C. THE GREEK CIVIL WAR AND BEYOND

C. THE GREEK CIVIL WAR AND BEYOND

1. Nikos Zahariadis (CPG Secretary General)

Nikos Zahariadis was the man whose policies at that time created the conditions for the political situation in Greece. I would say many amazing things were written about him. The Fourth of August Fascist regime (1936-1941) sent him to prison on the island Kerkira and to Athens. The Asfalia (Greek intelligence service), then headed by Maniadakis, had more and more agents imbedded inside the CPG leadership. As is well known, the Asfalia “inflicted heavy blows on the Party”. (CPG Central Committee Sixth Plenum resolution, taken in June 1941. See: Το ΚΚΕ απο το 1931-1952, pp. 103-104.) As a result the CPG found itself “broken” with its organizational cadre pyramid destroyed. It was alleged that Zahariadis helped with this destruction from inside prison. Maniadakis organized secret nightly “conversations” with his most prominent police agents known as “Communist hunters”. Zahariadis was one of those people who participated in those nightly conversations. After a rich feast Zahariadis lectured the communist hunters on “how to effectively fight against communism in Greece…”

When the Germans occupied Greece the Asfalia surrendered Zahariadis to the Gestapo. But, even though he was imprisoned in the infamous Dachau prison, Zahariadis was well looked after. Namely, he did his time at the prison headquarters where it was clean, warm and cozy. He was also fed well. Here he “worked” as an interpreter. While Zahariadis, a very important communist, enjoyed his time in prison the Gestapo and the SS furiously looked for ordinary communists among the captured soldiers on the fronts and among the occupied and enslaved nations, and, as soon as they were found, they immediately shot them. They even shot communist sympathizers...

When the war was over, Zahariadis found himself in London, a guest of the English intelligence service. After spending two or three weeks in England, on May 29, 1945, Zahariadis was flown from England to Greece on a special British military aircraft, wearing a British military uniform. The English delivered him to Athens. The Siantos CPG leadership welcomed him back and immediately gave

him his old position - CPG Secretary General, the function he served during the war...

All of these things, however, can’t mean that Zahariadis was not one of those capable agents of international anti-Communism, entrenched in the leadership of the Communist movement in various countries of the world.

History of diplomacy says: There are no eternal friends and enemies in politics, there are only interests.

It is precisely because of these modern Great Power interests that England has included Greece in its affairs. And that is why the English were in Greece and did what they wanted for their own benefit and no one bothered them. If Zahariadis was indeed an international anti-communist and in charge of the CPG, then the CPG, more or less, directly or indirectly, served English interests in Greece. This means that the CPG, more or less, directly or indirectly, undermined the democratic forces and robbed the people of their victory in the revolution in Greece.

As we now know, the CPG Central Committee, during its Sixth Extended Plenum, a general party conference held in March 1956, looked at Zahariadis’s policies and publicly condemned him and removed him from the CPG leadership for what he had done. After that he persistently, but without success, tried to return to Greece and land in the hands of the “enemy” - the junta, that is, the domestic reactionaries and their English and Americans patrons. He even went on a hunger strike, but died alone in 1973, in the USSR, completely abandoned and despised. (Ξενοκρατια, page 259.)

Let us now have a look at some of the more important and distinctive moments that resulted from Zahariadis’s policies...

2. Unilateral Civil War

After the Varkiza Agreement was signed on February 12, 1945, and after ELAS was disbanded, the government of “national unity”, spending English money and relying on English tanks, began a cruel and open campaign against the democratic forces: To disorganize

them and, ultimately, to break them. This was the main goal of the English in Greece.

Helping the local reactionaries to break up the liberation forces, along with exploiting the country and people was an old, well-known, English colonial policy.

A strange and incredible phenomenon, known as a “unilateral civil war”, was unleashed to physically liquidate a large number of people who fought in the people’s revolution, including a large number of members and middle cadres belonging to ELAS, EAM, and the CPG.

