THE POLITICAL REFUGEES AFTER THE GREEK CIVIL WAR

THE POLITICAL REFUGEES AFTER THE GREEK CIVIL WAR

On August 29-30, 1949, after the Greek Civil War ended, DAG General Headquarters transferred all military personnel to Albania where they were disarmed and sent to the Bureli and Elbasan military camps. Some fled to Bulgaria where, after crossing the Berkovitsa border, they were disarmed.

The CPG Central Committee held its 6th Plenum in Bureli where, in addition to evaluating its military achievements, it decided what to do with its DAG fighters, where to send them and in what numbers:

Country

Czechoslovakia Poland Romania Bulgaria Hungary East Germany USSR (Tashkent)

Number of people

13,500 9,000 5,600 8,800 4,000 2,200. 16,500

to arrive later

6,000 from Bulkesh 3,000 1,000

2,000 1,500 young children 5,500

It should be noted that 56 to 60% of these numbers, as verified by Greek sources, were Macedonians.

There were no reliable sources for the exact number of refugees in Yugoslavia, but according to some sources there were about 60,000 people, exclusively Macedonians.

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FACTS FROM GREEK OFFICIAL HISTORY ON THE GREEK CIVIL WAR (1944-1949)

FACTS AND ARGUMENTS ON THE GREAT FRAUD AND GENOCIDE COMMITTED AGAINST THE MACEDONIAN PEOPLE IN GREECE

Historical Studies of the Macedonian people in Greek occupied Macedonia during the Greek Civil War 1944-1949

8. The CPG 5th Plenary

Decisions made during the CPG Central committee’s 5th plenum in January became apparent after February 8th. They clarified, interpreted, and confirmed in detail General Markos’s isolation and removal from duty as well as the removal of Hrisa Vasiliou who agreed with Markos’s views, and the removal of Ioanidis from the PDK.

1. “DAG is firmly and safely in control of the entire region of Mount Pind. We took the top of Mount Gramos once again. The national (Greek government) army soldiers showed fatigue and despair.

2. The enemy’s military forces (national army, police, National Guard, Maids, MEA and so on) number over 300 thousand. They forced over 700 thousand people out of their homes with aims at isolating DAG.

3. General Headquarters and the Divisions will provide all necessary military supplies to all the units in this region at all times. Any delays in this will cause problems, similar to the ones we had in 1948. (The kind that made us lose Vicho.)

4. As their task, Thessaly and Rumeli are obliged to launch combat operations and begin offensive attacks with aims at pinning down the enemy and preventing him from expanding his capabilities in 1949.

5. The 6th and 7th Division (Eastern Macedonia and Thrace) are tasked with gradually increasing pressure and launching strikes against the enemy and against Solun.

Other observations made and problems uncovered during the 5th Plenum are showing that the leadership (the CPG leadership) is currently far from its targets.

6. DAG is showing to be stronger than in 1948. It has widened the national liberation movement all the way down to the Peloponnese.

The Peloponnese should be torn apart by our military campaigns and all ordinary villagers should join DAG’s ranks.

All of the above suggestions and conclusions may represent little in terms of tangible items but are good news for the left-leaning public. As for the Macedonians, the 5th Plenum said the following about them:

In northern Greece, the Macedonian (Slavo-Macedonian) people are giving their all for the struggle and are fighting for the ultimate goal with heroism that provokes a heroic self-sacrifice that is a feat of great admiration. There should be no doubt that after DAG comes out victorious in the people’s struggle, the Macedonian people, who spill their blood today, will find their full national freedom as they wish. The Macedonian Communists are always at the forefront and responsible in the struggle. At the same time, the Macedonian communists should also pay attention to the Macedonian communists who carry out agitation for foreign intelligence services. The CPG is loyal to the EAM which is in close cooperation with all the people’s organizations and first and foremost with AKE and NOF.

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Investigative Commission Report to the Security Council regarding incidents at Greek border

“Before making our suggestions, the Commission feels it would be useful, in short, to recap the situation along the northern Greek border, and our suggestions aimed at alleviating and correcting the problem.

First, the Greek government has made accusations that its three northern neighbours are aiding the guerrilla war in Greece.

Second, there is a disrupted situation today in Greece that is a legacy of the past. Its causes can be found in the tragic Greek experience during the Italian, German and Bulgarian occupation when a guerrilla war was led in political turmoil and economic hardship was caused by the war.

