FIFTH TRUTHS AND CONTROVERSIES ABOUT THE GREEK CIVIL WAR (1945 - 1949)

FIFTH: TRUTHS AND CONTROVERSIES ABOUT THE GREEK CIVIL WAR (1945 - 1949)

Some Greek historians believe that the Partisans lost the Greek Civil War because of “basic errors”. According to Thanassis Hadzhis, EAM Central Committee secretary, as stated in the introduction of his book entitled “Victorious Revolution”, the Greek Civil War was lost primarily because of the mistakes made by the leadership of the National Liberation Movement and by the CPG Political Bureau...

GREAT POWER POLICIES TOWARDS THE GREEK CIVIL WAR -THE UK (24) AND THE U.S.

Based on what happened, both the U.S. and the U.K. led their own policies in Greece.

Western Great Power consensus regarding Greece falling under Soviet control was; if that were to happen, both the Middle East and Western Europe, especially France and Italy and part of Northern Africa would be in trouble. According to U.S. President Truman, if Greece were to fall under Soviet influence, it would put the safety of Turkey, the Middle East and Western Europe into jeopardy.

DEVELOPMENT OF POLITICAL PROCESSES AND EVENTS AFTER WORLD WAR II (THE VARKIZA PERIOD - 1945) (25)

Events in 1945 contributed to the outbreak of the Greek Civil War (1946-1949) and to Greece’s history, but the actual Greek Civil War officially did not start until March 31st, 1946. The Greek Civil War began in the village “Lithohori” when armed CPG supporters and ELAS fighters, who disagreed with the signing of the Varkiza agreement, attacked the village police station. Because of what happened here all investigations of the historical aspects of the Greek Civil War, were reduced, without a doubt, to the ideological motives for this police station attack which took place during the night of March 30, 1946 from 10:30 to 11:30 pm.

But the more serious historian, especially the leaders and participants of DAG will have noticed that we, the Macedonians, had entered that war before it started. In fact we were preparing for war since the formation of NOF, AFZH and NOMS on April 23, 1945, almost a year earlier. So, we should be asking the question:

“Why did the CPG call for the armed resistance, exactly one year after the Varkiza agreement? Why not call it immediately after February 12, 1945 when the agreement was signed?

According to political assessments made by Greek historians and according to the assessments made by the General Headquarters of both the Greek Government Army and DAG, the Greek Civil War (1946-1949) was “a great historical mistake” because it took place “after” the Second World War, when everything was already settled and agreed upon between the Great Powers in the Yalta (26) Conference, which carried out the division of spheres of influence. The Greek Civil War took place “after” it was decided and after everyone was advised that the borders in the Balkans between states would remain “status quo”.

In other words, a recognized government was already established in Greece and the Iron Curtain was already closed over Greece’s northern border when the Greek Civil War was started. It was already decided by the Great Powers that the State borders between Greece and Yugoslavia were to remain “status quo”!

But, there are also those who say that after the Second World War ended, 1945 was characterized by a lot of things that happened in Greece, especially after the signing of the Varkiza agreement and the acquisition of power by the Greek right. The year 1945 is considered to be a pivotal year by Greek historians, especially the winter and spring months when persecution of the Left (CPG, ELAS, EAM and others) was at its peak, which is believed to have been organized and coordinated by the British (26a) through the newly formed Greek government.

Results of the organized terror, which took place in the period from February 12 to March 31, 1946, were published in a report prepared by the EAM Central Committee and submitted to the UN Commission of special overseers by Mihalis Kirkos. The following were registered in the report:

Shot………..1,284 Wounded ….6,681 Interned…....3,632 Arrested..…34,931 Missing………151 Raped………..165

500 more citizens were abused on various other grounds.

For the sake of history, let us also mention the 1945 EAM report written in French by Oktav Merlie, head of the French Institute in Athens. (See: Tassos Vurnas 1981/32, Athens).

Third: A conceived project which intends to eliminate the minorities who have lived in their ancestral homes for centuries.

The nation (tendency towards a pure Greek nation).

How can Greece, a member of the EU, in its legislation today have such racist laws as law 106.841/5-1-83 based on a decision made by the Interior Ministry to allow the repatriation of only “Greeks by genus”?

This law was signed on December 29, 1982 by the Minister of the Interior, Giorgos Genimatas and Minister of Public Order, Gianis Skoularikis.