With the dissolution of ELAS, the democratic forces were disarmed, but not disorganized and crushed. As a result the English were not in a hurry to enforce the Lebanon Agreement, i.e. to create a “non-partisan national army” with a partial or general mobilization. It was still too early for that. For the time being, it also meant that the political left CPG-EAM would be arming itself all over again. To defend against that the English used the various pro-fascist elements and political right-wingers who assisted the occupiers such as the Tagmata Asfalias, the Higes, the Paogides, and so on. The English used these relatively small groups to pacify the massive and well-organized democratic forces.

The English, through the Siantos and Zahariadis CPG-EAM leaderships, achieved miraculous and incredible success in Greece. Namely, on the one hand the CPG-EAM leaderships sent telegrams to the heads of the major powers - the Soviet Union, America and England, “protesting over the terrorist orgy in Greece”, and on the other capitulated to England by allowing ELAS to be disarmed and liquidated. (One of the first protest telegrams sent by the EAM Central Committee, among other things, said: “In the four months since the signing of the Varkiza Agreement, 500 fighters from the national resistance were killed, and more than 30,000 were imprisoned. There are about 150 terrorist gangs and more than 20,000 unlawful armed terrorists killing and terrorizing the democratic population...” Further on, the telegram demanded that “the Yalta decision be applied in Greece with help from the Allied Commission...” (Hronikone tou Agona, p. 52.)

On top of capitulating to the English the EAM and CPG leaderships called on the people to endure and resist passively. Namely, they called on the people “to endure... in humility and discipline”. Here we are simply forced to point out that:

With this, objectively and substantially, in fact, the CPG-EAM leaderships facilitated the English and the Greek government’s murderous attacks which helped the English strengthen their position and power in Greece...

Here we are going to quote some details from the information referring to Greece from March 8 to December 5, 1944, from the two volumes “1944 - κρισιµη χρονια”, by Gianis Andricopoulos, which make use of the texts from 300 unpublished documents from Winston Churchill’s personal archives (released with the approval of the British government).

On p. 94, of the second volume, Andricopoulos wrote about Georgios Papandreou’s preparations to return to Athens, right after the Germans left Greece. Georgios Papandreou at the time was Prime Minister of the Greek government in exile. Papandreou at the time was deeply concerned about the situation in Greece and constantly sent telegrams to the Greek king in London, seeking urgent assistance from the English. In one of these telegrams (borrowed from Papandreou’s memoirs), sent on September 14, 1944, Papandreou said:

“When our government arrives in Athens without its own forces or without allied military forces, I will become a prisoner of the EAM... Therefore I ask of you to find a few necessary allied soldiers, at any cost… I will consider this a national debt…”

On September 18, 1944, Georgios Papandreou telephoned London and, among other things, said:

“London, you are my only hope!”

Just to be clear now, Papandreou, the English appointed Greek Prime Minister was concerned and afraid to return to Athens, among

the Greek people, because he had absolutely no support at home and humbly begged foreigners to help him? Did he not know that Greece fell under English influence and that England had made sure that Papandreou would find an ally in the CPG-EAM leadership which would welcome him and hand over Athens to him...?

3. England - a “great friend” of Greece

The Macedonian political organization “People’s Liberation Front” (NOF) was founded in April 1945 in the Republic of Macedonia. Also, heavily armed units formed from the Macedonian fighters who fled Greece (former ELAS fighters) were acting on the mountain massifs of Vicho, Kaimakchalan and Paiak Mountains...

All these events were influenced by the founding of ASNOM and by the creation of the People’s Republic of Macedonia, a nation state of the Macedonian people within democratic federal Yugoslavia. This was an inevitable echo and reflection of a joyful historical event...

