THE MILITARY CRISIS IN MACEDONIA IN 2001

THE MILITARY CRISIS IN MACEDONIA IN 2001

What happened to the Republic of Macedonia in 2001 - a Classic war, a military crisis, in other words an undefined war?

Understanding the elements or characteristics of a classic war, and comparing them with what happened to the Republic of Macedonia, one can arrive at the conclusion that it was a war or aggression of one state over another. War was brought to the Republic of Macedonia in 2001 with all the elements of a military crisis. Whether this war or military crisis was in agreement with the then state - political structures in Macedonia or not will be decided by historians. I became involved later, in the resolution of the crisis, and participated in the planning and execution of military operations, except in the military activities in the villages Tanushevtsi and Malina Maala. About this I intend to bring my own views and report the facts that suggested the involvement of many elements. But for now let me say that this was a military crisis planned from the outside with strictly developed tools to control the crisis, and of course to achieve political goals.

On March 14, 2001, the then ARM Chief of General Headquarters Lieutenant General Iovo Andreeveski called a meeting with all the retired generals, to inform us about the situation in Macedonia. I do not recall exactly who was invited but present at the meeting were: myself (Pande Petrovski), Lieutenant General Mitre Arsovski, Lieutenant General Dragoliub Botsinov, General Traiche Krstevski and Brigadier General Mile Manolev.

At the meeting the Chief of Staff of ARM General Headquarters, Lieutenant General Iovo Andreeveski, informed us of the situation, or what was known over the media and how the military operation in the villages Tanushevtsi and Malina Maala was going.

After Lieutenant General Iovo Andreeveski’s presentation we had a discussion and those present had their own ideas regarding the situation. One of the generals, during the discussion, among other things, said:

“Our party took the position that the Republic of Macedonia must be defended with help from Bulgaria. There are 20,000 soldiers outside of our border ready to be put into action immediately if we ask Bulgaria to defend the Republic of Macedonia.”

I could no longer listen to him and I reacted nervously. I said: “How can you, General, say such words when we all know that Bulgaria, historically, has always entered the Republic of Macedonia with intentions “to defend” it and always behaved like an occupier. The Republic of Macedonia has enough of its own military capacity to defend against these “terrorist gangs” and continued: - “Iovo should immediately request permission from the President of the Republic of Macedonia to start mobilizing part of our units - i.e. a partial mobilization according to the plan for combat readiness, developed by General Headquarters and approved by the Government of the Republic Macedonia.”

My proposal was supported by the other generals and it was concluded to start preparing part of the military units as soon as possible to prevent deterioration of the situation.

General Iovo had his own recommendation: “The politicians should solve the problem, given that they have caused it.” Perhaps he was right, but the problem needed to be resolved by ARM.

The events that took place before my involvement, however, had something else to say:

On February 16, 2001 a firefight broke out between ARM and four men dressed in black uniforms near the village Tanushevtsi. The battle took place near the village Debalde (SRY) as the armed men were traveling towards the village Tanushevtsi. The same day at around 15:55, in the forest about 150 metres north-west of the “old store”, two persons were observed obtaining a tent. But before the border security guards could identify them, they made their escape over the border. They then opened fire on the border security personnel from the other side of the Yugoslav border and so did several other groups from a few places in the same woods. The Macedonian border security was attacked from the other side of the border on several occasions. It was the first element which indicated

that acts of aggression by a foreign country were being carried out against our territory, especially since the very same aggressors were dressed in Kosovo Protection Corps uniforms. Later we will show that they not only wore Kosovo Protection Corps uniforms but that they were Kosovo Protection Corps supporters.

Four days later, on February 20, 2001, ARM border security noticed movements of armed, uniformed men in the Kosovo part of the village Debalde. The same day men in camouflage uniforms were observed moving in the direction of the village Tanushevtsi. On February 28, 2001 a shooting spree between ARM and a number of armed, uniformed men took place near the village Tanushevtsi. The same day around 15:40 Macedonian border security and police were attacked near the Tanushevtsi observation post. The attack was carried out by armed, uniformed groups of men from the village Tanushevtsi (the people who attacked wore Kosovo Protection Corps black uniforms).

On March 4, 2001 three ARM personnel were killed (two from a planted mine, one from sniper fire, killed at the village Tanushevtsi).

On March 5, 2001 ARM personnel were fired upon by mortar fire. The mortars were fired from the Kosovo side of the border; this means that artillery was fired into the territory of the Republic of Macedonia from a neighbouring state. Mortars were fired and aggression was initiated against legal Army members who were there to defend the integrity of their territory.

