ATHENS’S HYSTERIA WITH A CLEAR STRATEGY AGAINST THE MACEDONIANS

ATHENS’S HYSTERIA WITH A CLEAR STRATEGY AGAINST THE MACEDONIANS

Did the Papandreou government in Cairo receive all the assurances it demanded from the CPG and from ELAS, especially from CPG Secretary Siantos? In part, here is what Papandreou requested from Siantos:

“Liquidate all non-Greek political organizations and military formations in Northern Greece. It would be a historical error for Greeks and for the Greek State if the ‘Slavo-phone’ formations participated in the liberation of the cities: Kostur, Lerin, Voden and other places now occupied by the Germans and Italians!”

The most authentic information about these events comes from Naum Peiov-Chakalarov’s (9) brochure entitled “The Kostur Battalion - the first Macedonian Liberation Brigade”, December 1985, Skopje.

Peiov wrote: “... Тhe Yugoslav NOB and POJ units began their march towards Aegean Macedonia from Karadzhova to Karaorman on Easter Day in April in the spring of 1944. One of the units, following Partisan Headquarters, established itself in the villages Bapchor and Turie in Kostur Region. In Bapchor the fighters organized a meeting during which Headquarters representative Giore Velkovski spoke. In his speech, among other things, he said that given the reluctance of the Macedonian peasants of this region to enter the ranks of ELAS, they could come and join the NOB and POJ units in Vardar Macedonia. This conclusion may have been reached after assessing that the Macedonians from Aegean Macedonia had a deep mistrust of the Greeks and the Greek movement and they did not want to enter into the Greek ranks. This created a genuine desire for Yugoslavia to attract these fighters into the ranks of NOB and POJ. After announcing their intentions, several villagers from the village Trsie, Lerin Region immediately voluntarily joined these units.

I (Naum Peiov) was present at that meeting in Bapchor. I was invited to attend by a letter from Anesti Panovski. At the time I was SNOF secretary in Kostur. The meeting was also attended by ELAS representatives from the Vicho detachment. Anesti Panovski served as translator. When the Greeks found out what Giore Velkovski was trying to do they became very upset and urgently sought to prevent it.

After the meeting I (Naum Peiov) met with the broader leadership from the Headquarters and with Kiro Georgievski-Deian. I wanted to know from Georgievski why NOB and POJ wanted to recruit Macedonian fighters from Greece. I especially wanted to ask if those Macedonians who were now in the ranks of ELAS could also join NOB and POJ. Georgievski’s response to my question was: ‘... this primarily applies to fighters who want to participate in the anti-fascist struggle but who, until now, have refused to join ELAS because ELAS was entrusted to the Greek movement. These fighters did not approve of the Greek position on the Macedonian Question. Our aim is to use the anti-fascist spirit of this nation in order to perform a general mobilization of volunteer fighters. If members from the ranks of EAM and ELAS wish to cross into our ranks, we will gladly take them.’

The next day, “writes Paiov”, I left for SNOF Headquarters located in the village Krchishta where I met with some Macedonian fighters from the “Lazo Trpovski” Units. The fighters I met with were Nikola Shalbarinov, Dimitar Shishkovski and Sotir Andonovski with whom I discussed Giore Velkovki’s plan to recruit our people in NOB and POJ. I also met with and said the same thing to Lazo Damovski-Oshenski, Lazo Pop Lazarov and Paskal Mitrevski. But they expressed some hesitation regarding this plan and wanted to know more so they agreed to send me and some other people to the Macedonian Headquarters in the village Sulin in Prespa. The people they selected to send with me were Nikola Shishkovski, Spiro Lazovski, Risto Jankulovski, Blagoi Daskalov and Kicha Baleva (Vera).

After arriving at Sulin, which I believe was on May 4 or 5, 1944, the group held talks with Kiro Georgievski-Deian and then left. Kicha Baleva (now Evdokia Foteva-Vera) was left behind. It was estimated that if the group stayed it would have been placed in a precarious situation.

About the situation, Vicho Commissar Haralambos Haralambidis-Athanatos wrote a report detailing the meeting and what was proposed. The report was sent to ELAS General Headquarters. The report was entitled: “The politics of the Serbo-Macedonian partisans of NOB and POJ of Yugoslavia in April in the Greek territory: from Karadzhova-Prespa.” See “Collection Aegean Macedonia in NOB 1944/1945”, vol 1 p. 135-239.”

