IV. STATE OF AFFAIRS OF THE MACEDONIAN PARTY ORGANIZATION DURING 1940-1941 - Part 02

On August 22, 1941, the First Skopje Partisan Detachment was created. The Detachment was created near the Vardar River opposite the village of Zlokuchani in the "Chiflik"- Skopje locality. In fact, this was the first partisan detachment created in Macedonia in

1941." 166

"As we know, during 1938, 1939 and 1940, up until 1941, the Skopje Party Organization, was created, hardened and strengthened through a series of political and strike actions, so that in 1941 there were over 130 Communist Party and over 300 SKOJ members in Skopje. The March 27, 1941, demonstrations clearly showed the influence and authority the Party Organization in Skopje had. I don't know of any other city except for Belgrade, to have such organized and mass demonstrations, in which the Party Organization was actively involved.

Immediately after the occupation, the Local Committee had an extended meeting during which the directive to intensify vigilance was conveyed. Furthermore, another directive was given to the communists not to carry weapons because if they were caught they would be killed, which could spell disaster for our cadres." 167

166 Aleksandar Krstevski-Parto, ibid., p. 406. 167 Boge Kuzmanovski, ibid., pp. 410, 411, 412.

2. Military Commission activities in 1941 under Provincial Committee leadership Here I will refer to the report written by Dragoljup Bogoevich and Velimir Nikolov, regarding statements made by Serafim Vidovski under the title "Functioning of the first weapons workshop in Skopje

1941".

First, in my opinion, the report the way it was presented was flawed on many issues. Namely, creating and organizing this workshop to function the way it did was one of the most important tasks the Military Commission undertook under the CPY Provincial Committee for Macedonia's leadership. However, according to the above-mentioned report, there is no mention that the workshop was organized by the Military Commission. Even more than that, it follows from the report that Shikich, who then was a member of the Provincial Committee Military Commission, was the only expert material translator who served to organize the workshop.

By taking this approach, the authors of this very important document managed to reduce the Skopje Party Organization's role. Perhaps this stems from the fact that at that time Sharlo was leading the Party in Macedonia. However, it seems they lost sight of the fact that it was wrong to attribute their problem with Sharlo's views to the entire Party in Macedonia and especially to the Skopje party organization as a whole. If they had a reduced role the Party in Macedonia and the Skopje party organization wouldn't be able to successfully organize and lead NOB and the Revolution to its end.

The Military Commission operated from the end of June to the beginning of September 1941, under the leadership of the CPY Provincial Committee for Macedonia.

The Military Commission served as a special body for the Provincial Committee's military functions. I don't know if, when and where local Military Commissions were formed at the Local Party Committees, but I do know this was discussed by the Provincial Committee's Military Commission which deemed it to be necessity.

However, the Skopje Party Local Committee didn't create a separate Military Commission, but the tasks in the sector in which the Skopje Party Organization functioned were performed by members of the Provincial Committee Military Commission. At the same time, Perisha Savelich was in charge of the Local Committee along military lines. I assume that Savelich was directly under Sharlo, who at the time was president of the Military Commission at the Provincial Committee.

The Provincial Committee Military Commission was scheduled to be created at the end of June 1941. But it appears the Provincial Committee changed its mind and created it on June 22, on account of Hitler's Germany attacking the Soviet Union. A few days later, my friend Spomenka Shikich, who (together with Mileva Sabe) at that time was taking care of maintaining the apartment, supplying food and other necessities for the Provincial Committee secretary, told me that I should meet Metodija Shatorov in the evening near the old Directorate for Forests (today's "Ortse Nikolov" street). At the meeting, Sharlo told me that a military commission had been created and asked me to join it as a reserve officer. He also asked me to attend the first meeting, which would take place at six o'clock in the evening in the clearing near the "Treska" sawmill.

The next day my "intellectual" Party cell held a meeting in my apartment. At the time Strasho Pindzhur was Party cell secretary.

The meeting started at 3 in the afternoon and continued for a long time. Time was getting short and I started to worry that I wouldn't get to the field at "Treska" on time for my six o'clock meeting. The thing was that the cell wasn't supposed to know about the Military Commission and my 6 o'clock meeting. I was relieved when Pindzhur looked at his watch and said the meeting was over. So I had just enough time to get to my next meeting. I was very surprised when, after a while, I saw Strasho Pindzhur appear in the meadow.

