EXECUTING OPERATION “ARACHINOVO”

EXECUTING OPERATION “ARACHINOVO”

For many days Arachinovo was blockaded by the police from three directions and by ARM in a wider ring. The roads Skopje - Singelits - Arachinovo from the hotel “Belvi” to Arachinovo and Kumanovo to Arachinovo were completely closed. Only the people living in it could leave the village - civilians at their own desire. The hotel “Belvi” served as a remote command post but the real command post was in the village Choilia. The Interior Ministry, a few days before the operation, installed advanced monitoring and recording equipment on the fourth floor of the hotel so that the village and surrounding area could be monitored 24 hours a day. All defense points in Arachinovo and beyond were monitored and observed. Two days before the operation we realized that the terrorists, in terms of defense, grouped their main forces on the eastern side. They were expecting an attack from the Kumanovo direction. The village was prepared for a group system defense at its approaches. Internally along the streets the terrorists had prepared regular resistance spots with weapons and ammunition left there for quick access and to provide resistance. They had deployed several mine launchers in the villages Maintse and Orlantsi. The villages outside of Arachinovo were suitable for sheltering mine launchers. There were no more than 200 to 250 terrorists inside Arachinovo, but they were well organized to defend the village by engaging its residents to do the ancillary logistics work. In other words, Arachinovo was organized for group defense in a circular defense system - there were 8 to 10 terrorists in each group (grade), using the hard objects in the village to their advantage, along the entry road of the village -along the streets - and especially in the central part of the village. But given how their defenses were set up, the terrorists had a different aim than to just defend the village. Their aim was to hold out for more than three days. Their intentions were later confirmed. They wanted to create conditions for NATO to become directly involved in the operation.

On June 21, 2001, at 04:30 hours the attack started with artillery preparations following predetermined objectives and helicopter attacks following newly specified objectives. In less than an hour all the units from all directions assembled around Arachinovo. Thrown into the mix during the night was part of the Sixth Squad and the

special Interior Ministry police unit. They were positioned in the village along the channel in the direction of Singelits. They were joined by a tank platoon from the village Brniartsi TT - 370. The village was approached from the north side.

A main force attack from the Singelik and Brniartsi direction on Arachinovo was not expected. Initially there was no serious resistance in that direction and the Sixth Squad and the special Interior Ministry police unit entered the village up to the cemetery, and so terrorists immediately began to strengthen the defense near the new mosque.

The attack from the east side (from direction of Krivi Dol) was going very slowly because the terrorists had organized Bel Kamen well with a strong defensive point at about 1 km east of the first houses in Arachinovo. After strengthening our attack from the south side of Bel Kamen, our forces broke up the resistance point and the armed terrorists were trapped. Some escaped to Arachinovo and left their arms and equipment behind. Kota 354 was defeated in the afternoon. During the first day we managed to reach inside Arachinovo on the west and north side but not on the east and south side. There, our units were ordered to stop outside of the village. We did not want to enter the village with our tanks because it was risky and we would have had losses, and there was no need for that. We continued the battle during the night but from the distance. I did not want to pursue the attack and cause needless losses when the village was completely surrounded and every incident was properly handled from the distance. I said the same thing to Minister Liube Boskovski. There were terrorist snipers and we did not need unnecessary casualties. Every point that we discovered, where the terrorists were firing on us, we attacked with artillery fire and with the tanks, and then we sent the infantry in to finish it off. This method may have been slow, but it lowered the risk of our troops becoming casualties. There was no need to rush the offensive since the entire village was surrounded, and all actions were systematically watched and all attempts to get help from the outside were prevented. It was a matter of time before the terrorists were forced to surrender or retreat. Without being supplied, their reserves would have depleted in a few days. And when their ammunition ran out they would have two choices - withdraw or surrender.

During the first day we found two foreigners wounded near the village Arachinovo. Colonel Milisav Tashtanovski called me and said: “General, we captured two wounded people but they are not Albanians… they are Americans!” “What are they doing there?!” I asked. “Ask them, get their documents and then contact Colonel Robert Lynch and surrender them to him!” I thought they were there because they wanted to observe the operation from up close like some NATO officers did in Kumanovo.

