Front Matter

Declassified Documents (1939 – 1949)

Compiled by Risto Stefov

Declassified Documents (1939 – 1949)

May 22, 2015

Introduction

This series of articles will present the reader with direct quotes from declassified information from the 1940’s which was once only available to governments, statesmen and diplomats.

This information will answer questions such as;

How much did “governments” in the 1940’s know about the “Macedonian Question”? What did Macedonia’s enemies say about Macedonia and the Macedonian people? How did the Great Powers “influence” events that were aimed against the Macedonians? And much, much more.

Since these articles will not be available anywhere on the internet, I suggest you save them.

In my opinion, these articles, never before available, depict the correct picture of past events and will be invaluable to historians, especially those reports containing information collected by the field agents of the various Foreign Offices.

Risto Stefov

Balkan States – Report 1 - December 11, 1944

Mr. Leeper to Mr. Eden Athens 24th November, 1944

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to submit the following comments on Research Department paper of the 26th August, 1944, on the subject of Macedonia. (1)

2. The two formidable Macedonian problems in which Greece is concerned are: (a) that of Greek relations with the Slav world as represented by Serbia and Bulgaria, both of whom must be expected in the immediate future to be under strong Russian influence and to have Russian sympathy for their aspirations; and b) that of the surviving Bulgarophone minority in Western Macedonia.

3. The former problem turns chiefly on that of Serbian and Bulgarian access to the Aegean, the subject discussed in paragraphs 35-40 and 41-43 of the paper under reference. There is clearly no case (or handing over to Slav Powers any part of the North Aegean coast, which in 1940 had nowhere anything but an infinitesimal minority of Slav inhabitants. On the other hand, the strategic position of Greece here, even with Turkish backing, is very weak, vis-à-vis the Slav world, so that even in her own interests it behooves Greece to come to terms with her northern neighbours. The only possible solution-however difficult in practice under present conditions-seems to be that referred to in paragraph 51, namely, a return to, and preferably an extension of, the system of free zones. A Serbian free zone at Salonica is not difficult, but a Bulgarian zone at Kavala, or even at the outlying Alexandrupolis, would probably be out of the question for a considerable period to come, in view of the passions aroused by the atrocious conduct of the Bulgarians in Northern Greece since 1941. It remains, nevertheless, a Greek no less than a Bulgarian interest that Bulgaria's desire for access to an Aegean port should be satisfied so

far as possible; since otherwise Bulgaria's southward political aspiration, which are now largely artificial, will be kept alive by the real and continual irritation of an unsatisfied economic need. (How far this need might be met by the alternative of a free zone at Durazzo is a matter for separate study.) It may further be pointed out that the grant of free zones at her northern ports would, in fact, be of direct financial benefit to Greece herself through the revivifying influence of increased trade on the life of those ports in general and through the restoration of a natural degree of intercourse between these Greek ports and their Slav hinterland.

4. The problem of the Western Macedonian Bulgarophones, who are briefly mentioned in paragraph 7 of the paper, also remains serious and formidable, in spite of its limited dimensions. This minority, which extends through the region from Florina and Kastoria through Siatista to the plain of Yannitsa, has proved exceedingly unreliable during the war. Satisfactory data are not available, but it appears from events during the occupation that the dissatisfied minority must be considerably larger than is suggested by Greek census figures; and it is certain that successive Greek Governments have shirked facing the problem and have preferred to persuade even themselves that it did not exist. On the assumptions (1) that the policy of His Majesty’s Government is to treat Greece as the most important Balkan country from the point of view of British interests, and to support those elements in Greece which are most stably pro-British and (2) that Greece does not wish to belong to a Balkan Federation in which there would be a large Slav majority, it would appear to follow that Greece had better not contain any Slav minorities at all. And since the amputation of the Slav areas in Western Macedonia and their annexation to a Slav Federation is a practical impossibility and would also be economically disastrous for Greece. It would follow that, difficult as it may be, a home must be found for perhaps 120,000 Slav Macedonians north of the Greek frontiers of 1941.

5. I have sent copies of this dispatch to the Resident Minister at Caserta, to Mr. Houstoun-Boswall at Sofia and to Mr. Broad at Bari.

I have, &c. R. A. Leeper.

(1) See “Balkan States” print section, 26th August, Section 6.

