. Shesheli later accepted

the Macedonian people’s ethnic distinctiveness and repeatedly stated that he would strive to include them in a common federal state of Serbians and Macedonians. In 1993, when Serbians in RSK and RS reached the maximum territorial-state, Shesheli proposed a state union that would be called Western Serbia...

SRS will not change its position when it comes to organization of the state government; consistently advocating for a unitary Serbian state; abolishing the autonomous provinces in Serbia’s territory; requiring Kosovo and Metohija to declare martial law, suspending any political activities and introducing a military administration which would last at least ten years; establishing a 20-50 kilometre wide belt at the Albanian border and requiring the population to move out of that space with just compensation and for that area to be declared an area of strategic national importance...

The SRS political program stipulates the organization of a territorial principle; which is represented in all Serbian lands, in the Republic of Srpska Krajina the government in 1994 served in coalition with the Serbian Democratic Party. The February 2, 1994 agreement for the formation of the coalition, again mentions its strategic goal - the creation of a single Serbian state.

The Serbian Radical Party opposed the Bosnia and Herzegovina peace plan because it thought it was unfair to Serbian interests. In the spring of 1993, when Slobodan Milosevic supported the Vance-Owen plan for Bosnia and Herzegovina, the SRS distanced itself from the current regime and called for the resignation of the Republic of Serbia government headed by Nikola Shainovich.

The SRS was the only political party from Serbia that did not accept the agreement... The SRS never accepted Croatia, which perpetrated a genocide and ethnic cleansing against the Serbian people in that country. It considers the occupation of RKS temporary. The liberation of Serbian Krajina is tied to the changes in the geopolitical constellations, primarily to the strengthening of Russia and other Orthodox countries. This is why these radicals refuse to accept the Dayton agreement for resolving the crisis in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In terms of the mentioned changes, with respect to international rights - above all the provision of the right of peoples

to self-determination - these radicals insist that the Serbian question be resolved with the entire Serbian ethnic space being under a single Serbian state.

THE BALKAN MEGA-ETHNOS -National doctrines of Macedonian neighbors

A Summary

This book consists of a collection of ten texts presenting modern national doctrines of Macedonian neighbors, selected, edited and mainly translated into Macedonian by the author. A few of them are presented in their original form, while several, due to their length, are presented in brief version or given in fragments relevant to Macedonia, but with clear indication about of the original version of the text. Texts are listed in alphabetic order of countries and include: “The Platform for Resolution of 7 National Question”, published by the Albanian Academy of Sciences, Skenza, Tirana, 1998, and then, a short text by Arben Dzaferi, presented by the Albanian-American Civil League (http://aacl.com, October 1998) in New York. Three Bulgarian texts follow: Prof. G. Velev (Resp. editor et all.)- 1997. Bulgarian National Doctrine. First part. Fundament of the Bulgarian National Doctrine. Sofia: Znanie Publishers EOOD and Bulgarian National Doctrine. Second part. National Strategic Programs. Program No.1. Protection and Spiritual Union of Bulgarians All Over the World. (the same editor, authors, publisher, published in 1998 ). The third text is: Ivanov, Lј. et all. 2008. Bulgarian Policy Towards the Republic of Macedonia. Recommendations for Development of Good Neibourghly Relations After the Accession of Bulgaria into EU… Sofia: Foundation Manfred Werner.

The Greek national doctrine is presented by two texts: The Macedonian Question. Review of the Attempts to Create an Artificial Nation. 09 February 1993. New York: Publifax, UN. Published in Athens, Greece, by the Institute of International Political and Strategic Studies (Iketa and Tolemey, 11 104 42 Athene); Sfetas, S. and Kointros, K.. 1994. Skopјe in Search for Identity and International Recognition. Salonique: Institute for Balkan Studies. No.257. Three sources exemplified the Serbian national doctrines: The Memorandum of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts in Belgrade (SANU), 1986, published 1989-Zagreb, Nashe Teme, No-33, Vol.1-2, pp.128-163; Sheshelј, V. 2002. The Ideology of Serbian Nationalism. Scientific and

Publicistic Work of Prof. Lazo M. Kostic. Belgrade: Velika Srbia, AD. Subotic, M. The Serbian State int the Programs of Political Parties in Serbia till the Dayton Agreement. Belgrade. Politicka Reviјa. Year XVIII/V, Vol.12, No-4 (2006), pp.809-828. A few of these sources have been published in and translated from English, the rest translated from national languages.

