Introduction - Part 03

M.L. convoy of 50 trucks arrived, followed on the 11th instant by a food ship, an oil fuel ship and the Governor Genera1 of Eastern Macedonia. It had been intended that the National Guard should arrive on March 13th, but their movement has been subjected to some delay, and the Governor General, rather unwisely, has decided he cannot take over until he has their support. The population of Kavalla showed every sign of friendliness and satisfaction at the turn of events. As elsewhere, they are obviously anxious to resume their ordinary life, and the small minority who still retain a taste for turbulent politics are at present quiet. EAM/KKE have undoubtedly suffered a more than partial eclipse in this communist stronghold, helped by general dissatisfaction at their administration and the accompanying corruption and unfair discrimination. The communist organization, however, is here as elsewhere by no means broken, and will certainly make its presence felt as soon as events present a favourable opportunity.

9. On the morning of March 9th the American Consul-General and I attended a conference between representatives of M.L., UNRRA and the local authorities, represented by the Nomark and Demark. The purpose of the conference was to arrange for the resumption of the distribution of M.L. supplies. The Nomark and the Demark fell in with all suggestions made to them, promised their full support in every direction and self-sacrificingly stressed the point that the country districts were in worse need of help than Kavalla itself. In the course of the conference they mentioned that a delegation had been sent the previous day to Salonica to request the early arrival of Government officials and National Guards to take over the administration of the town. They contended that grain was in very short supply and would suffice the population for a few days only. Up to the present the peasants had been induced to make contributions for feeding the town, but now with the arrival of' M.L. and new authorities they would no longer feel under the same obligation. They stressed, too, the need for clothing, a need which was obvious to the most casual observer.

10. To introduce a little reality into the a1most unnatural friendliness of the proceedings, I enquired as to the whereabouts of three previous employees of M.L. who were known to have been arrested by the ELAS police in December last. The Nomark confessed that

two of them had been shot while trying to escape, adding that if we had not intervened in Greek affairs such things would never have been necessary. He was obviously very worried about asking about the third man, Constantine Vardakis, an interpreter who had been arrested in the M.L. office itself, and showed great agitation. After considerable hedging the Demark gave the game away by whispering to him audibly that Vardakas had been shot. I understood that these three persons were members of a group of eleven persons known to have been killed by the EP in December last. I explained to the Monark that there was no comparison between conditions in Kavalla and Athens, and that the shooting of these persons would doubtless be investigated by the Creek judicial authorities, as it might well disclose a common law offence.

11. A visit was then paid to the offices of the Administrative Committee for Eastern Macedonia and Thrace to explain, if need be, the altered circumstances of their existence, but the head of the Committee, Grimbas, had already realized the position for himself. He was prepared to hand over his office immediately to M.L., which had previously occupied them as its headquarters, and produced a declaration which he had already prepared, informing the population that the Committee were handing over their functions to the Governor General and thanking the people for their support. Grimbas also made no difficulty about leaving the house of the manager of the Commercial Tobacco Company, which he and his colleagues had occupied as residential quarter. He gave the impression of a man who was both disappointed and disillusioned, and confessed that previous lack of administrative experience likewise made him little desirous of remaining in office. He took the opportunity, nevertheless, of complaining that the National Guard had searched the house in Salonica occupied by his wife and child, and subjected them to certain rough usage.

12. At Xanthi we were received by the Nomark and Demark and other officials with bouquets of laurels, gifts of their best cigarettes and an invitation to a civic banquet, which time, however, obliged us to decline. They were all quite reconciled to handing over to the Government authorities, and as in other places complained of the delay that was occurring. Politically, they said, the bulk of the population was republican, and there was a movement on foot to

form a United Republican Front in conjunction with EAM, to include both Liberals and Progressives. The officer in charge of the EP/ELAS Guard informed us that security in the town was good, but that there had been some cattle stealing in the country districts owing to the absence of any police, and small bands of demobilized Nationalists (others called them demobilized Elastites) had been terrorizing certain villages. He said he was having difficulty in keeping his guard together; they were all anxious to go home without further delay. The food situation in Xanthi appeared from all accounts to be bad, particularly in the mountain districts which were appealing to the town for help. The bread ration was 400 grammes per day, 60% barley. I enquired as to the number of prisoners held, and was told that there were at present 42 in the local gaol, 20 of them on charges of collaboration, amongst whom were some Bulgars and two Bulgarians of Greek nationa1ity. It was said that all hostages had been released after a few days' detention. The police officer asked for my advice regarding two demobilized Bulgarian soldiers whom he had arrested a few days before. They had been found wandering about the countryside, and were in danger of being lynched by the local population. I advised him to hand them over for disposal to the first troops that arrived, considering them prisoners of war.