The people from Zahariadis’s CPG leadership reacted as follows:

Just two months after NOF was founded, the CPG Central Committee, during its Twelfth Plenum, vigorously declared that:

“The CPG is resolutely opposed to all territorial claims against Greece made by anyone. The preservation of the territorial integrity of the Greek state is the first task of every Greek patriot...” (Το ΚΚΕ απο το 1931-1952, p. 110.)

(The CPG Central Committee Politburo, during its September 12, 1951, meeting confirmed that the Party at the time allegedly feared that: Through NOF, i.e. with NOF’s help, “Tito was going to join Aegean Macedonia to Yugoslavia...” (Ibid., p. 271.) Before that, during the CPG Central Committee Sixth Plenum, held in October 1949, Zahariadis’s CPG leadership openly spoke of Tito about having some “military plans against Greek Macedonia…” on the basis of NOF, i.e. of the Macedonian people’s democratic liberation movement. (Ibid., p. 205.))

This is how the famous “Greek territorial integrity”, an event of fundamental importance, came into being:

The Greeks believed that Greek territorial integrity at its northern borders was weak and declared unreliable and would be threatened without English presence and support. Hence, England was declared a “great friend” of Greece in the CPG plenum resolution.

The document, in part, read as follows:

“The plenum proclaims that with England and Russia, two of our great friends being near us, and with their presence and support Greece will have peaceful development, brotherly bargaining and democratic cooperation with its northern Balkan democracies...” (Ibid., p. 111.)

Here, as one can see, Russia comes after England. Even so, this was done for propaganda purposes only. Secretary General Zahariadis, in his plenary meeting opening address, specifically said that England’s presence in Greece was indispensable:

“In order to ensure our positions and our borders in the north...” (Σαραντα χρονια του ΚΚΕ, p. 645. Αποφαση, vol. 12 Olom, Τις ΚΕ-ΚΚΕ ..., p. 21.)

After that to the end of the Greek Civil War his Party was: “Democratic co-operation” with the British and “συµφιλιωσης” (reconciliation) on the inner plane, parallel with suppression of the Macedonian People’s liberation movement.

This basically was the general Party line followed by the CPG leadership, led by Nikos Zahariadis.

Regarding all this, viewed from a certain angle, and within the familiar political situation in Greece in the past, it can be said that: While a large and well-organized democratic force, headed by the CPG, existed in Greece, England, of course, had a great need for a well-executed propaganda offensive that:

- would diminish any consequences resulting from the open British military intervention against ELAS,

- would strengthen Greek desires to accept the English in their country,

- would provide a comfortable stay and work environment for the English in Greece with as little English military forces and costs as possible.

This was quite understandable and, of course, indisputable.

When one considers all this, it is not difficult to see that:

This kind of huge scale and duration propaganda offensive was indeed implemented with great skill by the Zahariadis CPG leadership, and, unfortunately, had a huge effect on the struggle. Waving the Greek bourgeois invented hatchet known as the “Slavic danger” for Greece, Zahariadis effectively:

- justified the presence of the English as a “national” requirement for Greece’s security,

- suppressed and weakened the people’s resistance, and

- undermined DAG’s victory, which led to the final defeat of the democratic forces… which was England’s goal in Greece all along.

4. Some other characteristic maneuvers

I made a note in one of my books (“Records”, purchased as part of my memoir by INI in Skopje) in which was said:

As a consequence of the terrorist “plutocratic neo-fascist” orgy and the people’s resistance movement, the economic chaos and political crisis in the country deepened and widened.

The bourgeoisie English appointed Greek governments fell one after another: On October 18, 1944, Georgios Papandreou’s government

in exile arrived in Athens from Cairo. After two reorganizations, that took place on October 24 and November 2, 1944, it fell apart.

The new government, headed by Nikolaos Plastiras, lasted less than two months before it fell apart.

It was replaced by a newly formed “administrative government” headed by naval officer Petros Vulgaris. After it was reorganized on August 11, 1945, Petros Vulgaris, on October 17, 1945, was forced to resign.