In other words, this law does not apply to Greeks but to those who live in Greece and who are not Greeks. And who are they? They we the Macedonians who participated in the Greek Civil War, including those who were forcibly mobilized into DAG by the Greek Communists and led by General Markos. Those who were “Greeks by genus” were allowed to return to Greece, to their homes and were cared for and integrated into Greek society. Those who were Macedonians were accused of starting the Greek Civil War and of fighting with aims to create a Republic of Macedonia over Solun and to stretch it down to the Aegean.

II - Chronicles (27) from the hell of war – Review of military-political Balkan historical chronicles (1940-1950)

4.0 - Yugoslav Balkan strategy

How and why; Yugoslav strategic option! Tito (CPY) continues to show interest in the Macedonians and yet negates the Macedonian people in Greek occupied Macedonia.

Many things happened to us Macedonians, some without our knowledge, without the knowledge of ordinary people kept in the dark for over sixty years. For mysterious reasons, good and bad things, historic things, often happened to us because we had not learned our lessons from history. We viewed incident after incident as coincidences even though these incidents were not unique and had taken place previously in our history.

We are failing to rely on the wisdom of our ancestors; instead we rely on outsiders, we allow strangers and ideological activists to influence and take advantage of us, of our desires, of our patriotism, of our good nature and of our morals and use them against us. We are easily swayed by mere words and we tend to believe those who tell us lies and what we want to hear.

Now, sixty years later, six decades of living under an ideological web, we are finally waking up and looking for answers. We are finally developing a desire to understand our hidden story, a story cloaked in secrets. A story shrouded in foreign politics which sent many of our Macedonian heroes to their graves during the Greek Civil War (1945-1949). Among those stories is the story told by Historian Kiriazovski in his book “The five vital years in Aegean Macedonia” where he says: “Tito (CPY/CPM) handed the Aegean Macedonians to Zahariadis” but does not explain why he did that!

First: Let us examine Josip Broz Tito’s official position towards the Macedonians from Greek occupied Macedonia.

CPY policies adopted towards the Macedonians during World War II were intended to gain control over the Serbian occupied territory of Macedonia and hold onto it under the new communist Yugoslavia. CPY recognition of the Macedonians as a separate national identity was done strictly for domestic purposes to show that Macedonians were Macedonians and not Serbians or Bulgarians. Since the people living in Macedonia were Macedonians then Bulgaria had no claims on them. As a unique nation, Macedonians earned the right to be Macedonians and join their fraternal

Slavic peoples (Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, Montenegrins…) in the Yugoslav federation.

But on the question regarding the Macedonians in Greek occupied Macedonia, Tito and the CPY’s policies were very clear; Josip Broz Tito, during World War II, persistently advocated to keep the pre-war borders in the post war Balkans in order to preserve the Yugoslavia of Versailles. And in the spirit of this policy Tito never approved the unification of Greek occupied and Serbian occupied (Aegean and Vardar) Macedonia.

The question here then is very simple: “Why did CPG Secretary General Siantos not negotiate with the Macedonians, but instead asked to negotiate with a senior Yugoslav representative of the CPY?” Because he must have known that there was no plan to unite the two parts of Macedonia. And how did the Macedonian communists react to Siantos’s request? They didn’t! Because they were influenced by Tempo’s plans, who on one hand wanted to create a new “Macedonian movement with pro-Yugoslav historical tendencies” and on the other he himself was a “guardian of the border of Royal Yugoslavia and nothing more”. In other words, Tempo told the Macedonians that he wanted them united and told the Greeks that there was no Yugoslav plan to unite the two parts of Macedonia. The Greeks, now believed Tempo and that everything from the CPY side was confirmed by the removal of CPM General Secretary Metodi Shatarov – Sharlo (28). With Sharlo out of the way “there was no longer the possibility of the realization of Sharlo’s ideas of a spiritual unification of the Macedonians from the overall ethnic composition of Macedonia”.

After this, when the entire plan was revealed, it became very clear to us Macedonians (especially to those from Greek occupied Macedonia) that any action we were to take in attempting to “unite Macedonia” would be met with a knife point from both the CPG and the CPY.

In other words, Greece and Yugoslavia now did everything at the political-party and state level. The same was extended to Albania after it signed the Protocol of “close military and political cooperation” on June 20th, 1943 at the World War II Headquarters. Among the signatories at the signing were, Svetozar Bukmanovich Tempo representing Yugoslavia (CPY), Enver Hoxha representing Albania (CPA) and Ververis representing Greece (CPG).