13. Of all the places, Komotini made the happiest impression. The local officials seemed on excellent terms with the Liberals, a delegation of whom called on us in the Nomark's office. The Nomark confessed to being a member of KKE, but c1aimed that out of eighteen members of the Prefect’s council only two belonged to this party, the remainder being Republican. He also talked about the formation of what he called a "Liberal Republican Party", to include EAM and all Progressive elements. It was proposed, we heard, to hold a protest meeting the next day, to complain of the delay in sending Government officials and the National Guard, but the Liberals we saw said that they had dissociated themselves from this demonstration. Security in the town, we were told, was excellent, though there was some thieving going an outside. The Nomark stated that there were at present 60 prisoners in the local gaol, including six charged with collaboration with the Bulgars and two or three Bulgarians; the rest were common criminals. He also mentioned that one Bulgarian war criminal had been shot.

According to him, ten or twelve persons had been arrested preventatively during the recent troubles, all of whom had now been released. The food situation seemed better than elsewhere, although there was the same acute shortage of imported goods and particularly clothing and footwear. From reports received at Komotini it appeared that the situation in the Alexandroupolis and Demotika areas is very similar. Complaints were also made to us of the hardships caused by the inability to trade with Turkey and Bulgaria. Local efforts to renew commercial relations had failed as the present officials were not recognized by those Governments, nor could the question of payment be solved.

14. Throughout the journey one everywhere felt that EAM/KKE is in varying degrees very much on the defensive. It is anxious to prove itself respectable, moderate and patriotic, loyal to the agreement of Varkiza and anxious to co-operate to with republican and liberal elements in forming a common front against monarchists and other so-called reactionaries. But the KKE organization remains in the background unimpaired. The turbulent spirit that animates it is but temporarily repressed, and is ready to assert itself again when conditions are favourable. The demobilization of ELAS has been carried out with the greatest willingness. Most arms have been handed in, though there are many stories of hidden dumps and ultimate designs. Between Serres and Drama we saw a group of seven or eight demobilized ELAS soldiers on the road, and stopped to talk to them. It appeared that they had been disbanded some weeks previously and were then merely returning from a carnival celebration at a neighbouring village. They were extremely friendly and full of pacific intentions. It was noticeable though that EAM – appointed officials were very sensitive to any suggestions of collaboration or even relationship with Bulgarians. They were anxious to appear first and foremost as good Greek patriots, even when their previous association with Bulgarian communists had been matter of common knowledge.

15. There are two aspects of the economic situation that deserve special mention. In the first place, an early decision should be made or the question of currency, for east of the Strimon the leva is still the only circulating medium. To refuse to exchange at least limited quantities of leva into drachma at a reasonable rate will involve a

great part of the population in considerable hardship, although even a reasonable rate from the point of view of the Greek Government will cause complaints, as all prices in terms of leva are unreal, the leva enjoying a purely fictitious value owing to its scarcity. Whereas in the rest of Greece currency has undergone a considerable devaluation, here the value of the leva has to a great extent been maintained in a closed economy. It would also seem essential that the Bank of Greece should as soon as possible establish branches throughout the area and make arrangements to give advance on a generous scale against merchandise during the transitional period.