Peiov further explains: “... After leaving the NOB and POJ Headquarters, the group arrived in Kostur Region in order to inform the Macedonians who wanted to leave the ELAS units and join the NOB and POJ units. But early in the morning on May 8th we were arrested and disarmed by ELAS units at a place called “Kiprievi orevi” near the village Gabresh. Among those arrested were myself (Naum Peiov), Spiro Lazarovski and Nikola Shalvarinov. We were then taken to the village D’mbeni where we were told that we would be tried for desertion and treason. The group was

transferred under guard to SNOF Headquarters in the village Krchishta on May 9th.

In Krchishta we were received by the CPG District Committee Secretary for Kostur Region, Antonis Andonakis-Periklis, and by representatives of ELAS. We were also accompanied by a large number of villagers and SNOF members who sought to liberate us. After a lengthy discussion we were conditionally released and placed under the watch of CPG activists and ELAS units.

The situation became more and more volatile, especially with the Macedonians who served in the ranks of ELAS. There were volatile reactions from the Macedonians in the ranks of ELAS.

Under dramatic circumstances of mistrust,” writes Peiov, “we decided to leave. At dusk, on the eve of May 15, 16, 1944, around 30 fighters from the “Vicho” units got together at the village Pozdivishta and left for Mount Mali-madi towards Prespa. As we continued on our way to the Macedonian General Headquarters located in the village Sulin, we ran into more fighters who also wanted to leave. By the time we got there we were numbering about 80. There, we were received by the Political Commissar of the brigade Naum Naumovski-Borche. A plan was out together and we were dispatched to Karaorman where we were enlisted in the first Macedonian-Kosovo Brigade.”

There were strong reactions from the CPG and from ELAS headquarters. Тhey declared an emergency and gave chase to the deserters. The reactions were not only directed at the Macedonian Headquarters but at Yugoslavia, at the Yugoslav Communist Party headquarters and at Josip Broz Tito himself.

With the fighters from Kostur Region in Karaorman switching from the ranks of ELAS to the ranks of the new NOB units in Vardar Macedonia, there was a clash in tactics between the two Communist Parties. The CPG demanded that the CPY return the “deserters” so that they could be “punished”.

The CPY, on the other hand, considered the group’s switch of allegiance a personal choice. The only way these fighters would return to the ranks of ELAS was if the CPG would allow them to form separate Macedonian ELAS units in Voden, Kostur and Lerin Regions. See: “Macedonians under Greece, the struggle against fascism 1940-1944”, p. 168.

NOB and POJ delegates Dobrivoie Radosavlevich-Orce, Petre Bogdanovaki-Kocho and others from the Yugoslav Supreme Headquarters were in attendance when ELAS and the CPG agreed to establish these Macedonian units. This took place in the village Rodivo in Voden Region on July 7, 1944 and in the village Pozdivishta in Kostur Region on Ilinden day in 1944. The aim here was to further strengthen the links of cooperation and solidarity between the partisan units in Yugoslavia and Greece.

By order of the CPG Central Committee Politburo, the CPG Bureau for Macedonia ordered the ELAS commanders to form, within their compositions, separate Macedonian units in Voden, and Lerin-Kostur Regions. By order of Siantos, CPG leader, the Voden Macedonian Battalion was formed on July 16, 1944 in the village Rodivo and the Lerin-Kostur Macedonian Battalion was formed on August 2, 1944 in the village Pozdivishta, Kostur Region.

The defectors were awaiting transfer from Karaorman to Koreshtata, Kostur Region.

Here is what Naum Peiov wrote: “... The Kostur Battalion decided (or perhaps was ordered?) to leave Karaorman and go to Kostur Region during the last days of July 1944. The Battalion was to go directly to the village Pozdivishta-Koreshtata (the author too returned with this Battalion). But instead of going directly to Pozdivishta, the Battalion decided to pass through the villages in Prespa and after that visited the villages V’mbel, Kosinec and D’mbeni where it held rallies calling on the people to join the fighting against the fascist occupiers.