In the evening, during our usual meeting with the state leadership, I proposed that we continue with our military actions from the distance and gradually eliminate all enemy points of fire with our artillery, destroy all resistance and then send the army and police in to perform a clean up. The actions were to unfold constantly - day and night, 24 hours a day. Someone suggested that we: “Involve NATO as an intermediary to draw the terrorists out!” The idea was accepted with ease along with the need to continue the offensive and intensify the attacks. They all also agreed to keep the casualties down to none if possible; there was really no need to have any victims. The second day we intensified the attack and continued to escalate the pressure. Our tanks took point TT 354 and entered Arachinovo from the east side. Our units on the west side had reached the new mosque and were slowly but surely increasingly tightening the ring, pushing the terrorists towards the central part of the village. All this was monitored and recorded at the hotel “Belvi” by our recording equipment, operated by the Republic of Macedonia’s Interior Ministry.

On June 24, 2001 I received a call from President Trajkovski who said: “Come to my office tomorrow at 09:00 hours!” The next day I was at the Presidents office and I noticed that he was nervous. He turned to me and said: “General, George Robertson has accepted the idea that NATO should draw out the terrorists from Arachinovo.” I said: “Well then we will continue with the offensive until conditions are created for an extraction.” He looked at me and said: “No, George Robertson told me that there are 30 of his people in Arachinovo!” I looked back at him but I could not understand exactly what he was trying to tell me, so I asked: “Who are these people and how did they get to Arachinovo?!” He looked down and

said: “I do not know… but he promised to give me a list of those people…” He then continued: “Listen to me,” he said, “listen to me well, at 13:00 hours Javier Solana will be arriving here, do whatever you can until then. At 13:00 hours you are to stop the offensive. Now go, go and continue with the attacks and I will call you.” I tried to tell him that we were almost done with the campaign and victory was within our grasp. I said: “We are already at the new mosque in Arachinovo and rapidly progressing on the east side, the only place they hold is the centre of the village and around the channel...” But it seems he heard nothing of what I said and again told me: “Go, I will call you and tell you when to stop!” Those were the President’s orders.

I returned, but not to the “Belvi” hotel command post. I went directly to the village Choilia to the command post were General Miroslav Stoianovski was stationed. General Metodi Stamboliski was also there acting as coordinator for all ARM units involved in the campaign. General Zoran Iovanovski, a police general, was also there coordinating police actions.

When I got there I immediately called everyone to the operations room, we went to a separate hall so that I could let the officers know of our latest order, received from the President of the Republic of Macedonia. I also wanted to re-plan our actions so that we could do whatever was needed before we received the order to cease all actions.

I went back to the “Belvi” hotel command post around 11:00 hours. By that time our actions inside the village had escalated and were becoming more intense. Almost 2/3 of the village was under our control. Shortly after that the Prime Minister, together with Minister Liube Boshkovski, arrived at the command post. I briefed them on the present situation on the ground which they could see for themselves. Fighting was raging in the village streets.

Everyone was in good spirits that day because we were all expecting to completely destroy the terrorists. A while later, Liube Boshkovski received a telephone call on his mobile telephone. At the time he was sitting beside Liubco Georgievski. The call made him very nervous so he got up and, with a high pitched tone of voice, shouted

back abusive words. Colonel Stoian Petrovski happened to be in the near vicinity so I gave him a look and signaled him to get out of the room and not listen to what Liube Boshkovski was saying. I looked at the Prime Minister but he did not react, he kept watching the battle taking place in Arachinovo. When Boskovski was finished talking on the phone, he nervously said: “He wants the actions stopped right now!” I then immediately realized that he must have been talking to the President about what the President had told me at 09:00 hours, so I imagine he had not communicated this to Boshkovski until now. After he calmed down Boshkovski said to me: “Trajkovski told me to tell you to terminate all military actions and for me to terminate all police actions!” The Prime Minister did not say a word but got up and the two left for Skopje. After they left I went to the Choilia command post where, around 12:45 hours, I received a call from the President who told me: “General, I want you to terminate all action in Arachinovo at 13:00 hours. Now go back to ‘Belvi’ hotel and meet with the NATO officials!” I said: “I understand but I will need at least an hour to end the offensive; for the orders to trickle down. On top of that I have the aviation ready for a final blow.” He then said: “No, no, under no circumstances are you to deploy the aviation. I want you to call me at 13:30 hours and tell me that you have ended all actions!” He then added: “Don’t you try to employ the aircraft, no, this is not a game, and I explained to you this morning what is going on!” I then reassured him that I would do as he ordered.