16. The second questions relates to a stock of some 8.5 million kilograms of processed tobacco now ready for sale at Kavalla and elsewhere. This tobacco was bought by the Bulgarian Government from producers at unremunerative prices, and will now presumably be considered the property of the Greek State. Nevertheless, if the proceeds of its sale (and the United States is at the present moment a very interested purchaser) are paid into the Greek treasury there will be considerable local discontent, the producers complaining that they are now being robbed by the Greek Government instead of the Bulgarian Government. A reasonable suggestion for solving this problem has been made by the newly appointed Governor General for Thrace, M. Papathanassis. He suggests that part of the proceeds should be paid as compensation to the producers, and that part should be retained to form a fund for the repatriation and resettlement of refugees from Thrace now temporarily living in other parts of Greece. This proposition merits serious consideration, and it is to be hoped that something on these lines can be arranged.

17. Finally it may be said that, in general, all conditions favourable for the resumption of complete authority in Eastern Macedonia and Thrace by the Greek Government. The only question is whether the Greek Government can rise to the occasion. The principle dangers lie, firstly, in delay, secondly, in the quality of officials who are to assume office, and, thirdly, in the attitude and behaviour of the National Guard. Any ill-considered action on the part of the latter body would strengthen the hands of the extremists and seriously perturb the majority of the population who are now only too anxious to see normal life re-established on a peaceful, orderly basis. Here,

as elsewhere, law must once more be made supreme and legal firms observed.

Sir Reginald Leeper, K.C.M.G., C.B.E., His Majesty’s Ambassador, Athens.

British Embassy – ATHENS - March 3rd, 1947

Dear James,

The following is an extract from a letter dated 10th February which we have received from our Consul at Corfu:

“Recently I visited the prison of Corfu where six hundred prisoners are incarcerated, having most been sentenced by the special Collaboration Courts before the coming into force of the Emergency Measures Act of June 1945.

The capacity of the prison is one hundred and thirty prisoners and of the present inmates three hundred and thirty-three are communists and eight-five were convicted of normal crime.

By interrogation it was ascertained that while in Salonika Prison, prisoners awaiting transportation to Corfu sent a list of their names to “ORIM” an organization founded in 1903 for the independence of Macedonia, address:- Secretary Nicholaos Papa, Anastasio Rallis (a school teacher) 9 Dean Street, Toronto, Canada, One hundred cheques of twenty dollars each have since been received by various prisoners from this source which were dispatched from Toronto in the name if individuals and not of the organization, although the accompanying letters are all written in the same handwriting.

This organization is alleged to have assisted one hundred and thirty-two families from the village of Vasiliyadis near Kastoria, to immigrate to Canada and pre-war distributed funds via Bulgaria. It is said that the procedure in 1932-1933 was for Macedonians in Greece to immigrate to Canada via Istanbul and Sofia whence they continued their journey provided with Bulgarian passports.”

We have no evidence here to support or deny this story of the activities of “ORIM”, but we think you may like to know about it and look into it.

We should very much like to know the outcome of any enquiries you may make, meanwhile we also will attempt to find more.

Yours ever, (signed) John Tahourdin.

J. George, Esq., Canadian Embassy, Athens

British Embassy Belgrade - April 15, 1947

I was greatly interested to read what Frank Roberts had to say in his letter of the 3rd of February to you about his conversation with Quaroni, and I have now had an opportunity to think about your letter N. 2364/389/38 of the 26th February on the same subject.

2. I must own to a certain diffidence in expressing my views on a question of the kind that after being in this country for comparatively so short a time, and, to adapt a saying of Pascal, I don’t as yet know enough to write you a short letter, and I must ask you to bear with a long one.

3. In the first place, Yugoslavia to my mind represents an entirely different picture from that displayed by any other European country except Russia. Here Communism hiding under the cloak of the National Liberation Movement, has won an outright victory and reigns unchallenged. Before, therefore, attempting to answer Quaroni’s question, it is perhaps worth while taking a brief glance at the past, to see how the present situation in Yugoslavia came about.

