X. AS ALWAYS “THE EARTH WILL CONTINUE TO REVOLVE” - Part 01

X. AS ALWAYS “THE EARTH WILL CONTINUE TO REVOLVE”

(Publicly condemned and convicted by the INI associates through the Voice of the Institute for National History (INI), I invoke Galileo Galilei’s comment as a title - a response, and in the text that follows one will see the historical reality that needs to be respected...)

“Recognizing or distorting the historical truth?” Using this title Risto Kiriazovski wrote a critical review for the Voice of the Institute of National History (INI) number XXVII 3/1983, 331-338. The review was accepted by the editorial staff on June 28, 1985, and published this year (1986).

The main characteristic of the review was:

a) It is a carefully compiled review of what has been said, that is, what has been written by the CPG, EAM and ELAS leaders, which could have some connection to the issue of forming “separate Macedonian units” within ELAS, and

b) the fact that his author, despite the negative experiences that existed with the CPG leadership’s attitude towards the Macedonian national liberation movement (as they very well know, the ordering of executions and the killing of Macedonian partisans), tries to convince us that historical truth is only what is spoken or written by the people from the CPG...

“Do you want to know the truth? Then allow freedom in the word!” Kiriazovski and I (Rakovski) were comrades (former in the battle field, and now here). The only difference between us now is that we hold opposite views. But that should not be scary. The truth is born from the clash of opposites. Only, now, here we have unequivocally the necessary freedom to express our views. However, five times so far, the editors of our newspapers did not publish my articles because Kiriazovski (a representative of INI) did not give his consent. Here is a case characteristic of that relationship: Through a long article, published by one of our more reputable periodicals, Kiriazovsky painted a rather ugly picture using personal insults that were not nice, but in doing so he opened more questions about our ELAS and DAG recent history. (See “History” number XVII, 1 (Skopje 1981), 288-297). I offered my contribution to highlight some of those issues, especially about events in which I participated directly. Again, the editorial board refused to accept it… The fact is my articles were continuously rejected by the editorial board despite the fact that some of my articles were previously published including an article entitled “For the Roots of Evil.” (See “History” number XIII, 1 (Skopje 1977), 87-114. Also see, “History” number XIV, 1 (Skopje 1978), 235-258, article entitled “On the occasion of the publication “Aegean Storms” by Vangel Aianovski-Oche...”).

It is not at all disputable that the people from the CPG and ELAS leaderships discussed and finally decided to form “separate Macedonian units” within ELAS. What is incredible is that Kiriazovski did a review to prove the opposite by quoting “original documents of that time” of something indisputable and widely known! Theory and practice in the CPG’s politics were two quite separate constituent elements. My dispute with Kiriazovski is a matter related to the practice. As far as I know, Greek authors (mainly former CPG, EAM, ELAS and DAG officials), for understandable reasons, are not talking about the unpleasant events that occurred in Voden when the CPG attempted to implement this decision (to form separate Macedonian units). It is also unpleasant and surprising to see Kiriazovski doing the same thing. Namely, not finding it necessary to expose what happened, that is, why the CPG, in March 1944, failed to create “separate Macedonian units” from the Macedonian people in Voden, as planned. As is well-known, the CPG (via Barba Nikos a CPG official and CPG regional secretary better known as Takis Papadopoulos) asked Voden fighters to act as “a separate Macedonian unit” for only one month, and then be deployed in the ELAS Greek units. Consequently, the Macedonian people were publicly denied the right to have their own struggle and to fight for their own freedom as an equal ally to the Greek people.

The people of Voden however refused to become bearers -implementers of such a nationalistic anti-Macedonian practice.

In general, it is impossible to believe that Kiriazovski knows nothing about this. In practice however, he acts like the politicized Greek authors: He remains silent on the practices and emphasizes the theories…

There is also something else that cannot be accepted. It is natural, even today, for the people of Voden who then were CPG activists, to recount why the CPG attempted to form a “special Macedonian unit” in the city Voden and failed.

In an article entitled “Voden Macedonian Battalion” (thirty-eight years after its formation), published in INI Journal No. 2-3 / 1981, author Tashko Mamurovski, in a brief explanation based exclusively on information obtained from the Voden activists, noted that:

“Before the ELAS Macedonian Voden Battalion was formed, during the months of April and May 1944, long discussions were held at the CPG Voden Region district, during which the Macedonian CPG activists demanded that they be allowed to form their own partisan units. At that time, the CPG Voden Region district, in accordance with the CPG Central Committee for Macedonia... allowed the formation of Macedonian units, provided that they act only one month, that is, until ‘Ohrana’ is disarmed and then the units can join ELAS. The Macedonian communists did not agree with this opportunistic attitude of the CPG leadership and rejected it. And that is why the separate Macedonian units were not formed!” (p. 187.)

