ORDERS FROM FOREIGN GODS - Part 01

ORDERS FROM FOREIGN GODS

(Looking through military archives. See: “Aegean Macedonia in NOB September 1944 - February 1945. Volume 4 Book 3, 1996, p. 173 and 174)

Summary of Events:

October 4, 1944

A Radiograph from Svetozar Vukmanovich Tempo (also called “the most beloved brother” by the Macedonians) to Supreme Headquarters of NOB and POJ regarding the Greek resistance leadership’s inappropriate attitude towards the Macedonian people in Greek occupied Macedonia.

Radiograph no. 35.

The Greeks are again seeking to crush the Macedonians in Greece. They are prohibiting them, by use of arms, from mobilizing new fighters into the Macedonian units. They are removing Macedonians from leadership positions and replacing them with Greeks. They are arresting officers, killing innocent people, prohibiting Macedonians from singing Macedonian songs and even songs about Tito.

We are advising the Macedonians to leave Greece and come to us (Yugoslavia) to avoid being intimidated, harassed and arrested. We should also receive some of the leadership comrades, authoritative Macedonians and we will form a delegation with evidence for the General Headquarters of Macedonia.

Tempo.

October 5, 1944.

A Radiograph from Alexander Rankovic to Svetozar - Tempo with which he orders not to send NOV and POJ Yugoslav units to Greek occupied Macedonia.

Radiograph no. 3.

For now, do not send units to Greece. Send us concrete evidence so that we can launch a protest to the Greek representative (ELAS, General Headquarters, and PEEA. Andreas Dzhimas was at the Supreme Headquarters of NOV in Yugoslavia.)

* * *

October 6, 1944.

A Radiograph from Svetozar Vukmanovich - Tempo to Supreme Headquarters of NOV and POJ, with which he reports on ELAS’s oppression of the Macedonian people in Greek occupied Macedonia.

Radiograph no. 43.

Due to the re-launching of a Greek Partisan massive terror attack against the Macedonian units in Greece, we have considered sending our units to Greece in order to fight against the Germans and in order to protect our population.

Tempo.

* * *

One morning, radio London broadcast a report given by Captain Evans Hutchison Patrick. The program was devoted to the Macedonian liberation movement in Lerin and Kostur Regions, and the following was said:

“As captain and commander of the Second ELAS Battalion or Regiment 28, Goche (Ilia Dimovski), in October 1944 was ordered by ELAS command to depart for Mount Vermion (Durla). His response to that order was a flat ‘no’. He said ‘we are Macedonians and our place is in Macedonia’. I believe that Vermion was less Slavic than Vitsi, the area where Goche’s battalion was then stationed and where Goche was born. He then stood up and left for Prespa and after that he went to Monastir (Bitola) and took his battalion with him.

This battalion was joined by Chakalaro (Nahum Peiov), commander of the “Lazo Trpovski” Unit which had armed itself with captured German weapons and was fighting against the Greek bands (Andartes). He declared that his aim was to fight for a free and independent Macedonia and that he was not fighting for a Greater Bulgaria. Being Macedonian, speaking Macedonian and fighting for a free Macedonia gained him a lot of respect with the villages around Gabresh, his village of origin. His unit was attacked by ELAS and dispersed during the middle of the summer.

Even though Peiov was a communist before the war, he was disappointed with the CPG and with ELAS’s attitude towards the Macedonian Question. In May he left for Prespa with a group of his comrades and went to NOV General Headquarters located in Shulin to ask if all the Macedonians from ELAS could come and join Tito’s Army. Deian received him there and gave him shelter, but soon Peiov was reprimanded by Tito. Some say Peiov was personally removed from Tito’s army by orders from Tito himself. Peiov was sent back to ELAS under the amnesty of Goche’s battalion. When Goche got upset and left in October, Peiov kept him company all the way to Monastir (Bitola) and supported him in all his actions.

October 17, 1944.”

When Captain Markos, with his old hatred for Macedonians, found out about the fleeing battalion, he frowned and summoned all the Headquarters to immediately dispatch elite units to chase after them and destroy them.

He said: “Now... I would pursue them as I would pursue the Germans. This is a very serious issue. They might revolt in our ranks and we will suffer huge losses...”