Authority over the government was then taken over by the regent Archbishop Damaskinos, but only for a couple weeks, before it too fell apart.

On November 1, 1945 a new government was formed, this one headed by Georgios Kanelopoulos. This government only lasted three weeks before it fell apart...

There was imperative need to legalize and strengthen the power of the reactionaries in Greece but through “elections”. To this end, the English used their main and last trump card, the liberals headed by Themistoklis Sofoulis (November 22, 1945).

During this crucial moment, the CPG came to the rescue. (Yes, yes, it did indeed!). It came out in support of the Sofoulis government. In a press release dated November 25, 1945, the CPG Politburo told the “entire democratic world, civilian citizens as well as the armed forces, to do their duty, by any means possible, to prevent the political right from taking power and follow the directives issued by Sofoulis!” (KOMER, number 12/1945, chronology, p. 50.)

So, at the time the English sponsored liberal government needed support to legitimize itself in the eyes of the Greek people, the CPG and EAM gave it their support. And because of the general support it received “from all sides”, (which was not the case with previous English creations), it placed itself in a position to perform an “electoral coup” against the political right and lead up to the March 31, 1946, falsified elections.

By not participating in the elections, the CPG and EAM, through especially characteristic maneuvers, stopped a large number of democratic people from voting and thus prevented an “undesirable” outcome for the English and the reactionaries and thus transferred the struggle from the streets to parliament.

Understandably, “election victory” was granted to the Monarchists of the Populist Party and, thus, the “legalized” path for the restoration of the monarchy and counterrevolution power in Greece was strengthened - a precondition for breaking the political left...

In the meantime, Zahariadis’s CPG Central Committee, during its Second Plenum held in February 1946, decided to inform EAM that: “It was urgent to take all organizational and technical measures” and start acquiring weapons. “The state of a unilateral war perpetrated by the criminally plutocratic neo-fascist regime against the people can no longer be tolerated and from today onwards, we must respond to our enemies with the same means until we achieve a decisive victory...” (Το ΚΚΕ απο το 1931- 1952, p. 146.)

So as not to fall dangerously behind events as a result of the murderous terror which gradually and in large numbers pushed people into the mountains and created DAG, the new revolutionary army, and above all, to maintain a hold on the “unilateral war”, EAM began to arm itself but at the same time maintain a treaty with England.” (Το ΚΚΕ απο το 1931-1952, p. 146. From Zahariadis’s CPG Central Committee 20th Plenum Resolution held in February 1946.)

At the same time Zahariadis’s CPG top leadership was doing everything possible to make sure the new growing uprising was not directed against the presence of “the great friend” England and co-operation with the English was maintained.

The English in turn acted decisively. They forced a unilateral war against the democratic forces in the country. However, an attack against a strong opponent, naturally, would cause strong counteraction - resistance. This swift attack, however, gradually led to stronger and more frequent counter-attacks from the democratic forces - DAG all across Greece. Soon afterwards, in April 1947,

Royal (reactionary) General Staff was forced to order the withdrawal of all field garrisons and gendarmeries and concentrate them in the larger cities. This allowed the resistance movement to create extensive free territories. The English and reactionaries, at this point were faced with low morale while DAG and the resistance movement were experiencing high morale. Slowly, but inevitably, the bourgeois camp was forced to face a crisis:

A broad mobilization was also conducted and turned DAG from a small rebel army into a major revolutionary army.

Unfortunately, even in this critical and decisive crucial period, Zahariadis’s CPG leadership did nothing to corner its opponent, who at the time was weakened because of the severe crisis it was experiencing due to the people’s resistance. The CPG allowed this crucial moment to pass by without doing anything to take advantage of the situation...