After receiving the call from Trajkovski, Brigadier General Zvonko Stoianovski, commander of air defense, called me and informed me that: “The helicopter pilots were reporting seeing white sheets displayed on top of the houses in Arachinovo. What should we do?” he then asked. I gave him a short reply. I said: “Okay Zvonko, at 13:00 hours you are to terminate all actions. Those are the Supreme Commander’s orders! Also, after all the helicopters have returned, call me, in the meantime you will be receiving a written order for this termination!”

Because General Metodi Stamboliski and General Miroslav Stoianovski were standing beside me while I was talking to the President, and because they were in command of the units on the ground, I immediately ordered them to cease all military actions and

take necessary measures to defend our current positions. In the end I told them: “I am going to a meeting now so please stay in contact in case of further developments. Please keep the units on alert and be ready to attack on short notice, only if so ordered. They are only allowed to open fire on the terrorists if attacked, for security purposes and to protect themselves!”

I arrived at “Belvi” hotel around 14:00 hours and noticed many journalists, TV crews, various diplomatic vehicles, etc., standing in front of the hotel. I entered the hotel through the restaurant hall and there I saw the entire diplomatic corps accredited to the Republic of Macedonia. Amongst them, from our side were Vlado Buchkovski, Liube Boshkovski, Nikola Dimitrov, Todor Pendarovski and many others.

Immediately after entering the hall I asked Vlado Buchkovski: “What is that going on?” He said to me: “You will soon find out, there will be a meeting; Javier Solana is due to arrive at 16:00 hours.” Then Air force commander Brigadier General Zvonko Stoianovski informed me that our radar had picked up six planes, fighter-bombers coming out of Italy, flying through Albania and heading towards the Republic of Macedonia. I told him to keep an eye on them, follow them and watch where they are going. In the meantime, prepare our helicopters to be moved to the village Lozovo to the reserve airport!”

I thought to myself: - it’s no joke; NATO is prepared to use force if we continue with our actions. The President of the Republic of Macedonia was certainly aware of this meeting this morning when I was at his office, but he did not say anything to me, I do not understand why. I asked Liube Boskovski what was going on. He said: “We will both soon find out brother, I don’t know anything. I have no idea what these NATO people are planning?!”

National Security Advisor to the President, Nikola Dimitrov, representing the President on this occasion, introduced me to a civilian. He said: “This is Mr. Peter Faith, envoy to the NATO Secretary-General; he will be leading the meeting today and present the plan for extracting the terrorists out of Arachinovo.” So I asked

him: “Does the President know about all this?” Dimitrov then said: “Yes, and I will inform him about everything that transpires.”

The meeting started around 14:30 hours. Without any introduction, Peter Faith indicated that he was going to come into contact with the terrorists and offer them passage out through his organization. In other words NATO was prepared to extract the terrorists out of Arachinovo and transfer them to Kosovo. Liube Boshkovski strongly objected to Peter Faith’s proposal and said that he would not allow the terrorists to be extracted without being punished. I interrupted Minister Boshkovski, took him to the side and said: “Wait, let him finish talking and then we will talk. The terrorists are surrounded and going nowhere.” After Boshkovki calmed down he went back to his place and the meeting continued.

We all, for one thing or another reacted, we did not want the terrorists to be taken to Kosovo. In the end it was agreed that: “The terrorists to be extracted by NATO with their own buses and taken to the village Nikushtak. We were to take our tanks out of Arachinovo and out of the road Arachinovo - Nikushtak.”

Basically NATO and OSCE had three variants of the extraction plan, which in fact were two plans:

“A” - to extract the terrorist with vehicles owned by civilian companies - from Tetovo, “B” - to extract the terrorists with NATO/KFOR buses, or “C” - to extract the terrorists in their own vehicles.

From the three variants available we accepted a combination of variants “A” and “B” - (i.e.: First round to be completed with 4 buses from Tetovo and the second round with 7 NATO buses, 5 combat hummers, 5 medical hummers and 2 trucks).