He asked me if Sharlo had asked me to be here and when I confirmed he told me that he had come for the same reason.

However, when the allotted ten minutes passed and no one else arrived, we dispersed. That was the last time I saw Pindzhur. From this I conclude that Pindzhur was included in the Provincial Committee's first Military Commission composition.

Two or three days later, Sharlo invited me to attend a meeting at the Jewish cemetery. The meeting started at 3 o'clock and was attended by Sharlo, Kotse the metal worker, Gjuro Lekovich-Gorski and myself. Sharlo informed me that a Military Commission was being created as part of the Provincial Committee composition. The Military Commission was made up of Sharlo as President, Kotse in charge of public relations with our people in the Bulgarian army, Gorski in charge of the subversive groups and I was placed in charge of the intelligence service. The following tasks were set before the Commission: collecting weapons, ammunition and explosives, producing flashlights, acquire devices and other equipment that would damage railway tracks and other equipment, collect information - timetables for the movement of trains, specifically those transporting military units, ammunition and other military equipment, organize sabotage groups, train sabotage groups and party members to on how to handle weapons (rifles, guns, bombs, explosives, etc.), collect data, find places for military training, etc. Members of the Military Commission were asked to immediately begin executing the assigned tasks.

The Military Commission had four meetings during its existence.

Except for one, which was held in Pajo Momchilovich's apartment, the rest were held around the Jewish cemetery. The last meeting took place at the end of August or beginning of September. I am certain that the Military Commission stopped functioning the same day when our "intellectual" cell discussed the CPY Central Committee's letter regarding Sharlo '5 anti-party attitude. That meeting was also attended by Lazar Kolishevski.

At its meetings, the Military Commission spent its time analyzing the tasks it performed. Among other things, it discussed the three sabotage groups that were created in Skopje, it discussed the situation with the collection of weapons, the manufacturing of flashlights, bombs and other explosives materials. It discussed the organizing of action for extracting explosives from the Radusha mine, for creating a radio station, collecting radio devices, etc. It discussed its connections with some Bulgarian soldiers and the way to collect data on the movement of trains, which the commission aimed to blow up, and how to use the Bulgarian party organization at the railway station in Skopje for that purpose. It also discussed how to attract reserve military officers to train the subversive groups, Party members, etc.

The Military Commission also spent time analyzing and discussing ways to organize a partisan detachment. In connection with that I attended a meeting with Sharlo near the end of July during which I informed him that some workers (among whom was Mihajlo Andrich) who worked at the Kapina factory and who, before the occupation, came from Porechje, had asked me or one of my friends to join them. They said we should organize the people who hid in the forest to avoid the Bulgarian occupier's terror. They told me they could assemble about 80 people and about 300 rifles. They also told me that some workers from Kapina were political workers before the war. I suggested to Sharlo that after work I should go there and organize a partisan detachment. He told me that he needed to consult the others in the Provincial Committee and maybe he would go himself to get to know the situation better and for now that we should wait. Two or three weeks later, at my constant insistence for an answer, Sharlo told me that the comrades (he meant the Provincial Committee) didn't agree with my proposal because its realization at the moment wasn't politically opportune. The population in Porechje was Serbian leaning. The detachment that would be created wouldn't be considered by the Macedonian people as their own but as a Serbian detachment, and the occupier would use this to blame the Serbians and accuse our Party of being a Serbian nationalist weapon. That's why we had to postpone all the work until later.

As part of my work in the Military Commission, I was assigned to supervise Serafim Vidoevski and Bogoljub Dimitrievich who were responsible for manufacturing flashlights, bombs, flame throwers, a radio receiving station and other items. I was also there to help them interpret the drawings and professional literature. As a result I often found myself in the workshop with these comrades.

After training the three subversive groups in Skopje, towards the end of July and the beginning of August, the Military Commission decided to combine the three subversive groups and create a partisan detachment. The Military Commission also decided to train military tactics to party members, young people, sympathizers and all kinds of groups throughout Macedonia. As a result we needed to find as many military instructors as possible. I was expected to be the chief military instructor. There was talk of appointing Gjuro Lekovich-Gorski commander of the Skopje detachment. However, the Military Commission never mentioned Gorski as the commander in chief of all the partisan detachments in Macedonia, even though Gorski later claimed that he was. He couldn't have been because at that time not a single partisan detachment had been formed.

