CIRCULAR D. 306

CIRCULAR D. 306

My telegram Circular D. 200 of February 2nd.

Yugoslav-Bulgarian Pact. We have received no independent information from Brigadier MacLean regarding negotiations between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria for conclusion of a Pact of Alliance and Mutual Assistance referred to by Soviet Government.

2. Our preliminary view is that proposed Pact would be open to much same objection as a Yugoslav-Bulgarian Federation. Meanwhile, Brigadier MacLean has been instructed to reserve our position if Tito mentions the project.

Telegram 455 - September 3rd, 1940

Bulgarian Minster remarks on Bulgarian-Yugoslav relations, and politically his opinion constitutes over-simplification of a complex situation. They should not be accepted without prior critical analysis. It is true, however, that relations remain normally good though Yugoslavia's slight disappointment and anxiety over Axis lnfluene on the Bulgarian Government and Russian influcnce on Bulgarian population seems now rather paltry.

2. [?South] Macedonian, here again situation is complex. Italy is at work and perhaps Germany too with (incidentally) no friendly intentions towards Yugoslav unity.

3. The Macedonians of South Serbia as distinct from Macedonian leaders outside the country may be divided into three main groups: (1) Ideological Federalists whose spiritual leader is Mihailoff, democratic in outlook but lacking political realism. They tend to idealize Bulgarian people but for the present are generally loyal to Yugoslav State. (2) Communist Federalists, whose goal is a free Macedonia within a great South Slav Federation linked to the Soviet Union. (3) Disconsolate peasantry who resist tax collectors, without their crops, and remain in a perpetual state of discontent against the Serbs.

4. It remains to be seen whether Italian propaganda can re-awaken among the people a movement for an independent Macedonia, this desire for which at present seemed to be practically confined to Macedonian leaders. In any event it seems that the idea of an independent Macedonia under Italian influence is generally regarded as a poor second best by Macedonian leaders who, it seems, would prefer for the present that Macedonians of South Serbia should continue to belong to Yugoslavia as loyal citizens subject to grant of increased local autonomy.

5. Matter should not therefore be over easy for Italy especially if Yugoslav Government are prepared to conciliate Macedonian National sentiment. This they have not so far been prepared to do and recently appointed Ban of Vardarska Banovina is a reactionary “old Serb” with Federalist ideas which he has been putting into

practice with brutal thoroughness. It appears however that the Government have been recently trying to moderate his zeal.

6. I agree that it seems hardly necessary to consider question of Macedonia at present moment in connexion with Yugoslav-Bulgaria relations.

7. I am continuing to watch developments of Macedonian situation and am trying to collect material sufficiently well-founded to justify a considered report to your Lordship.

Telegram 488 - London, December 12th, 1946

From the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs To the Secretary of State for External Affairs Canada

CIRCULAR D. 488

My telegram Circular D. 1150, 10th December.

Greece

Current discussion on alleged incursions over Greek frontier by her northern neighbours contain frequent references to Macedonian autonomous movement NOF. This organization is present day counter-part of former autonomous movement IMRO and OCHRANA; but it differs in being more closely allied with Yugoslav-Macedonian aspirations, in relation no doubt to suspected plans for Yugoslav and Bulgarian Federation after signature of Peace Treaty with later country. The following notes by United Kingdom Consul General at Salonica on NOF, may therefore be of interest, Begins.

1. During the enemy occupation of Greece, Bulgaria, not content with Eastern Macedonia and Western Thrace, was anxious to annex Central and Western Macedonia, and with German permission infiltrate OCHRANA agents who operated mainly in the area between Florina, Kastoria, Kozani and Edessa. Kalcheff, now serving a life sentence in Greece as a war criminal, was the chief of OCHRANA in Greece. OCHRANA’s aims were exactly the same as those of IMRO. At that time there was no collaboration between OCHRANA and EAM/ELAS. On the contrary there were frequent clashes, and ELAS disarmed OCHRANA bands wherever it could.

2. As, however, Axis power showed distinct signs of weakening another organization was indicated, this time an anti-fascist one, and about July-August 1944 SNOF (Slavomakedonski Narodni Osloboditelni Front) was founded, the members of which were the same as those of OCHRANA with a few additions. Directives now came from Moscow – though via Tito – and SNOF collaborated with EAM/ELAS until about October-November 1944 when a split

occurred and Gotche (alias Gotseff) its military leader, and his men withdrew into Yugoslavia (Vardar Macedonia). It is said that this split was cause by EAM/ELAS insistence on bringing SNOF bands further south, presumably with the object of utilizing them against the Government and British in Athens, and by Gotcheff’s refusal to abandon his own are.

3. Subsequently SNOF dropped the S (Slavomakedonski), which was objectionable to a large section of KKE following, and became NOF. That this latter is merely the continuation of SNOF is admitted in a leader in “Deltion” of 20th February. “Deltion” claims to be the “official organ of NOF” and is believed to be published in Skopje. It is printed in Makedonski and Greek. In the same issue, an extract from a manifesto is published by ASNOM (Antifascist Council of People’s Liberation of Macedonia) urging “Macedonians” under Greece and Bulgaria to participate in the “gigantic antifascist front” which is the only way “to win the right of self-determination and unity of the entire Macedonian people under the aegis of Tito’s Yugoslavia”.

4. It is correct that NOF does not participate in “autonomous activities” in that it does not work for Macedonian autonomy in the true meaning of the work (which was the object of IMRO when first founded in 1891-1892), nor for autonomy and the incorporation with Bulgaria, which IMRO and OCHRANA subsequently stood for. For reasons best known to Moscow, Belgrade and Sofia, NOF now owes allegiance to Tito, and the means to ensure Macedonia passing under his “aegis” would be the union of “Vardar” (Yugoslav), “Aegean” (Greek) and “Pirin” (Bulgarian) Macedonia under the president of Vardar Macedonia at Skopje – to form a single unit of the Federal State. This is clear from another leader of “Deltion” of 15th March, where it is stated that “from the early days, the Macedonian people had expressed its will to live with the people of Yugoslavia, since the Yugoslav people esteem it (the Macedonian people) as a people, and since under Marshal Tito’s wise leadership the Macedonian people, in a common struggle with the people of Yugoslavia, won its national freedom for the first time”. In the same leader it is said that “the Macedonian people of Aegean Macedonia is right in wanting union with its supporter the leading Macedonia of Vardar”.

5. Nor is it only NOF which holds such ideas. Tito in his speech at Skopje on October 11th, 1945, as reported in the “Deltion” of 21st October, spoke of the unity of all Macedonians within Federal Yugoslavia and rebuked Bulgarian “reactionaries” who still spoke of “Greater Macedonia” i.e. “independent” Macedonia. Ends.