Waiting for the Battalion’s arrival in the village Pozdivishta were Petre Bogdanovski-Kocho, representative of NOV and POJ-Yugoslavia Headquarters and Renos Mihaleas, ELAS representative of IX Division. The reorganization was discussed in detail and agreements were reached with the Greek representatives about the formation a new Lerin-Kostur battalion. The announcement was made on August 2, 1944 (Ilinden) in the village Pozdivishta followed by a big rally. In the spirit of the agreement between the CPY, the CPG, POJ and ELAS, the Macedonian people were invited to join the ranks of this all Macedonian battalion.

Even though the ranks of this new battalion were Macedonian and even though there were plenty of qualified Macedonian and loyal communists in the Karaorman unit to lead this new battalion, its leadership was entrusted to Kozmas Amindas, a Hellenized Arvanitis (Albanian). Aminda’s

command was shared with Ilia Dimovski - Gotse. The rest of the leading Macedonians were demoted.”

* * *

Immediately after their creation, the Macedonian battalions received orders to seek and destroy all armed bands, armed by the enemy. On August 21, 1944 the Kostur Battalion attacked several armed village bands and managed to disarm them without much effort. When these bands found out that the Battalions were Macedonian many surrendered without a fight and some band members requested to join the Battalions. By the end of August about 300 band members from Kostur Region alone had joined the Lerin-Kostur Macedonian battalion and considered themselves fighters of the Macedonian army. After this many band members voluntarily surrendered their arms and joined the Battalions in unprecedented numbers. The more extreme Greeks in ELAS, unfortunately, did not like the band members joining because during the occupation some “presumably” fought for a United Macedonia to be annexed by Bulgaria.

During and after these campaigns, some of these former Macedonian band members were accused of working with the enemy and were constantly threatened by extreme Greeks with threats like: “We will destroy you; we will kill you, you filthy Bulgarians, Ilinden dogs, because you want Kostur and its villages to join Bulgaria.”

The former band members had accusations of their own which went something like this: “You are nothing more than thieves, you filthy Greek dogs. You come from our people but you destroyed everything of ours, our church, our language, our names, our place names, our dances, our songs… You took all these things from us and made them Greek. The people will curse you and God will punish you... We are who we are and we will remain the guardians of our centuries old heritage.”

The moderate Macedonian communists in ELAS belonging to the CPG had some advice of their own for the band members: “Although we are all communists not all of the Greeks here are killers and hangmen like those of the old days. Come with us, join us. We are a Macedonian army and we fight with the Greeks for a better common future for the sake of both the Macedonian and Greek people.

Our fate should be tied to this native, centuries old Macedonian hearth because this is where our share of Macedonia is, this is how Macedonia was divided in 1913. Here and now we are together with the Greeks and we should solve our problems together because we Macedonians have spilled a lot of blood for the interests of the Greek state; we fought together during the Greco-Turkish War, we fought together at the Albanian front, we fought together against fascism during World War II etc. Greece is bound to respect us Macedonians because our brothers and fathers gave their lives as soldiers of the Greek army.”

And the people said: “He who does not love and respect what is his will be used by others and by strangers many times and for as long as he is useful!”

Even though the Macedonian battalions did very well in performing their tasks, the CPG Central Committee and EAM, on August 2 and 3, 1944, made a request to the Soviet government, through the Soviet military mission in Greece, to accept the Lebanon Agreement and the cabinet ministries offered by the National Unity government led by Papandreou. With this move, the Greek Party leadership renounced their pretensions to gain power by force. After that the Macedonian battalions became an obstacle to the implementation of this policy, as the civil parties that created the government did not recognize the Macedonian Nation and movement in Greece. ELAS Headquarters and the CPG then decided to disband the Macedonian battalions and deploy its fighters in the deep south of Greece as part of the ELAS units stationed there. And as such no Macedonian Military formations and no political Macedonian organizations would exist. This news upset the Macedonians and created panic. There were various rumours floating around that by doing this the “Greeks wanted to liquidate the Macedonians”.

In short, the Macedonians were lied to and used to disarm and destroy the village bands. And the promised cooperation turned out to be a ruse.

