15. XI. 1976 (S.P.) - Part 02

Despite the fact that we now know that the Macedonian battalions were sent south into Greece intentionally so that they could be destroyed, the CPG leadership’s position still remains the same: It was done to incite the uprising there…

And then we have Paskal Mitrevski, quoted by “Glasnik”, saying: “The thesis that the Macedonians should fight only in Macedonia, was long rejected and condemned because it was contrary to the vital and real interests of “unity” and the very principle of the inseparability of combat units in the overall movement in the country…” (p. 202.)

Mitrevski however did not specify when and who rejected this thesis. He only said that such a decision was made and the Macedonian fighters were destined to fight “in the interior of Greece” in the Greek south, to stir up the uprising there. And, according to Mitrevski: “To widen the struggle and strengthen the position of the uprising”. In other words it was decided that Greek DAG units will fight in Macedonia and Macedonian DAG units will fight in the Greek south. And in Mitrevski’s words: “To continue their resistance against the Monarcho-fascist reactionaries in those terrains…”

Mitrevski confirmed that he himself made the decision to send the Macedonian battalions south. He made this decision during a meeting with the Greek leaders in November 1946, when he was NOF secretary and in charge of the Macedonian NOF leadership (p. 201). It is well-known what happened after that:

The Greek units in Macedonia, especially those stationed in Kostur, Lerin, Voden, Meglen, and Enidzhe-Vardar Regions, where the Macedonian people were a compact majority, did not at all attract new recruits into DAG’s ranks, the way the Macedonian battalions did. But, it would appear that, the Greek units were not sent there to protect the Macedonian people and flare up the revolution, they were sent there for preventive measures. They were sent to Macedonia in order to control the situation and suppress the revolutionary character of the Macedonian people.

This arrangement, of course, worked against the joint struggle’s vital and real interests and was a blow against the Macedonian national liberation movement, against DAG and against the uprising.

As for the Macedonian battalions sent to the Greek south, in no way were they sent there to fuel the uprising. And it does not take a genius to figure that out. The appearance of the Macedonian battalions in the deep south caused panic in hundreds of thousands of local people who thought they were some kind of international Slavic army that had penetrated Greece from the northern neighbouring territory, as was claimed by Greek propaganda. The Macedonian presence there drove these local people to flee to the cities to save themselves. By doing so they fell into the hands of the enemy where they were turned into enemy reserves. There were thousands of people who witnessed this, some are still alive today. And as is well-known, DAG Eighth Division command in Epirus was forced to ask the Macedonian fighters not to speak Macedonian, sing Macedonian songs or dance Macedonian dances and to represent themselves as Greeks to the locals...

This too, of course, worked against the joint struggle’s vital and real interests and was a blow against DAG and against the uprising.

As I mentioned earlier, the Macedonian battalions in the Greek south were gradually liquidated in tough and uneven battles fighting against a superior opponent. To facilitate and secure their liquidation, the Macedonian battalions were reorganized the moment they arrived in the deep south of Greece. All the Macedonian commanders were removed and replaced with Greeks. Those Macedonians who objected and protested against the reorganization were immediately shot and killed. Obviously, this was the first step taken to cleanse the Macedonian battalion of their patriots. The second step was to destroy entire battalions because the Greeks did not want them around. These battalions were composed of exclusively Macedonian elite fighters and bearers of the Macedonian national ideal who were proud to publicly proclaim that they were Macedonian.

However, these political crimes against the Macedonian people were not just hurting the Macedonians but were also hurting the vital interests of the joint struggle, DAG and the uprising.

Unfortunately, some Macedonians do not seem to see things for what they are. Defending Mitrevski and the Greek leadership’s position as to why the Macedonian battalions were sent to the deep south of Greece, Kiriazovski claims that: The uprising also existed in the Greek south and all this was merely and unarguably necessary… (p. 24.)

In his book “The Truth about Aegean Macedonia”, Hristo Andonovski wrote: “DAG headquarters ordered the DAG battalions stationed in Paiak, Kaimakchalan, Karakamen and Vicho Mountains to relocate to Thessaly and southern Greece. This departure towards the south was aimed at escalating the guerrilla movement in southern Greece, which in this respect was lagging far behind the one in Macedonia. However, all these operations were performed without preparing the Macedonian fighters or the local population in these areas, all of which created negative circumstances with regards to DAG’s intentions and the CPG leadership’s intention in relation to the Macedonians…” (p. 218 and 219.)