The Military Commission stopped functioning the moment Sharlo was removed from his post as Provincial Committee Secretary." 168 "WEAPON WAREHOUSES IN 1941 In July 1941, several sabotage groups were created in Skopje. They attacked the Radusha mine several times and expropriated ecrasite, dynamite, capsules and other items. These were very difficult and dangerous measures, especially since we weren't armed and couldn't fight back if the enemy discovered us. After that we carried out an action at the Pyrotechnic factory in Gjorche Petrov - then known as Handrievo.

In addition to expropriating explosive items, we also built bombs and flame throwers at Seraphim Vidovski's workshop and several other places. All those weapons had to be secretly stored somewhere. That was my task with the help of a few other comrades. Parts of the explosives were stored locally in secret warehouses and the rest we gave to comrades from Prilep, Kavadartsi, Veles and other places. I packed the explosives for them in cement bags and they carried them to their places.

We had a warehouse at the Jewish cemetery. Dragan Tomich and I opened old grave slabs and filled them with dynamite and other explosive items. It wasn't pleasant walking around the graveyard at night but it was a very good shelter.

We also used a small house in Madzhir-Maalo as a weapon's warehouse. We rented the house for some time and no one knew

168 Branislav Shikich, ibid., p. 444 and the "November 13" edition of the Skopje Fighters Organization, Skopje, Year VI, no. 6/1967 p. 12.)

what was happening inside it. In fact, there was hole dug under the shower which we filled with explosive materials that were used to supply the saboteur groups.

After the First Skopje Partisan Detachment was disbanded, its weapons were left in Vodno. Those weapons where taken and secured with the other weapons. Dragan Tomich, Kemal Sejvula, Vancho Zafirov-Chanakov and I brought them to the city. We took them from Vodno, loaded them in a car, brought them down to Skopje and secured them in our warehouses.

We had a third warehouse in Madzhir-Maalo located in Nada Veselinova's house. Nada was a monopoly worker at the time.

There was a bunker dug in the shed where we stored most of the weapons, the rest we stored in her attic. However, I don't remember why but Nada had to move from that house to another. After she did we moved the weapons to her new house. We loaded them in a cart:

weapons and explosives at the bottom with a bed on top of them and Nada's child on top of that. Her child has now grown and is in school. We dug a bunker in the yard of Nada's new house and hid the weapons in it. Next we built a chicken coop on top of the bunker. This house also had a well in which we hid more explosive materials. There we hid explosive liquids, a Geshtetner (duplicating machine) and some propaganda materials.

These were the main weapons warehouses in 1941. As a result of a major search campaign in Skopje some were discovered by the Bulgarian police, the rest remained intact and were used throughout the struggle". 169

"During the month of June 1941, organizations for your people were created in Chucher and Gluvo. The two organizations held a joint meeting above the village Gluvo, near the Pudarats Locality where they discussed Germany's attack on the USSR. At the end of the meeting they decided it was time to arm themselves and for that they needed to start collecting weapons." 170

169 licho Jakimovski, "Weapon warehouses in 1941", The "November 13" edition of the Skopje Fighters Organization, Skopje, year VI, no. 6/1967, p. 12.) 170 Trajko Stojkov, ibid., year I, no. 1 of 1962, p. 9.

"While I was going home accompanied by Metodija, (Shatorov) we talked about people who had been killed and why they were killed!

They were killed because they were caught carrying weapons on them. Then Metodija said that a directive should be issued to all party organizations in Macedonia and to all organized party comrades not to carry weapons on them because the fascists would instantly shoot them for that. He was thinking that way in order to preserve Party cadres.

This directive was immediately implemented in Skopje. A few days later it was also implemented in the interior.

During the entire occupation, even when I was in Skopje, in Albania and after I was released from prison, I never heard of any directive given to hand over weapons to the Germans! I heard that after the occupiers left. I was surprised that someone would even say such a thing. Several years after the liberation, a friend accidentally told me that it was I who had delivered the directive to Prilep in 1941. I immediately denied that because it wasn't true. I told my friend that I never delivered such a directive, nor did I know about such a directive. And why is it that no one asked me about this until today?" 171 Svetozar Vukmanovich - Tempo, a member of the CPY Central Committee in Macedonia, sent Sreten Zhujovich to Macedonia at the end of 1939 and he remained there until the first half of 1940.