The most ominous collision between ELAS and SNOF - the bitterest conflict between Macedonians and Greeks

The CPG was very upset by the Yugoslavs flirting with the question of a united Macedonia which for the Greek communists was a very delicate question. In June 1944 the Headquarters of the Macedonian Partisans gave new instructions to their agitators and to the CPY military units in Greek occupied Macedonia. They gave them advanced warning that the question of Macedonia must not spoil their “brotherly relations” with ELAS. They were also reminded that the achievement of national freedom and equality by the Macedonians in Yugoslavia was the ideal for all the Macedonian people.

Relations between the Greek communists and Gotsе came to a climax in October. When Gotse found himself face to face with ELAS units deployed in front of his SNOF units, Gotse, along with 800 of his fighters, crossed over the Yugoslav border and arrived in Bitola. On December 9, 1944 McLean, head of the British mission, complained to Tito about the formation of the First Aegean Brigade. At that point Tito assured McLean that the Brigade was not going to cross the Greek-Yugoslav border and enter Greece and that Yugoslavia had no claims on Greek occupied Macedonia.

Tito’s people treated Gotse and his fighters with the same suspicion as any other pro-autonomist group of Macedonians. Over the next several months Gotse’s group was placed in half internment and it was not until the next year that the CPY began to rely on Gotse’s fighters for operations in Greek occupied Macedonia. In fact, the people selected to run the Organizations NOF and AFZH, created on April 23, 1945 in Skopje, came from the ranks of Gotse’s fighters. The people comprising NOF and AFZH were in fact the same people who led the conflict in Greece. These people knew about the CPG and Greek government plans. They knew the entire history of SNOF and under what circumstances they had left Greece and voluntarily entered the ranks of Tito’s army. They knew that the conflict was still unresolved.

* * *

Over the course of several months the press, which was then under the control of the Communist Party of Greece, with the exception of one attack against the Papandreou government in November 1944 because of the “terror waged against the Macedonians” and one bitter “political” editorial at the end of December, did not take any initiatives to deal with what was boiling in the Greek cauldron.

As time passed it appeared that the thinking was that the CPY began to lose interest in Greek occupied Macedonia. Several factors stood behind this CPY shift. Tito, in early 1945, who at the time was in close contact with Moscow, may have concluded that it was more important for the Greek Communists to come to power in Greece than for him to gain control of Greek occupied Macedonia. Also, all the Macedonian combat units in Greek occupied Macedonia were strongly inclined towards autonomy and Tito was somewhat confined by the existence of Shubashoch’s rival government which at the time was still enjoying Western Power support. It was necessary to be cautious. But when circumstances began to change, the CPY reawakened its concerns for Greek occupied Macedonia. Did we Macedonians, in that period, have a Macedonian revolutionary platform?

A CPM Regional Committee (Note: most Regional Committee members were members of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia up until 1940) was organized and formed in April 1940. The CPM held its first Provisional Conference on September 8, 1940 when it adopted an optimal but Macedonian Revolutionary program. Here in part is what the proclamation said: “Ilinden is the day of the Macedonian Revolution. It is a day of our light. It is a pure Macedonian flag...” The resolution in part read: “The National Policy of pressured assimilation, wild terror, destruction of everything that is Macedonian, including Macedonian culture, language, songs etc., is conducted under the severest cruelty. The tortured, abused and enslaved Macedonian population is finding itself before new and great battles…”

Secretary Metodia Shatorov-Sharlo was elected during that Conference. Shatorov was a Macedonian and a man of high consciousness who understood the Macedonian problem. Beside him stood Kuzman Josifovski, a highly valued man by the Regional Committee membership. It was often said that Kuzman Josifovski was a second Delchev because he carried Delchev’s attitude and ideals regarding Macedonia. Shatorov and Josifovski were calling for unity of the entire Macedonian nation and to fight against a common enemy be it against violence, national oppression, confiscation of property, assimilation, exile etc., whenever dealing with the regimes that occupied Macedonia and kept the Macedonian people under Serbian, Bulgarian and Greek slavery. Shatorov viewed the liberation of Macedonia as the liberation of all of Macedonia, not just parts of it, unlike the Regional Committee membership which was inclined to advocate for a partial solution within the existing borders. On August 20, 1940 Shatorov published an article entitled “Liberating Macedonia from under the yoke of Greater-Serbian, Bulgarian and Greek imperialism”. In part the article said: “... If the Macedonians don’t have their own state; they are not at fault, at fault are the Serbian, Bulgarian and Greek imperialists who as allies invaded, occupied, partitioned and annexed Macedonia for themselves.”