Vangel Aianovski in his book “Aegean Storms”, whose reviewer was Risto Kiriazovski, provided us with some information on the Voden “special Macedonian unit”. In pages 128 to 133 he gave a detailed description of the event (the same one which Kiriazovski is silent about) on how and why the CPG attempted to carry out this decision in Voden and failed. Briefly and specifically he said that: In May 1944, at an expanded meeting of the Macedonian communists and anti-fascists from the city Voden, Barba Nikos, secretary of the regional committee, announced that the CPG Central Committee had accepted the request from the Voden Macedonian Communists and

approved the establishment of the Macedonian partisan unit which was to have its own Macedonian leadership. “Barba Nikos’s comments caused joy and enthusiasm among the audience…” wrote Aianovski. The next day Barba Nikos called on Aianovski, a candidate for commanding the planned unit, and told him: “Yesterday we did not tell you all the details contained in the letter from the CPG Central Committee... The unit that will be formed will act independently for only one month, and then it will be dissolved... The fighters will be deployed in other ELAS units... Our goal is to attract as much of the Macedonian population as possible in the ELAS partisan units, because there is a danger that they will be armed by Kalchev... (Anton Kalchev was a Bulgarian officer who was organizing an autonomist counter-band movement in Western Aegean Macedonia...) This is a ‘good plan’ and spectacular strike against Kalchev’s plans and his masters in Sofia!”

But the unit was not created. The Macedonian communists disagreed with this “good plan” hatched out by our Greek “patriots” in the CPG, EAM and ELAS leadership...

I (Rakovski) gave a description of the Voden events in question in my book “In the deep night, the dawn is born”, published by INI, and in the INI messenger number 2-3/1982 in an article entitled “CPG, EAM, ELAS and the Macedonian national liberation movement”. I described the circumstances under which, in June 1944, one month after the CPG’s failure in Voden, about which we did not know in Meglen Region, the party leadership in Tresen Region, on my introduction, decided to immediately carry out an urgent counter-measure against the dangerous influence of the autonomist movement in that region: On June 16, 1944, it formed the Voden Macedonian Battalion. With the battalion’s formation the CPG leadership showed signs that it was pursuing equality for the Macedonian people… This deed was seen as a practical application of the CPG line to mobilize the people in the armed struggle against the fascist occupiers. However, Secretary Kole Pop-Sermidzhiev immediately left to inform the CPG Voden District Committee of this decision to make sure the CPG line of both “equality for the Macedonian people” and of “raising the people in armed struggle” was consistently applied...

Mamurovski, based on information he obtained from direct participants and witnesses, in the above-mentioned article (Glasnik 2-3 / 1981), has also given an interesting account on the circumstances under which the Voden Macedonian Battalion was formed in Meglen Region. (p. 188-189.)

In his book “Pozharsko in ELAS, NOF and DAG”, author Gorgi Iskov, who lost his brother, his sister, her husband, and his own arm up to his shoulder, proudly wrote how the mobilization started from his village Pozharsko with Zertzev and his daughter Risa Zertseva and teacher Katina Iskova - Pashku being mobilized. (p. 15) Meaning, one could say that the Voden Macedonian Battalion was born in the village Pozharsko, Meglen Region...

In his article entitled “Formation of the ELAS Voden battalion”, published in the magazine “Voice of the Aegeans”, number 15, on October 6, 1951, author Hristo Andonovski, then CPG activist in Meglen Region and the city Voden, wrote: “The Tresen Region CPG regional committee, at its meeting held on June 15, 1944 in the village Tresino, after a strong request from the Macedonian activists, members of the CPG, decided to form a separate Macedonian military unit in the composition of the ELAS units. At the meeting it was decided that the composition of the newly formed Macedonian battalion should be exclusively of Macedonian volunteers and, as a mark, the fighters would have to wear a red band around their neck…”

In his book “Macedonians under Greece in the struggle against fascism”, published by INI in 1968, Hristo Andonovski, among other things, wrote:

“On June 16, 1944, the Voden Macedonian Battalion was formed. Its appointed leaders were Pavle Rakovski-Gotse and Giorgi Atanasov-Blaze, and later, Gorgo Urdov-Dzhodzho, organizing secretary of the Voden Region committee, was appointed to serve as commissar of the battalion. A Greek named Lefteris Fundulakis, a lieutenant of the Greek Army, was appointed battalion commander!” (P. 177-178.)