This is what Sreten Zhujovich said in his memoirs: "First, we organized a mass celebration to celebrate the Ilinden Uprising.

When we gathered the people on a national basis the Macedonian people didn't know why we acted this way..." Then in 1940 we learned that after Shatorov was placed at the head of the Party organization, in the spring of 1940, the Macedonian national question became a primary issue in Macedonia. In 1939 both Zhujovich and Tempo were in Macedonia but they did not pay attention to this issue and attached primary importance to the class issue, which for Macedonia was of secondary importance and therefore the Macedonian people were passive observers. This 171 Kiro D. Petrevski-Dimush, autobiography, August 9, 1971, MANU Skopje N.R., no. 87.

shows how little the CPY knew about the situation in Macedonia.

Attitudes were imposed that didn't mobilize but created passivism.

Secondly, there were different views on how to organize the general Macedonian People's Front. Shatorov was of a firm position that the entire Macedonian population should join the Macedonian National People's Front, regardless of nationality, religion, or social affiliation - all who were ready to fight for national liberation, unification and the formation of an independent Macedonian state.

Those who were fighting for other people's interests on an anti-Macedonian basis couldn't be included in the front, regardless of whether they worked for the Greater Serbs, Greater Bulgarians, or Greater Greeks. However, Svetozar Vukmanovich-Tempo was adamant: "only those who are pro-Soviet Union can enter the front and participate. Those who aren't cannot participate..." The third question that was asked was about the unification of all parts of Macedonia. This is what Zhujovich said about that: "As for the unification of the Macedonian people, this couldn't be established then because there were Macedonians under Serbia, under Bulgaria and under Greece, and a conversation with those bourgeoisies wasn't possible... because they were all against the unification of Macedonia." But Shatorov advocated for an opposite view, unification should be the main goal in the program for the liberation of Macedonia.

The fourth issue was that all proclamations handed out should be written in the Macedonian language. 172 The following can be concluded from carefully analyzing the documents and other materials, as well as the statements made by the contemporaries:

The Provincial Committee, formed in early 1940, eventually renamed the Party Organization in Macedonia from the Communist Party of Yugoslavia Provincial Committee for Macedonia (CPY PC)

led by Serbia, to the Communist Party of Macedonia Provincial Committee (CPM PC). The Provincial Committee had been under

172 Sreten Zhujovich's memoirs, June 14, 1960. INI Skopje, Si. IV no. 748, pp. 32-

40.

CPY Central Committee leadership since 1940. With the renaming, the Macedonian Communists finally achieved their goal which they had established in 1919, and amended in 1923-1924 to include the formation of a separate, independent Communist Party of Macedonia (CPM), equal to the other Communist Parties in the Balkan countries. Unfortunately their effort was in vain because the CPY, CPB (Communist Party of Bulgaria) and CPG (Communist Party of Greece), which led the Macedonian communists in the their respective parts of occupied Macedonia didn't agree with that concept and stood firm for a fragmented communist movement in Macedonian, i.e. that each Communist Party should manage the communists living in their part of the Macedonian territory which the various monarchies occupied and annexed during the wars of 1912-1918. This situation led to each of these Parties looking for communists in Macedonia to support their respective Party. Those communists in the three parts of Macedonia who didn't want a CPM to be created were declared undesirable and removed from the Party ranks, that is, they were accused of being Bulgarian, Serbian, or Greek but not Macedonian.

After it renamed its Party to CPM PC, the Provincial Committee began to build its basic program goals for solving the Macedonian national question and for tackling social and economic issues. One of its main goals was the unification of Macedonia as an independent state and as an independent subject with its own sovereignty and to be allowed to participate as an equal partner with the other Balkan states in solving Balkan problems. Unfortunately the old leaders at the District Committee level who could implement directives, answered only to the Provincial Committee of Serbia and weren't too keen to create programming goals to serve Macedonian interests. They wouldn't issue independent documents of program importance for solving the issue of Macedonian individuality. They were basically set on the issue of class liberation, which wasn't at all connected with national issues and national traditions which the Macedonian people desired.