The CPM Regional Committee under Shatorov’s leadership supported a common Balkan struggle for the liberation of all of Macedonia with political ties to other Balkan nations; it wanted an Independent Macedonian National Political Party for Macedonia, as opposed to what the Central Committee of Yugoslavia wanted; a CPM to be only a political party and an entity tied to the CPY. Based on historical traditions of struggle, the Macedonian people should have been organized under one sovereign Macedonian Republic and not as a Yugoslav sovereign state; the Regional Committee was against the CPY in this regard and wanted liberation and national sovereignty. The CPY unfortunately wanted the section of Macedonia to remain within Yugoslavia and thus harshly opposed the Regional Committee.

Time of the Communist International

It was a time of truth when the CPY, CPB and CPG were members of the same force, of the same authoritarian organization, like a single superior authority - the Communist International. Its decisions were binding. In such a constellation no Party could function independently of the others without a decision from this high authority.

On May 26, 1941 Shatorov was invited for talks with the CPB Central Committee in Sofia. There he met with the Bulgarian party leadership and was offered a solution for connecting the Regional Committee in Macedonia with Bulgaria’s Communist Party. He was told that this solution was offered by the Communist International and personally by Georgi Dimitrov. For Shatorov this was an order from the highest party organ, which he, as an experienced party member, knew what it meant. Having little choice Shatorov accepted the decision which was not a mistake, but it was a mistake not to inform the Central Committee of the CPY immediately afterwards. He was hoping that “those above would understand”.

Under Yugoslav Party Control

In the meantime a CPY instructor arrived in Macedonia and, on July 24, 1941, brought a decision signed by Tito criticizing Shatorov’s behaviour and poor performance. Shatorov was dismissed as Secretary and kicked out of the Party. With Shatorov out of the picture the Macedonian Regional Committee, on August 17, 1941, convened a Party meeting during which Petre Bogdanov, a member of CPY Central Committee, was delegated to clarify the status and situation with Shatorov and convince those present that the solution for connecting the Macedonian party organization with the Bulgarian Party was truly a Comintern solution. Petre Bogdanov also relayed this same information to Dragan Pavlovich, a delegate of the CPY Central Committee, who in turn informed his Central Committee.

Approximately ten days later a telegram from the Comintern arrived through the Bulgarian Central Committee addressed to the Macedonian Regional Committee. The telegram carried orders which in part said: “Macedonia must remain in Yugoslavia for practical and meaningful reasons because today we are leading a struggle against the German and Italian occupiers and their agents. Given past military situations in Macedonia, it is necessary to create close cooperation between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria particular on the ground.”

The orders given here clearly show that the authority was with the top institutions and not with Shatorov. Shatorov was dismissed to remove any action other than that prescribed by the leading authorities, which in effect put an end to the uncertainty and questions about the realization of the Macedonian revolutionary program. Shatorov, being kicked out of the party in accordance with Tito’s decision, found himself in severe isolation.

The Greek Communist Party’s Political Platform

On July 18, 1943 General Sarafis, Commander of ELAS Headquarters, and Colonel Eddie Myers, head of the English mission, signed an Agreement adding ELAS to the Allied Armies under Middle East command. Henceforth any operations carried out by ELAS would be under the orders of Middle East command (p. 120, “ELAS” by Stefanos Sarafis).

According to this Agreement ELAS became influenced by British command with regards to its developments, operations, formations and relations with EKKA (National and Social Renaissance of Greece). Even though EKKA was an insignificant force, it imposed itself on ELAS as if it was a full partner and, under the direction of the British representatives, signed two agreements: the Plaka Agreement and the Kazerta Agreement. These Agreements completely limited ELAS’s freedom to function as an independent force, particularly at the most critical time when the communists were (supposedly) preparing to take power.