In the book “History of the Macedonian people”, Volume 5, page 483, it says: “The Fourth ELAS Division decided to use military force to liquidate the battalion, in which it engaged ELAS Regiments 27, 28 and 53 as well as local reserves. To circumvent a collision with ELAS and to avoid bloodshed, on October 12, 1944 the Macedonian battalion left the territory of Aegean Macedonia and moved to Vardar Macedonia. The same day and for the same reasons the Voden Macedonian battalion did the same. The total number of Macedonian fighters who severed themselves from ELAS and crossed over the Yugoslav border, numbered about 2,250”.

On October 10, 1944, when news surfaced of what was happening in Kostur and Lerin, Tempo’s emissary Rochko, from Vatasha, arrived in Sarakinovo. He asked that the battalion be placed under the command of NOV and POJ Headquarters in Yugoslavia. See: Pavle Rakovski’s Autobiography – “My Suffering”, published by AEA, Skopje, 1995.

According to CPG sources, more that 25,000 Macedonian fighters took an active role in the ranks of ELAS and ELAS reserves. See: Risto Kiriazovski “CPG and the Macedonian National Question”, p. 347.

The split and all the Macedonian paradoxes

During that period of time there was a terrible split between the Macedonian communists in Greek occupied Macedonia, a split reflected even during the Greek Civil War. The communists who remained in the ranks of the CPG continued to support the Party Line which guaranteed: “equal rights for the Macedonians within Greece”. According to our “history”, these people were considered “scum” and Greekophiles (as Evdokia Foteva – Vera calls them in her book: “To Hell and Back”, Skopje, 2005), while those who fled with the battalions to Tito’s army were labeled “deserters” and in the latter part of the Greek Civil War were called “Tito’s agents” and condemned by the CPG. This is how it was for the Macedonians of that time, a split that caused paradoxes; a split that affected the Macedonian consciousness down to the core.

After that split, during war and peace, we were a spiritually divided people and we had different visions and different desires.

In the meantime, the Greek partisans responded with reprisals against the Macedonian people… Even more so against the Macedonian fighters; now they isolated and closed in on all the Macedonian fighters in the ranks of the Greek Partisans and “interned” them in the southern part of Greece. All Macedonian propaganda and promotional material was also declared illegal.

What was Tito’s (CPY/CPM) diplomatic game with the Macedonian people’s future in Greek occupied Macedonia, just after World War II, at the beginning of 1945?

During the War, Tito took the Macedonian side in Greek occupied Macedonia with aims to help the Macedonians realize their aspirations within the Greek state, but after the Varkiza agreement of February 12, 1945, there was a radical change in his attitude.

The People’s Republic of Macedonia and the attitude of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia

Why Srem and not Solun? (29)

People who are not entirely familiar with the situation surrounding World War II often raise the question “why did the Macedonian units have to go to the Srem front and not to Solun to liberate and unite Macedonia?” There was also the Artillery Brigade rebellion at Skopje Kale (Fort) on January 7, 1945, when officers and soldiers began to yell “to Solun, to Solun, to Solun!!!” Those rebelling were immediately turned back and some were charged with disobedience, convicted and sent to prison. Historians, who have researched this period, say the decision to send the Macedonians to Srem was not decided by one person, but by the ASNOM presidium, the highest body of the newly formed Macedonian government, after it received a direct order from Supreme Commander Josip Broz Tito.

There were several reasons why the army could not be sent to Solun. At that time there was a British presence in Greece. Stationed in Greece were around 200,000 British troops, 400 British planes and 3,000 British tanks. Besides the British there were about 100,000 Greek troops belonging to the Greek coalition and Solun was also protected by 10,000 Royal Yugoslav troops. All of them were under British command led by General Scobey. If the Macedonian army took the road to Solun, it would have had to fight against the British and their anti-fascist allies, too great a force to defeat. A collision such as this would have also jeopardized Macedonia’s chances of becoming a Yugoslav Republic and no Macedonian state would exist today. But because they avoided such a collision, the allied missions and their representatives attended the first ASNOM session.