Unfortunately that was not it. The real Greek intention here was to cleanse the Macedonian national liberation movement (NOF) of its Macedonian “patriots”.

As I have shown, DAG had to be cleansed of the “nationalists” in its ranks as described by Mitrevski himself in “Glasnik”… (No. 2-3/1977, p. 203-204.) This could not have been done in Macedonia so the Macedonian battalions had to be moved south into Greece so that they could be destroyed.

The Macedonian commanders were replaced with Greeks as soon as the battalions arrived on a purely Greek terrain. The Macedonians who protested were then shot to death, followed by the destruction of the battalions themselves…

This was the sequence of events that took place and the political crimes that were committed against the Macedonian people. There is no doubt what the real intention of the Greek CPG leadership was in this scenario. This was indeed a political crime carried out by the CPG leadership under its general anti-Macedonian policy. A policy that needs to be looked at more closely and understood for what it truly was.

It is perfectly clear that, by defending the position of the Greek leaders and that of Mitrevski who asserted that the Macedonian battalions were sent to the Greek south and “reorganized” and “destroyed” in the interest of the joint struggle, we, like it or not, are aiding the Greek criminal acts perpetrated against the Macedonian people and are allowing them to remain hidden…

* * *

As I mentioned several times before, the Greek Asfalia (security service) handed Zahariadis to the Gestapo in May 1941, and the English intelligence service took him back in May 1945. Even though he was a communist serving a death sentence in Dachao, Zahariadis not only survived but was kept in a dry, warm and clean cell, working as an interpreter. After a three week stay in London, English intelligence brought him to Athens in a special aircraft. He arrived in Athens on May 29, 1945.

Zahariadis remained in their debt forever. Namely:

The English had a need for a well-executed propaganda offensive in Greece, a country that was vastly well-organized by democratic forces led by the CPG. The English needed “someone” inside the CPG to execute that propaganda offensive…

In other words, they needed Zahariadis to mitigate the consequences of an open English military intervention against ELAS.

They needed Zahariadis to strengthen English relations in Greece.

They needed Zahariadis to provide them with a more comfortable stay and to minimize their military forces and costs as much as possible...

This huge scale propaganda offensive and its long duration were aided, and this needs to be recognized, by Zahariadis’s great skill through the CPG and on behalf of the CPG. By waving the Greek-bourgeois fictional scarecrow, the “Slavic danger” in Greece, Zahariadis effectively:

- Justified the English military presence as a “national requirement” in Greece.

- Suppressed and weakened the people’s resistance movement. And,

- Undermined the uprising and DAG’s victory which led to the defeat of the democratic forces.

All these maneuvers Zahariadis employed during his service as CPG Secretary General were discovered and voiced during the CPG Central Committee Sixth Extended Plenum resulting in his removal from the Party leadership in March 1956, and later he was completely erased from the Party...

Following are some of the comments that were made during the CPG Central Committee Seventh Plenum, held in April 1957, as

published in the party magazine “Neos Cosmos”, number 4 and 5, in April and May, 1957.

Leonidas Stringos, member of the Politburo, said:

- If our party had decided on a district struggle in 1946-1947, with a decisive mobilization policy to increase DAG’s military effectiveness, the issue of reserves, one of the most basic issues, would have been successfully and timely resolved. But then, Zahariadis made it clear to us at the Bureau for Macedonia and Thrace that: “Our forces in Macedonia will not number more than two thousand fighters!”

Panaiotis Mavromatis, member of the CPG Central Committee and CPG Bureau for Macedonia and Thrace, said:

- “When the Bureau informed Zahariadis that we in Macedonia can mobilize up to 25,000 volunteer fighters within a month, Zahariadis told us to stop recruiting because the armed struggle was only a bluff!” This was said after the Central Committee Second Plenum, held in February 1946.

Twenty years later, General Markos Vafiadis said the same thing during an interview with the Zagreb weekly Vus: “A few weeks after the CPG Central Committee Second Plenum, held in February 1946, our Macedonia and Thrace District Bureau informed the CPG Central Committee Politburo that we would be ready to go to war with 25,000 armed and organized fighters. We, however, did not find understanding and support for that action. Secretary General Zahariadis said: “Stop making such proposals because it’s all a bluff calculated to intimidate the government so that we can get some concessions…!” (See: Vus, 1290, January 29, 1977.)