The Serbian led District Committee refused to recognize the CPM Central Committee's program goals, which represented a maximum program for solving the Macedonian question, i.e. for the Macedonian people's complete liberation from slavery from Serbia, Bulgaria and Greece. In the District Committee's view the wars of 1912-1918 liberated Macedonia. The District Committee refused to recognize that Macedonia was occupied, fragmented and annexed by the surrounding monarchies and that the Macedonian people were enslaved by those same monarchies. The CPM Provincial Committee's idea was to create a single Macedonian communist party with a single leadership. The CPM Provincial Committee wanted to create a Macedonian state that would be equal to the other Balkan states, which would fight in a joint struggle with the working class in the other states which were struggling for their liberation.

The CPM Provincial Committee wanted to create a Macedonia which, in addition of struggling for class liberation, would also struggle for its national liberation.

The CPM Provincial Committee's program goals fully encompassed the Macedonian people's interests and protected their permanent historical interests. The Provincial Committee's goals, unfortunately, didn't coincide with the interests of the neighbouring communist parties, which in their program goals envisioned a partial solution for the Macedonian question within their existing borders and to be treated as a minority issue. Unfortunately for some (CPB and CPG) the Macedonian question didn't exist at all as a national issue. They hesitated (refused) to recognize the Macedonian national identity.

The position taken and decisions made at the CPM Provincial Party Conference held in September 1940, weren't accepted by any of the delegates attending the CPY Fifth State Conference held in October

1940. Disputes and major controversies arose on the following issues: the status of the Serbian colonists deposited by the monarchy for the period from 1919-1940, the Macedonian national question, the front organization in Macedonia, etc. The Macedonian delegation's views, especially those of Metodija Shatorov, were a thorn in the side and were sourly received by the Serbian Party leadership.

A growing inter-party struggle for greater influence in Macedonia began in 1941. The Bulgarian Communist Party took action to expand its influence and to act in all of Macedonia but left the Vardar part of Macedonia to the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, i.e. the part that was under the slavery of the Serbian monarchy.

Contrary to that were the CPM Provincial Committee's views. The CPM Provincial Committee wanted to preserve its independence and be treated as an equal in decision-making. It wanted to be an independent master in the struggle for a complete solution to the Macedonian question, that is, for the establishment of united state on the entire Macedonian territory. These views, however, weren't acceptable to the Communist Parties of the neighbouring countries.

To achieve their goals, the communist parties used the Communist International, which at that time was a major factor in the communist movement with its ability to decide on personnel and organizational issues. The CPY and CPG asked the Communist International to leave the party organizations in Macedonia, each in their own part of Macedonia, as they existed before the war. On the other hand, the CPB, using the war and the expansion of the Bulgarian state, sought to expand its activity to the whole of Macedonia. Each wanted to grab as large a part of Macedonia as possible, and none of them wanted an independent Macedonian communist party as defined by the CPM Provincial Committee program goals. None of the Parties respected what the Macedonians wanted and each imposed itself without choosing the means to achieve the Macedonian people's goals. Each asserted their views and demanded from the Communist International a solution in favour of their own interests, regardless of whether they coincided with the Macedonian national interests or not.

For reasons still unknown, the Communist International decided to authorize the Communist Party of Bulgaria to manage the CPM Provincial Committee and, on May 24, 1941, summoned Metodija Shatorov, then Provincial Committee Secretary, to go to Sofia to receive further instructions. Metodija Shatorov returned to Skopje on June 1, 1941. Why did the Communist International do this? Was this done after the CPB intervened? Or was it done because of the pact made by the USSR and Germany by which the USSR recognized the new borders set by fascist Germany and according to the former principle: one state one party?

From this we can deduce that the connection between the CPM Provincial Committee and the CPB wasn't under the Provincial Committee's random initiative but under a Communist International decision. This is evidenced by the fact that the Communist International didn't answer the question posed by the CPY Central Committee as to whether the Communist International had made a decision to authorize the CPG to manage the Macedonian Party Organization. The Communist International on its own initiative decided to return the Macedonian Party Organization to the CPY composition (to the part of Serbian Macedonia). This didn't happen by accident. Also, this took place before the CPY Central Committee intervened on September 4, 1941. From this it follows that the separation and reinstatement of the Provincial Committee wasn't the Provincial Committee's decision, and specifically not the Secretary's (Shatorov) decision. This decision, in its entirety, was made by the Communist International, i.e. the decision of an external factor which interfered in Macedonian affairs and didn't allow the CPM Provincial Committee to independently adopt its own position and decide on its own how to resolve current issues that were of interest to the Macedonian individuality, that is, as an independent entity.