5. Testimonials

(CPG Central Committee Seventh Plenum, April 1957)

According to Leonidas Stringos, member of the CPG Politburo:

- Had our Party, in the course of 1946-1947, decided on an armed struggle, with a decisive mobilization policy to increase the military effectiveness of DAG, the issue of reserves, one of the most basic issues, would have been successfully and timely resolved. But then Zahariadis told the Provincial Bureau that:

“Our forces in Macedonia should not be more than two thousand fighters...”

According to Panagiotis Mavromatis, member of the CPG Central Committee and the CPG Provincial Bureau for Macedonia and Thrace:

- After the CPG Central Committee Second Plenum, held in February 1946, took place, the Provincial Bureau informed

Zahariadis that we in Macedonia can mobilize up to 25,000 volunteer fighters within a month. To that Zahariadis said:

“There is no need for that because the armed struggle is just a bluff…!”

General Markos Vafiadis said the same thing twenty years later, in his interview with the Yugoslav weekly Vus: “A few weeks after the CPG Central Committee’s Second Plenum (February 6th), our CPG Macedonian-Thrace District Bureau informed the CPG Central Committee Politburo that we were ready to fight with 25,000 armed and organized fighters. But we did not find understanding and support for that action. Secretary General Zahariadis told us to stop with these proposals because the armed uprising was just a bluff to intimidate the government in order to obtain concessions...” (Vus, no. 1290, January 29, 1977.)

During the CPG Central Committee’s Seventh Plenum, held in April 1957, DAG Supreme Commander Markos Vafiadis, among other things, said:

- The period between 1946 and 1947 was the most favourable time to develop the armed struggle, to even take power in Greece... During almost all of 1946, however, the CPG leadership was full of apathy towards the drama survived by ordinary members of the Party and by former fighters of ELAS. Then, during the first months of 1947, when CPG activists in the field committees raised the issue of seizing power in Greece, Zahariadis said:

“We are not going to seize power for now. We will see, maybe in 1948...”

During this time, the CPG leadership was mostly concerned with economic problems and “symphiliosis”. ELAS fighters were forbidden from becoming partisans, and those who did so, due to the intolerable terror perpetrated by the Monarcho-Fascists, were accused of being cowards, suspicious characters and provocateurs…” (Seventh Plenum, Νεος Κοσµος, No. 4-5/1957.)

DAG headquarters:

In January 1947, a letter was sent to the Politburo asking for people and for military and other material so that DAG could oppose and dismantle the opponent’s planned general offensive.

The request was rejected with an explanation that: “The aim of the Party is not to take power by an armed struggle...” (Timeline, p. 141.)

General D. Zafiropoulos (DAG’s opponent) in his book “Ο αντισυµοριτικος αγων”, on p. 190, wrote:

“In July 1946, when the Taxiarchy insurrection movements were discovered in the city Kozheni, command was powerless to restore order, and had the partisans found out about it they would have had the opportunity to dominate the entire area, from Thessaly to the northern border. This critical situation was overcome thanks to the extreme measures taken by Second Army Corps command which acted beyond the limits of legality, because the partisans were operating outside of the law...” (Ξενοκρατια, p. 76)

General Zafiropoulos did not write (and maybe he did not even realize) that the extreme and unlawful measures taken by Second Army Corps command and the goal it achieved were due to the help it received from the provocateurs in the CPG leadership...

This is what Dragan Kliakich, “Vuk” correspondent, wrote about what General Markos Vafiadis had said to him: “It is a pity that many ELAS officers and generals did not join our ranks (DAG) earlier before they were arrested. Their rich combat experience would have greatly benefited DAG. When a group of well-known senior ELAS officers were called to appear in police stations on August 16, 1947 (with written invitations), they addressed the CPG Central Committee leadership asking what to do? Zahariadis and his like-minded people told them: ‘Of course, you need to go to the police. And do not take any unlawful steps’...” (Vus, No. 1290, January 29, 1977.)