A Statement of the Bulgarian Idea of Unification as the Motive of Bulgarian Foreign and Internal Policy

April 5, 1944

No. 2782 (R-2585) American Consulate General, Istanbul, Turkey

SUBJECT: A Statement of the Bulgarian Idea of Unification as the Motive of Bulgarian Foreign and Internal Policy

Sir:

I have the honor to present below a leading article from the Bulgarian newspaper ZORA of March 28, 1944, in which Mr. N. Kolarov, Editor of the Macedonian newspaper TSELOKUPNA BULGARIA, gives his view of the fundamental significance of the idea of unification in relation to Bulgarian foreign and internal policy.

The writer reviews the development of the movement in Bulgaria inspired by the idea of national unification in the nineteenth century, especially as it came to a head in the church settlement of 1870--which achieved the setting up of the Bulgarian Exarchate in Constantinople- and the Treaties of San Stefano and Berlin in 1878. He also refers to the long continued struggle that has been carried on in Bulgaria since the Treaty of San Stefano. Ethnographically the writer lays primary emphasis upon the areas of Bulgarian habitation as indicated in the delimitation of the territorial limits of the exarchate and the limits of the Treaty of San Stefano.

The writer sets forth no new ideas on this subject. The article merely emphasizes the fact that the idea of unification has been a powerful force working through the whole period of Bulgarian modern history and never more powerfully than today.

For the student of Balkan affairs the article is important in that it is another reminder of the fact that this powerful well organized movement and this profound sentiment must be taken fully into account in the settlement of the Balkan problem at the close of this

war. As long as great numbers of Bulgarians live outside the frontiers of their country this struggle unification will go on, -for the Bulgarians are a determined and resourceful people in waging this kind of struggle. The aspiration for national self-determination and unification was in thorough accord with democratic sentiment in the nineteenth century, when it was born. The idea of unification was quite natural and commendable. The heroism of the people primarily concerned in carrying on the struggle, especially in Macedonia, for relief from the terrible conditions under which they lived was heroic. The literature which originated in the struggle is a fundamental part of Bulgarian literature and a part of the education of all the youth of country. Hence the ideal will not die.

The fatal element in connection with the whole movement, and that which has caused it to be wrecked in the twentieth century, was the unwise political methods adopted for its achievement, and the uncompromising attitude of those leaders in charge of national interests at critical moments, primarily in the spring and summer of 1913. In the bitter enmities and struggles between the Balkan states Bulgaria gave her enemies the opportunity of getting the drop on her, an opportunity which they were not slow to take advantage of; and so by her own lack of wisdom and political skill she wrecked the edifice which had been built up by so much suffering and bloodshed. The continuation in 1941 and since of this policy of political short-sightedness seems again destined to leave Bulgaria naked to her enemies; and to her natural enemies she has deliberately added Great Britain and the United states.

The writer of the article presented below, Mr. Kolarev, does not seem to be aware of the critical conditions which his country faces at this moment, for he writes of successful resistance to enemies without seeming to know that the forces gradually being built against his country are irresistible. He would do better, therefore, to devote his energies to devising by political skill some new alignment for his country that might save something from impending wreckage of Bulgaria's long cherished hopes.

The article shows how the most intransigent Bulgarians are still thinking and writing in this the eleventh of hour of the war in the Balkans. In free translation this article reads as follows:

In the Spirit of the Idea of Unification

By N. Kolarov

"Even for the first leaders of our renaissance, for whom the frontiers of Bulgaria were clearly defined, the unification idea, that is, the idea of the national unification of the Bulgarian nation was the fundamental and sacred aim of their efforts and of their epochal struggles. Later on in the political program of the revolutionary committee in Bucharest, the frontiers of the desired Bulgarian state were described with an accuracy which represents a true and understanding political view, especially when one bears in mind conditions at that time, conditions not only of patriotism crystal clear, but also showing an amazing ethnographical and historical knowledge.

Against all attempts to attack or deliver a deadly blow to the idea of unification the Bulgarian nation as reacted with iron determination, on which these attempts have ingloriously failed. The greatness of our church struggle rested precisely in the fact that it was an uncompromising struggle insofar as the territorial demarcation of the projected Bulgarian church (exarchate) was concerned. The southern frontiers proposed by the Patriarch of Constantinople and located on the crest of Stara Planina was turned down with an indication which made it clear, once for all, that the Bulgarian nation would no longer admit of its being challenged and insulted by such proposals. The further attempts of Russian diplomacy and of the Sultan's government to satisfy the demands of our church further increased its territorial limits over which the jurisdiction of the Bulgarian church would extend, but which did not find favorable consideration in the Bulgarian nation. Our church leaders considered themselves satisfied only after the publication of the Sultan's decree, the tenth article of which opened for them the possibility, though under difficult conditions, of gathering all the territories with a Bulgarian population within the pale of the Bulgarian exarchate.