All the survivors from the command structure, all ordinary Voden Macedonian Battalion fighters, as well as the entire Voden Region population, will say the same thing: The ELAS Voden Macedonian Battalion was born in Meglen Region because its first volunteer fighters were from Pozharsko, Baovo and other Macedonian villages in Meglen Region.

But Kiriazovski has decided to ignore all of this... calling it misinformation! In fact Kiriazovski has gone as far as accusing the Macedonian CPG activists, the direct participants and witnesses, the commanders and fighters of the battalion, and even the people, of “distorting the historical truth” and spreading misinformation.

This must not be allowed...

The District Committee in Voden, for some reason, thought that these formations were the work of the Macedonian Partisans from the Yugoslav part of Macedonia. Regarding this, Aianovski wrote that Dzhodzho Urdov, then organizational secretary of the District Committee, was given the task to go to Kaimakchalan and lead a raid against them and disband this “newly created Yugoslav Army”. And if it encountered resistance, to use all necessary force... (Aegean Storms, pp. 135-136.)

None of this, of course, happened by accident... As is well-known, a document was adopted and signed on June 20, 1943 by representatives of the National Liberation War and the Communist Parties of Yugoslavia, Greece and Albania. This document called for forming military and political alliances between the various people’s revolutions of the three above-mentioned countries. (This document was written in French and can be found in the Archives of Macedonia.) There was also the “Agreement” reached in September 1943 between representatives of the CPG and CPM/CPY for “cooperation” between the two parties and movements… (See details: Sources for the Liberation War and the Revolution in Macedonia, 1941-1945, volume I, book 2, Skopje 1968, p. 320.) At the request of the Yugoslavs, the CPG was also asked to form separate Macedonian units and arrange for the issuance of “Macedonian lists” for all of Aegean Macedonia. The Yugoslavs also insisted that constant contact be maintained, in general, at all

times between representatives of both parties and movements. This explains why, in this particular case, the District Committee concluded that this was a Yugoslav move.

The information provided by Aianovski challenges Kiriazovski’s dispute as to when, where and under what circumstances the Voden Macedonian Battalion was created. According to Aianovski: Around July 20, 1944, news reached the District Committee that many Macedonian anti-fascists from Meglen Region had massively moved to Kaimakchalan with a desire to join the partisan units. This move, of Macedonians going to the mountains, the District Committee estimated was due to Yugoslav partisan influence. There were Yugoslav partisans at the time stationed on Kozhuv Mountain. The District Committee ordered them to stop their activities. Dzhodzho Urdov, then CPG organizing secretary for Voden, together with Risto Kordalov, Tushi Keramitchiev and several members of the diversionary group was ordered to go to Kaimakchalan and disband the newly formed partisan units. They were ordered to use force if they encountered resistance. (p. 136.) According to Aianovski:

“The District Committee used the situation to implement a decision to establish a separate Macedonian battalion in the composition of the ELAS 30th regiment. With the formation of the Macedonian battalion, the CPG Central Committee aimed to attract as many Macedonian anti-fascists in the ELAS ranks as possible, and later deliberately transfered them to other ELAS units. In fact, the Macedonian battalion served only as a pretense to attract the Macedonian people, and in no way to satisfy their intrinsic national aspirations. In order to carry out this action smoothly the District Committee appointed Lefteris Fundulakis, a Greek, as battalion commander, and Dzhodzho Urdov as battalion commissar. The CPG had full confidence иn Dzhodzho Urdov, then CPG Central Committee organizational secretary, because by nature he was submissive and never opposed CPG decisions. Giorgi Atanosovski ... and Pavle Rakovski were appointed assistants in the leadership…” (p. 136-137.)

On the basis of all these Macedonian source materials and testimonies from direct participants and witnesses, we should be able to objectively conclude that:

- The CPG, EAM and ELAS leaderships had long discussions before they finally decided to form separate Macedonian units within ELAS...

- This “Twist” in their attitude towards the Macedonian people was happening in parallel with SNOF’s dissolution and the tension that had arisen in the Macedonian national liberation movement. The Greeks were worried that with SNOF’s loss the Macedonian people may be attracted to the controversial autonomist movement...

- In principle, by its decision to establish separate Macedonian units, the CPG recognized the right of the Macedonian people to have their own struggle, to fight under their own name as an equal ally of the Greek people. However, the Macedonian units were needed for “only one month”, that is, until the autonomist movement was broken up...

- In practical terms the decision was not accepted only because the Macedonian CPG activists did not agree that the Macedonian units should exist for “only one month” and then be disbanded. They saw that this was a cruel anti-Macedonian nationalist policy that denied the Macedonian people their right to organize and fight on their own behalf...

