DEMOCRATIC ARMY OF GREECE (DAG) ORDER

DEMOCRATIC ARMY OF GREECE (DAG) ORDER General Headquarters Headquarters Bureau 1 Protocol number 722

In regard to reference to No. 132 / 25.8.1947 and AP. 307 / 25.9.1947, the following order is issued:

All men and women are invited to serve in the ranks of the Democratic Army (DAG)... All mobilized, wherever they are, must find a way to report to the nearest Democratic Army unit camp. Those mobilized who do not respond to this order will be marked undeclared. The regional headquarters are to issue appropriate orders. Measures must be taken to notify all those who were called in a timely manner.

General Headquarters, September 30, 1947. General Markos.

Second order, 23.11.1947.

DAG General Headquarters issued another order, but only for Vicho Region, to mobilize all men and women between the ages 17 and 35. This included the men who were left behind to build fortifications and those who were ill. Virtually every Macedonian from the Kostur and Lerin Regions was mobilized with this order.

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The young Macedonians confidently obeyed Markos’s order and reported en masse to the mobilization centres. But then the unexpected happened: Thousands of these young Macedonians, by Markos’s orders, found themselves sent south to the depths of Greece, where their fate became a special story – where they

disappeared in the proverbial quicksand. I, Stoian Kochov, was one of those young boys. We were all 17-18 year-olds when, from October 5 to October 10, 1947, about 350 of us were recruited from the villages Turie, Bapchor, Visheni, Kolomnati, etc., and taken from Macedonia and sent to the headquarters in Epirus and Antihashia. There after the battle for Konitsa only one third of us were still left alive. But let us see how our endeavour was evaluated by our Macedonian mainstream history:

“The Macedonian military formations, now DAG units, were sent deep inside Greece in order to expand the partisan movement there. This truly immensely contributed to the development of the struggle in those areas…” (See: Kiriazovski 1985/166.)

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Sadly this did not happen. The truth is we were sent there to be target practice for the Greek army but that was not all. When we came into contact with the local population the people there thought we were a foreign army. They thought we were there to slaughter them. So, instead of joining the struggle they ran away from it and into the arms of our enemy, the Greek army. They wanted to fight against us and not with us. This is because the CPG never informed the local population that we were Macedonians from inside Greece. In fact the local population was led to believe that only Greeks lived in Greece. So, it was natural for them to assume we were enemy soldiers. The only thing that we can conclude from this is that not only did we lose two-thirds of our young people fighting a foreign war, but in doing so we helped the Greek government enlarge and strengthen its forces. To add insult to injury, our historiography is now making attempts to cover this up.

We made great sacrifices for the Greek communists; we blindly trusted them and confidently obeyed their orders but after the war ended they claimed that we do not exist.

The CPG Central Committee 3rd Plenum was held from September 15 to 17, 1947, during which time military issues were discussed. This was when the slogan: “All to arms and everything for victory!” was coined. A decision was also made to create a “free territory” at

the Kozheni Region highlands which are surrounded by the plateau of Mounts Pind, Pieria, Karakamen, Kaimakchalan and Vicho.

On September 27, 1947, DAG Headquarters with Markos in charge (the Provisional Democratic Government of Greece was not yet proclaimed and was still illegal) issued an order to mobilize men between the ages of 17 and 35. But even after this mobilization, since it was carried out only in the Macedonian villages, the number of mobilized barely reached 15,000 to 17,000. Just for comparison: in the spring of 1946, when the Greek Civil War began, the Greek government had the following armed forces:

- Around 27,000 militiamen, of whom 14,000 were stationed in Northern Greece (Greek occupied Macedonia); - Around 5,000 paramilitary organizations; - Around 17,000 national military units consisting of about 40 battalions; and - A regular army of about 75,000 troops (7 armies and 2 free brigades). (See: “DAG - Strategic Issues and Tactics of Governance”, by G. Maltezos - Szhumerzkiotis p. 60.)

Further on Maltezos wrote: “It is well-known that in 1947 DAG not only did not solve the problem of military supplies, but did not solve the issue of ammunition and armaments with ordinary machine guns, an issue which remains to be explained.” Why on one hand did Zahariadis order Markos to increase the DAG forces to 60,000 fighters, and Ioanidis to provide Markos arms for only 4,500 fighters. On top of that, by the end of 1947, why did Markos turn back thousands of volunteer fighters and supporters who wanted to join DAG?” (p. 354.) The next question that comes to mind is: Why did General Markos illegally mobilize every available person, young and old, but only in Macedonia? Was it because he wanted to destroy the Macedonian nation?

A problem for Greek analysts was the decision made during the 3rd CPG Central Committee Plenum held in Belgrade in September 1947, and as Gusias wrote (p. 251), only six members of the CPG Central Committee and a few military personnel were present, but not a single Macedonian.