It is well-known that the English were determined to establish a firm pro-English regime in Greece. A precondition for this, of course,

was to defeat the democratic forces (the political left), i.e. bring the CPG down to its knees but not with English military forces because the general world political climate would not allow it. This was going to be achieved using Greeks against the Greeks through a civil war.

However, due to England’s economic exhaustion from the war (WW II), and above all due to the strong democratic movement in Greece, it took a lot longer to establish the framework for installing a pro-English regime. Above all, it took direct American intervention to prepare the groundwork, to create a government army, a gendarmerie and to bolster the police and the Asfalia, before the political left could be broken in the cities and on the battlefield.

It goes without saying that all this time the CPG and EAM, with millions of people supporting them, could have taken decisive measures. Unfortunately, in some sort of anticipation, EAM and the CPG remained passive and indecisive.

In other words, the English, through Zahariadis, achieved brilliant success...

6. The occult side of events

After being silent for thirty years, Markos Vafiadis, then commander of DAG, decided to speak. He first spoke to the Greek weekly “Epikera” and later to “Vus”.

Vafiadis spoke about the Greek Civil War which, according to him, rocked and exhausted Greece and led to the final break up of the political left and the democratic movement in general. His comments were published in “Epikera” issue numbers 436 and 437, on December 9 and 16, 1976.

Here, in part, is what he said:

“We did not want a civil war. It was organized and imposed on us by the English and by the reactionaries, i.e. the collaborators who came to power immediately after the Varkiza agreement. Being unable to break the strong democratic movement they banded

together to form a new collision. And so they began with the terrorist gangs to whose challenge we responded...”

Markos Vafiadis explained that the Greek Civil War was a consequence of a number of accumulated contradictions. But at some point all this depended on one specific event: “For the political left to participate or not to participate in the March 31, 1936 upcoming elections?

The decision - yes or no - solved everything.

Markos Vafiadis continued: “If we took part in the elections, in the cities where terror was minimal and in Athens and Solun where there was no terror at all, we would have received at least 110-120 seats from a total of 300 in the Greek parliament. We would have been a strong opposition, and that was a big deal. A completely different ambience would have been created in which we would have had the opportunity to resist the violence from the reactionaries by legal means, by defense in parliament.

When we discussed this issue Partsalidis, as the head of a delegation, was sent to the Soviet Union and a similar delegation was sent to England. Among the many questions posed to our Soviet comrades was one about the elections. Our side said: ‘Zahariadis and the other members of the Politburo think that we should not be participating in the elections. What advice would you give us?’

Stalin said that it would be proper for us to participate in the elections.

When the delegation came back Partsalidis informed Zahariadis of what Stalin had said. Nothing more was said about that. As it turned out it was made to look like Moscow had suggested that we should not be participating in the elections. But we did not find out until 1948 what Stalin had really said, which was too late by then.

So we were drawn into the civil war.

This was God’s gift for the English and the reactionaries...

When the Civil War was over and the political left had been broken we re-evaluated whether we should have taken part in the elections and whether the decision for the CPG not to participate in the elections was itself a decisive mistake. In September 1961 (after Zahariadis was removed from his position), K. Koligianis, first Party secretary, in his presentation at the Eighth Party Congress, made the following official statement:

‘The non-participation in the elections was one of the Party’s most serious tactical mistakes... Starting from the wrong assessment that there was a revolutionary situation in the country, the CPG Central Committee decided not to participate in the elections and oriented itself towards an armed struggle...’

The Party Eighth Congress in its own resolution underlined: ‘The people wanted and fought for a democratic development to be realized peacefully without any shakeups. And there were real opportunities for that. So, the only correct policy was to participate in the elections... Ignoring the election was a mistake of fundamental importance, with very serious consequences for the Party and for the democratic movement’...”

It was under these conditions that Zahariadis’s decision to opt out of the elections was condemned. However, no one challenged the other CPG and EAM top leaders who went along and did not oppose Zahariadis’s decision. Were they sheep following Zahariadis or more cold-blooded, smarter and more mature than Zahariadis?