- Faced with dangerous influence from the rebel autonomist movement (primarily because of the CPG, EAM and ELAS anti-Macedonian policies), the Tresen Region party leadership was forced (as the only countermeasure) to transit from “equality in principle” to “equality in practice” for the Macedonian people; from a verbal declaration to action… This time the party “applied” the party line in order to raise the people in the armed struggle against the fascist occupiers. Namely, on June 16, 1944, it created a special Macedonian military formation...

The special Macedonian military formation, according to the proclamation, existed and acted as a “Macedonian people’s army”, as “the power of the Macedonian people”... a guarantee that the Macedonian people will freely speak their Macedonian mother tongue at all times...

The above was expressed in a leaflet dated September 5, 1944. The leaflet also outlined the special Macedonian alphabet I created for the needs of our ideological and political work at “Macedonian National Army” Headquarters. (See: Communist, Skopje May 7, 1971, p. 19.) We abandoned the Greek and Bulgarian alphabets because they could not serve the Macedonian people’s unity, the battalion and our people in general.

According to the Proclamation issued by headquarters, my role, as a third member of the battalion command, was to prepare for the ideological and political education of the fighters and put together an agitation and propaganda department to serve the needs of the Macedonian people… The proclamation was published by INI under the title “Macedonians under Greece in the struggle against fascism”, p.179, by Hristo Andonovski, and by INI “Glasnik” number XXV, 2-3, Skopje, 1981, p. 191-192, in an article written by Tashko Mamurovski.

This was how the Macedonian military formation in Meglen Region was created following the decision made during a meeting held on July 5, 1944, at the camp where the unit was stationed. Included among those who participated in the meeting were:

1) Barba Nikos, CPG district secretary for Voden Region, 2) Giorgi Urdov–Dzhodzho, CPG district organizational secretary, 3) Petros (Hristos Moshos), ELAS 10th Division representative, 4) Barba Traiko (Kole Pop-Sermidzhiev), Macedonian regional committee secretary for Tresen Region, 5) Giorgi Atanasov-Blaze, and 6) Pavle Rakovski-Gotse.

Dr. Risto Kiriazovski has been a historian for about three decades studying the history of the Macedonian national liberation movement in that part of (Greek occupied) Macedonia, and there should be no doubt that, based on the many original Macedonian source documents he has studied, he knows everything there is to know about the aforementioned historical realities. But why has he not paid attention to them and, instead, chose to say that:

“According to the original documents preserved from that time, the task of forming the battalion was entrusted to the CPG District Committee for Voden Region, and its realization was entrusted to Giorgi Urdov–Dzhodzho, District Committee organizing secretary, and activist Kole Pop-Sermidzhiev. Pavle Rakovski... was involved in the action as an ELAS reserve regional activist, and not as a member of the CPG’s regional committee, as he claims…” (History, XVII 2, 1981, p. 289.)

Kiriazovski continued: “Rakovski is persistently insisting that he was the founder of the aforementioned battalion, he and nobody else! (Clearly this is a low blow against Rakovski.) Even if there was no original documentation that clearly speaks about the reasons, the founders and the course of the battalion’s establishment (the circumstances under which the battalion originated excluded the existence of such documentation, and the fact Kiriazovski only speaks about it, but does not quote from it, confirms it)… was a large and complicated issue…” No it was not! It was consistent with the implementation of the party line. Taking into account the politics, tactics and the mentality of the CPG leadership this was not the work of the Regional Committee… or the work of a small body… The decision to create the Voden battalion as well as the Lerin-Kostur Macedonian Battalion... was made by the CPG Central Committee Politburo, and its practical implementation was entrusted to the CPG District Committee for Voden Region. Like other Macedonian activists in this district, Rakovski too was involved in the process. (p. 332.)

As we can see, Kiriazovski never did ask the question why did the CPG people want to create “separate Macedonian units” so late in the game, and why did they want to “disband them only a month later”? He must have had more in his mind... By proposing the idea that Dzhodzho and activist Kole Pop-Sermidzhiev created the Voden Macedonian Battalion Kiriazovski was trying to conceal:

a) The CPG’s unsuccessful attempt to form a “special Macedonian unit” in Voden that was to be led by Vangel Aianovski-Oche, and above all

b) The reason for its failure; which was an anti-Macedonian nationalist demand to have it created and then disbanded a moth later.