4. When, in 1941, Tito began to organize the armed rising, which took place in June of that year, although in all probability he was acting in complete independence of Moscow, yet he must have been confident of eventual Russian support since he had been trained in Moscow where he seems to have been regarded as an excellent organizer and an able and far sighted man. Little was known of him in his own country, except by his fellow communists, nor had he made - for himself a reputation as a military leader, for, contrary to popular belief, he was never in Spain at the time of the Civil war, during which he sat at Besancon organizing a depot for recruits and supplies. But when his hour struck he quickly proved himself to be a commander of genius, with a remarkable power of injecting enthusiasm and a sense of unity into all manner of diverse elements, and welding them into a Movement of National Liberation. Not the least of his achievements was the programme which resulted from the Jajce Congress of November 1943. It was not a communist programme, the emphasis being entirely upon the new and national Yugoslavia. One of its avowed aims was to put an end to the persecution and internecine strife that had always been an element of

disruption in the country between the two great wars. It had, that is to say, a strong element of reputable nationalism. This was the alternative he offered to his countrymen who, if they wished to play their part in ridding their country of the invader, had either to throw in their lot with him or to join Mihailovic, whose aim was to restore the monarchy, and with it the old dominance of Serbia in the tripartite kingdom.

5. The result was that there rallied to Tito's side many who were fired by the ideal of a united Yugoslavia in which internal strife would cease and all efforts would be bent to increasing the country's prosperity and position in the world. The majority of these did not, and I believe do not care a fig for theoretical communism. Many, indeed, must dislike it, and this, I think, applies in large measure to the, Army where, however, the officers owe their social position to Tito, without whom they would revert to being errand boys and boot blacks. But they also put up with it because they are imbued with the Slav ideal; their thoughts are bent on their country, its expansion end its hegemony in the Balkans, and they believe that this regime has a better chance of achieving these aims than any other. In short, it was not least by his ability to project the one idea which could attract and hold these differing elements that Tito was able to make himself Prime Minister or the first united Yugoslavia in 1945. The rest is soon told. The young communists who had been in and out of prison with him before the war and who had shared with him the perils and difficulties of his campaigns were quickly moved into key positions, and the regime was started on its way. Here it is, and here it looks like staying. Tito's own power has waned while that or his associates has waxed, but his position in the country, end still more with the Army, remains undiminished and continues to be built up.

6. The reason is easy to see. This is a minority government, and it is well aware of the fact. It enjoys complete power, and is determined, come what may, to hold on to it. But to remain in power it is necessary first and foremost to be sure of the Army, in which communists are by no means in the majority. This is where Tito is a godsend to the Government, and it is one of the chief reasons why his prestige must at all costs be maintained. To the Army he is presented not as a communist but as a great military leader by whom his country achieved its freedom. Indeed, in this one respect only

Stalin and Russia are pushed into the background. To the army it is nothing but Tito all the time. The marching songs sung by the Yugoslav soldiers as they go about their business have for their sole theme the exploits of the Marshal, his tribulations, his battles and his victories. The nationalist ideas in the Jajce programme are kept constantly before them, and their gaze is directed as much externally to the territorial expansion of Yugoslavia as it is internally to the liquidation of Yugoslav political opponents of the present regime. No effort is, or course, being spared to indoctrinate the rising generation with the communist creed, but some years must pass before there is on Army which can be counted on for certain to be politically reliable. Until this happens Tito as a leader is indispensable and the nationalist sentiments of the army are given full rein and even encouraged in every way. It is worth recording that the Russians have themselves encouraged such sentiments. Marshal Tolbukin stayed a minimum of time in this country and, as far as we can judge, with an eye to the morale of the Yugoslav Army made every effort to withdraw his troops as quickly as possible. The Russians at that time went so far as to put it about that some victories which they themselves gained had been the work of the Partisans. They would obviously go to particular lengths in this direction in the early days when they were anxious to build up the regime. Their policy does not however seem radically to have changed in the intervening period. The Russian military instructors here are kept fairly discreetly in the background and the Yugoslav army certainly could not complain that it does not receive sufficient encouragement and praise from Russian sources.

7. This then is the historical background against which we have to judge the political thought and tendencies of the present government. The relevant points are, I think

(i) The regime built itself without Russian assistance. It would be too much to say that the Russians allowed Tito and his colleagues wide latitude; in their curious ignorance of Balkan affairs during the war they scarcely seemed to have noticed Tito until a fairly, late date. On the, other hand he was himself sufficiently confident of eventual support to take very far reaching decisions on his own authority.