During the CPG Central Committee Seventh Plenum, General Markos Vafiadis, DAG supreme commander, among other things, said:

“The period from 1946 to 1947 was the most favourable time for the development of the armed struggle, even for the seizure of power... Throughout almost the entire 1946, the Party leadership was

characterized by apathy towards the drama survived by ordinary former ELAS fighters and now members of the party. When activists from field party committees raised the issue of seizing power, during the first months of 1947, Zahariadis’s position was: “We are not going to take power for the time being. We will see... perhaps in 1948!” The Party leadership, during this entire time, invested its effort dealing primarily with economic problems... ELAS fighters were forbidden from joining the partisans. Those who broke the rules, because of the unbearable terror the Monarcho-Fascists unleashed on them, were accused of being scoundrels, suspicious people and provocateurs!”

DAG General Headquarters:

In January 1947, DAG General Headquarters sent a letter to the CPG Central Committee Politburo requesting to be supplied with fighters, military and other material so that DAG could be prepared to successfully oppose and repel the opponent’s planned general offensive... The request was rejected with an explanation that: “The tactic of the party is not to take power by an armed struggle…” (See: Chronology, Aegean Macedonia in the national liberation war, p. 141.)

* * *

The examples shown above, as well as many other examples published by the party press and other publications, quite clearly and indisputably indicate that the CPG leadership’s decisions, made in February 1946, not to build up the democratic forces and not to engage the Monarcho-fascist regime, actually gave the English and domestic reactionaries the time they needed to prepare for the offensives that followed. But all this is being ignored…

Not ignored however is a statement made by Zahariadis in Solun when he recognized NOF as an anti-fascist organization. (See: Laiki Foni, December 29, 1945.) Here is what some of the Macedonian authors had to say:

“This change in the CPG’s views on NOF is due... to the new views and tendencies for revising the former attitude of the ‘political

struggle’ in the cities and for preparing the membership for the new armed struggle…” (Andonovski, The Truth about Aegean Macedonia, p. 188.)

“They (the Greek leaders) saw the need to settle their differences and unite with NOF in the armed struggle that was increasingly flaring up. But precisely because this became a necessity, which could not be avoided, they demanded that NOF be unconditionally placed under CPG leadership…” (Naum Peiov, the Macedonians and the Civil War in Greece, p. 147.)

“This kind of turn in the CPG attitude towards NOF was due to the orientation for an armed confrontation with the right that, without NOF’s participation, could not be imagined…” (Risto Kiriazovski, unpublished work, p. 11.)

Clearly these statements do not correspond to the truth.

First, to claim that Zahariadis had been orienting the CPG towards an armed struggle with the political right as early as 1945, is ungrounded and far from the truth. That is not what happened.

Second, there was no turning point in the CPG’s attitude towards NOF, just nice words spoken by Zahariadis, nice words about NOF which were later accepted as the thesis for an attitude reversal. This however is unfounded and contrary to what actually happened. Even after Zahariadis uttered those “nice words” nothing changed. The hostilities against the NOF leadership and activists that were there before continued to be there even after Zahariadis made his “good word” statement. Zahariadis’s statement was made to aid the establishment of “unity,” and not to aid the armed struggle or for the necessity to reinforce the armed struggle…

Allow me to clarify a few things:

It was Zahariadis himself who said: “Stop with that...” to the CPG Bureau for Macedonia and Thrace, in March 1946, when the Bureau suggested that about 25,000 fighters could be recruited... It was Zahariadis himself who said: “There should not be more than 2,000 fighters in Macedonia.” It was Zahariadis himself who said: “The

armed struggle is just a bluff!” Markos Vafiadis, then under Zahariadis’s command, said: “The period 1946-1947 was the most favourable time for the development of the armed struggle, even for the seizure of power... But... ELAS fighters were forbidden from joining the partisans. And those who did... were declared provocateurs…” And let us not forget the aforementioned letter from DAG Headquarters, sent in January 1947, to which Zahariadis replied: “The tactics of the party are not to take power with an armed struggle!”

But because all these frontal attacks against the Macedonian national liberation movement had little effect, NOF was getting stronger with time! With Zahariadis’s statement and with the establishment of “unity,” the right conditions were created to carry on the anti-Macedonian struggle from within, that is from within the ranks of the Macedonian national liberation movement. And this was used systematically and persistently. And like I said earlier, the Greek CPG leadership exacted heavy blows on the Macedonian national liberation movement and on the Macedonian people who were a natural ally and a pool for DAG reserves in the uprising in general. This is what actually happened… There was no “reversal” or any other kind of change in the CPG’s attitude towards the Macedonian people or NOF.