The CPG leadership’s decision to dissolve SNOF in May 1944 was a heavy blow to the Macedonian national liberation movement which, in a way, gave rise to the spread of the counter-band autonomist movement. The CPG’s attempt to create a Macedonian unit for only a month could not and should not be regarded as a cancellation of the CPG’s previous policy - suppression of the Macedonian national liberation movement. The CPG wanted to attract Macedonian fighters into its Greek lead struggle and into the ranks of the Greek units for a couple of reasons. Creating a short term Macedonian unit was going to achieve two objectives: one, swell the Greek ranks with Macedonian fighters after the unit was dissolved, and two, stifle the creation of a Macedonian organized military force by robbing it of its fighters...

Knowing all this then why does Kiriazovski, in his reviews, in this case, act like the Greek authors – being silent about Greek nationalism and trying to conceal anti-Macedonian acts committed by the CPG leadership against its own membership and against the wider public. We need to speak up and point this out:

“In support of this assertion”, Kiriazovski wrote, “we are changing parts of several original documents of that time!” (p. 332.)

And, have a look at what he has changed:

He has made changes from line 40 on page 332 to line 14 on page 333:

He adjusted part of the report written by CPG official Panos (Evripidis Kapetanios), dated May 27, 1944, to refer to the enthusiasm expressed by the 45 activists in Voden when Barba Nikos announced the CPG Central Committee decision to allow the formation of a “special Macedonian unit”. That was it. He said nothing about the planned “separate Macedonian unit” that was never formed or that it was going to be led by Aianovski. He was silent on this matter leading the uninformed reader into believing

that the Voden Macedonian Battalion was formed by the District Committee!

He has made changes from line 15 to line 21 on page 333:

He adjusted part of the CPG Bureau for Macedonia report to the CPG Central Committee, posted on August 15, 1944, to read: 41 days after the acceptance of the Macedonian military formation as the Third Battalion of the ELAS 30th Regiment... In this report, in fact, the bureau for Macedonia justifies why it accepted an entire battalion.

In this quote, as he did in the previous one, there is no information that the bureau and the District Committee formed the Voden Macedonian Battalion. Kiriazovski produced no such document. Therefore, with these carefully selected citations, he tried to lead the reader to the conclusion that the Voden Macedonian Battalion was created in Voden by the District Committee...

And that was all. This completes the changes made to that “original document of that time”...

From line 22 to line 33 on page 333:

By name and surname, Kiriazovski publicly accuses the author of these lines of altering the facts. For saying that the Voden Macedonian Battalion was formed not in Voden Region but in Meglen Region!

It is not by ignorance, nor can it be considered as a possible typographical error. But here Kiriazovski made a mistake, perhaps, because he did not know that Meglen Region is part of Voden Region… Or perhaps he was trying to mislead the readers who are not familiar with the political map of Greek occupied Macedonia...

Further down Kiriazovski categorically stated that: “It’s not true!” In other words, he refused to accept my explanation that the Voden Macedonian Battalion was created without the knowledge or participation of the District Committee and that the District Committee found out afterwards and its consent and approval was

granted after the fact. He refused my explanation even though I was a direct participant in this event… I cannot accept that Kiriazovski is not aware of this fact even though he was informed about this by other field activists including Aianovski. Kiriazovski should have also known that the District Committee attributed the formation of the battalion in Kaimakchalan to the Yugoslavs. The District Committee proclaimed it a deed of the Yugoslavs and ordered it to be disbanded, even by force if necessary. But Kiriazovski has ignored all this… he is silent on it. He persistently emphasized that: “The Voden Macedonian Battalion was formed in Voden Region”, clearly for the readers’ benefit, even though he knows that no one is thinking or claiming otherwise. He insisted that: “The decision to form the battalion was announced by the CPG District Committee secretary for Voden Region, which took place at a meeting of a larger group of Macedonian activists from Voden Region, held in the city gardens in Voden…” Yes, but this does not mean that this is proof that the battalion was formed here… If that was so, then:

“How was it possible to form an entire battalion without the CPG regional leadership’s knowledge in whose area it was formed?”

Kiriazovski insists on all this because he knows that this is how things appear on the surface for those who look from afar…

Further down, until the end of the review, only because of lack of “original documentation that very clearly speaks about the reasons, the founders and the course of the establishment of the battalion”, extensive materials are placed that exclusively speak to the category: “what it would have been if...”

Kiriazovski wrote: “Cancellation of the Lebanon Agreement meant collaborating with the internal and external enemy. At the same time, this determination required the activation of all the revolutionary forces and close cooperation with the liberation movements in the Balkans and, above all, with the Yugoslav national liberation movement. Given that the Macedonians were the most significant and most reliable force in that calculation, the Greek party leadership, this time, turned their attention to them. This was due to the “moves” made by this leadership, which kept in

touch with and which had an immediate connection to the formation of the Voden Macedonian Battalion…” (p. 334.)