Much has been written about this subject (See: Vlado Ivanovski: "Nova Makedonija" from October 11-12, 1997. no. 3: “Why not to Solun”. Transferred from Macedonian Times, especially number 3: “Why not to Solun” which provides an overview of events, especially in the sub-headings: “Desires stronger than circumstances” and “Attitudes of the Great Powers”), that deserve special attention. Other authors too have tackled this subject and all of them have handled it with great ease. But no one has tackled it better or more in-depth than historian Vlado Ivanovski, who also reveals all the actions taken by the CPM/CPY.

Very competently and with irrefutable facts! Here is what Ivanovski says:

1. Conduct of the three great powers of the anti-fascist coalition: the USSR, the U.S. and the UK;

2. It is an undeniable fact that the “unification of Macedonia” was a problem for the CPY during the time of NOV and PC;

3. We cite the document from August 16, 1944, entitled “Macedonia – Memorandum”, by the State Secretary for Foreign Affairs of Great Britain, which said: “We are ready to give consent to the formation of a Macedonian state within federal Yugoslavia. But we have to insist that this country must not attempt to annex, or seek any other territories, regardless of whether those territories belong to Bulgaria or Greece.”

4. There was mention of State Agreements on the division of interest, and that Greece was 100% under British influence, with the right, if necessary, at any time be able to intervene with all possible means; 5. That Tito, in the summer of 1944, requested of NOV units in Macedonia to secure the southern border with Greece. That meant to protect the sovereignty of the borders of these states;

6. That, at that time the United States emphasized the necessity to preserve the territorial integrity of “status quo” to prewar borders for Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Greece and that the United States was categorically opposed to any border revision, even though it recognized the Macedonian territory in Greece.

And at the end he concludes:

“…The political and military leadership of Macedonia realistically estimated, held and controlled the situation during the January events, not allowing emotions to prevail above reason and logic, preventing the newly formed and fragile federal Republic of Macedonia from being drawn into a war. The consequences of which would have been catastrophic.”

“Should we have gone to the Srem Front?” asks General Atanasov in the daily newspaper “Utrisnki Vesnik” in the September 14, 2009 issue. After giving the question some serious thought the General concluded:

“I was a participant in that campaign, then called ‘Operation for the liberation of Yugoslavia’ so I say here’s why we had to go to Srem:

In my estimation it was a wise decision for the newly created Macedonian state to continue to struggle against the occupiers in the anti-fascist war until complete victory was achieved. If we had not gone to the Srem front, I don’t believe we would have had the success we have with our country.

The Varkiza Agreement between the Royal Greek government and EAM, the Anti-Fascist Front in Greece, had already been signed before we were sent to the Srem front. The Varkiza Agreement was followed by the disarming of the ELAS fighters which was then followed by the white terror instigated by the Monarcho-Fascists against the anti-fascist fighters. At this point the Macedonian fighters found themselves in the Monarcho-Fascist machine for grinding human flesh. More qualified than me who can speak about this are the fighters from Aegean Macedonia who are still alive and the historians.

ASNOM and we, its fighters (NOV and POM), could not ignore the experience called ‘Varkiza’. We saw what happened when the Royal Greek government returned. It would have been a similar experience for us here if the Royal Serbian government were to come back from London! We couldn’t let that happen.

The outcome of the War in a global sense was certain, however the outcome of the war in Yugoslavia was not quite so certain. At that moment, Macedonia, for the Macedonian people, for the Macedonian state and for the benefits of the four-year struggle, had to struggle. Because the real live question was; what was going to happen to us if a ‘Varkiza’ type agreement was to be put in place here? And what could we do to avoid it? The Macedonian exodus from Aegean Macedonia after ‘Varkiza’ was not the work of the German fascists, but the work of the Monarcho-Fascist terrorists sponsored by the anti-fascist allied forces. Not only did we have to go to the Srem front but we also had to be ready to do more to avoid the return of the Serbian kingdom to Yugoslavia.