Here is what Vasilis Barzotas, Commissar of DAG General Headquarters and member of the CPG Central Committee Politburo, had to say (Neos Kosmos no. 2/1957):

“…A massive people’s revolutionary struggle was taking place in all of Greece sometime in the middle of 1943. At the same time the CPG and EAM leadership placed ELAS, the National Liberation Army, under British command. British officers were given command of the General Staff and all other Headquarters. The British officers received their orders from the British Middle East General Headquarters. Large divisions, divisions, group divisions etc. were all in the hands of the Intelligence Service.” Svetozar Vukmanovich – Tempo, as representative of the CPY Central Committee, spent about ten days in Greece in the summer of 1943. Here is what he had to say:

“The Communist Party of Greece together with EAM and ELAS mainly led a policy of support for the British. This, of course, does not mean that the CPG does not support the Soviet Union and the Red Army, it means that today its overall national liberation movement strategy is primarily tied to Britain.”

* * *

Here is what Christopher Montague Bunthouse (Chris), representative of Greece’s Intelligence Service, deputy head and then head of the British Military Mission, had to say:

“…If the British officers had been absent from the resistance movement in Greece, not only Greece but all European history would have gone in a totally different direction… The presence of the British Military Mission in Greece prevented the Communists from taking absolute control of Greece in 1943-1944. If the Communists had taken power in September 1944, when the Germans were retreating, it would have been very difficult to take that power away from them especially in the eyes of the world public!”

On April 23, 1949 the 1940 general course of events was further explained.

Macedonians under the watchful eye of the British mission, the Greek Communist Party, ELAS and EAM:

SNOF (10) (Slavo-Macedonian National Liberation Front) and its armed Partisan wing SNOV (Slavo-Macedonian National Army) were created in the fall of 1943. These organizations were created because of the horrible situation in which the Macedonian people found themselves, under Greek control. There was also fear that once the Greeks came back they would liquidate the Kostur bands and all other fighters.

The SNOF founding Conference for Kostur was held on December 24, 1943 and for Lerin on December 27, 1943.

At the founding conferences SNOF had to comply with Tempo’s instructions which basically called for building a platform for a joint struggle between the Macedonian and Greek people. The platform’s basic principles were:

1. Form a unified struggle between the Macedonian and Greek people in Aegean Macedonia as a condition for a victorious struggle against the fascist occupation;

2. Mobilize Macedonians en masse in ELAS units and prepare for an armed struggle to rout out the occupiers;

3. Fight a political and armed struggle against Kamchev’s bands and against Mihailov and the Gestapo, who with their autonomist propaganda want to turn the Macedonian people against the Greeks and vice versa;

4. The Macedonian people will struggle together with the Greek people, within EAM against the occupiers. The Greek people will help the Macedonian people realize their national aspirations and right to self-determination on the basis of the Atlantic Charter Principles and on other major ally resolutions.

With that said the SNOF District Committee, for the first time in front of the Communist Party of Greece, officially set the Macedonian National Question in motion.

At the time, still in its infancy, the CPG leadership had limited initiatives and most of them were directed against the Macedonian bands armed by the occupiers. This is why when it defined its own, EAM and PEEA’s principles and when it signed agreements with the Greek government in exile and with the British mission, the CPG did not recognize the rights of the Macedonians. So what changed? Nothing changed. Initially the CPG was against the formation of Macedonian Partisan units with Macedonians seeking their national rights. But then when it realized that these same Macedonians were capable of forming their own independent forces, they changed their mind. So the CPG’s aim was not to help the Macedonians gain their rights but to stop them from organizing independently.

It is a historic fact that the CPG and EAM leadership, up until April 1944, used SNOF for its own political and military aims, primarily in dealing with the armed bands. Then in the beginning of May 1944 the CPG disbanded SNOF and SNOV because they had become an obstacle in the CPG’s negotiations with the Greek government in exile and with the other coalition government parties scheduled to meet in mid-May 1944. Negotiations to divide the Balkans into spheres of influence began on May 5, 1944. Britain gained supremacy over Greece and the Soviet Union over Romania. On May 20, 1944 the CPG, EAM and ELAS, under British pressure in Lebanon, signed an agreement with the Royal Government after which the coalition government was dissolved.