The peace treaty of San Stefano found the Bulgarian nation with an enhanced national and political consciousness and a fully crystallized idea of the meaning of unification. This is why this

treaty, which was considered to be the crown of Bulgarian aspirations and the just reward of Bulgarian suffering and sacrifices, since it brought to life a just settlement which bad long been buried for five centuries, awakened an indescribable enthusiasm in the grateful nation from the Danube to the Aegean Sea and from the Black Sea to the Albanian Mountains. This is why the unfortunate news, which came a few months later with reference to the Congress of Berlin, found not only a painful echo but also the firm determination to take up a new struggle in the name of the idea of unification. This struggle in our then enslaves provinces is well known to all. It is known to us by its powerful romanticism, its sacred victims and its legendary heroism. In this struggle the indomitable sons of the provinces and the noble sons of the free fatherland took part side by side dying in a fraternal embrace. It was Bulgarian in spirit, in ideology and in aims.

The political elasticity with which the juridical principles, expressed in article twenty-three of the Treaty of Berlin, and then of the Treaty for the minorities, allowed and compelled the struggle to grow, because of the stipulations of the treaty and the international conditions at the time, from small to great achievements and gradually to attain the final Bulgarian solution of the Macedonian question, a fact which is used in vain today by some enemy countries, by ethnographical nihilists, for anti-Bulgarian purposes, for ideological combinations directed against them.

The final and great aim of the Macedonian liberation movement has been the union of Macedonia with the free kingdom. Similarly the underlying motive of Bulgarian foreign policy from the date of the Congress of Berlin until today, as well as the fundamental impulse which induced the Bulgarian soldier to die at the four corners of the Peninsula in the wars of liberation, has been the unification of all Bulgarian provinces in one Bulgarian state.

The idea of unification has also been the fundamental motive force of our national and political life. To the Balkan problem, insofar as we are concerned in it, we desire to give and shall give the solution which is in the spirit of our history, our wars of liberation, our national ideology. Any ideas which carry even the smallest sign or germ of separation or of particularism are equally alien to

Bulgarians on both sides of the Osogovska Mountains. This is especially true today when we are living in a time of national and unitary states. We shall not seek our place in international life and establish the form of our state in accordance with the prescriptions of foreigners, the more so that these foreigners are known as our inexorable enemies. We shall build up our all Bulgarian state exclusively in the spirit of our idea of unification and Bulgaria will be a member of the international community ... a fully national and independent political entity." (ZORA -March 28, 1944.)

Respectfully yours, Burton M, Berry, American Consul General To Department in original and hectograph

Balkan States - Report 2 - February 1, 1945

Brigadier Maclean to Sir Orme Sargent

(No. 4)

With reference to my dispatch No.1 of the 6th of January regarding Macedonia, it may be of interest to recall the following sequence of events indicative of trends in Yugoslav, Bulgar, and Greek Macedonia in favour of incorporation in the new Macedonian federal unit of Yugoslavia.

2. On the 18th November the Greek Macedonian Brigade held its foundation ceremony at Bitolj to cries of “Give us the right to live within the framework of federal Yugoslavia.” Yugoslav partisan leaders appear to have attempted to moderate popular enthusiasm and Pasanko, representative of the Macedonian National Liberation Front, reminded his listeners that “this is a delicate diplomatic question in which the co-operation of our allies England, Russia, and America is essential.

3. The Greek Macedonian Brigade appears to have been formed partly of refugees resident in Bulgaria and partly from former adherents of E.A.M. who disagreed with E.A.M.’s minority policy. Keremediciev, Political Commissar of the new brigade, accused E.A.M. of harbouring certain elements who refused to accord the Greek Macedonians their cultural rights and own military formations. E.A.M. he added, finally issued instructions for the Macedonians to be disarmed and it was to avoid this that they crossed the border to Yugoslavia.

4. There they were probably joined by volunteers recruited from amongst Macedonian refugees previously living in Bulgaria. Yugoslav sources claim that there are some 700,000 of these refugees in Bulgaria, most of them having been transferred there as a result of agreements made after the last war for the exchange of population in the Balkans. The Yugoslav partisan newspaper Nova Makedonija for the 14th November, 1944, gave the following account of their present attitude: “These Macedonian refugees realize that the independence and liberation of the Greek part of

Macedonia depends not a little on its direct participation in the operations against the German Fascists. Committees are therefore being formed in every village and town in Bulgaria where Macedonians are living. It is to be expected that the response to volunteering will assume very large proportions and will include all those able to bear arms, and that whole units will be formed from the refugees alone.”