The author exposes these sources to conceptual and critical analysis, taking as a starting point the fact that all the doctrines, regardless of their academic ground and association mainly with academies and institutes of sciences, have played and are still playing a considerable role in politics, foreign policies and current events in the Balkan region. Some of them have had a direct impact on the political forces and governmental policies that led to the dynamics, disputes and conflicts in the region over the last few decades, including the disintegration of former Yugoslavia, the wars and violence on the soil of the former federation, the Kosovo conflict, the dispute over the name of Macedonia, the actual state of affairs in Bosnia and Herzegovina etc. This analysis is presented in the rather extensive introductory part of the book titled “The Balkan Mega-Ethnos. From Ethno-Romanticism to Ethno-Violence”.

Doctrines presented in this volume are a second generation of ethnic or national programs of Macedonian neighbors. The first generation of doctrines had been formulated during the national “Risorgimento” process in the mid 19th century, with strong national liberation and national emancipation focus. Nevertheless, when these countries achieved their independence and established or envisaged their statehood, the doctrines were reshaped and provided by expansionist, claiming towards others elements in territorial, population, historical, ethno-cultural sense. The author mentions here- the Serbian Draft (“Nachertaniјa”) of I. Garashanin and the Greek “Megali-Idea” of Colitis, both published in 1844, then the Bulgarian Program and Order of 1869 published in Bucharest, The Program of the Albanian Prizren League from 1878 etc. There is no doubt that these doctrinaire programs, including the ethno-political programs of other Balkan countries, had played a crucial role in decisive historical periods and conflicts, like the Great Eastern crisis (1877-78), the Macedonian Ilinden Uprising (1903), the two Balkan wars (1912-13), the two World wars etc. Meanwhile the national

doctrines have been framed and dependant on the bi-polar international relations after the WW II, but the interests for their revival and reactualization appeared again at the threshold and at the birth given to nationalism in the Balkans, during the great transformation in the early 1990-s.

This set of programmatic texts is a result of that interest, ambitions, aspirations for expansion, hegemony, avoiding human rights, rules of democracy, reconciliation and good-will or beneficial neighborly relations. Regardless of their “academic” character, at least some of them have obviously influenced the course of the political events in the neighborhood over the last two decades, often featured by disputes, pretensions, conflicts and open policies of “great states”.

Macedonians have not produced such documents. Historically, their independent state was established during the WW II and has immediately јoined the Yugoslav federation; this means there has not been a state as an instrument of national or nationalistic policies. A few attempts at formulation of doctrinaire documents were present after the year 1990, but without substantial results.. This was due to the predominance of the civic factor in the newly established political order of the country and its multicultural composition as well as due to its specific international position.

The author nevertheless, examines the nature of the conflicts in the Balkans, most of which are on inter-ethnic, inter-religious, intercultural basis and absence of dialogue, tolerance or democratic political culture and traditions. A corpus of research studies, publications, comments, particularly by western authors, describes the region in dark colors, attributing to its populations, ethnicities, leading circles, unfavorable value systems, historical traditions, even anthropological distinctions: inclinations to fragmentation, conflictualisation, intolerance, rigid conduct, ethno-centric and ego-centric patterns etc.; even the notion of Balkanism and balkanization is often defined as fragmentation into small quarrelsome states, entities, groups. However, scholars like Mariјa Todorova, Roberta Guerrina and others wrote on the unfair and inadequate image produced for the Balkans as a necessary counter-point and “Other” relating to “Us” attributed by modern and highly civilized values

etc. V. Friedman even defines Balkanization as association and cohabitation of different cultures and languages.

Sociological research gives deeper insight into the ground and possible reasons for inter-ethnic, inter-religious and inter-group tensions and conflicts in the region or among or within individual countries.