It was precisely at this level of talks that the Papandreou government in Cairo insisted on. Greece knew that Yugoslavia had accepted and resolved the Sharlo, the CPM party leadership and the new platform issue at this level. Taking advantage of this, the Papandreou government demanded of the CPG and ELAS that they do not make any compromises with the Macedonians from either side of the border because the Papandreou government knew there would be historic consequences for Greece and for its sovereignty if the Macedonians were made a factor during this struggle. I do not know what more was needed to convince the Macedonian Communist in Greek occupied Macedonia for them to realize that they were not considered “a factor” by the CPG and by ELAS. Their expectations were only an illusion put in their heads by Tempo.

Once again we need to emphasize here that all decisions made and all agreements signed between representatives of the CPG and the CPY at that high level had to comply with the 1913 Treaty of Bucharest.

For us Macedonians, who fought to defend the ideals of communism, this meant that we lost our identity and our centuries old hearth, for nothing. Our destiny was ours and we could have placed it in our hands but we made a mistake when we chose to place it in their hands and they in turn subjected us to unfathomable cruelty.

And so it began – Brother fighting against Brother.

Another CPY aim with its policy towards Macedonia was to extend the Yugoslav communist hegemony over the Macedonian people. Tito’s post-war goals were not modest. He demanded from Italy, even by military occupation if necessary, to be given Juliska Kraina, including Trieste. He also demanded that he be given almost half of Carinthia. He demanded that Albania, Greek and Bulgarian occupied Macedonia also be included in the Yugoslav federation.

Macedonia’s new politics gave the Yugoslav Communists (CPY) an ideal weapon for achieving their goals. Playing with the Macedonian cultural diversity card was certainly an attractive incentive for the Macedonians from Greek occupied Macedonia who were exposed to Hellenization.

The campaign for Macedonia’s unification was started by Yugoslav Partisan leaders during the Second World War, even before they had control of Vardar Macedonia. The chaotic and fluid conditions that prevailed in the Balkans, after the withdrawal of the Axis powers, incited this movement.

In the months during which the CPY consolidated its power over Vardar Macedonia, Tito tried to use his influence to influence all Macedonians but was wary of intervening in Greek affairs. At the same time relations between the Greek communists and the Yugoslav communists became strained. In May 1944 all that was left of the Macedonian fighters (whom ELAS threatened to liquidate, and a majority of whom were brutally liquidated) joined Gotse’s SNOF units.

There was a quarrel between ELAS headquarters and Gotse on how to proceed with the weapons seized from the village bands. Meanwhile, CPY agents and small units were sent to Northern Greece to encourage Macedonians from Greek occupied Macedonia to join Tito’s army. After that a mass crossing of Macedonians from the ranks of ELAS began to go into Yugoslavia and join Tito’s army.

When a large group of Macedonians, members of the CPG, left ELAS and joined the ranks of Tito’s army, ELAS headquarters labeled them “deserters”.

* * *

The confusion as to what was going on began after the group of fighters left Greek occupied Macedonia and joined Tito’s army. The group began to be influenced by the politics of the CPY. The group of fighters who remained in Greek occupied Macedonia began to be influenced by the CPG which in turn labeled its compatriots “deserters” and therefore “traitors”. This “split” created a paradox among the Macedonian people which has lasted to this day. Interestingly, both groups saw themselves as “patriots” and the others as “traitors”. Those who left for Yugoslavia were seen as traitors because they “fled like cowards” and left the people at home “unprotected”. Those who remained home were seen as “Greko-phils” and “traitors” by those who left because they fought on the side of the enemy, the Greeks. The best at analyzing this phenomenon were those who fled to Yugoslavia and, while they saw themselves as “patriots”, they saw everyone else as traitors, including the organizations SNOF, NOF, AFZH, NOMS, KOEM and Ilinden and the overall Macedonian movement in Greek occupied Macedonia. These people saw themselves as patriots by profession, who wanted to be rewarded for every cheer they uttered. Anyone who did not cheer for them was a traitor.

This proved that the people who allowed “ideology” to divide them, were prone to open themselves to quarreling and fighting. These double standards within a single Macedonians nation ultimately led to different visions, different desires and different situations. This ultimately led people to question “who is right and who is wrong”, a situation that further divided the Macedonian people and was easily exploitable by those who wanted to harm the Macedonian cause and the Macedonian nation.