5. On the 3rd December another meeting was held in Bitolj to elect “a Political Commission to lead the fight of the Macedonian people in Greek Macedonia.” The commission appointed Filip Velkov as its representative to the Presidium of A.S.N.O.M. (i.e. the Anti-Fascist Assembly for the National Liberation of Macedonia) and J.A.N.L., H.Q., for Macedonia. At the second session of A.S.N.O.M. held at the end of December Velkov stated: “We Macedonians from Aegean Macedonia have a grim struggle before us to realize the age-old ideal of our people, the liberation of our part of Macedonia which is still beneath a foreign yoke.” At the same session of A.S.N.O.M., Atanas Atanasovski spoke in the name of the Bulgarian Macedonians. “The entire population of Pirin Macedonia,” he asserted, “is waiting for the happy hour when we shall be included with our brothers in Macedonia in Tito’s democratic, federal Yugoslavia.”

6. These claims for union between the Macedonian population of Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Greece had already been advanced some weeks previously by authoritative Yugoslav partisan leaders, such as General Dzilas, General Tempo and Dimitar Vlahov. Though some of the more categorical of these claims may have been made in a burst of momentary exuberance, it is worth while examining the career of the most experienced of these politicians, Vlahov, for indications as to the more permanent aims and principles determining their policy.

7. Dimitar Vlahov was born in Kilkis in Greek Macedonia in 1878, and joined the original I.M.R.O. as early as 1903, collaborating closely with the famous Macedonian leader Goce Delcev. In 1908 he was elected to the Turkish Parliament as a deputy of the Popular Federal party, whose object was to work constitutionally for an autonomous Macedonia. In 1907, after Macedonia had been

annexed by Bulgaria, Vlahov became Governor of the Pristina district and after the Great War, served as Bulgarian Consul-General first in Odessa and then in Vienna. In 1924 he signed the Aleksandrov-Protogerov manifesto which attempted to patch up a truce between the rival I.M.R.O. leaders and he was repudiated by the Bulgarian Government. Disapproving of the terrorist methods of I.M.R.O. which was now falling increasingly under the domination of Ivan Mihajlov and degenerating into the tool of Bulgarian and Italian designs of disruption in the Balkans, Vlahov founded his own organization, the United (Obidinena) I.M.R.O., in 1925, and expounded his ideas in his well known book “Balkan Federation”. Vlahov looked neither to Bulgaria nor to Yugoslavia (which was then pursuing a policy of rigid centralism) but to the Soviet Union, with whose support he hoped to achieve a union of the South Slav peoples in which Macedonia would form a separate, autonomous federal unit. Though Vlahov still continued to lay great stress on non-violent methods for the achievement of his aims, his organization was broken up by the Government of the Military League in Bulgarian in 1934, and its members sentenced to long terms of imprisonment on a charge of Communist conspiracy and planning of an armed revolt. Vlahov himself settled in Moscow in 1936 and appears to have remained there until returning to Yugoslavia at some point to join the partisans. Observant readers have been able to secure an interesting side light on his activity in Moscow from an article in a recent partisan newspaper which wrote that Vlahov had “liven in Moscow, where he worked tirelessly in the International Agrarian Institute” – the latter phrase being substituted for the blocked-out but still legible word “Comintern”.

8. Although the energy with which the authorities appear to have quelled the anxiety of certain of their troops to march on Salonica (see my telegram No.63 of the 16th January) bears out Tito’s repented assurances that he intends to take no premature action over the Macedonia problem, there is every reason to suppose that it is his intention to unite in due course the Macedonian provinces of Greece and Bulgaria to Yugoslav Macedonia, and that this project has the approval of the Soviet Union. Dr. Smodlaka has stated that the Bulgarian Government (no doubt under pressure from Moscow) have already agreed to cede Bulgarian Macedonia (see my telegram No.88 of the 21st January). The Greek attitude towards this problem

must be regarded as less assured and will doubtless depend on the eventual complexion of the Greek Government, although, as will be seen by my telegram No.2 of the 7th December, even E.A.M. do not appear to have proved quite as amenable on this question as Tito would have wished. It is however, difficult to see how Greece, whatever her attitude, would be able successfully to resist the wishes in this matter of an overwhelmingly strong South Slav bloc under Soviet tutelage.