But by accepting this thesis that, because Zahariadis made this statement, the CPG’s attitude towards the Macedonian people had somehow changed for the better, we accept to conceal the deep anti-Macedonian politics of the Greek leaders…

* * *

The first half of the 1930’s was characterized by the general rise of the labour movement and the mass revolutionary struggle all throughout Europe. The ruling bourgeoisie was forced to give up its favourite bourgeois democracy and establish an open dictatorship where it was most dangerous for it, as it did in Germany, Spain and Greece for example.

The main causal factor for this development in the Greek state was Aegean (Greek occupied) Macedonia. The Macedonian people

living in Greek occupied Macedonia were survivors of Greek bourgeois extermination policies who, regardless of the provocative and treacherous CPG leadership maneuvers, instinctively strove to attach themselves to the party that supported the oppressed and exploited people, and that was the CPG. For anyone who does not know this, it may sound unconvincing and amazing.

And, as we now know, in order to save capitalist Greece intact with Greek occupied Macedonia attached to it, DAG and the revolution had to fail. But this was proving difficult even with the forces of the domestic bourgeoisie and their fifth column in the CPG and DAG leadership apparatus, and even with English engagement… American intervention proved to be necessary...

But, even though the causal factor for the revolution in Greece was Aegean Macedonia, the Macedonian people themselves were consistently ignored. They were ignored during the November 7, 1926 Greek parliamentary elections when the CPG became involved in the pre-election campaign, in which not one word was mentioned about the “completely disadvantaged Macedonian people” in Greece. When the renowned Renegade Elevterios Stavridis was leader of the party the Greek leaders deferred the struggle for the democratic rights of Macedonian people. However, out of the ten Communist MPs elected, six were elected in Macedonia, and the other four in all of Greece. In other words, even after being ignored, the Macedonian people still gave the CPG their support.

Then, after Venizelos’s anti-Communist law was set aside, in the September 25, 1930, parliamentary elections, the CPG received about sixty thousand votes and ten more seats, while the Agricultural Left Party received seventy thousand votes and 11 seats, for a total of about 130,000 votes and 21 seats.

Most of these votes were cast in Macedonia.

In the upcoming elections, held on July 9, 1935, the number of votes the CPG received increased to about one hundred thousand, or about 10% of the total vote in the Greek state.

Again, most of these votes were cast in Macedonia. (See: History of the Macedonian people, book 3, p. 263.)

We are talking about one hundred thousand members and supporters, adult men, women and young people who had never voted before. This was a real army whose ranks were densest in Macedonia. Influenced by the CPG, this kind of growing force and under these conditions represented a mortal danger for the domestic bourgeoisie. There was no question that Macedonia was going to become the main focus of the revolution…

This proved to be the main hallmark of the time which decisively influenced and determined the practical politics of the Greek “patriots” in the CPG leadership and in the domestic bourgeoisie.

Generally, this is what happened:

The bourgeoisie camp resolutely went on intensive preparations for organizing a coup. They established an open dictatorship in order to abolish the people’s democratic rights and freedoms in order to prevent the existence and growth of revolutionary forces in the country.

Through the Third Plenum and the Sixth Congress, held in March and December 1935, for their part, the “Greek patriots” in the CPG leadership led by Zahariadis, demonstratively attacked the democratic rights of the Macedonian people, proclaiming Aegean (Greek occupied) Macedonia to be a constituent part of the old Greek homeland. They also proclaimed that the Macedonian people, as a nation in the Greek homeland, had no right to self-determination and secession from Greece. Naturally this was a blow to the Macedonian people, the CPG’s natural ally and reserve for the workers movement and for the revolution in Greece. But, why did the CPG do this? It did this to break the Macedonian people’s sympathy and their adherence to the CPG and turn them against the CPG. In other words, to isolate and weaken the CPG in Macedonia...

But, as it turned out, this was not possible because the Macedonians could not lose something that they never had. The Macedonians never had any rights from the day Greece occupied Macedonian

territories. This anti-Macedonian decision at the Sixth Congress did practically nothing to the Macedonian people because nothing has changed...

In the meantime the reactionary dark forces led by Glieksburg and Metaxas, in their persistent effort to organize a coup and establish a dictatorship, quite unexpectedly, realized they did not have the funds to do it and turned to the capitalists for help. As it turned out the then capitalist leaders did not understand why there was need for an open dictatorship and showed no willingness to finance it, especially when they did not foresee any returns from it. The modern press (especially the party press) often wrote about it, warning the public about a coup being prepared by the reactionaries.