Disputes arose between the CPY and the CPB over the Macedonian question on one hand and disputes between the CPM Provincial Committee and the CPY and CPB on the other. The CPM Provincial Committee wanted to become independent and act independently in the entire Macedonian territory as a single Macedonian organization in a joint struggle until a Macedonian state was created. This CPM Provincial Committee proposal was based on the decision made at the CPM Provincial Committee Plenum held in January 1941, which stated that the CPM Provincial Committee would be consistent in its struggle until the complete liberation of Macedonia and the establishment of an independent Macedonian state.

CPY leadership accusations against the Provincial Committee were leveled on the basis of reports sent to the CPY by its own delegates who were sent to Macedonia by the CPY Central Committee. The Provincial Committee and especially its secretary Shatorov, were accused of having a nationalistic and chauvinistic attitude towards the CPY leadership; of severing ties between the Provincial committee and the CPY; of not responding to the call to report to the Central Committee (not considering it necessary to explain the termination); of having a hostile attitude towards the Serbians, which doesn't differ from the attitude of the Macedonian reactionary bourgeoisie; of neglecting one's party activities; of ignoring all party rules regarding internal party relations and discipline; of conducting anti-party and counter-revolutionary activities; of giving a directive to hand over weapons to the occupying powers; of the position taken to create a Soviet Macedonia and waiting for the Red Army to arrive; of haranguing against the CPY leadership and its secretary, of calling the secretary an Anglophile because the proclamation said that Yugoslavia was enslaved; of not taking action in Macedonia to create partisan detachments thus expressing criminal attitudes; of having the attitude that the peoples of Yugoslavia are not enslaved, and Macedonia is liberated, which smells not only of nationalism but also of Germanophilism; for handing over the weapons to the occupier and leaving the people without weapons; for the destruction and disposal of the printing press; for not knowing the state and strength of the organization; for complete inactivity in all sectors, for conspiracy violations and lack of discipline, laziness; for Shatorov declaring himself a Bulgarian and a Bulgarian exponent, a Bulgarian at heart; for not acting even in the presence of colossal objective and subjective conditions, etc. These accusations were based on the published reports and letters sent in the name of the CPY Central Committee as well as from other sources and signed by Tito.

We have presented this summary of accusations in order to appreciate the conditions under which the Provincial Committee had to function at the time and what was said and written against it and against Shatorov. All these accusations have been already described in detail earlier in this book.

From the material presented here, one can see that the Provincial Committee Bureau's responses to the CPY Central Committee leadership's accusations were false. This is what Dragan Pavlovich, a CPY Central Committee delegate, said in his report: "They believe (referring to Provincial Committee Bureau members) that "Father's" (referring to the CPY Central Committee) decision was made on the basis of the slander and lies of one man (Lazar Kolishevski)." The CPM Provincial Committee Bureau believes that the decisions made to dismiss Shatorov and suspend the Provincial Committee were based on a report in which the contents were incorrect, slanderous and false. Dragan Pavlovich's report had quoted Provincial Committee opinions not facts. He made his decisions on the basis of untested arguments. These weren't the decisions of the collective body but the decisions and dictates of one individual.

From the published documents that we have looked at so far regarding this problem, it isn't possible to determine who made the decisions - whether it was the Central Committee Politburo or an individual. According to book seven of Tito's notes, Tito had convened a Central Committee Politburo session where this problem was discussed. However, there are no corroborating documents that show which day the session was held, who was present and what conclusions were reached. There is a document from a session held on August 31, 1941. In the conclusions of this document there is only information about letters being sent to the members of the CPM, to the Executive Committee of the Communist International and to the CPB Central Committee.

From this it can be concluded that the CPM Provincial Committee Bureau was right when it took the position that the decisions were made by an individual. We should be able to prove this by looking deeper into the Party archives, to the extent that there are available documents about these events. When that happens we should be able to get to the truth.