F. H. R. MACLEAN, Brigadier, British Military Mission. Belgrade, 21st, January, 1945.

Balkan States – Report 3 - January 29th, 1945

Brigadier Maclean to Sir Orme Sargent

I TRANSMIT herewith a report on Macedonia. F. MACLEAN

British Military Mission, Belgrade, 7th January, 1945.

Enclosure. Report No. 1.

1. Now that some time has elapsed since enemy forces evacuated Macedonia, an attempt can be made to asses the extent to which the Partisans have been able to implement their policy of creating a Macedonian federal unit. Although the Partisans are somewhat prone to discuss the problem as “solved” by the mere proclamation of Macedonia’s autonomy, it is clear that a real solution can only be achieved through a long process of educational, administrative and economic reconstruction.

2. It will be recalled that provision was made for full Macedonian autonomy by a decree passed at the Second Session of A.V.N.O.J. at Jaice in November 1943. By this decree Macedonia was accorded a status equal in all respects to that of Serbia, Montenegro, Croatia and Slovenia in the new federal Yugoslavia. The first step towards carrying this autonomy into effect was taken by the formation of the Anti-Fascist Assembly for the Liberation of Macedonia (A.S.N.O.M.) as the acting federal authority.

3. It appears, however, that there is to be a considerable difference in the degree of autonomy which the Partisans intend to allow in the various spheres of Macedonian national life. In cultural matters Macedonia is to be accorded immediate and complete autonomy; in political and administrative matters as much autonomy as can be digested; in economic life there are so far few signs of autonomy and, indeed, in opposite policy of centralized state control may well be introduced.

4. Macedonia’s cultural autonomy is finding its immediate expression in the official stimulus given to the “Macedonian language.” The later has hitherto been generally denied existence

and has been claimed as a Serb or a Bulgar dialect according to the national prejudices of rival philosophies. Nova Makedonija and other papers are now regularly published in the Macedonian language and a place of special honour given to Macedonian poems and songs.

5. Special efforts are also been made to educate and develop the most backward sections of the population. The Anti-Fascist Women’s Front is reported to be receiving a special response from amongst the Macedonian women, and the backward Turkish minority is being courted by solemn celebration of the Feast of Bajram, by Moslem rallies held in Skopje and by frequent favourable publicity in the press.

6. The right to political and administrative autonomy is being more differently applied. In the first place, this right is by no means universally recognized by the other Yugoslav peoples, especially the Serbs in who the old great Serb conviction that there is no Macedonia but only a “southern Serbia” is still strong. Significant confirmation of this was recently afforded by an article published in Borba criticizing a meeting of educationalists at Nis who acquiesced in a statement made by one speaker to the effect that Macedonia was “just a part of Greater Serbia.” The article went on to complain that at another meeting of the Women’s Anti-Fascist Front, also held at Nis, a delegate from Macedonia was denied the much publicized right of making a speech in her own language.

7. If the Serbs are slow to admit the right of the Macedonians to equal partnership in the Yugoslav State, the Macedonians for their part, are not quick to forgive the Serbs for exploiting their former hegemony. Macedonia was generally regarded in pre-war Yugoslavia as a colony – a sort of south Slav Siberia to which corrupt, inefficient or recalcitrant civil servants were relegated. Their task in Macedonia was less to promote the well-being of the population than to propagate the Great Serb creed. The Macedonians are now to provide their own administrators. Although local government by the committee or “odbor” system reduces the number of officials required, it would seem that a shortage of experienced Macedonian civil servants must be felt for some time to come.

8. Perhaps more resented by the Macedonian people than the old Serbian officials were the Serbian colonists settled by Government grant on Macedonian soil. The great Serbian outlook of these colonists, together with the economic privileges they enjoyed, led to considerable ill-feeling among the Macedonian population. That this ill-feeling has not yet been wholly dissipated has been confidentially admitted by Father Vlada Zecevic, Commissar for the Interior in the National Committee, who has recently returned from a visit to Macedonia. Father Zecevic states that a redistribution of land, by which it is hoped to satisfy the needs of the poorer Macedonian peasantry without entirely dispossessing the Serb settlers, is being now carried through and is inevitably giving rise to some cases of personal resentment.