The basic conclusion is that the Balkan region, regardless of the recent changes, systems’ transformation, progress and development, regardless of processes of integration into EU, altogether is in a development delay in terms of socio-economic dynamics, noticeably behind the levels of the Union or of the continent. Uneven and slow development, development and living standard gaps in the region as well as in most individual countries, this is a visible phenomenon connected with the socio-economic position of ethnic and other minorities, groups or communities. As a rule,, the typical patterns identified by the author, are as follows: minorities live in backward or less developed areas and this fact makes a ground for social groups differences and patterns of differentiation or dissatisfaction. This is the obјective basis on which ethnic or other factional interests are politisized and sometimes even conflictualized. Not less, in addition, such a social basis is a ground for massive involvement of populations in ethnic, religious and other disputes, tensions and even conflicts. Authors of doctrines rely significantly on this social basis. The essential solution is then- to accelerate the socio-economic development of the region as well as of each individual country, in addition to effective policies of balanced, sustainable, non-discriminative development.

Along these lines, theoretically and conceptually, in the following part of his analysis, the author examines particularly the correlation of the social context, the ideas and actions in the rise and expression of nationalism today. He takes as a starting point the conclusion of the American political scientist S. Bronner (1999) that “Nationalism is still ideology of our time. The petrified bureaucrats of nation-state still have an interest to reproduce that type of nationalism. The old fashioned notions of national sovereignty and self-determination, the atavistic traditions and habits still have the power of self-adduction”. It was sixty and more years earlier when the German sociologist, H.

Kohn wrote in the same sense that on the periphery (in Europe) the intelligentsia, in the circumstances of lacking of self-confidence of the middle class to secure its own way to sustainable rise, had to create a mythical feeling of “different” destiny of the entire community, by paving the way for national culture, based upon folklore elements and mobilization of masses. This is where the power of idealistic and subјectivist components of peripherical nationalism come from…” In this context, theories and concepts of nation, nationhood, ethnos and ethnicity, relevant in modern academic and political discourse are presented and discussed. This is due to the attempts of authors of most texts on national doctrines included here, to appeal to and associate with some of the important theoretical sources of modernity.

The author takes as a point that no single theory in this area is predominant, that many of them are still functioning but that several are, nevertheless considered as- out of date in contemporary social sciences. For instance, there is still a significant legacy of ethnoromanticism, influential in the 19th century, in the period of building and accomplishing the great etatist and imperial entities in Europe.

This stream of thought had emphasized and affirmed ethnic and ethnolinguistic determination as well as the “organic” and ethno-genetic nature of nations as a ground for “voluntaristic” and “organicistic” definitions of nation and nationalism, proјected even in modernity. The cult of the past and historical past of “predecessors and heroes” as well as that of collective “political will” of the nation is the focus of that notion, having often dramatic effects even nowadays.

Marxism was and still is another source of understanding and defining the pattern of nation and ethnicity, despite of its “cosmopolitan and universalist” ideology and criticism of nationalism as an expression of “capitalist slavery” and prevention of “liberation of labour”.

Nevertheless, communism had to conceptually and practically as wellsolve the issues of “world revolution” which was taking place within “nation states”, јust like communist policies to be

implemented in nation-states’ framework. In this connection, at the beginning of the 20th century, one of the Marxist schools, the Austro-Marxism of O. Bauer, defined the nation as “entity of people, associated by a common destiny and common communication, which mediator is the language, creating so- a cultural community”. This definition is not far from contemporary understandings of the nature of ethnic/national communities.

However, later on, Marxism, in the course of the rise of the Soviet political and imperial power, had reinterpreted the nation in the words of Stalin- as “a historically established stable community of people, based upon a communion of language, territory, economic life and political constitution, manifested in a community of culture”. These features had been founded and strengthened by capitalism, implanting in such communities class inequalities, contrasts, exploitation, hegemony.

This definition has not been forgotten even today, sometimes is fully utilized and instrumentalized as in the case of the Balkans. It particularly involves the component of the “class and labor liberation”, which now, like in the recent history comprises a variety of forms of political intervention in “national and ethnic issues”. The additional product of this concept is the “historical” gradation of national “growth”, from ethno-tribes and states through ethnic grouped population and ethnicities to- nations establishing their own states on their own, ethnically determined territories.

Under Yugoslav circumstances, E. Kardelј, in the late 1950-s would determine the nation as “specific people’s community, formed on the basis of the division of labor in the epochs of capitalism, on a compact territory, in the framework of common language, having altogether close ethnic and cultural communications”. Capitalism was a creator of differences among nations, while the labor liberation would give a rise to full equity and cultural equality of all nations…

By Marxist/Stalinist interpretation, nationhood is a real community, historical, linguistic, economic, territorial, cultural etc., while inequalities among nations are a product of capitalist reproduction, which would be resolved by the revolution, even “world’s

revolution”, overcoming all social groups’ inequalities. However, at the same time, Stalinism had introduced severe instruments of intervention and “political engineering” in resolving national/ethnic issues. Nevertheless, the Macedonian national issue was not affected by such methods of resolution.