By the way, if someone out there believes it was not important for the Macedonian forces to cross the Austrian border in the eyes of the world, then that “someone” does not know history and its problems. These Macedonian forces were not some wild army. Behind them stood their own state, ASNOM Macedonia, a de facto allied state within the Anti-Fascist coalition. Not only now, but according to J.A.’s opinion (debating with Jovce Angeleski, current head of the NOV Museum and expert on the antifascist struggle), even then there was no alternative but to go to the Srem front. Yes, all the way to Berlin but not to Solun. And who might want us to go to Solun? The Third Reich perhaps? Or perhaps fascist Bulgaria, which skillfully manipulated Macedonian feelings? What Macedonian did not want to go to Solun? Let us pose the question differently: what would have happened if we had not gone to the Srem front and opted for going to Solun? Here is the answer:

If we did not go anywhere, not even to Solun, we would have remained in an erased space where a ‘Balkan Dogma’ would have taken place and our lands from this part of Macedonia would have been redistributed.

If we had opted for going to Solun, as a country we would have gone to the side of the fascist axis. We would have gone to the losing side. We would have excluded ourselves from the anti-fascist coalition and from the front. We would have committed an act of war against the Allies -especially at an extremely negative time. We would have found ourselves at a dead end with our national freedom and with our new state. With such odds, we would not have been able to take Solun and the Republic of Macedonia would have had its own ‘Vardar Varkiza’ imposed on it. Macedonia would have been allowed to be ravaged.”

I read and re-read General Todor Atanasov’s columns. I was happy to read what he had written and that he understood the situation well. He is an intellectual and his writing reflects that. His was an act of historical and moral responsibility done in the service of Macedonian society. His writing has shown that he is a man of integrity who would not allow himself to be pushed into some kind of dark political tunnel.

After reading Dr. Vlado Ivanovski’s articles and analysis, my own conclusion was that: Dr. Vlado Ivanosvki gave us an excellent analysis of the military and political situation of the time. He explained the facts well and came to a conclusion that:

“…The political and military leadership of Macedonia realistically estimated, held and controlled the situation during the January events, not allowing emotions to prevail above reason and logic, preventing the newly formed and fragile federal Republic of Macedonia from being drawn into a war. The consequences of which would have been catastrophic.”

My family and, I as a participant in DAG and as a man who nearly suffered genocide in Greek hands, had found ourselves outside of our home; my father in Australia, my mother in Poland, my brother in prison in Greece, and I in the USSR. A fate that has befallen thousands of Macedonian families from Greek occupied Macedonia. Given all this, I had to ask myself: why had the general distanced himself from the integral perception of Macedonian history?!

Let us follow the strength of the arguments before argument of strength:

“Did our prominent and respected General know (he must have known what brought the evil in Greek occupied Macedonia, and more about who carried out the genocide over the Macedonian people) that from October 1944 to October 14, 1946 the Macedonians from Greek occupied Macedonia were in the arms of the CPY/CPM. Did he know that a few months after the Kale rebellion the Organizations NOF, AFZH and NOMS were formed on April 23, 1945, in Skopje by the CPY/CPM leadership? Facts which now, more than 60 years later have been confirmed by historian Risto Kiriazovski? (See: The chapter entitled “Tito’s action in the Aegean part of Macedonia” in Dr. Risto Kiriazovski’s book “Five vital years in Aegean Macedonia (1945 - 1949)” p. 13, 14, 15 and 16)

The history of Macedonian people from Greek occupied Macedonia is nothing more than a scam, a list of betrayals, crimes and misfortunes, but the question is why is it not told as part of the Macedonian people’s integral history? The Macedonian people’s integral history must openly tell the Macedonian story the way it happened; i.e. who activated “the Macedonian syndrome” for the (self) sacrifice of the Macedonian people in Greek occupied Macedonia in the years 1945 to 1949. Who was responsible for dragging the Macedonian people into the Greek Civil War which killed so many and permanently exiled so many more.

If in history we need to look to the future, I am interested to know and, as a participant in the Greek Civil War, it is my duty to investigate the roots of this evil, for which we were pushed to participate in the Greek Civil War (1945-1949) right after World War II ended. I am interested to know who is to blame and shares the guilt of emptying Greek occupied Macedonia of its Macedonian people? I am interested to know “did we have a Macedonian strategy when we entered this war and how did we ended up losing it and our centuries old hearth along with it? I am interested to know who among us decided to partner with the Greeks after living like slaves under them for more than three decades…?