9. In the meantime economic conditions in Macedonia remain confused, as has been reported by my No. 791 of the 29th December quoting a report received from my mission there; “the economic situation here is bad largely through lack of transport and inefficiency. There is sufficient food in Macedonia but distribution problems are acute. The foregoing is probably the reason for the re-election of a new ministerial council of A.S.N.O.M., which is to take place on the 28th December.” The immediate implications of autonomy in the economic field cannot therefore be regarded as an unmixed blessing, and apart from this adjustment of claims between Serb settlers and poor Macedonian peasants it seems doubtful whether the Partisans will attempt a more extensive application of the principle. Indeed, the special character of Macedonian economy suggests an opposite tendency towards State centralism. In addition to opium and cotton cultivation, both of great potential value if wisely fostered by the State, the chief Macedonian crop is tobacco. This furnishes a valuable source of income to the State, who bought it through a monopoly from the peasant cultivators at fixed low prices. The State, however, played no part in organizing or improving cultivation, though the peasant could have been greatly assisted through expert advice in methods of cultivation, model plantations, financial help, co-operatives, &c. State assistance along these lines maybe expected to yield considerable economic results, and if Partisan controlled Yugoslavia is to attempt any promising

experiment in agricultural collectivization it may well be in the tobacco fields in Macedonia.

10. That the path of Macedonian autonomy is still beset with thorny problems, both in the sphere of external and internal affairs, is suggested by Marshal Tito’s decision, already reported by telegram, to send his right-hand man Kardelj to attend the Second Session of A.S.N.O.M. held on the 28th of December, 1944. In his speech to the Assembly Kardelj congratulated the Macedonians on their newly won autonomy, but went on to warn them against becoming “giddy with success.” Their enemies, he asserted, were still active and the independence of small Powers was constantly threatened. “Vigilance was all the more necessary as, unfortunately, every-day experience showed that solemn undertakings not to interfere in the internal affairs of other countries” – and here Kardelj made a veil reference to events in Greece – “were in practice only treated as scraps of paper.” Macedonia’s enemies, he continued, were “the Great Bulgarian, Great Albanian, Great Serbian and Greek chauvinists” and their supporters abroad. Equally pernicious were the opposite tendencies towards separatism. Macedonia could only flourish, Kardelj concluded, within the framework of the new federal democratic Yugoslavia.

11. A similar creed was expressed by other speakers at the Assembly, notably by General Tempo-Vukmanovic, who asserted: “We have gained a victory in the field of battle and must now gain it on the field of politics. The danger which threatens to destroy the achievements of our great struggle lies in the efforts made to stir up chauvinism and separatism.” Tempo went on to stress the need for free and democratic elections by secret ballot and affirmed: “We did not fear to give arms to the people – still less shall we fear to give the people the vote.” Thus the official line taken by the Partisan speakers was the avoidance of any territorial claims or suggestion of any eventual South Slav federation and affirmation of a conciliatory and moderate policy of full democracy. These discrete utterances were in contrast with the wild polemics and even wilder territorial claims advanced by General Tempo and Dr. Vlahov in November on the subject which, under instructions from the foreign office, I made strong representations to Marshal Tito.

12. From this and from the various conversations which I have had with him on the subject of Macedonia, there can be little doubt that Tito fully realizes the delicate nature of the internal and external problems involved, and there is every indication that, for the present at any rate, he intends to tread cautiously. What future plans he (or possibly Moscow) has for this traditionally explosive region remains to be seen. He has always told me that he does not intend to prosecute any territorial claims he may have in this region before the Peace Conference, and that in the case of any disputed region he would be prepared to be guided by the results of a plebiscite. In the case of the ethnological patchwork of the Kosovo Polje he has on occasion mentioned the possibility of moving what is left of the Arnaut population, whose loyalty to the Germans was unshaken to the end, to Albania on bloc. The first speeches made by Tempo and Vlahov after the liberation of Macedonia referred to above show that at any rate some leading Macedonians would like to see the present frontiers of Macedonia extended at the expense of Greece and Bulgaria.

13. A possible solution to these problems would, of course, be the creation of a Federal State comprising Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, and even possibly Greece and Albania, with which the frontier of the ideal Macedonia could be firmly established, if not by mutual agreements, then by an over-ruling decision of the Central Federal Authority. On the other hand, even if no Balkan or South Slav Federation should be created it seems likely that, in view of the similarity of outlook of the regimes which either have or eventually will be set up in all these countries, the task of reaching, or if necessary imposing, settlement will present little difficulty.

F. MACLEAN., 6th January, 1945.

Balkan States – Report 4 - April 27th, 1945

Mr. Stevenson to Mr. Eden Belgrade, 13th April, 1945.