(ii) The regime's strongest appeal in its early days rested upon nationalist sentiment in various forms. Among the population as a whole nationalism is a confused and often parochial feeling. The Slovenes irrespective of party feel very deeply about Trieste. The Macedonians don't, but feel intensely about Salonika. Both of them loathe the Montenegrins. But Yugoslav nationalism, as opposed to regional nationalism, remains a, very potent force in the Communist Party and in the Army upon which the Party depends for its hold on the county.

8. So much for history and now for the present. No one here would think of denying that the present rulers of Yugoslavia are all convinced and many of them fanatical communists. It may seem a platitude to add that they must therefore believe in communism, but I think we sometimes forget the implications of this obvious conclusion. To Tito and his colleagues communism is not simply an intellectual theory and it has not been watered down as it must have been, for example, among many French and Italian communists by other intellectual influences. I suspect in fact that Yugoslav communism keeps at the moment far more closely to the classical principles of Leninism than does the brand of communism now favoured in the Kremlin. Yugoslav communists have a much more recent experience of persecution for their faith than have the Russians. They seem to me to believe in communism as the answer not only to internal economic- problems but also, according to the old Marxist theory, as the answer to all problems of foreign affairs. They believe that whenever another neighbouring country becomes communist it will cease, to harbour imperialist designs against Yugoslav territory; it will run its own internal affairs more efficiently; it will produce more exports for other countries including Yugoslavia; it will raise its own standard of living and will be a better potential market for the goods; which Yugoslavia can now export and for the larger quantity, which she hopes to be able to export after completion of the 5-year plan; finally, being communist it will be more sympathetic and accommodating to Yugoslavia's needs, and relations with it, being conducted by two communist governments, will be immeasurably easier. In short, we must assume that the Yugoslav communists believe that whenever another country becomes communist this process represents a direct and immediate benefit to Yugoslavia.

9. At the same time we are all agreed that the Yugoslav Government is intensely nationalist. It is not merely that they depend for their support upon that strongly nationalist organization, the army. Their own nationalism is perfectly genuine. The first symptom is intense pride in what their country has done during the war and confidence in their plans for the future. The relevant aspect of their nationalism is, however, that they desire:

(a) maximum prosperity at home in the form of a secure agricultural basis to the country's economy and the fulfillment of far-reaching plans far industrialization.

(b) international prestige;

(c) territorial expansion;

10. As I have indicated above the Yugoslav communists must believe that maximum prosperity at home is attainable only when communism has embraced as many countries as possible, when all countries are making the best use of their productive facilities and when having shed the gross prejudices which some Governments still seem to harbour, all countries are ready to trade with Yugoslavia upon the sort of terms which suit the Yugoslav Government's taste.

11. The Yugoslav communists must have just as much reason to believe that their international prestige is also to be attained in the same way. Here indeed I think they are perfectly right. This prestige exists at the moment only among communist parties and fellow travelers and in countries which are governed by communists. The press they get in Italy and Greece is as bad as the press they get in Albania and Bulgaria is good. We all know how long this state of affairs would last if Italy and Greece fell under a communist government. In short, the more communism there is in the world the more prestige for communist Yugoslavia. This must be qualified to the extent that if a major European country became communist Yugoslavia would obviously lose the position which she now seems to hold as the second most influential communist country. But you will find my answer to this qualification in paragraph l5 below.

12. When we turn to Yugoslavia's territorial ambitions it is harder to determine whether there is a conflict between the claims of communism and nationalism. I do not, however, believe that there is such a conflict. Of the 4 major Yugoslav territorial claims, three are now being prosecuted against non-communist governments and one against a communist government. There has been much speculation whether the prosecution of territorial claims against Italy, Austria and Greece is in the interests of world communism. It is obvious that such claims strengthen the anti-communist feeling in these three countries. It may be that the body which has, replaced the Comintern took account of this, but whether or not it did, one thing seems to me comparatively clear. Yugoslavia's three territorial claims against non-communist Governments ore not going to be disappointed because the Comintern's successor has decided that it' is better tactics to help the Italian, Greek and Austrian Communist Parties. They are going to be disappointed because the, non-communist forces in the world look like being strong enough, at any rate at the moment, to prevent their realization. We here have sometimes thought that the Russians might take pains to avoid embarrassing the Italian Communist Party over the Trieste question. They do not appear to have done so. On the contrary they pressed Yugoslav claims to Trieste, firmly and stubbornly and appear to have relinquished their pressure only when they were certain that it had failed. They and communist parties in other countries are supporting Yugoslavia's Austrian claims with a similar, disregard for the repercussions which such claims may have upon the success of communism in Austria. Finally, although Russian intentions in Macedonia are obscure they have, to say the least, not discouraged Yugoslav and Bulgarian claims on Greece which must be a great embarrassment to the Greek communist party. In fact, they seem so far definitely to have decided to back the really safe horse of a communist Yugoslav Government and not to trust themselves to the uncertainties, of public opinion in Greece, Austria and Italy where, in the absence of communist Governments, public opinion is still an important factor.