ARM only reciprocated against these provocations or classic attacks perpetrated on Macedonian territory from a foreign territory, and against our legal ARM border and Ministry of Internal Affairs authorities. ARM was supposedly “instructed to do this by the top political leadership” and at the same time the “government expressed its dissatisfaction with KFOR’s current unresponsiveness; in not having performed its tasks” (cabinet session report). At the same session, the government concluded that: “The competent national authorities need to strengthen their existing measures and take additional measures to secure the border in order to prevent spillover of the conflict from the north to our country and to protect the vital institutions and facilities in our state.” Following the

government’s decision, and not that of the Supreme Commander, or of the Chief of Staff, etc., the provocations continued to occur on a daily basis. Kosovo Protection Corps units kept invading our territory from Tanushevtsi and Malina Maala, and no organized military action was taken to curb the invasions.

Official border service rules were clearly provided by Article 24 which stated: “If an armed group enters our territory, ARM must immediately take action to terminate and destroy the invasion.”

It took until March 12, 2001 before ARM was “called in” to take broader actions to completely clean up the villages Tanushevtsi and Malina Maala with KFOR’s alleged knowledge. After this was done, at 1700, the KFOR commander and the ARM commander in charge of the campaign met at the border to “establish a border regime.” So, what happened to the terrorists, where did they go?

On March 14, 2001 at 1030, a number of armed men appeared in Tetovo Kule, Tetovo, and attacked a Ministry of the Interior police patrol traveling in the direction: Tetovo - Seltse - Lavtsi. Fifteen police officers were injured during the attack, seven of whom sustained gunshot wounds. It seemed like KFOR and ARM had not done their job in this common responsibility that they shared!

Besides all the previously released information in the print and electronic media, now there was an obvious public concern that called for action: by ARM or by the Ministry of the Interior. In essence the “mastermind” of this military crisis, which carried out “provocations” in advance, as they then called them, wanted to test the state and military leadership to see if it was willing to take decisive action and, in the beginning, to see if it would subdue those 27 terrorists in the villages Tanushevtsi and Malina Maala, of whom only 8 terrorists were from Malina Maala and Tanushevtsi. The rest were from the Kosovo Protection Corps who wanted to continue planning to expand the depth of the crisis in Macedonia. (According to captured documents, included in the list of terrorists from the villages Tanushevtsi and Malina Maala were: Muharem Ziberi Hasani, Edim Adem Shakiri, Zadik Raif Romani, Emirush Medzhi Veliu, Zekir Sefet Xhaferi, Agim Musa Memeti, Kadri Rusten

Sadiku, Esat Seifula Sulusi and Isa Ietish Sinani. The others were from Kosovo.)

In spite of the fact that the Republic of Macedonia was a legitimate, independent and sovereign state, defined by its Constitution, and having developed laws for Defense and rules for border security purposes, the state authorities waited 26 days before they ordered the security forces to take serious measures and take back the space that was occupied inside the territory of the Republic Macedonia: Tanushevtsi and Malina Maala. The media, rightly so, began to put pressure on the Republic of Macedonia’s state authorities to take military action in defense of our country’s sovereignty and territorial integrity because, the way things were going, there was expressed doubt that ARM was even capable of playing that role.

In the afternoon of March 16, 2001 I was visited by Vlado Popovski, a member of the Security Council and defense, who said: “Pande, the Prime Minister (Liupcho Georgievski) and President (Boris Trajkovski) would like see you tomorrow at 10:00 hours.”

“Why do they want to see me?” I asked Vlado.

“Come an hour earlier and I will brief you,” he replied.

On March 17 and 18, 2001, those who had previously forced me into premature retirement now persuaded me to come back in order to help them solve the crisis by military means. A few months later, during an interview with President Boris Trajkovski, he was honest in answering my question: “Why did you retire me when I was not ready to retire?”

He said to me: “General, when I became president I did not know you. Richard Griffiths, the US Major General, brought me a list of who should stay and who should be retired. I just signed the list.”

He then looked at me with a particularly honest look, giving me no reason not to believe his statement.

From the conversation I had with Prime Minister Georgievski, I got the impression that he sincerely wanted to solve the crisis by

military means, but had doubts about the General Headquarters command staff. During our conversation he said: “The Chief of Staff is afraid - he is afraid of taking serious military action using ARM.”

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