(No. 44.)

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to report that two members of my staff recently had a long conversation with M. Emanuel Cuckov, the Minister for Macedonia. Mr. Cuckov was very friendly and appeared anxious to give all possible information.

2. He opened the conversation by saying how important it was that Allies should understand the situation in Macedonia and should realise that the Macedonians regard themselves as a separate people. What he meant by that statement was not clear, but he later said that Macedonia was very satisfied with her federal status inside the Yugoslav State and explained that the federal idea was not a new one to Macedonians, who had previously envisaged obtaining a measure of autonomy as a federal unit in a South Slav federation. From everything he said it emerged that the Macedonians have very concrete ideas on the measure of autonomy offered by their present federal status. In internal matters they seem to regard themselves as being entitled to operate almost entirely independently of the rest of the Yugoslav State. From other remarks which I have heard from prominent Yugoslavs recently, it seems possible that this tendency towards excessive independence on the part of Macedonia is causing the Central Government a certain amount of concern.

3. On being asked about the new administrative districts which have recently been set up in Macedonia, M. Cuckov said that he was not expert on this question but that he understood that these new divisions were essentially the same as they had been before 1941. They had, however, been somewhat improved and under one administrative centre were now included all villages and districts which were bound geographically to that centre. Before 1941 the divisions bad been Some what- arbitrary and areas whose market produce naturally went to one town had been often included in the

administrative district of another. This had led to much inefficiency and had caused the peasants great difficulty. The frontier between Macedonia and Serbia was the historical one, i.e., a line running east to west just north of Kumanovo and south of Kacanik. I enclose as an appendix 1.0 the dispatch a list and a map (map not printed) of the new administrative areas in Macedonia.

4. M. Cuckov then spoke about agriculture. He said that attempts had been made before 1941 to encourage wheat growing in Macedonia. The son, however, had not lent itself to this and the intention of the Macedonian Government was henceforward to concentrate on the cultivation of rice, sesame, opium and tobacco, all or which could easily be grown. Macedonia had never had many factories, but it was the intention of the Macedonian Government to remedy this and to encourage industrial enterprise for the processing of commodities grown inside the Macedonian frontiers. The main industrial enterprises before the war such as the Allatini and Radusa chrome and lead mines near Stip, had not suffered much damage and were more or less ready to resume work.

5. As regards reconstruction, the Federal Government of Macedonia had- immediately after the evacuation of the Germans on their own initiative set to work to repair runways and roads. This reconstruction had been financed by the Macedonian Government itself without assistance from the Central Government. This was due mainly to the fact that the dinar had no value in Macedonia and though the Central Government had set money aside for Macedonian reconstruction it still remained in Belgrade. He believed that all roads were already repaired and the runway from Belgrade to Veles was open. From Veles to Djevdjelija the Germans had completely destroyed the runway during their withdrawal and it would take some time to repair. The runway to the Greek frontier through Bitolj was, he thought, however, very nearly fit for traffic.

6. On being asked whether the Serb colonists would be free to return to Macedonia he said, somewhat platitudiuously, that all Yugoslavs would naturally be free to come to Macedonia if they wished. As regards officials, he said, however, that the question of whether they return to their old jobs depended entirely on the Macedonian Government and not on the Central Government. The Macedonian

Government were anxious that as far as possible the official positions should be fled by Macedonians and, provided that there were men to fill the posts, it was, therefore, unlikely that the Macedonian authorities would be ready to take back the old officials. For example, before 1943 the police had been almost entirely Serbian and the police chiefs had been Serbs. Now the militia who had taken their place were Macedonians and it was natural that the head of the militia should be Macedonian as well.

7. As regards the redistribution of land, he pointed out that before 1941 it had been easy for the Serbs to buy land in Macedonia, and as a result the Macedonians, for whom the purchase of land had not been easy, had been driven out of the more fertile parts of the country. He indicated that there would be as far as possible a redistribution in favour of the Macedonians and that Serbian colonists would if possible be sent back Serbia: Thirty per cent of the Banat had been owned and cultivated by Germans and here the population had been only ninety to every square kilometer of cultivable land, whereas in Macedonia it was 350. He thought that the Serbs from Macedonia could be moved to take the place of the Germans in the Banat.