Markos Vafiasis, undoubtedly told his side of the story which corresponds to the historical truth. In fact, it illuminates the infighting side of the known events.

If the political left had participated in the March 31, 1946 elections, the situation in Greece could have been calmer (and a serious failure for English interests). This, however, was happily avoided and fulfilled the English plans to have a civil war. The decision to have an armed (rather than a parliamentary) struggle was the English plan all along. Therefore England is guilty of starting the Greek Civil War.

This, of course, was accomplished through Zahariadis and even more so, with Partsalidis who made it look like Moscow, and not London, had plunged the political left in Greece into the whirlwind of a civil war.

7. The most explosive weapon

Andre Molro in his “Antimemoari”, among other things, wrote about his impressions of his visit to China. He noticed that Chairman Mao’s axiom became a folk song: “The enemy is coming, we are leaving. The enemy is camping; we do not give them peace. The enemy does not accept our challenge, we attack him. The enemy gives up, we hunt him down...”

The partisan way of fighting was to start the revolution with small armed but fast-moving groups, so that you could create a huge revolutionary army and finally break up the enemy. The revolution in China, Yugoslavia, Cuba, Vietnam, etc., triumphed in this way...

General Markos Vafiadis was an experienced fighter who not only fought in ELAS but had the opportunity to study the tactics applied by the Yugoslav partisans, i.e. Tito’s strategy and tactics. So, the question is:

- What tactics did Markos Vafiadis apply when he was in command of DAG?

Markos’s answers: “Constant and continuous movement! For me it was important to attack the opponent when he was not expecting it, above all, to attack him in his initial bases while he was still planning his attacks. Then, when he started attacking, we would suddenly appear in his background and on every side, attack him as much as possible to bring experience to your units while breaking the opponent’s initiative. One of the opponent’s weaknesses was that he was unable act simultaneously at any time or at least not in multiple areas at once. With our extensive maneuvering we achieved our goal - the enemy was not able to follow our (true and false) continuous movements in all directions. We almost always imposed on him the place, time, and action we took making sure it was a surprise attack. In this way, we almost always managed to disable

our opponent’s plans and break his units...” (Vus, number 1293, February 19, 1977.)

This coincides with the historical truth. Namely: During 1946, 1947 and 1948, while DAG was led by Markos Vafiadis, it successfully prevented English and reactionary intentions and crushed the opposition. As is well-known, the English were hopelessly fighting a war in which they continued to spend money on enlarging the Greek government army but without success and no victories. And this is why the English engaged the Americans, who, with their vast resources, created a huge military machine. But, how and what to do against the unattainable victory against an opponent who is like a ghost?

No problem! Zahariadis’s leadership was successful in dragging the political left into a defined armed struggle in which the domestic reactionaries and the English could win.

First and most successful, on the other hand, was Zahariadis’s ability to prevent a massive partisan army from forming by calling the armed struggle a “bluff”. But, even so, with the small force created, the democratic movement was still able to hold on its own. So, something more had to be done because after a three-year struggle with a small rebel, hit and run army DAG was still able to hold its own…

In this way DAG was able to prevent the opponent from achieving success, and at the same time demoralizing and breaking him...

But then, on Zahariadis’s orders, Markos Vafiadis was removed from his position as supreme commander of the DAG forces. And with Vafiadis out of the way, DAG lost its ability to fight partisan warfare. Zahariadis effectively and instantly turned DAG from a mobile to a stationary army. DAG in effect became a stationary target for the huge military machinery of the opponent...

(On January 15, 1948, Zahariadis convened a CPG council in Prespa involving the highest military and political cadres. To express his line in Peloponnesus he sent Stefanos Giuzelis, member of the CPG Central Committee. At that time DAG controlled almost two thirds

of the territory, with 1,200 villages and smaller towns, like Kalavrita, and others. (See: Civil War in Greece by G. D. Kiriakidis, p. 288.)