The next thing to identify is the refusal of most mentioned countries accepting their borders as final, in the way they are defined today. Some of their demands were legitimately raised before the United Nations or at other relevant international bodies, but their introduction undoubtedly exacerbated the already dangerous situation.

Furthermore, in the case of the Macedonian question, the demands are not raised in front of the United Nations, but in the speeches of individual governments or in the press controlled by governments. Using the Macedonian question in this way, in the Commission’s view, poses a threat to peace in the Balkans and can only further contribute to existing tensions and doubts.

There is another thing that needs to be mentioned which is present in Greece, on the one hand, and in Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Albania, on the other: The political refugees from different territories, who have participated in many political parties and struggles and who have fought in their countries during and after the war. Some of these refugees are located near the borders of the country from which they fled. Some, during their exile, have engaged in political and military activities, and many of them live in the hope that a violent upheaval will allow them to return to their homes under the conditions they choose. Other refugees are victims of the spreading panic and if given a free choice would gladly return to their homes. However, the constant presence of all of them under the conditions under which they currently live, quite clearly, is a serious factor contributing to the ongoing situation.

Finally, the violence and level of propaganda used by some of the protagonists in their mutual relations could not be avoided by the Commission during its stay in the four countries. This kind of propaganda has served to inflame passions, which are already pretty inflamed... The Commission suggests that the Security Council let the Greek government know that it is ready, if that government so requires it, to make its services available in order to find possible means to solve its problems.

The Commission offered its own proposal:

A. The Commission recommended to the Security Council that it propose to the Greek government, on the one hand, and to Albania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia, on the other, that they do everything in their power to establish normal neighbourly relations and to abstain from all direct or indirect action... The Commission believed that armed gangs operating in the territory of one State crossing into the territory of another should not be supported. Governments should take all possible measures in their territories to deprive these gangs of all assistance and protection. The Security Council should treat these gangs as a threat to peace within the meaning of the United Nations Charter.

B. To ensure that efficient mechanisms are implemented for regulating and controlling their common borders, the Commission recommended that the Security Council propose to the governments concerned that they conclude new talks following the example of the Greco-Bulgarian Convention of 1931, taking into account the needs of the current situation. (Greek-Bulgarian Convention on Population Exchanges.) In other words the commission suggested that MINORITIES be exchanged.

C. In order to restore normal conditions along the borders between Greece, on the one hand, and Albania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia, on the other, and thereby help to establish good neighbourly relations, the Commission recommended the establishment of a separate border commission.

A delegation from the Soviet Union objected to the proposals:

1. The above proposals are not in any way derived from facts and documents collected by the Commission during its investigation of the situation in Northern Greece and its northern borders, but are based only on some unfounded assumptions made by the Greek Government concerning guerrilla assistance by Greece’s northern neighbours.

2. The Commission has no grounds for making proposals which will recognize border incidents or acts of aggression that may or may not occur in the future between Greece on the one hand and Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Albania on the other.

3. The proposals foresee measures not only for Greece but as well as for Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Albania, although from the documents available to the Commission, it is quite clear that Greece has a tense situation. The turmoil there is not only happening in the north, but across the country and this situation in Greece is a consequence of internal causes.

4. The establishment of a standing Border Commission or body representing the Security Council, as provided for in the proposal, as well as the conclusion of conventions and agreements between Greece, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Albania, is a major constraint for those states and their sovereign rights in resolving their mutual relations.”

The Polish delegation made the following objections to the Commission’s proposals on the Greek situation:

1. The measures as a whole are ineffective because they only take into account the symptoms, not the causes of the problems that exist in northern Greece and along the northern border. The fact that the proposed measures are ineffective can easily endanger the prestige of the United Nations.

2. Some of the measures proposed do not seem to take into account the fact that there are no diplomatic relations between Greece on the one hand and Bulgaria and Albania on the other.

3. In relation to the proposal made under B, which suggests the establishment of a permanent control body, this measure appears inappropriate for the following reasons:

A. Such a watchdog would threaten Greece’s sovereign rights, as well as those of Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia.

B. It will be a measure of coercion in relation to Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia. This measure can in no way be justified by the results of the Commission’s investigation. Therefore, instead of leading to an improvement in the existing difficulties, it could lead to quite the opposite. (United Nations Special Commission Report on the Balkans. General Assembly, Official Records: Third Session proposal no. 8 (A/574), June 30, 1948, p. 18 and 29.)

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