3. THE ENGLISH POSITION

3. THE ENGLISH POSITION

Here is what the United Kingdom Secretary of Foreign Affairs said on August 16, 1944 in a document entitled “Macedonia – Memorandum”: “We are ready to give consent to the formation of a Macedonian state within the federal Yugoslav state. At the same time, we must insist that this state must not annex or seek other territories, regardless of whether those territories belong to Bulgaria or to Greece.”

In the same document the Secretary reiterated the fact that the British had an interest sharing agreement in which Greece was under 100% British-influence, with the right, if necessary, to intervene at any time and by any means possible.

This was confirmed by the fact that in the summer of 1944 Tito demanded that the NOV Macedonian units secure the southern border with Greece in order to secure and preserve the sovereign borders of these states.

At the same time the United States emphasized the need to preserve the status quo territorial integrity of the pre-war Yugoslav, Bulgarian and Greek borders. Even though it recognized the Macedonian territory in Greece, the United States was categorically against any border revision.

For more information on this see the article entitled “Why Not to Solun” by Vlado Ivanovski, published in “Nova Makedonija” on October 11-12, 1997. Number. 3.

Note: There is a broader explanation of the English position on the Macedonian question at the end of World War II. The English were concerned that the existence of a Macedonian state would endanger British interests in Greece and the Balkans in general. The English position on the Macedonian question was spelled out in a Memorandum on Macedonia, prepared by the Foreign Office Political-Research Department on August 20, 1944. According to the Memorandum the idea of an independent Macedonia was not accepted but various variants of a federation were offered:

One of those variants was the establishment of a Balkan federation that would include Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Greece and Turkey. In that variant Macedonia would be autonomous. However, no consent was offered by the other Great Powers for this variant.

Another variant was a federation between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, with the Bulgarian part of occupied Macedonia joining the Republic of Macedonia. This variant would have received support from the USSR and would not have jeopardized Greek, Turkish or British interests in the Balkans.

But, given that the situation might change in the future, the English could accept the formation of an independent Macedonian state. The English demanded that if such a federation was to be created then it required guarantees from the Macedonians and the Yugoslav leadership that Bulgarian and Greek occupied Macedonia would not be annexed because this would endanger British interests in Greece and Turkey. This Memorandum was sent to the United States and the USSR and they agreed with it. Afterwards, it was submitted to the governments of Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Greece.

See: “British Documents on Macedonia” KN. 1, 15, 22 and 64.

4. THE USSR POSITION

Where did the USSR stand regarding the question of creating a Macedonian state in March 1949?

Chernishov, a Soviet representative in Greece, telephoned Moscow on March 8, 1949 and reported that the Greek reactionaries were using unprecedented aggressive propaganda against the Communist Party of Greece and against the partisan movement (DAG). They were particularly angry and disturbed by the decisions the CPG Central Committee made during its 5th Plenum and during the National Liberation Front’s 2nd Congress regarding the “Macedonian question”. The strongest actions and propaganda were directed against the CPG and DAG; the reactionaries claimed that allegedly the CPG and DAG were attempting to usurp the sovereignty of Greece, that is, the entire territory of the state. Discussions about the unification of Macedonia continue even now, added Chernishov,

With this propaganda the government in Athens used the opportunity to recruit more government troops to pursue the partisans in the DAG controlled territories. The vast majority of Greek people were particularly sensitive when it came to the question of Greece’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. This was also true of the communist and partisan sympathizers who lived in the cities. So, before the Macedonian National Liberation Front (NOF) was about to convene its Congress on March 10 in the DAG controlled territories, the Anglo-American state press, with provocative intentions, declared that the Congress was going to opt for the incorporation of Greek occupied Macedonia into a common state that was to include Bulgarian occupied Macedonia and the Republic of Macedonia, and by supporting this the Communist Party of Greece was “betraying Greek occupied Macedonia”.

According to information Chernishov received from Moscow, i.e. the USSR’s position, the Congress organizers were told that it was unwise for the Congress to discuss, even for the future of the Macedonian people, some kind of Balkan Federation and urged the Congress delegates to turn their attention to orienting the population in Greek occupied Macedonia, “to focus its energy in the fight against the Monarcho-Fascists in Greece and to struggle for the creation of a free and democratic Greece”.