13. We do not, of course, know how Yugoslavia’s territoria1 claims would fare if Greece, Austria and Italy became communist. It might be that once they secured power the Communalist Governments of

those countries would become just as nationalist as the Yugoslav Government and would be unwilling to make any territorial cession. But one thing is quite clear. So long as the Governments in these three countries are not communist and provided that they receive sufficient support from non-communist forces in the West there is no chance whatever of their ceding territory. If we exclude the possibility of a complete economic collapse of the non-communist forces of Europe it is therefore clear that only through the spread of communism and the emergence of further communist Governments will there arise any prospect at all of the satisfaction of Yugoslav territorial claims. Their chance of securing territory from communist Greek, Austrian or Italian governments may be less than they suppose, but at least cannot be as small as their chance of securing such territory under the present dispensation.

14. I think this argument is supported by the manner in which Yugoslav claims have been prosecuted against Bulgaria. These claims have, I think, provoked some press reaction in Sofia but not, as far as I know, the governmental reaction to which all other Yugoslav claims have given rise. I world not base an argument too strongly upon any aspect of the Macedonian question because as I have said, I find Russian intentions in this regard very obscure. But it seems at least possible that the communist Bulgarian Government are ready or have been compelled to promise territory to the communist Yugoslav Government.

15. To sum up it seems to me that the Yugoslav Government believe and have good reason for believing that their national interests as defined in paragraph 9 above are inseparable from the spread of communism over the world. I should be surprised if they made any great distinction between the expansion of communism and the expansion of Russian influence and domination. They believe I think, that if the whole of Europe embraced communism they would find themselves as a senior partner of the Balkan Federation (whether or not the technical procedure of Federation was carried out). This, I think, the answer to the qualification which I made at the end of paragraph 11 above. Yugoslavia would obviously have to cede the second place in the communist hierarchy to, e. g. a communist France, but I think the Yugoslav Government much too hard-headed to nurse unlimited ambitions. As the head of a Balkan

Federation in a communist Europe they could enjoy, or at any rate would expect to enjoy, considerably more prestige and influence than their country has possessed for centuries, and they would not, I am sure, hope for more than this. They may from time to time have to put the brake on nationalist exuberance among their supporters. For example, the shooting down of the American aircraft last September, appeared to me to be an outburst of such exuberance on the part of the army which caused considerable embarrassment to the Government. But I believe that the Government are ready to wait a long time for the realization of their hopes. So long, therefore, as communism is an expanding force, and so long as they are not disillusioned in the belief that it is a valid economic theory I do not believe that serious conflict is likely to arise between the claims of international communism and of Yugoslav communist nationalism. I have certainly no person to believe that such a conflict has yet arisen.

16. I believe that a fundamental change of circumstances is required to create conditions in which such a conflict might arise. The best example I can think of is the possibility of a serious failure of the present Soviet 5-year plan, which would, I presume first put the strongest brake upon the present Russian policy of dynamic expansion, and secondly give Russia serious reason to consider plundering all the satellites for her own benefit. Such conditions might well cause both some measure of disillusion among Yugoslav communists, and a direct and serious conflict of interest between Yugoslav nationalism and international communism, of which the latter's first object being presumably to render assistance to Russia. This is, of course, a matter of speculation and I cannot say whether even in such circumstances Belgrade would attempt to refuse any demand which Moscow seriously pressed. I can, in fact, only give you a few general ideas which I think govern every-day relations. The first is that the Yugoslav Government seem to enjoy as much confidence as the Soviet Government are ever likely to give to any organization outside Russia. As I have said above, Tito assumed authority during the war for far- reaching decisions in the confidence that they would later be approved. The Yugoslav Government are still, I believe, trusted by Moscow to take the right course in most fields of administration without too much instruction or advice. At the same time, if and when instructions are received