But, as Metaxas explained, it was wise to “invest a little now in order to save a lot later”. (As a contemporary, I remember reading about this in the press.)

Unfortunately things did not go as expected…

Then, suddenly, something completely unexpected and incredible happened. In a parliamentary debate on April 27, 1936, Sklavenas, then leader of the CPG group in the Greek parliament and member of the CPG Central Committee Politburo, in the name of the CPG, declared that the CPG would fight for the recognition of the Macedonian nation in Greece and for its self-determination.

In particular, he said:

“Another issue this government has ignored in its declarations is the issue of giving minorities living in Greece full equality with the Greek population…”

He was referring mainly to the Macedonian people when he said this. He then went on to say:

“Anyone who has passed through (Greek occupied) Macedonia, especially in those areas where the Macedonians were a compact mass, would have certainly noticed the extraordinary oppression they were experiencing. They have no right to have Macedonian

schools to speak the Macedonian language or to practice their own customs… This kind of situation would certainly make the Macedonian population organize and fight to win those rights…

The victors of the Great War and the League of Nations proclaimed the right of the oppressed nations to self-determination. We fully acknowledge this right for the Macedonian nation…” (History of the Macedonian people, book 3, p. 268.)

This “theatrical” performance in the Greek parliament was characterized by the principle of revolutionary consistency and, without a doubt, was one of the most glaring moments in the declarative politics of the Greek CPG leaders… in regards to the Macedonian national question.

There is an attachment in the three-volume edition of “The History of the Macedonian People”, which assesses the Macedonian people’s demands for national equality in this (Greek occupied) part of Macedonia (book 3, p. 268.)

Andonovski, in his book “The Truth about Aegean Macedonia”, has also provided a similar assessment about Sklavenas’s “theatrical” performance in the Greek parliament with regards to Macedonian rights... (p. 73.)

In his article “The Macedonian national question through the Politics of the CPG during the National Liberation Struggle”, Todor Simovski, historian at the Institute of National History in Skopje, wrote: “The CPG should be honoured... the fact that after the Sixth Congress and the change of the CPG’s stance on the Macedonian national question, just before the Metaxas dictatorship, Stilianos Sklavenas, communist people’s representative of the Solun electoral district, on April 27, 1936, in the Greek People’s Assembly, defended the Macedonian people under Greek rule from terror and denationalization…” (See: “Glasnik”, No. 2-3/1970, p. 26.)

As far as I know, Sklavenas’s “theatrical” performance in the Greek parliament is generally accepted as a positive thing in our historiography.

However, it is necessary to mention that, accidentally or not, some things were left in the dark. Namely:

No one was eager to mention the fact that the Macedonian people, just four months ago, lost their rights when, during the CPG Sixth Congress, Macedonia was referred to as part of the old Greek homeland and the Macedonian people officially lost their right to self-determination. Accordingly, the CPG declaration in the Greek Parliament which fully recognized and supported the right of the Macedonian nation to self-determination, did not result from the CPG’s official line on the Macedonian national question and did not represent the application of that line. Quite the opposite...

As we know, the CPG line adopted during the Sixth Congress never changed for a long time, until the beginning of 1949. Accordingly, the declaration in the Greek parliament was not intended to bring change to that line.

Most importantly, after the declaration was made in parliament, nothing was done organizationally, technically or any other practical measures taken to “support the Macedonian nation” to organize and fight, and as Skavenas put it, “fight for elementary civil, national and democratic rights…’ On the contrary:

If the Greek CPG leadership wanted to grant rights to the Macedonian people why did they not create IMRO (United)? And exactly through Sklavenas, why did the Greek CPG leaders not follow up on the “famous initiative” to create this organization after having accepted to do it for a whole decade? Why did they ignore this? Why did they only act after being criticized and pressured from the outside? And after all that no functioning IMRO (United) came to exist in Greek occupied Macedonia?