Modern thought and notions of nations and nationalism are primarily considering the dilemma weather nations are primogenial, eternal, historically determined creations, or creations of modern era, society, political development. The primordialist stream in theory defines nations as almost bio-social groups, having ethno-genetic, race, organic and even blood-relation character. That is the basis of formation and existence of cultural, language, religious and other “natural” group features and self-perception of a nation or ethnicity. As Shils, Gertz and others, explained, such groups are a root of social organization as they have organic and organic-evolutionary nature. Political and state institutions are mainly civil and secular coverage and protectors of nations… Ethnic territory is a natural space of free expression of nations and ethnicities and is protected by state apparatus.

The Modernist stream in theory of nation, although one cannot speak of homogeneous theory, generally considers that nations are not creations rooted in ancient or antique times but are a fruit of modern history and not so distant past. Most of nations in the world have been encompassed only recently and there is no sociological or historical evidence that they have been “pre-modern” collectivities. Most of the evidence indicates that their history was mainly based upon mythology and myths, not on bio-genetic, ethno-genetic or natural linkages. They are even “invented or imagined” communities and a result of modern socio-political developments which created prerequisites for rational sometimes “scheduled” activities of nation-building. These processes have been particularly visible during and after the French revolution and other civil revolutions. Authors like R. Bendix, L. Pie, E. Hobsbaum, D. Lerner, G. Allmond, E. Gellner, E. Kedourie, B. Anderson and many others have offered a deep insight in the essence of these developments, explaining in the first instance the knot correlation of the nation-building, the role of the state and politics and the requirements of industrialism and capitalism: large and single markets, mass production, massive

education and application of common standards, cultural and linguistic patterns.

Exchange and mobility of capital, labour force and goods require these common standards and destroy the traditional forms of association of populations on feudal, local, religious, ethnic, even family and primary groups’ levels. States and political institutions greatly facilitate this dynamics. However, it is pointed out that building of modern nations and nation-states is also connected to and implemented by the advancements of human rights, civil liberties and democratic order, something which is not considered as relevant in many newly established states introducing allegedly modern nation-building models.

Balkan countries, at least many of them, belong to this group of “democratic” systems. In some national doctrines of Macedonian neighbors, nationalism is defined as good (nationalism of “Western” type) and bad (of primitive type, repudiating the rights of others).

In fact, this is a distinction of nationalism perceived as patriotism and nationalism as a form of depriving “others”, ethnic minorities first of all of their natural and legal rights of self-expression. The distinction of civic patriotism and ethnic nationalism is a relevant problem in policies of many Balkan states. Even when Balkan nationalisms declare themselves as nationalism of Western type, when they refer to “citizenship of a nation-state”, they are in fact ethnic nationalisms.

It is interesting how this type of nationalism penetrates into politics and mass consciousness. The author quotes here the well known German sociologist H. Kohn, who, writing 60 years ago, said that intellectuals play a pillar role in the periphery, in East-European countries, where the petty bourgeoisie lacks the necessary confidence to pave its road to self-sustained growth. Instead, intellectuals should provide the mythical feeling of different destiny of the entire community, by nourishing a national culture based upon folklore elements and mobilization of masses. This is where the source of power of idealistic and subјectivist components of peripheral nationalisms, derives from.

Much later, in the mid 80s of the last century, the Czeck sociologist M. Hroch would conclude his research on nationalism in Eastern Europe, detecting the common matrix of nationalistic movements in the region; they usually begin with small caucuses of intellectuals, writers, artists who elaborate the idea of a threatened nation, then that idea is spreading into larger circles of patriots-agitators, teachers and јournalists, to comes to an end in a largest body of lower and middle strata as well as to- massive movement.

Ethno-symbolist school of thought, represented in the book through analysis of the works of A. Smith, Hutchinson, Burt, Gounot, Held and McGrew and others, is close to the modernists; nevertheless it is not burdened by rigid definitions, requirements and categorical determinations of what an ethnos or nation is or is not. To say in simplified words, it assumes that if a part or a group of a population feels differently from the others, particularly from the maјority, if it declares itself as an ethnically or in terms of nationhood –distinctive, it has the right to do it so.