We certainly were not going to accept variant “C” - the terrorists extracting themselves in their own vehicles. The meeting lasted only briefly. I was surprised to see that 10 to 15 minutes after our meeting ended, NATO troops were rushed in, in front of the hotel with all the agreed upon vehicles ready to do the extraction. This,

for me at least, confirms that the plan was already in motion before we even had our meeting. All we did at the meeting was confirm it!”

The deal was that the terrorists be extracted while it was still day time. We insisted on that because we needed the light to video tape the whole extraction process from the hotel “Belvi”. NATO was aware of that too. So, even though the NATO delegation went into Arachinovo very quickly it did not come out with the terrorists as per our agreement; come out at 16:00 hours and exit Arachinovo in the direction of Kumanovo.

After the NATO contingent went inside Arachinovo and while being supported by its own combat vehicles and troops, it completely forgot about our agreement. I have no idea with whom Nikola Dimitrov was communicating, but he stood by me in the hotel “Belvi” hall and continued to inform me of what these NATO people wanted from us. First, he informed me that the terrorists allegedly did not want to be extracted on buses but wanted vehicles and tractors from the village Nikushtak. I told Nikola Dimitrov to tell Peter Faith that: “If the terrorists don’t want to be extracted from Arachinovo like we agreed then NATO must withdraw from Arachinovo and I will resume the offensive.” Peter Faith replied and said he needed to consult with Javier Solana and George Robertson first. About 10 minutes later Nikola Dimitrov came to my office with a smile on his face and said: “They told me to tell you that the terrorists have agreed to withdraw with NATO.” I said to Dimitrov: “I told you that we needed to do exactly as we agreed.” I was thinking of NATO when I said that. But still they made changes to the original plan. Finally the 4 buses delivered from Tetovo, 4 sports utility vehicles and a truck began to roll out of Arachinovo around 17:30 hours and headed for the village Nikushtak where they offloaded the first group of terrorists. But the seven NATO buses, the 5 military hummers, the 5 medical hummers and the 2 trucks were nowhere to be seen coming out of Arachinovo. In fact they waited until dark. They did not want to be seen. They did not want us to see who they were taking and where they were taking them. That was the reason why they did not want to leave during daylight. But as the night drew nearer we closed all the exits from Arachinovo towards Singelik, towards Nikushtak and to the “Belvi” hotel. NATO and its security vehicles remained blocked in Arachinovo.

We wanted to let them out the next day at dawn but they were unwilling to go. The NATO people were well aware that we had recording equipment in the hotel and that we could not record during the dark of night. Similarly that is why we took our own measures and held them in Arachinovo all this time, but I did not understand why they let the 4 civilian buses from Tetovo take that group of terrorists to the village Nikushtak at 17:30 hours.

At nightfall, while NATO units still remained in Arachinovo, I returned to General Headquarters. I received a call from Mr. Ketskovski, head of President Boris Trajkovski’s security team, who said: “General, please tell me, suggest to me, where should we withdraw the President, he has been threatened with murder. A crowd of people, police, etc., has begun to gather in front of the Parliament Building.” I thought about it and 5 to 6 minutes later I called the President and said: “Take your security team and leave now. Go to the ‘Ilinden’ Barracks. I will wait for you there!” I also advised him to do this secretly. I said: “Don’t tell anyone where you’re going!” He took my advice and the President took to the road alone with just his personal security team. In the meantime, I ordered Colonel Blazho Kopachev to secure the barracks with military police in addition to the regular guard. I put the “Wolves” in charge of providing direct security to the command building. After the President arrived we moved to the guard brigade commander’s office where everything that was needed - telephone connections (PTT, Special links, etc.) was available, and there was also a bedroom located next to the office for the President to rest. We watched live on television what was happening in front of the Parliament Building.

During the first moments after we settled in the barracks, we talked about the current situation and what was happening in the Republic of Macedonia.

“Does the Prime Minister know where you are and who you are with?” I asked.

“Nobody knows, the situation is very serious, I should have notified the Prime Minister and the Minister of Defense,” he replied.

He then said “General, today is my birthday, and look what is happening to our country!”

After that he contacted his wife Vilma and then gave me the telephone to reassure her that her husband was indeed in the barracks and not in the Parliament building and that this was a safe place.

A while later the Prime Minister called me and asked: “Do you know where the President is?”