As we can see Kiriazovski here is silent about what actually happened… He is silent regarding the historical fact that the Lebanon Agreement was accepted and implemented by the CPG, EAM and ELAS. He based his assumption on that which was not the case - the cancellation of the Lebanon Agreement. However, as an example, we will look at several of the mentioned “moves” that, according to Kiriazovski, had an immediate connection with the formation of the Voden Macedonian Battalion...

From line 31 to line 39 on page 334:

Part of Partsalidis’s performance in the Greek parliament was presented to the PEEA National Committee (the Greek AVNOJ) on May 25, 1944, in which, among other things, he calls for following the path of the Yugoslav peoples in overcoming the reactionaries...

From line 40 to line 43 on page 334:

There was information that in April 1944, PEEA appointed Andreas Dzhimes as his representative to the NCOJ and General Headquarters of NOV and POJ.

From line 1 to line 11 on page 335:

Part of Georgios Siantos’s radio broadcast from June 24, 1944, was sent to Andreas Dzimas, instructing him to inform Marshal Tito about the situation in Greece and seek help from Yugoslavia, not only political help, but also military action against a common enemy. Siantos announced: “We are recruiting and creating separate Macedonian partisan units!” In this regard, in footnote number 15, Kiriazovski emphasized, without any need: “And from this document you can see who made a decision to form Macedonian units!” And, again, he is silent about the fact that they were forced to do it. We will say more about that a little later...

From line 12 to line 23 on page 335:

A part of the resolution from the CPG Conference on the Aegean (Greek occupied) part of Macedonia, held on June 25, 1944, condemned the Lebanon Agreement saying that “the Greek people... depended on their own might and in close cooperation with their Yugoslav Allies, have the strength to exact destructive blows, speed up the dissolution of fascism and liberate their fatherland!” And so on...

Having in mind that:

The CPG, with a special declaration made during the CPG Central Committee Tenth Plenum, held in January 1944, emphasized to its allies and to the world its famous request for expansion beyond its northern borders… (Up to Veles for “strategic security” purposes…) (See: January 1944 CPG Central Committee Tenth Plenum Declaration in: Saranta Hronia TU KKE, CPG Central Committee edition, p. 504.) (See also: Hristo Andonovski, “Macedonians under Greece in the struggle against fascism”, INI 1968, p. 154-155.)

With the signing of the Lebanon Agreement in May of 1944, and in the spirit of the said declaration, the CPG solidified its commitment to the domestic imperialist bourgeoisie to fight together “for Greece’s interests” and due to the “great sacrifices” made during the national liberation war, it earned them the right to expand Greece’s borders northward and for Greece to become “a new free greater Greece”! (Ibid., p. 152.) When these historical events are taken into consideration it becomes clear that Kiriazovski used empty words when he talked about the so-called alliances and cooperation between the CPG and the CPY and the Yugoslav people...

It is surprising and truly unpleasant to see Kiriazovski remains silent on the Greek manifestation of Greek nationalism, anti-Macedonian sentiments, and anti-Yugoslav expansionism, while trying to guide the reader in a roundabout way that our historiography is somehow on the wrong track...

As for the contentious issue, he has said nothing about when, where and under what circumstances was the Voden Macedonian Battalion created, in the so-called “moves” of the Greek party leadership, mentioned earlier. It is unclear where Kiriazovski’s assertion that

“there was a ‘connection’ in the formation of the Voden Macedonian Battalion” comes from… It appears this too is as an attempt to again “fool” the uninformed reader...

Further on, just before the end of his review, Kiriazovski wrote (without insulting me):

(a) “Regarding the ELAS Voden Macedonian Battalion’s separation and departure to Vardar Macedonia, Rakovski wrote: ‘...before being attacked and disarmed (Markos at that time was commissar of the ELAS division in Macedonia, and that was well-known) the battalion fled over Kozhuv Mountain and landed in Kavadartsi. This took place during the night of October 12/13, 1944’. Led by Rakovski the battalion maneuvered to avoid being attacked…” (By ELAS.)

And further on he wrote:

(b) “In one of his statements made on October 3, 1949, regarding the same case, Rakovski gave the exact opposite information. In particular, he wrote: “I was deceived by my own conviction and by that of the late Dzhodzho, to transfer the Macedonian battalion to Kaimakchalan across the border. They told us that they would not arm us heavily, give us very heavy weapons, and we will immediately be returned to raise the people to a war against the Greek reactionaries and England…” (p. 337-338.)

Clearly, all this has nothing to do with the issue… What has Kiriazovski accomplished by comparing an event from October 1944 to an event that took place five years later, in October 1949…?