they have some, and probably fairly wide powers of “arguing back”. Their relation to Moscow is indeed probably very similar to that of a senior colonial governor. They are trusted and known to be working in the same direction. They can represent, very strongly at times, that local conditions made certain courses of action desirable and they know that such representations will be considered. In the last resort they will carry out instructions. Secondly, we should remember that Yugoslavia is now very useful to Russia as a source of imports, as a spearhead of the attack in international organizations and as a show piece of communism outside Russia. So far as the Russians consider unselfishly the needs of any Government it must be the Yugoslav Government.

17. These two rules may govern every day relations but would probably break down in the event of a serious clash of interests. But there as a third rule which would, however, obtain even during such a conflict. This is that the Yugoslav Government must depend to a very large extent upon Russian support for its internal position. At the moment there is no need for aggressive Russian support to keep the country held down, but one of the most potent factors which has prevented active opposition is the wide-spread belief that even if the Army could be penetrated or neutralized the Russians would still return and re-impose Tito by force of arms. If the regime were ever to lose Russian support the possibilities of a revolution would be very greatly increased, a fact which the regime could certainly not afford to ignore.

18. After Saying all this I need hardly add that at present I see no chance whatsoever of useful encouragement to national as opposed to international communists. I shall of course bear the matter in mind and let you know If I see any reason to change the conclusions I have now reached.

19. I am sending copies of this letter to Frank Roberts, Ashley Clark, Ward and Nichols.

C.F.A. Warner, Esq., CMG, Foreign Office, London, S.W.l.

British Embassy – Belgrade - December 21st, 1946

No. 425

Sir,

The Slav Congress, which opened its proceedings in Belgrade on 8th December, brought them to a close some five days later. Thorough preparations have been made for this meeting, and an Organizing Committee had been set up so far back as July last in order to facilitate its work, which was stated to be the development of the brotherhood between the Slav nations, with the aim of strengthening democracy in Europe and the world in the fight against fascism, and to help in the building of international peace and security. The Yugoslav press played its full part before and during the proceedings, and no effort was spared to make the occasion, which was loudly and proudly proclaimed to be the first post-war congress, a memorable one, and to point out the significance of choosing Yugoslavia as its host.

2. At first sight, it might have been thought that the choice of Belgrade was an add one. The city has suffered heavily from the ravages of war and is notably lacking in those facilities and amenities normally in demand at international gatherings. It is best with an acute housing problem, and it can have been no easy task to accommodate the 250 delegates, a list whose names is annexed hereto, who together with their advisers and experts, cannot have amounted to much less than 500 persons. But the choice of Belgrade was clearly not dictated by convenience. Yugoslavia proclaims herself with increasing assurance the leader of the Balkan countries and the head and front for the coming Balkanic Confederation. Her long seaboard on the Adriatic encourages her to believe that she is the advance guard of the Slav nations facing the West, and the choice, therefore, of Belgrade a the place most suitable for those purposes of Slav propaganda, which the Congress was convened to carry out, was no doubt made with great deliberation.

3. A study of the proceedings of the Congress, which have been published in great detail, reveals the following three main themes:-the unity and brotherhood of the Slavs, not only in Europe but the

world over, under their great mother, Soviet Russia, upon whom they are entirely depended and to whom they owe everything; the necessity of maintaining this unity against the menace of “fascism” and “imperialism”; and the superiority of the democratic system as evolved by the Slav nations since the war over what is described as the “classic idea of democracy” in the West. The list of delegates, as you will see, is a long one, and contains representatives from the United States and Canada (who sent 11 and 10 representatives), South America (represented by an Argentine Slav, who proclaimed that he also represented the Uruguayan and Bolivian Slavs) and delegates from Brazil, Australia and New Zealand. The largest delegation, 21 strong, was that from Russia, headed by Marshal Tolbukin, but Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria and Poland were each represented by approximately the same number. A delegation from Albania was also present, first as brotherly observers and later to understand, to all intents as purposes, as full members of the Congress and honorary Slavs. The decorations in the streets, which were not too well contrived, invariable gave their chief honour to the Russian flag with smaller satellite emblems grouped around it.