During a conference held on July 25, 1944, the communists in Macedonia unanimously agreed to pull out from the Lebanon Agreement as well as for the People’s Liberation Movement to apply revolutionary tactics and to rely on its own forces and on the Yugoslav people’s Liberation Army. The CPG leadership was divided on the issue, one group wanted to accept the Agreement and another wanted to reject it.

The group that advocated for the acceptance of the Agreement prevailed. The Soviet military mission headed by Colonel Grigor Popov, which had arrived in the free territory on July 28, 1944, contributed to the acceptance of the Agreement. Popov was well aware of how Stalin had operated in changing the Russian system into a one-party dictatorship and removing any competition by liquidation, not just in Russia but everywhere in the world. Stalin wanted Moscow to lead all Parties and branches of the Comintern in the world and anyone opposed to that was liquidated. Stalin wanted Moscow to be the absolute centralization of management of all communist parties.

Here is what Soviet citizen Grigor Popov, high representative in the Soviet government with full powers, later, had to say: “Here is the directive… this is what Comrade Stalin ordered!”

The Agreement was accepted by the CPG Central Committee on August 17, 1944 and a decision was made to take part in the coalition government headed by George Papandreou.

Here is what Stringos, member of the CPG Central Committee Politburo, had to say during the acceptance meeting: “The Central Committee, not once but many times, had warned Gotse and Peiov that their attitude and behaviour would bring them no good! We, again and again, told the Slavo-Macedonian communists to subordinate themselves to the Party and their lives would be spared. But did they want to? Well if they didn’t want to, then in that case let them leave, let them get lost, let them go to hell!” This was followed by applause.

Following is a radiograph from Hristos Moshos to the group of ELAS divisions from Macedonia notifying them of the Voden Macedonian battalion’s desertion from ELAS and its crossing over into Vardar Macedonia:

“No. EP 162 Paiak, very urgent.

To: The group of ELAS divisions from Macedonia.

On October 14, 1944, the Slavo-Macedonian Partisan Voden Battalion stationed at Kajmakchalan has fled to Serbia (Vardar Macedonia) without our knowledge. We have dispatched a delegate to Serbian Macedonia to negotiate its return. We believe it was convinced to leave by the staff of the Macedonian partisans.

October 17, 1944. Petros (Hristos Moshos).”

* * *

In accordance with the decisions made at the First ASNOM Session, the Vardar Macedonian political and military leadership, around mid-September 1944, took serious measures to liberate and unify Macedonia. On September 23, 1944 NOV and POM Headquarters sent the following directives to the Lerin, Kostur and Voden commanders:

“You are to carry out extensive recruitment of fighters from the ranks of the Macedonian people. You will receive arms, ammunition and other military material from the NOV and POM General Headquarters. You are to prepare for operations against the Germans in the Aegean part of Macedonia and in Greece in which NOV and POM units will participate with you.”

Several days later the Lerin-Kostur battalion numbered 1500 fighters and officers and the Voden Macedonian battalion numbered 575. When the CPG and ELAS found out about the recruitment, fearing that the Macedonians would attack Solun, they tried to disband the Macedonian battalions. Because of this, relations between the CPG and the CPY became strained and on October 4, 1944, Svetozar Vukmanovich - Tempo notified General Headquarters and POJ that the Macedonian units within the ELAS had been advised not to agree to be disbanded but to cross over into Vardar Macedonia. During the night of October 4 and 5, 1944 the battalions crossed over into Vardar Macedonia.

Note: We planted our future and uprooted our past (our centuries old hearth).

In the context of what took place, everything that happened with the leaving of the two Macedonian battalions left us with eternal longing for our own piece of land. Going to Yugoslavia and joining Tito’s army was not a small mistake. In retrospect, as experience has shown us, leaving our fatherland and our hearth defenseless was a big mistake. This was the first step in the long plot of what turned out to be a Macedonian tragedy. In retrospect, our people were used for the benefit of foreign interests during the Greek Civil War, when the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (Tito) and the Communist Party of Greece (Zahariadis) with their “pseudo concerns” for the Macedonian Question led the Macedonian people to their own destruction.

More tragic than that was the “false history” perpetuated, which, instead of calling what happened a “tragedy”, “genocide” and the Macedonian people “victims of foreign interests”, it called it a “triumph” and for the last 60 years, referred to it as a “revolution”.