Even after being pressured by outside forces, the Greek CPG leadership still managed to avoid creating a functional Macedonian IMRO (United) organization. This initiative disappeared without a trace in the Greek (occupied) part of Macedonia like water in sand. Namely, the IMRO (United) that was “formed” remained nominal and fictitious without a statute and program, without a political line or political activities. The stillborn IMRO (United) Central

Committee, based in Solun, managed nothing. Nothing depended on it and nothing was left of it. The people of whom the organization was composed did everything they could but were unsuccessful. In their endeavours to communicate with the Macedonian people and broadly affirm the Macedonian movement, they acquired a typewriter with Cyrillic letters and set up their office in an antique shop belonging to a Jew in Solun, with the intention of starting a revolutionary press in the Macedonian native language intended to directly touch the hearts of Macedonian people. (INI, Book 3, p. 267.) Even after all that, they remained without a voice. The Greek CPG leaders, headed by Zahariadis, did not allow the publication of a Macedonian newspaper, did not allow the affirmation of the Macedonian people amidst the Greek people, and did not allow the affirmation of elementary democratic rights and freedoms for the Macedonian people in the Greek state.

After their newspaper was shut down, the people of IMRO (United) decided to purchase and disseminate other Macedonian revolutionary newspapers printed abroad (“Balkan Federation” and “Macedonian Work”). At first, the Greek leaders seemed to tolerate them but soon afterwards they banned them. Georgi Krontsedchev from Voden, the person responsible for receiving the newspapers in Solun and distributing them, was detained and immediately liquidated by the police.

There is barely any historical information available about the creation and existence of IMRO (United) in the Greek (occupied) part of Macedonia both before and after Sklavenas’s “theatrical” performance in the Greek parliament.

When all this is taken into consideration, one will inevitably have to conclude that Sklavenas’s performance was just another verbal and declarative maneuver well-placed by Zahariadis and his comrades from the CPG leadership. Only empty words with nothing to back them…

Obviously, there was another reason why Sklavenas voiced this issue in the Greek parliament and it is not because the CPG Greek leadership cared about the fate of the Macedonian people, their struggle or their democratic rights. Given how the CPG leaders

treated the Macedonian people in practice in general, it would be foolish to believe that Sklavenas did what he did in parliament for the good of the Macedonian people.

It is also foolish to think that Sklavenas did this in front of the Greek parliament for nothing… just throwing words in the wind. This was not just a meaningless gesture on the part of Zahariadis and his CPG leadership comrades. We know that thirteen years later, during the CPG Central Committee Fifth Plenum, held in January 1949, Zahariadis and the CPG leadership also came out before the Greek public with a similar declaration. This is what Zahariadis said: “As a result of DAG’s victory and the people’s revolution, the Macedonian people under Greece will accomplish their complete national establishment according to their will. They will be self-determined…” It was a well-timed classic Zahariadis maneuver in order to mass mobilize the Macedonian population around the border zone and bring it to its physical destruction. At the same time it was a well-planned maneuver to provoke the political right into action and into blaming the CPG for its treacherous anti-Greek politics. As a result huge masses of Greek people were mobilized to fight against DAG and against the revolution to save Greece and to hold onto Macedonia.

This is not my own or someone else’s guess. It is not a “rash” interpretation of events. Unfortunately it is exactly what happened. It is a fact...

In the given case, Sklavenas’s appearance in parliament was also a provocative maneuver that gave the bourgeois a timely pressing opportunity to begin a real storm against the CPG, anathematizing it as the bearer of the “Slavic danger” against Greece. At the same time, the CPG’s tremendous power and influence forced the capitalist leaders to rethink their choice if they made a mistake not financing the fascist coup.

Zahariadis helped the capitalists finally decide right at this critical moment. Namely: Immediately after Sklavenas spoke in parliament, the CPG organized a wave of strikes and demonstrations all across Greece. The situation amplified itself with each passing day until it reached its peak in Solun on May 8-9, 1936. The army that was sent

to quell the riots then joined the demonstrators and took control of the city. Solun was the second largest city in the Greek state, after Athens. Here the Greek police was forced to retreat and barricade itself in the police stations.

But immediately afterwards, this people’s victory and that of the army was destroyed and converted into a reactionary triumph.

Zahariadis send K. Theos, a member of the Politburo, to “negotiate” and sign the capitulation of the uprising with the Metaxas government (allegedly without any reprisals from the government). The rebel leaders and other CPG activists were then ordered to send the people to their homes and jobs and the soldiers back to their barracks.

After that Zahariadis said that he handed the city back to the reactionaries because at the very moment the Party did not have the organizational and technical ability to take power. In other words the Party was not “ready” to take power.

The inevitable question that arises from this then is:

Why did Zahariadis start these demonstrations and take over Solun in the first place, and then so easily hand it back to the enemy?