4. The Congress opened on 8th December with the setting up of the Presidential Committee, to which were elected, among other, M. Stalin, Marshal Tito, M. Dimitrov, President Beirut, President Benes and M. Molotov, these names being received with tremendous applause, though the loudest cheer of all was received for the name of M. Stalin. Marshal Tito then gave the inaugural address, which was softer in tone than some he has delivered lately. The Slav people, he said, must walk the way of reciprocal affection, collaboration and spiritual unity, wherever they live. They had great mission, but it was not, he emphasized, to create a pan Slav bloc. It was only when Hitler attacked the Soviet Union that the Slavs had realized, for the first time, what disunity meant. What would have happened had there been no great Soviet Union? What would have happened without the Glorious Red Army? What would have happened without that genius Stalin? No gratitude would be so great to pay to the mighty Soviet Union. Meanwhile, the Slavs were creating a new and true people’s democracy. They were not meeting at the congress to make blocs against other nations, but to

demonstrate their resolution that a just peace must be made for all countries which had played their part in the struggle.

5. All this was well received, but it breathed an unexpected air of mildness, which Marshal Tolbukin, who spoke for the Soviet delegation, was at pains to correct. He warned his listeners that there were reactionary forces in the world which were trying to prepare the way for a new aggression; to conquer other countries and to enslave other peoples. They must never forget comrade Stalin’s words that it was necessary to hinder and curb these war-mongers.

6. Little comment is called for upon the other introductory speeches, though it is of some interest that one of the American Slavs in spite of so recent an arrival in Yugoslavia, announced that he had discovered that it was a land of smiling people, singing their way through life, and said how great would be his privilege to tell the United States that in Yugoslavia freedom reigned, and hoped one day Americans too might enjoy the same liberty. Upon this note of mutual gratulation the day’s proceedings closed, and the guests proceeded to the business of refreshments upon the customary heroic scale.

7. The following day, the Congress was offered stronger meat. The tone was set by Milovan Djialas who, while he did not deny that such great states as Britain and America had made certain sacrifices in the war, pointed out that these could not be compared with those made by such little countries as Poland and Yugoslavia. After the customary references to foreign imperialists, he went to coin a phrase by describing Russia as the Empire on which the sun never sets. When bombs had fallen on Yugoslavia, the Yugoslavs had said “so many less bombs on Russia”. One thing had become clear to the Yugoslav people – that there was not and could not be any salvation without Russia. There could be no Slav collaboration without unselfish love for the Soviet Union, and no success in the fight for freedom and democracy without reliance on the Soviet Union.

8. Djilas was followed by the Argentine delegate who said he spoke for 800,000 Slavs in his own country as well as the Slav communities of Uruguay and Bolivia. He described all that the Slavs are doing in South America to strengthen their ties with the Soviet

Union, - “that fortress of democracy”, - and in general to forge the links of Slav unity.

9. On the third day, a complete change came over the proceedings, and the deliberations of the Congress took on a mood of tranquil piety. The opening speech was by the Russian academician Grakov, who paid a moving tribute to St. Cyril and St. Methodius, to whom, he said, the Slav nations owe an inextinguishable debt, since they had made the worship of God possible in the language understood by all Slavs.

10. He was followed by Monsignor Ritig, so lately in evidence as a Yugoslav delegate at the Paris and the one Roman Catholic cleric of any note in sympathy with the regime, who was received with great applause, and who was carried away by the spiritual fervour of the occasion that he described the souls of the audience as being “washed with the growth of majestic thoughts”. Reconciliation, he said, was the aim of the Congress. Reconciliation between the white and the black races – and here he was addressing himself particularly to the Anglo-Saxons. But the greatest reconciliation of all he continued must be between the East and the West. With the West, the Slavs had been until yesterday allies, and they never wished to be their adversaries, not only for their own sake, but for the sake of all humanity.