8. He then spoke about the Church and Stated that before the war one of the main attempts to Serbianise Macedonia had been made through that medium. Nearly all the priests had been Serbs and this had been very unpopular with the Macedonians, who were extremely Nationalistic and would only recognise a Church run by themselves with Macedonian priests. He believed that the solution lay in a federal Yugoslav Church. Whereas previously the Orthodox Church had been a Serbian Church with tentacles in Macedonia, Bosnia and other parts of Yugoslavia, he hoped to see separate Orthodox Churches in each of the federal units which each in turn owed allegiance to a central Yugoslav Patriarchate. If such an arrangement could not be sanctioned by the Orthodox Church he felt that the Macedonian Church would be forced to carry on schismatically as the Bulgarian Church had previously done for some seventy years. He then attacked the Metropolitan Joseph of Skopje, who, he said, had during the war been associated with Trbic, the Cetnik leader in Macedonia, and had continuously been opposed to the partisans. He considered him a time-server who was unfit to

stand as deputy for the Metropolitan Gavrilo whom everyone admired. The Metropolitan Joseph was also a Serb and though it might only be an internal affair of the Orthodox Church that he should call himself the Metropolitan of Skopje, it had aroused the anger of all Macedonians when he recently went to Moscow in that capacity and apparently representing the Macedonian Church. He pointed out that the Macedonian Church Assembly had sent greetings to the Holy Synod, whose authority they recognised, but not to the Metropolitan Joseph. It seems possible that the recent visit of the Metropolitan to Moscow may have been the reason for bringing to a head the Macedonian demand for a separate Church.

9. The recent elections had been a great success and had aroused widespread interest. In nearly all districts over 90 per cent of the electorate had polled. He believed that everyone over 21, except those accused of collaboration, had been allowed to vote and, in addition to this, those under that age who had fought in the Yugoslav army of National Liberation. Candidates had been chosen freely by the people and he gave an example a town of 10,000 inhabitants. This might be divided into four districts, each of five streets. Each street would at a public meeting choose two members, and a district meeting would then be held and those of the candidates who had anything against them would then be ruled out. All those who were approved as candidates would then stand for election and election was by secret ballot. No suasions had been used either by the police or by the army during the elections.

10. Opposition to the present regime in Macedonia was very slight. The Cetnik problem had never been serious and the few who had fought in the Macedonia had a long time ago gone north into Serbia. The Albanian bands who had at one point been a fairly serious menace had only been bandits, whose object was to profit from the general disorder, and at the time of the German withdrawal had impartially attacked both Germans and Partisans. These had nearly all departed – some going north with the Germans and others taking refuge in the mountains of the Kosovo.

11. A Court of National Honour was now in operation in Macedonia, but he did not know any details. He said that the number of Macedonian civilians executed for crimes under the occupation

and after the liberation had been small, and gave the figure of seventy. The main crimes had been material and cultural collaboration, spying, informing, &c., and he also mentioned that four men had recently been condemned to death for speculation. Naturally after the collapse of the Germans a number of opponents had been caught under arms and had been shot out of hand, and he mentioned a group of some forty Albanians captured near Skopje.

12. Macedonia had no problems with Albania and he thought there was no question of any change in frontiers.

13. As regards the Bulgarians, he was non-committal. At the time of Yugoslavia's collapse in 1941, however, the Macedonian people, who had been striving for autonomy for a long time, had felt that the chances were remote without outside help. They therefore welcomed the Bulgarians and thought they intended to set up an independent Macedonia. Few Macedonians, however, desired to be under Bulgarian domination, and when their hopes of independence were deceived the Bulgarians became more and more unpopular and many Macedonian patriots like himself took to the woods.

14. When questioned about Greece he said that Macedonia, being a part of the Yugoslav federation, had no separate foreign relations. The Macedonians realised that the main task for the moment was to beat the enemy and to allow no other considerations to come between them and that end. They therefore did not desire to embarrass in any way the Allies, and were determined not to create any trouble by meddling in Greek affairs. He added, however, that 70 per cent of the population of Greek Macedonia was Macedonian and they were being badly treated. He felt there were many problems to be settled with Greece, but these could wait until alter the war.

15. I am sending copies of this dispatch to the Resident Minister at Caserta, to His Majesty's Ambassador in Athens and to His Majesty's political representatives at Sofia and Debrecen.

I have, &c. R. C. SKRINE STEVENSON.

Enclosure

The Administrative Divisions of Macedonia

By a decree of the Anti-Fascist Skupstina of National Liberation of Macedonia, published on the 13th February, 1945, Macedonia was divided for administrative purposes into eight Okrugs as follows:-