The plenum made a decision obliging DAG Headquarters to mobilize all throughout the country but only until March 1948 and was expecting DAG to grow to 60,000 fighters. At the same as the Plenum it was decided to change the central focus of fighting from self-defense to offense in a struggle to take power by armed force. To achieve this, the military operational plan “S”, more commonly known as “Lake”, was developed. The slogan “All to arms and everything for freedom!” was coined. It was also decided to create a free territory on the Kozheni Plateau, surrounded by Mounts Pind, Pieria, Karakamen, Kaimakchalan and Vicho, and to liberate the cities Lerin, Voden, Negush, Sobotsko, Konitsa, etc. This would be the first stage of liberating Greece.

All this confirms and is another undeniable fact that the Greek Civil War was intended to be located in Greek occupied Macedonia, and that this was decided in Belgrade at that Plenum, without regard to the Macedonian people and their fate. This was decided without a single Macedonian politician or military leader from Greek occupied Macedonia or from the People’s Republic of Macedonia. Not even a single cadre who actively participated in the national liberation struggle (NOB). And all this was done in the interests of foreign political goals.

Mobilizing outside the borders of Greece: from the pool of people who fled to Yugoslavia to save themselves from the Greek terror.

On September 27, 1947, DAG Headquarters issued an order to mobilize all men between the ages of 17 and 35 from the pool of Macedonian refugees who had fled to Yugoslavia from Greece. The mobilization effort, which lasted over half a year, took place in Skopje, Veles, Shtip and Bitola. All those mobilized were sent to DAG units in the field. (See: F.M. at INI, SK.4 - 271/60, pp.73-76.)

In accordance with the CPG Central Committee’s decision made on December 23, 1947, the Provisional Democratic Government of Greece was formed. It was disbanded on October 15, 1949.

The Provisional Democratic Government of Greece was formed on the basis of a decision made during the CPG Central Committee 3rd Plenum held between September 12 and 15, 1947 and was

established in Prespa, in the village Asamati, Republic of Macedonia, in the building of the pre-war seaport. The seat of government was to be moved to the Greek city Konitsa after Konitsa was captured by the partisans. This is what Secretary-General Zahariadis said: “...we will take over Konitsa, we will form the government and they will probably recognize us…”

Not much later Konitsa was attacked by DAG units which fought fierce battles and acquired great losses but to no avail. They were unable to take Konitsa and thus could not move the provisional government there. So they went ahead with moving the government to Prespa, which was aided by Yugoslav Lieutenant Colonel Slobodan Krstich from UDBA, an officer of the Yugoslav army. Yet again no Macedonians participated in the move (See end of book: his interview by the magazine “Duga”). The provisional government was originally composed of eight members:

Markos Vafiadis was appointed President, the rest were members Ianis Ioanidis, Petros Rousos, Miltiadis Porfirogenis, Petros Kokalis, Vasilis Bardzhiotas, Dimitrios Vlandas and Leonidas Stringos.

Along with the political appointment there were also military appointments. By decree 25 DAG officers were promoted to colonels. Still not a single Macedonian was appointed; not in the government and not in the military.

The Provisional Democratic Government of Greece was a one-party and one-nationality organization composed exclusively of Greek Communists. Although more than 50% of the DAG force was made up of Macedonians, there was not a single Macedonian appointed in the high ranks of the government or in the military. And yet we have our Macedonian mainstream history which claims that NOF was a military and political factor in the Greek Civil War.

Reactions to the appearance of the provisional government:

1. The Greek Government asked the United States and Great Britain to warn the Soviet Union and other European countries of the consequences of their recognition of the Provisional Democratic Government of Greece.

Aware of the consequences the US government reacted immediately. On December 30, 1947, it informed all Eastern European countries not to recognize this government, warning that doing so they would face serious consequences. The UN Balkan Commission also urged UN member states not to recognize the Provisional Democratic Government of Greece.

2. “...The Markos government has none of the basic features a government needs to have to qualify as a government, not even the most basic requirements that are necessary which are defined by international law. It is not represented or vested in military rights or norms and all its actions are illegitimate. More than that, it has nothing that can lead to recognition as a political entity and as a legitimate government.

The Partisans, commanded by Markos, have adopted nothing concrete, and thus, legitimately have no rights on what constitute Greek state space. The headquarters of their Main Command is not at all certain, but they keep it a secret, and they are in constant displacement. Their so-called centres are located in areas that only sometimes fall under their control, and are located in the mountains and in wild, inaccessible hilly areas. They do not have any essential government communications. They are generally organized in groups and are in constant motion, and when pressured by military chase, retreat to the most impassable mountainous areas and sometimes even withdraw to foreign border territories. This has been confirmed by the United Nations Commission.”