Also, if the party did not intend to change its line on the Macedonian national question adopted during the Sixth Congress, then why did Sklavenas contradict the CPG line in the Greek parliament when he declared that the CPG recognizes and supports the right of the Macedonian nation to self-determination (and secession from the Greek state)?

Elevterios Stavridis, former “general secretary” (as he called himself) and CPG deputy in the Greek parliament, after leaving the CPG and returning to the bourgeois camp, wrote: “It is quite clear that the May 9, 1936, Solun events, were one of Metaxas’s strategic maneuvers to better justify the establishment of his dictatorship. He used the CPG strikingly well... He allowed the CPG to lead and pull the masses, so that Solun, the capital of Northern Greece, would appear like it had fallen into communist hands. Then, when the

anticipated strategic maneuver fulfilled its objective and reached its culminating point there was a counterattack... As a political strategy, the maneuver Metaxas pulled was marvelous…” (Στα παρασκηνια του ΚΚΕ, Αθηνα, 1953, p. 493-494.)

Stavridis argued that, while these large demonstrations in Solun were taking place and were deliberately left to grow until the army and the people achieved victory over the police, there were other major military forces stationed somewhere outside of the city ready to intervene at any moment.

If this were true then the surrender would have been completely normal. But no such military forces intervened. The people’s victory was destroyed and turned into a reactionary triumph for nothing and in a much more efficient way.

In other words, the Greek CPG leadership pushed the party organization activists onto the streets and then handed them over to Metaxas’s asfalia (secret service) and police.

A massive hunt for communists followed. Many of the party organizations in Solun and all throughout Macedonia were completely uprooted. The Metaxas counterattack, of which Stavridis spoke, was successful thanks to the betrayal of people the likes of Stavridis (exponents of the domestic bourgeoisie) and many others like him who served at the top of the CPG leadership.

The fascist coup was implemented right after these events and the so-called Fourth of August dictatorial Glieksburg-Metaxas regime came to power. The necessary funds they needed were found in abundance.

All these, of course, are not my own assumptions. They are not a “rash and unreasonable” interpretation of events. This is exactly what happened. These are the facts...

Unfortunately, there are those among our people who were called upon to write our history in this (Greek occupied) part of Macedonia, who are of the opinion that: Sklavenas’s “theatrical” performance in the Greek parliament was a reflection, that is, a

consequence of the famous April 1934, Comintern decision on the Macedonian national question. This view of Sklavenas’s performance however is incorrect because it does not explain:

a) Why the Comintern decision did not affect the official CPG line with regards to the Macedonian national question, which remained anti-Macedonian?

b) Why the Comintern decision, not in the least, was upheld or reflected in a practical sense in any of the party organizations, in the Party’s political programs or in any of the Party’s political actions? Why the publication and dissemination of Macedonian revolutionary materials was prohibited?

c) Why did it take two years, from April 1934, when the Comintern decision was made, until April 1936, when Sklavenas brought it up in the Greek parliament, for the Macedonian national question to be mentioned in public in the Greek bourgeois parliament instead of a CPG Central Committee sitting? Why suddenly and precisely at a certain particular moment exactly when Metaxas was in need to justify a coup and the establishment of a dictatorship?

One can also reason the act this way: “Using his parliamentary immunity, Sklavenas decided to tell the parliament what he could not tell them outside of it…”

One can also interpret Sklavenas’s performance in the way he himself later portrayed it: “That he was a daring revolutionary who risked everything for the Macedonians…” One can almost say that he was a hero.

There are many ways Sklavenas’s performance can be interpreted but there is only one truth and it is quite different. Namely, the CPG then was a legal organization and Sklavenas’s performance was published by “Rizospastis”, a CPG organ, on April 28, 1936, along with the brochure with the text of what was discussed in the Greek Parliament. (T. Simovski, “Glasnik” No. 2-3 / 1970, p. 27, also see: H. Andonovski, The Truth about Aegean Macedonia, p. 81.) Before that, during the CPG Sixth Congress, the Macedonian national question was freely discussed.

I decided at this point to mention this arbitrary and irresponsible interpretation because it is still supported by some of our people who consider these events to be part of our history. In other words there are those among us who are bearers and distributors of this erroneous belief...

* * *

There are many examples that show the Greek CPG leadership’s attitude taken towards the Macedonian people where the Greeks have said one thing and done another. The good words expressed in such moments, together with the general thesis that the Greek leaders never officially contested that the Macedonian people are a separate nation, cannot have another purpose but to:

- Twist the historical truth. Hide, blur and throw fog and smoke on their profound anti-Macedonian practices.