3. Shatorov informs the Comintern on the situation and disputes that have arisen It follows from this document that, while the Provincial Committee and the Macedonian organization were part of the CPY, they never neglected, not even a single directive issued to them by the CPY. At some point later, relations between the Provincial Committee and the CPY Central Committee began to change. Around April 20, 1941, the CPM Provincial Committee received a directive from the CPY Central Committee to cleanse the Party organization of various unhealthy elements. At that time, there were about 300 Party members, and if the same CPY Central Committee criteria was applied like it was in Shatorov's case there wouldn't be "even five souls" left, which would mean a complete dissolution of the Macedonian Party. This is what Metodija Shatorov said about that:

"It is true that on my proposal we decided that the party shouldn't be dissolved, but the membership should be increased and I was a determined opponent of that panicky directive. It was my duty, however, to suggest that this decision be carried out in the exact opposite way. We would do no great good if we disbanded the party, which was already small in number. Our goal was Macedonia's liberation from fascist slavery. How could we achieve that without the party organization? We took over everything and increased the membership to around 700." The reason why the Provincial Committee didn't implement the CPY Central Committee's directive was because it deemed it to be incorrect and harmful to the Macedonian communist movement. The Provincial Committee at that time was preparing for a complete social and national liberation, and in order to achieve that goal it needed a party organization. Further research should be done to determine why the CPY Central Committee issued such a directive in the first place.

This is what Shatorov said about the CPY Central Committee's allegation that the proclamation the CPY issued, calling on the membership and masses to action, was annulled: "That proclamation didn't exist. No such proclamation was received. It is true that if we had received even one copy and if we'd had the technology, we would have duplicated it into multiple copies. Also, not a single word was said about not publishing it, neither from me, nor from my comrades." However, someone had said that the Provincial Committee had received a proclamation that was brought to it by the CPY Central Committee representative but it wasn't the same proclamation. This proclamation was the one the CPY Central Committee issued on the occasion of fascist Germany attacking the USSR. The CPY Central Committee, in this proclamation, didn't call for action but only to prepare for an armed struggle. The decision to call for an armed struggle was made on July 4, 1941.

This second proclamation was discussed by the Provincial Committee about which Shatorov said the following: "In my conversation with that villain "Mitre" (Kolishevski) and with the CPY Central Committee representative, I said that even if we wanted to issue this proclamation in Macedonia it would have been especially harmful because this proclamation equated Macedonia to the other provinces in Yugoslavia regarding losing their freedom and independence because of the occupation. Macedonia, however, wasn't free or independent before the occupation or after it. It simply fell under a new slavery. However, the real reason for not issuing this proclamation was because at the time we didn't have the technology to duplicate it. The equipment was thrown out by a fellow technician, a Montenegrin, whom the CPY Central Committee had expelled from the party for that reason. The CPY Central Committee might be regretting doing that and that's why it's talking about us persecuting our Serbian comrades and accusing us of being nationalists and chauvinists." Regarding the allegations made by their contemporaries against the Provincial Committee and Shatorov, accusing them of issuing a directive to hand over the weapons to the occupier, it can be concluded that such a directive was never issued. Conversely: the weapons were collected and stored in warehouses. On top of that the Provincial Committee organized workshops to repair and manufacture weapons. This is what Shatorov said regarding this accusation: "This issue is also misused; we haven't passed a directive on handing over weapons." From statements made by his contemporaries it is clear that no weapons were handed over to the occupier by directive. There is no document found claiming that weapons were handed over to the occupier at the time. However, there are statements made that the weapons were kept in secure warehouses and that new ones were collected.

This is what Shatorov said about the accusation made that the Serbian comrades were persecuted and that the Provincial Committee took a chauvinist position: "It would be good if the CPY Central Committee would say specifically, how and which of our Serbian comrades were persecuted and mistreated. The CPY Central Committee also talks about this same issue in the documents that it has adopted. Unfortunately, the CPY Central Committee and its representative can't cite a single example. One Montenegrin, a technical person of the party, was excluded, not because he was a Montenegrin, but because he committed a crime against the Party (because he threw the printing press out). As for the three comrades (two Montenegrins and one Serbian) leaving, it happened at their request and in agreement with the Provincial Committee and not because someone had said that they were not really useful in Macedonia because they were constantly being persecuted by the authorities. There are comrades here who can prove that the comrades left of their own accord. We still have a lot of Serbians and Montenegrins in the party who are in responsible positions and we not only didn't persecute them but we, the party, the leadership and I, all worked to convince them that they should stay. The CPY Central Committee representative was himself convinced by several Serbian and Montenegrin comrades, in my presence, that something needed to be said and written about "nationalism and chauvinism and the chasing of Serbian comrades." This is boondoggling..." It's also interesting what Shatorov had to say during the concluding part of this document under the issue of "the other charges -persecuting the Serbian comrades and Macedonian chauvinism". To this Shatorov said: "This was invented to strengthen their incorrect Bolshevik position on the national question, mainly on the Bolshevik position in practical terms and relations... The question arises as to why in all its editions from the war onwards it was stated that Macedonia had lost its independence and freedom. They talk about 'lost freedom' etc., when such freedom never existed in Macedonia before the occupation. The Communist Party in Macedonia can't accept these statement and slogans because it will lose the Macedonian people's trust that it had gained so far. I am saying this because this attitude isn't accidental; it follows from the CPY Central Committee's letter. The party organizations in Macedonia are rightly wondering what the difference is on this issue between the CPY Central Committee and the Yugoslav speaker (this part in the document is not legible, but surely the speaker is Radio London m.z.). The difference is that the Central Committee calls us 'Macedonians' and the speaker calls us 'Southern Serbians'. From this it follows that only these two terms are distinguished in the address to the Macedonian people and the attitudes about lost freedom and independence are the same. My comrades and I don't take a chauvinistic position but the comrades from the Central Committee do. They are hitting a blank by throwing blame on us.