I had to tell him the truth and when he found out he said: “Okay then, tell him that I will be coming there to join him!”

Before that I contacted Vlado Buckovski, Minister of Defense, and told him where I was going and when I would be able to see him. I also told him that it would be a good idea if he went to the “Ilinden” Barracks.

Gradually, one by one, almost all of the Republic of Macedonia’s top state leadership had gathered in the guard brigade commander’s office in the “Ilinden” barracks. Only Stoian Andov, Ilinka Mitreva, and Liube Boshkovski were not there.

I tried to establish contact with Liube Boshkovski but was unable. The Prime Minister also tried but without success, at least that’s what he told me. I established contact with General Risto Galevski and informed him that the Prime Minister had asked that if Risto made contact with Liube Boshkovski to tell Luibe to immediately call the Prime Minister.

The situation in front of the Parliament Building was getting worse. We all were able to follow it through live television in the guard brigade commander’s office. Hour after hour the situation kept getting worse and worse; it could have easily gotten out of control.

At one moment the reservist police appeared with weapons and joined the citizens, and then a platoon of cadets from the Military Academy appeared. I got information that: The intention of the reservist police officers was to join the people at the Parliament

Building and then lead them on a march to Bit-Pazar. Many of those present here, given the current situation, were thinking about what could be done to change that situation, and were offering their suggestions. One thing was certain, if the crowd was allowed to reach Bit-Pazar, inevitably it would lead to general chaos and to casualties. The Prime Minister requested that we engage the army to close the bridges over the Vardar River. I immediately replied and said: “The army cannot be engaged because there is no constitutional authority for such a task, besides, the army is already engaged at the moment.” “Then I suggest,” said Prime Minister Georgievski, “that we order General Risto Galevski to immediately shut down the bridges over the Vardar with his police forces.” (I immediately became suspicious that all this may have already been prearranged?!) His proposal was accepted by everyone but still we could not get in touch with Minister Liube Boskovski of the Interior Ministry. By now everyone was aware of what was happening in front of the Parliament Building, given that the entire event was broadcast live on television.

Personally, I had other problems: Arachinovo was blocked, but in it there was still a composition of NATO forces along with the terrorists. Inside were seven buses and a number of other vehicles along with soldiers, mostly Americans. According to our sources, there were many seriously wounded terrorists inside the 5 medical hummers. The buses contained so-called fighters dressed in NATO uniforms, i.e. in American uniforms. But no matter what, I did not forget what the President told me the same day at 09:00 hours when I was in his office: “that in Arachinovo there were some of their own (NATO) people, and that George Robertson promised to give the President a list which would identify who those people were!”

Because all roads to Arachinovo were blocked by the police, by the people and by the ARM units, every attempt by the NATO contingent to extract the terrorists was challenged. NATO would not allow their vehicles to be checked by the police. In other words NATO did not want the police to know what they were transporting in any of their vehicles at any cost, even if they had to open fire on our security forces. If we were to come to such a situation, it would mean direct conflict between NATO and the security forces of the Republic of Macedonia. For this reason Colonel Robert Lynch - US

military attaché to the Republic of Macedonia, contacted me several times and demanded that we allow the NATO forces out of Arachinovo.

So as not to further complicate an already complicated situation, I asked Brigadier General Miroslav Stoianovski to contact Colonel Robert Lynch and extract the NATO forces that were blockaded in Arachinovo. With help from the “Wolves” 6th Unit we moved the NATO forces from Arachinovo towards the “Belvi” hotel, along the village dirt roads during the night of June 25/26, 2001. In the morning of June 26, 2001, the US ambassador and Colonel Robert Lynch contacted us and thanked us for ARM’s help with the extraction. On June 27 I received an operational report from KFOR with the following content:

“The KFOR brigade for securing the border from Kosovo into the Republic of Macedonia (MNG - East) reported that at 05:30 hours this morning it caught 27 people, men, at location EM 436 777 (Dolno Zlokukiani, Kosovo), four of them had wounds from fighting and were evacuated by air to a hospital in Camp ‘Bondsteel’ and the remaining 23 were taken to ‘Bondsteel’ Prison. There were no reports of weapons found.” So, what was the likelihood that they would produce the “list” which they promised to submit after the Arachinovo extraction?

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June 28/, 2001, 11:30 hours