This is a refined combination of pro-minority verbal principles verses anti-Macedonian practices. The first façade always stands out and the second remains hidden behind the first.

As I mentioned earlier, it is usually the façade or nice words that are accepted and any anomalies are explained as omissions, weaknesses, mistakes… supposedly inevitable in dealing with Macedonian issues… There cannot be life without mistakes, right? This is how the Greek CPG leadership has been hiding behind the anti-Macedonian acts it has committed. Now let us have a look at the official CPG line with regards to “Full Equality for Minorities”…

Even though the CPG officially supported in principle “full equality for minorities” in Greece, in practice it acted as if no Macedonians existed in Greece, not even in Greek occupied Macedonia, their ancestral home.

The Greek leaders in principle never officially contested that the Macedonian people are a separate nation, but in practice they maintained that:

- Macedonia is as Greek as Attica! Meaning no Macedonians existed in Macedonia.

- The Macedonians are “Slavophone Greeks”!

- The Macedonian anti-fascist liberation movement must be suppressed!

- The bearers of the Macedonian ideals must be “cleansed”!

- The Macedonian people must be deprived of their own literacy. Literacy, created by order of the Greek CPG leaders, must be imposed on them.

- The Macedonian people must be deprived of their literary language and grammar and a different language and grammar must be imposed on them, created by the wishes and orders of the CPG Greek leaders who very much care for their “Slavophone Greeks”!

These practices that the CPG imposed on the Macedonian people were never part of the CPG official line and to this day have remained a classified secret. These anomalies, explained as omissions, weaknesses, mistakes… supposedly inevitable in dealing with Macedonian issues, are not random but actual and intentional CPG practices.

There are a lot of illusions and self-deceptions in our history. That is why it is necessary for our historiography to come out of its fake and tragic position as soon as possible. It is time to leave the façade, or nice words, out of our main basic subject for research and become engaged in the analysis of the real politics - the Greek CPG leadership anti-Macedonian practices...

* * *

The Macedonian liberation movement, until the fascist occupation, existed mainly in the form of passive resistance. It was smoldering…

Under the conditions created by the neighbouring nations, during the fascist occupation, where each nation was struggling for its own rights and freedom, the outbreak of the Macedonian anti-fascist liberation movement was inevitable. It broke out in the form of an active organized resistance.

The Macedonian anti-fascist liberation movement developed not only without CPG help but quite the opposite. It had to fight to protect itself from Greek hostilities including those perpetrated by the Greek CPG leadership, which cost it both human and material losses.

In the end, it was Zahariadis and his cronies, and not the reactionaries from Athens, who managed to destroy the Macedonian movement. Included in the destruction were the most elite Macedonian fighters and many dozens of Macedonian patriotic villages around the border zone.

And before that, after DAG was transformed from a partisan hit and run army into a stationary army, a target for the opponent’s military machinery, the CPG and DAG leaderships made heavy allegations against the Macedonian anti-fascist liberation movement accusing it of being a “counterrevolutionary movement which was helping the reactionary regime in Athens to turn the Greek people against DAG and help the antirevolutionary forces defeat DAG and the revolution”.

According to Minister Averov, a friend of Prime Minister Karamanlis and a well-known member and representative of the governing bourgeois circles in Greece, who wrote about the period after the interim democratic government of Greece was reorganized somewhere on the “free territory”, when Mitrevski, Kotsopoulos and Koitsis were appointed into “senior management positions” in the interim government and in DAG’s military council, sometime in March 1949, the CPG thus was implementing a new line in regards to the Macedonian national question. Minister Averov alleged that the CPG intended to carve out part of Greece’s territory, above all the Greek region of Macedonia... At this point Averov called for the complete isolation of the CPG in Greece... and for strengthening the

will of the Greek people to break the rebels... (Αβερωφ, Φοτια και τσεκουρι , Greek edition 2, p. 435.)

* * *

As we can see, the management circles of both opposing camps have equally looked at this issue.

It is true that the CPG eventually found itself completely isolated in Greece and that the regime in Athens managed to turn the Greek people against DAG and against the revolution and, in the end, defeat them. It is also true that the opponent, in order to succeed in this, among other things, used the Macedonian organized struggle and NOF in its propaganda campaign.

However, it is not true that the Macedonian people were guilty of all of this just because they were organized in a struggle.