In (a) Rakovski spoke about Markos, then ELAS commissar in Macedonia, who ordered the attack on the battalion with aims at disbanding it. And, as Kiriazovski himself said, while facing danger, the battalion retreated to the Yugoslav part of Macedonia. The same thing happened with the Lerin-Kostur Macedonian battalion. The battalions retreated to avoid a possible armed conflict. The Greek ELAS units opened fire on the Macedonian partisans. Here is what Markos said: “While the Macedonian (Lerin-Kostur) battalion fought on Bigla Mountain against the Germans, it was attacked by

ELAS units from the 28th regiment…” (“Markos’s Biography” by Dragan Kliakich, 1979, p. 75.)

In (b) Rakovski spoke about a written statement that was requested from him by the CPG Politburo. CPG Politburo member Dimitrios Vlantas put a pad of paper and three pencils on the table in front of him and said: “Describe your ‘betrayal’ in detail with particular reference to how and why you took the battalion to ‘Serbia’...” The statements Rakovski made about the promises the Yugoslavs made… were false. The purpose of the battalion’s withdrawal, the formation of the “First Aegean Shock Brigade”, the constitution of a Political Commission for Aegean Macedonia with further mobilization of fighters… was a misleading tactical maneuver against the great Greek appetites - aspirations expressed by the CPG Central Committee during the Tenth Plenum Declaration, the Lebanon Agreement and the EAM program for a “Greater New Greece” and so on…! But, after all that was said and done, history will have the final say on all this...

Because of what Rakovski wrote under duress (a and b above), to basically save his skin, Kiriazovski used the opportunity to attack him and accused him of being a man without real dignity, an adventurer, a man without principles, who allegedly claimed that: it was not Greek political and armed anti-Macedonian sentiments that forced the Macedonian units to leave… but this was done by the Yugoslavs who accepted those units…!

There was a time when Kiriazovski (sitting on the opposite side of the barricade) condemned NOF and referred to the people like myself (along with the people from the CPG) as “leaders of a division”, “leaders of a rebellion”, “adventurers”, “crypto-Fascists”... And judging by his silence and concealment of some matters, in this and other of his texts, he is still on the opposite side of the barricade! He is not alone, of course. Sometimes I was like him. History is at fault, a stepmother until yesterday. Grkomani, Bugaromani, Serbomani… They are all the work of history…

But that’s the past! Today the Macedonian ideal is blooming and strong everywhere in the world where Macedonians live. The name

“Macedonia” will not perish! It is also possible that Kiriazovski too will find his way home...

* * *

General Markos said that “they were forced” to form separate Macedonian units within ELAS “in Voden, Lerin and Kostur” to “get the Macedonian people in the ranks of ELAS”, to “organize them” in order to remove them from the counter-band propaganda! General Markos was the second person in the CPG leadership, member of the Politburo… and later DAG Supreme Commander… He said this on page 74 of his biography, written by Kliakich.

This may seem believable and quite normal for the Yugoslav public but things were different than they seemed. Namely, the National Council (“Ethniкon Simvulion”) of Democratic Greece, convened a meeting in May 1944 in a place called Korishades and completely ignored the Macedonian people. During the introductions and greetings the Council treated the Macedonian people like they were Greek people. The Council did this officially in front of the Greek and foreign guests and made sure the “Greek character” of Macedonia was publicly emphasized. (“Aegean Macedonia in the National Liberation War, V. I, Doc. No 104, p. 407.) Because of this SNOF, the Macedonian political organization with its clear Macedonian national, ideological and political agenda, as well as with its organizational activities, found itself in direct and irreconcilable opposition to the CPG and the National Council’s policies regarding the Macedonian question. And as is well-known, SNOF was dissolved in May 1944 which the Macedonian population found very painful. This created a tense situation. In protest an important group of Macedonian fighters and political activists left the struggle at home and joined the Macedonian units in the Yugoslav part of Macedonia so that they could fight against the occupier as Macedonians. The Macedonian dissatisfaction at home was quickly exploited by the controversial autonomist movement with the slogan “fight for a free autonomous Macedonia”, which was spreading dangerously. Counter-bands turned up where they never existed before. Outside of the “Ohrana”, in Voden Region for example, the people in the city Voden were armed by the Germans. Some of the surrounding villages around the Voden-Ostrovo

Passage were also armed. “Ohrana” was led by Giorgi Dimchev, a Macedonian native of Bozets, Enidzhevardar Region. He left Macedonia and went to Bulgaria when he was a child. He achieved the rank of air force officer in the Bulgarian army and was assigned the role of commander of a counter-autonomist military formation in Voden, known as “Ohrana”. Dimchev was working in the service of the occupiers...