What remains as essence of this doctrine, as Kedourie would formulate, is the fact that people have the right to endure on differences that distinct then from others, no matter whether differences are real or imagined, important or not; they have the right to make these differences their first political principle…

Moreover, such a group or entity of the population does not have any obligation or duty to prove why it so feels or self-identify as a distinctive group. Identity, self-identity and self-identification are basic concepts of theorizing in this context. The well known Croatian cultural theoretician Z. Kramaric, develops further this way of thinking, elaborating in more details the issues of group identification, particularly in situations of unfavourable conditions for nation-building, absence of own state or political forces as well as in presence of what is usually called “dual identity”, a phenomenon often seen in Balkan cultures. Kramaric applies this analysis to the phenomenon visible in Macedonian literature and nation-genesis.

At this point, the author tries to relate this theory to the international legal order and already adopted and functioning acts and treaties,

providing human rights and civil liberties relating to ethnic and minorities’ rights as a substantial part of this order. Both at individual level and subsequently at collective level, ethnic self-identification and self-determination have been incorporated in the corpus of international law and legal order. As a matter of fact, the right of selfidentification is an inclusive part of the new generation of human rights and liberties. Not everywhere this has been understood and respected.

Conceptual analysis gives a ground for a presentation and critical examination of the texts of modern national doctrines of Macedonian neighbors. The author comes to a set of analytical observations relating to most of these doctrinal documents. First of all, they present a continuation of the lines of reasoning, demands, ambitions and aspirations of their founders and ideological fathers in the mid-19th century. That was a period of national “Risorgimento” of many Balkan ethnicities, a period of ethno-romanticism, of creation of new statehoods, nationhoods, a period of formation of policies of expansion, conquests, enlargements of influence, claims to neighboring territories and populations.

In most texts, ethno-romanticism and ethno-centric interpretations of history are present nowadays, together with complains that “their” nation was a historical victim or obјect of victimization, of suffering and being deprived of some historical rights, first of all of living to the gether in one single state. This was, allegedly due to the interferences and interventions of great powers and their interests in Balkan affairs, due to specific balance of forces in the Balkan politics and inter-state affairs, not less because of domestic and internal weaknesses of the “national forces”.

The analysis of the author indicates that theoretically, the doctrines are a product of ecclesiastic methods of thinking and concluding, of a combination and discriminative selection of arguments and theses of Ethno-romanticism, Primordialism, Marxism and to certain measure Modernism. As a matter of fact, many of them draw out from these concepts- the most rigid and for them- rather instrumental definitions and conceptions of nation and ethnicity. Consequently, they try to shape the imagined paradigm of a “great nation”, historically and ethno-genetically rooted in ancient times, a

nation historically deprived of its natural rights, reduced in its ethnic territory and population by its neighbors, a nation suffering of space and resources’ limitations, a nation rich of its geno-funds and intellect but denied in rights by the present political arrangements. The claims for expanding to the entire mentally determined ethnic territory is present in most doctrinal texts, sometimes even clearly and programmatically.

Most of the doctrines deny the existence of any ethnic diversity in their own states, deny the existence of ethnic minorities and declare one-nation states; if, because of international acts and obligations they should recognize some undisputable ethnicities, they recognize their ethnic rights on individual basis only; even this is followed by active stimulation of members of these ethnicities to јoin the citizenship of the nation-state and become nationals of that state, preserving their language or group identity “for home and family”.

Most of the documents also emphasize the right of expansion to and appropriation of Macedonian territory and other territories in the neighborhood. This is on “ethno-historical”, ethno-genetic, economic, linguistic and cultural basis. An enormous and carefully selected evidence of statistical, historiographic, economic, demographic etc., basis, has been utilized to prove these claims and hypotheses. Several documents openly deny the existence of the Macedonian nation, of Macedonian minorities in their countries, of Macedonian national identity, language, history and culture. Selected lists of geographical maps, statistical censuses evidence from the past are attached to demonstrate that Macedonians are јust an invented nation, an amorphous mass of population ethnically belonging to other nations. Consequently, Macedonian ethnic communities in neighboring countries do not exist, with exception of small groups of individuals conducting “destructively”.