All this success was achieved by DAG exclusively thanks to its partisan warfare tactics, about which Nikos Belogianis, one of the commanders and a Greek national hero, wrote:

“This tactic is nicely adapted to local conditions and peculiarities, and is based on continuous movement, maneuvers and unexpected attacks. Instead of concentrating in one place where the opponent could surround them, partisans constantly change their place, suddenly appearing in various regions occupied by the enemy, inflicting losses on him and compelling him to chase them…” (see: Demokratikos stratos, no. 6/1948, p. 200.)

DAG’s main task was to engage the hostile forces, impede them here and there and exert constant losses… DAG was very successful in doing that.

Immediately upon his arrival in Peloponnesus, Stefanos Giuzelis, united the separate partisan units in a brigade and assigned them the task to free a number of towns and administrative centres. This led to the concentration of DAG fighters in several places, and here they were surrounded by much greater opponent forces and destroyed...)

All this was achieved by the enemy through Zahariadis and his “like-minded” cronies in the Politburo the likes of Mitsos Partsalidis, president of the interim democratic government, Petros Rusos, Miltiadis Porfirogenis, ministers in the interim democratic government, and others.

As was mentioned earlier, Siantos and Partsalidis both ignored Politburo directives when they signed the Varkiza Agreement. They signed the agreement even though they had no authority to sign it and, as a result, derailed ELAS and the democratic movement. Partsalidis, former president of the Provisional Democratic Government of Greece, (a revolutionary and partisan in his day) today freely travels in a limo through the streets of Athens. He is not

a danger to the “national interests” of the Greek capitalist oligarchy or to the regime in Greece.

And then we have Petros Rusos, Miltiadis Porfirogenis and Zvolos, top CPG leaders, who overwhelmingly overstepped their powers in the Politburo and signed the Lebanon Agreement, even though they were not authorized to sign it, and they too brought great harm to the democratic forces and movement in general. People like Rusos, Porfirogenis and Zvolos (I believe they are dead now), had no problem living in Greece because they were never dangerous to the “national interests” of the capitalist oligarchy or to the regimes in Greece.

And then, on the other hand, we have thousands of ordinary DAG ex-fighters, as well as their children (born somewhere outside of Greece) who cannot return to their homeland, to their native villages, to their grandfather’s hearth, because they are “some kind” of danger to the Greek state.

Nevertheless, despite all this, for decades now it has been widely believed both inside and outside of Greece that imported dogmatism and Moscow’s interventions were to blame for DAG’s catastrophe.

It is understandable that in this case it was the thief who was shouting: “Thief, get the thief!” while pointing in the opposite direction. It is amazing how easily this succeeded in Greece. Popular Greek publicist Kiriakos Diakogianis reluctantly found himself in the “hell of the State Information Service”. In his book by the same name he provides first-hand evidence that on the eve of the establishment of the Colonel’s military-fascist dictatorship in April 1967, about 40,000 people in Greece were on the CIA list.

Judging by how widely and intensively this viewpoint was cultivated where all the troubles the Greek people and the Greek state experienced and all the suffering the democratic movement went through in general, were blamed on some kind of imported dogmatism and on Moscow’s intervention. But here we can easily say that:

Greece was truly flooded with mercenaries of international anti-communism.

So, no one should be surprised that today the Greek communist movement is broken into five rival communist camps!

Obviously: The Greek Communist Movement (CPG) needs to cleanse itself from its foundation up if it truly wants to finally get rid of the injuries that are bothering it from the inside. In these nearly six decades since the CPG was established, such efforts have proved unsuccessful. Of course, such a cleansing and rebuilding could be done with success, but on one condition: The Communist movement itself would have to enter the governing bodies of the Asfalia, the State Information Service and so on... (April 1977)

II ANTI-MACEDONIAN-ISM (critical remarks)