The anti-fascist struggle, of course, suffered as a result of the official and public declaration of the “Greek character” of Macedonia. ELAS tried to break the counter-bands in villages without Macedonian help but failed. This is what Thanasis Midzhopoulos-Stavros, ELAS 13th Regiment party secretary, wrote in his book “Το 30-ον συνταγµα του ΕΛΑΣ” (Geneva, 1977, p. 261):

“...We had serious losses (ELAS was attacking with three battalions). One hundred and fifteen were dead and one hundred and fifty wounded. Our ammunition was exhausted. All of this was difficult to come by. The drama with the wounded was especially shocking. They were transferred to the slopes of Karakamen Mountain where they lay for days in a very dense, humid and dark forest...”

A year ago, during the summer of 1943, ELAS fiercely fought many battles against the autonomists in Lerin and Kostur Regions which ended without results… small military victories with great losses. But, politically, ELAS was losing hopelessly. The autonomist movement was still burning. It became very clear to the Greeks that they needed the Macedonians, especially Macedonian revolutionary troops, in order to liquidate the success of the counter-bands. ELAS did not have such a thing at that time. Therefore, as we all well know, the Greeks asked for Macedonian troops from the other (Yugoslav) part of Macedonia to do this.

Here is what Svetozar Vukmanovich-Tempo wrote in his report to the CPY Central Committee, dated August 8, 1943:

“Our troops from Bitola Region went to Greece to Lerin and Kostur Regions at the request of Greek headquarters. There they achieved a major political breakthrough among the Macedonian masses. The

Macedonian people welcomed them as their liberators and all the counter-band fighters voluntarily surrendered their weapons. The Macedonians wanted to be placed under the command of the Macedonian Main Headquarters. We rejected this because of the Greek party’s (CPG’s) position on the Macedonian question!” (See: Liberation War and the Revolution in Macedonia 1941-1945, Volume I, Second Edition, p. 183.)

That was a year ago in the summer of 1943. Now, however, after liquidating SNOF, the CPG could no longer seek help from the CPY. The CPG itself disabled the organized Macedonians and enabled the spread of the autonomist movement. Now the CPG had to manage its own affairs. Its strain with the Macedonian national liberation movement and the danger from the spread of the autonomist movement, or, more precisely, the Macedonian reality that was shaped as a consequence of the CPG, EAM, ELAS and the National Council leadership’s nationalist anti-Macedonian policy, forced the CPG to re-think its strategy and again create new Macedonian units. The CPG was expecting that if its tension with the Macedonian national liberation movement could be mitigated the Macedonians would come on its side and with the Macedonian units on its side the Greek units would succeed in suppressing the autonomist movement, breaking its organized military force - the count-bands...

These were the reasons and the historical reality as to why the CPG decided to establish Macedonian units within ELAS...

* * *

Instead of forming a military unit in August 2, 1944 (Ilinden), as expected, Renos Mihaleas, ELAS IX Division representative, formed the Kostur-Lerin ELAS Macedonian battalion. This was done about a month and a half after the Voden Macedonian battalion was formed. Because of this Mihaleas ran into trouble with Leonidas Stringos, CPG Bureau secretary for Macedonia and Thrace. This is what Renos Mihaleas wrote about that moment: “The Secretary: ‘Why did you establish an entire battalion when the order was to form only one unit in Lerin and Voden Regions…?’ Renos: ‘And what would have been the damage if divisions were formed…?’ The

Secretary: ‘You are naïve. If the Macedonians had divisions, we Greeks would not be in Macedonia…!’…” (See: CPG and Macedonian National Question, p. 593.)

This is the historical truth about how the “special Macedonian units” were created. Obviously, the two battalions were created contrary to CPG, EAM and ELAS plans and wishes but they “accepted” the battalions because they needed them to do their dirty work. The Greeks, unfortunately, could not help but show their real attitude towards the Macedonians…

- First they sent their famous “medical committee” which scandalously began to declare the new Macedonian volunteer fighters incompetent. After a brief conversation with each fighter, during their medical examination, especially those who spoke Greek poorly, the medical committee, more often than not, declared them incapable of fighting and denied them access to the battalion.

- In July and August 1944 the English sent weapons and other military material to the Thirteenth Regiment. Part of it was supposed to go to the Third (our) battalion. But we got nothing…

- After intensive military exercises, the first Macedonian unit began to act. But soon an order arrived ordering the unit to go to Paiak Mountain where it would remain at the disposal of the Thirteenth Regiment command... As a result, it ceased to exist as a Macedonian unit.