The speaker, on the other hand, is standing on the Greater Serbian position in regards to the Macedonian question. With this kind of attitude, the Communist Party in Macedonia is losing confidence.

This is a gain for Hitler and for his Bulgarian agents in Macedonia.

In other words, the Macedonian people are yet again being disappointed." This is also what Shatorov said further down the same document: "I blame the Central Committee of Yugoslavia for secretly organizing a war against us; their Provincial Committee comrades. It placed a wedge between us when it called us chauvinists. But there was no specific reason given for that, except for the question we asked during the Conference (he thinks of the Second Land Conference held in 1940, m.z.) when we asked them to clarify their stand on the Macedonian question. But it seems our question was received sourly. Since then, that is, from the end of the conference until our binding to the Central Committee of Bulgaria, we weren't informed about current internal or external issues, so we had to figure things out on our own." The Provincial Committee and Shatorov were against the CPY Central Committee's views as expressed in the proclamations that referred to Macedonia, that is, that Macedonia also lost its freedom and independence with the fascist occupation, implying that Macedonia had freedom and independence during the Serbian monarchy, which meant that the 1912-1918 wars were liberation wars for Macedonia and not its occupation and enslavement. In its proclamations issued to the Macedonian people after the fascist occupation in 1941, the Provincial Committee had clearly stated that Macedonia had fallen under a new slavery, that is, the proclamation said: "Every honest Macedonian had the right to ask: 'What kind of freedom is this, when the people of Shumadin were replaced by Bulgarians, and the Macedonians were kept under quarantine?" This is what the Provincial Committee in its July 1941 proclamation to the Macedonian people said: "You are now under a new slavery, new violence, new terror... Your children-sons... are still lying in the dungeons of Kosovska Mitrovitsa and others who were arrested under the rule of the German fascists. Their crime was and still is, because they fought against the Serbian enslavers and imperialists for a free Macedonia." The CPY accused the Provincial Committee and Shatorov of not organizing sabotage actions against the occupiers and Shatorov of wanting to escape from CPY Central Committee control and flee to Sofia. This is what Shatorov said about that: "It is a lie! I did not desert my work or my duty to the Party. I was away only once in the month of May and June, that was from May 24th to June 1st 1941 when I was summoned to go to Sofia at the request of the CPB. It is true that we have not organized actions here like they have done in the other parts of Yugoslavia, but we have conducted minor sabotage campaigns in the tobacco monopolies. We have not conducted sabotage campaigns in the factories and the reasons for that are of a political and organizational nature. I deny that we did that consciously. As for the CPY Central Committee's accusation claiming that we said that the peoples of Yugoslavia are under occupation and enslavement (except for Macedonia), and that with the current occupation we see the Macedonian masses 'liberated'?

This CPY assessment is not correct and I reject it because the Party, even before the arrival of the occupier, explained to the people the true intentions of the fascist occupiers, that is, the dangers from Germany, Bulgaria and Italy. I can also say that I personally as well as the Provincial Committee membership, in our oral and written agitations always pointed out the dangers that threatened the Macedonian people from the Bulgarian, German and Italian fascists.

Germany's entry into Bulgaria gave us a new opportunity to explain to the Macedonian people that their enslavement was about to begin.