REPORT - Part 02

The truth is Zahariadis tried to conceal his own betrayal of DAG and the revolution by accusing the CPY and Yugoslavia of “betrayal”. It is an undeniable fact that after Zahariadis failed to show “Yugoslav betrayal” through the KOEM “trick”, he was forced to invent a new “trick”, the famous “attack from behind”. He tried to convince everyone that Yugoslavia attacked DAG from behind. But, as it turned out, there was no such attack and Yugoslavia had nothing to do with DAG’s defeat. I have no doubt that anyone researching this subject based on the events that took place and based on the documents left behind, will easily find the truth; convening the KOEM meeting “five minutes to twelve” on the eve of DAG’s defeat was nothing more than a provocative act with an obvious goal to provoke a new split in the leadership in order to accelerate DAG’s defeat...

If, on the other hand, the KOEM leaders decided to sign the document against the CPY/CPM and against the leadership of the People’s Republic of Macedonia, they would discredit themselves in the eyes of the “Skopje leaders” and in the eyes of the CPY. And that, it seems, was most important and most acceptable to Zahariadis...

b) This was also a provocation and a trap against the “Skopje leaders” and against the CPY.

Namely, if the KOEM leaders signed the document (and that’s what happened) against the CPM/CPY and against the People’s Republic of Macedonia’s leadership then, perhaps in response (this is what Zahariadis was certainly hoping for), the “Skopje leaders” and the CPY would declare the KOEM leaders traitors and would anathematize them. That, of course, would be a brilliant move on Zahariadis’s part. By doing so the “Skopje leaders” and the CPY would not only remove themselves from the game but would

abandon the so-called “Slavophones” altogether for at least one generation. Then, led by enthusiastic anti-Macedonian leaders, these “Slavophones” would have nowhere to turn except to remain as an internal Greek phenomenon - as a “Slavophone” speaking part of the Greek people...

Not knowing where they were expected to go and when, the NOF leaders were taken individually, in two’s or in three’s so that they had no chance to talk to one another. They were sent to see Zahariadis at DAG Headquarters/ provisional democratic government of Greece. They had no idea that they would be signing the KOEM resolution. Maybe Rakovski was the only one who thought and said to himself “now was not a good time for open confrontations and for creating new cleavages”… This is how Rakovski evaluated the situation...

Responding to that Kiriazovski said: “The truth however was different. Zahariadis’s purpose was not the one that Pavle Rakovski has served us wholesale...” (p. 296.)

“As for the second eventuality (under b), Pavle Rakovski ‘triumphantly’ bragged about the fact that the CPM/CPY allegedly did not condemn and did not anathematize the KOEM-NOF leadership.” (p. 296.)

It is common knowledge that Pavle Rakovski was among the members of the KOEM-NOF managing body that managed to flee and live in Yugoslavia. For their difficult activities in the field these people were awarded several decorations...

Kiriazovski wrote: “Zahariadis actually wanted to include the Macedonian national question, that is, the Macedonian factor, as an integral part of the informative campaign against Yugoslavia, as it is clearly specified in the CPG Central Committee’s March 3, 1949 radio program!”

However KOEM and its resolution did not exist at that time and the above-mentioned radio program could not be applied to them. So the burning question here is: Why did Zahariadis create KOEM so late

in the game, that is, just before DAG’s catastrophe? And then impose his resolution on it?

Kiriazovski wrote: “Rakovski is wrong in claiming that the CPY did not react to anti-Macedonian actions (alluding to the signing of the famous KOEM resolution and thus avoiding speaking about it). “For example, the CPY Central Committee repeatedly orally and in writing reacted against the idea of some allegedly independent Macedonian state within a Balkan federation proposed during NOF’s Second Plenum, held in February 1949. The CPY Central Committee called this a hostile act directed against Federal Yugoslavia and against the People’s Republic of Macedonia.” (p. 296-297.)

“Regarding the Macedonian national question, and also with an attempt on your part to use this issue in the Informburo campaign against Yugoslavia, we have already given you an appropriate answer with the radio program of March 3, 1949. We also acknowledged that you with your denial from March 7, 1949, renounced the position taken during the NOF Second Plenum, and with that, once again you acknowledged that your mass organizations (NOF), under your leadership, are leading a wrong policy in Aegean (Greek occupied) Macedonia.”

The other part of the other radio program reads: “It is characteristic that for the purposes of this campaign against the CPY, separate manifestations of the mass organizations under the leadership of the CPG are also used. Thus, for example, the NOF Second Plenum Resolution for Aegean (Greek occupied) Macedonia claims that a new situation has been created in Yugoslavia, which should mean that the CPY position and attitude regarding the struggle in Greece has changed.” (p. 297.)

According to Kiriazovski all these documents quite clearly deny Rakovski’s claims!

However, it is interesting to note that these documents refer to the decisions made during the NOF Central Committee Second Plenum, held on February 3 and 4, 1949, that arose before KOEM was established and cannot “deny” Rakovski’s opinions as to why

Zahariadis called the assets to form KOEM precisely “five minutes before twelve o’clock”.

This was Kiriazovski’s conclusion, given with these unnecessary words: “If Pavle Rakovski does not have enough of these facts we are ready to give him more… (his insistence that the meeting of the KOEM assets was held on June 20, 1949, on October 3, 1949, etc.)” (Page 297.)

Of course, when the KOEM meeting was held, as Rakovski claims, has nothing to do with the contentious issue: why were the KOEM assets called. After that, postures were only verbally expressed. Well, if you take into consideration that Rakovski, whenever he wants to freely rewrite well-known texts, God knows what he will invent and attribute to himself and what he said at the meeting. As for the October 3, 1949 text Rakovski wrote (during the first day of his prison sentence), the following can be said: Whatever he wrote to the CPG Central Committee then was almost the same of what he wrote to the CPM Central Committee when he returned from prison. This can be confirmed… The document is entitled: Protest letter to the CPM Central Committee.

(April 1983)