OPERATION “VAKTSINTSE”

OPERATION “VAKTSINTSE”

In this situation we had no choice but to change the way we performed our actions, or change our tactical approach to our actions, in order, above all, to extract the population.

I decided we should try and clear the region village by village by extracting the civilian population through use of military action and pressure. Loiane was a village at the edge, near the Yugoslav border. We did not act inside that village but only in certain positions outside of it. During the first day of operations we evacuated about 3,500 residents and sent them to the village Miratovtsi in Yugoslavia and all that time we had no problems with the terrorists. Only about

a dozen old people remained in the village and the village itself came under our control.

The next village was Vaksintse. We had a plan of operation for Vaksintse but without the knowledge of the state leadership. My idea was to secretly and quickly, without the action of artillery and helicopters, penetrate the village with tanks and transporters and, through the mining colony, surround the village from the north side. It was already surrounded from the other three sides. Three extraction teams from the Sixth Squad acted simultaneously landing near the chrome mine where civilians were held hostage. Demonstrative attacks were to commence from the other routes in the distance but without entering into the villages.

I worked out a plan in parts and began to personally prepare the units that would carry out the attack. The tanks that were required to carry out the attack withdrew in the barracks to prepare and their commanders and service staff were sent to the terrain to prepare for their arrival and attack. When it was decided to perform the operation, because of the secrecy the tanks left the barracks in Kumanovo without artillery support and went directly inside the village Vaksintse and surrounded the northeast side. The plan was signed by Stoian Andov because President Boris Trajkovski was out of the country. Andov signed without any problems or issues and all I had to do was enter the date and time of the execution.

I told Giorgi Karakutovski that, even though this plan was approved, I had no idea if it was going to be realized and when, but in any case we needed to prepare the military units.

Vlado Buchkovski, Minister of Defense, had planned to come and visit the units in Kumanovo and so I used this occasion as a suitable moment to lead him to the village Vaksintse, to the front line where the units were deployed in defense of the terrain and where we would have to go on the attack when we decided to perform the operation. I also used the occasion to let him know how we were going to extract the civilians from the village Vaksintse. Minister Vlado Buchkovski approved of my idea and my intentions.

Every day from May 10, 2001 to May 25, 2001 we were under the control of some “international factor” or another, each attempting to persuade us not to use force, etc. However, I decided that we should start performing actions in the distance with conclusively legitimate aims to disrupt the “agreement” with the international factors which were permanently present and with us. NATO and KFOR helicopters often flew in the space above us without our knowledge or permission, and took pictures.

In the villages Slupchane, Otlia, Orizare and Vaksintse we found a concentration of terrorists from the Kosovo Protection Corps, or the so-called “spilled action” forces. They were ruthless in dealing with the people. In fact they kept the entire population as hostage. They engaged the men and younger residents to build them fortification facilities (ditches, trenches) in front of and inside the villages.

From the information we gathered from the civilians, we were able to figure out terrorist movements and schedules.

Based on what we knew, from our own research and based on other kinds of information that we had gathered about the terrorists, we decided to initiate actions in the distance, exclusively by open means - the only interruptions we had were requests from the humanitarian organizations. Those were the orders. We even established a team in Kumanovo to expedite the work of the humanitarian organizations.

We performed our actions during the night to mentally exhaust the terrorists.

On May 11, 2001 I received orders to cease all actions the entire day, supposedly for extracting civilians. If I did not halt the actions, diversions would be conducted throughout the entire country.

An ambassador from a NATO member country visiting President Boris Trajkovski said that he had reliable information that “if we continue with the attacks in Kumanovo, etc., the NLA will begin with ambushes, surprise attacks and diversions in the entire territory of the Republic Macedonia and therefore during the truce we must be very careful not to cause a surprise because the NLA was operating outside of their control and political influence.”

Several days later I realized that this was not the case. President Boris Trajkovski contacted me and ordered me to receive an individual named David Foley who would be arriving in a diplomatic vehicle with two other people. I was to escort David Foley through Slupchane Vir to the village Slupchane to reportedly negotiate the extraction of civilians. I ordered that Mr. D. Foley go with my people secretly, especially when entering the village Slupchane, and to keep an eye on the people with whom he met.

The same day I received the following report from the officers observing David Foley: “At the entrance to the village Slupchane, he was welcomed by three bearded men wearing KLA uniforms. He was welcomed, embraced and kissed by each individual before entering the village.” In the evening I asked President Trajkovski: “Who is this David Foley, what is his function and for what purpose did he go to the village Slupchane?” The President said that Foley wanted to help us, to pull out the civilians. So then I said: “What civilians, he was getting kisses from the terrorists right in front of my officers, he is with them and he is not here to help us!” He then said: “Okay, okay General Pande not everything can be resolved by force.”

Because of the things I knew I decided to hatch the operation in the village Vaksintse, which was already prepared. On May 25, 2001 the Yugoslav army entered Presevo - Bujanovats Region, so I decided to pick that day to commence the operation.

On May 25, 2001, at 06:00 hours I ordered preparations for an attack at 08:00 hours. The attack was to take place immediately in all directions - demonstratively overflowing in front of the villages Slupchane, Orizare and Otlia. Fresh forces were to pull out from the Kumanovo barracks and head for Tabanovtse and after from Tabanovtse they were to cut off the road to Vaksintse and then go through the mining colony and surround Vaksintse on the north side. In the meantime, the three teams from Sixth Squad were to rescue the hostages from the chrome mine.

I contacted General Risto Galevski and told him to prepare the police forces and to be in Kumanovo at 10:00 hours. “Will we make

it on time?” he asked me. “You will make it, it is very important that you be there!” I replied.

I ordered a 40 minute artillery attack in all directions except at Vaksintse. This gave the forces from the Kumanovo barracks and the tanks the necessary time needed to arrive at their destination and to mask their attack. Moreover, I ordered the commanders not to enter the villages, except Vaksintse. They were to perform actions with legitimate purposes outside of the villages. All the commanders were looking at me and did not know what to make of all this, except for Colonel Chedo Krstevski who was familiar with the operation “Vaksintse” and was preparing the units for field duty.