How was it with the Macedonians in Yugoslavia? In that period of time (and until the disintegration of Yugoslavia), it is a fact that Macedonians in former Yugoslavia, in the Yugoslav Federation, had little to no clout. They had absolutely no clout regarding foreign affairs. Foreign policy was in the hands of Belgrade, with some impact from Zagreb and Ljubljana. Let’s say that they would not allow Macedonians in the mix. This meant that all injustices done against the Macedonian people from Greek occupied Macedonia had to be handled from Belgrade. And why would Belgrade (Serbia, Greece’s traditional ally and 1913 co-conspirator) care about the Macedonians from Greece?

I don’t want to talk only about how others are to blame for what happened to us Macedonians. There is much hidden in our historiography which, for half a century, has not been told. For example, how and why did the CPM allow Yugoslavia to have a two-fold policy; public and private, which encouraged the Macedonian people from Greek occupied Macedonia to enter the Greek armed struggle? Was that not against the will of the Macedonian people? With that, did the Macedonian people allow others, outsiders to control their fate? Why has Macedonian integral historiography not explained the CPM/CPY’s involvement in this?

The problem looks complicated, but that’s the way it is at first glance. The truth can be simple if we look at it honestly and impartially with a sense of historical objectivity. So the question is: Were we the Macedonians (about 3% to 5% of the total population in Greece, after all the ethnic changes that took place) in Greek occupied Macedonia, politically and militarily capable, under the leadership of NOF and AFZH, as intimated by these organizations, to preserve the territorial integrity and compactness of the Macedonian population in Greek occupied Macedonia after World War II, after the borders between Greece and Yugoslavia became international military borders between the two camps of the cold war?!

SOUND OF WAR: Policy changing events - steps taken leading to the hellish Greek Civil War

Here are some facts and arguments which prove evil doesn’t fall from the sky but is part of our story in these conflicting Balkan states.

1. By order No. 236 issued directly by Tito on April 2, 1945, the First Aegean Brigade was disbanded;

2. This may have been as a result of Tito’s following statement made in Moscow on April 26, 1945, when he gave an interview for the “New York Times” during which he said: “If the Macedonians from the Greek regions of Macedonia express desire to unite with other Macedonians, Yugoslavia will respect their aspirations”. See: Yugoslav-Soviet treaty of friendship signed April 11, 1945 in Moscow, and FO 371/48388/7762.

3. According to official historiography: There is no doubt that the establishment of NOF, AFZH and NOMS had political aims as confirmed by historian Risto Kiriazovski’s works (1966/181) in an attempt to reveal the “truth” by leaving us clues. But on the other hand Kiriazovski pushed the thesis that we led a Revolution and not a fraud perpetrated through the creation of NOF and AFZH. And finally in his latest book, Kiriazovski gives us yet another clue by saying that NOF and AFZH were led by the CPY/CPM during the period from April 24, 1945 to October 16, 1946.

Anyone who has read our history and those who want to know what happened will easily discover how we Macedonians made mistakes and how we put ourselves in perilous situations.

It is time that Macedonian history debunks the games played by “the great leaders, by the statements and by those who led this horror show perpetrated against the Macedonian people from Greek occupied Macedonia. It is time for the Macedonian people to know: “Who activated the “Macedonian syndrome” of (self) sacrifices in the years 1945 to 1949 during the Greek Civil War!?”

Why is that important? Because the Greek Civil War was the most tragic event that the Macedonian people from Greek occupied Macedonia have

experienced, which not only killed many but uprooted even more from their centuries old hearths and left them with a deep sense of alienation.

It would have been authoritative, as a living witness, if Evdokia Foteva – Vera, one of the AFZH leaders responsible for the agitation and mobilization of Macedonian women into the struggle, had spoken about this matter and answered the questions put forth in this write-up. Unfortunately she too passed on and by-passed these relevant historical issues, leaving us engulfed in fog. Why did NOF and AFZH choose war over all other options? More importantly why did NOF and AFZH allow exclusive foreign (Greek) leadership over the Macedonians? Up to now nothing has been said about this from the leadership. What were the aims behind forming a “National Liberation Front” platform, part of which were NOF and AFZH? Was the bloody story in Greek occupied Macedonia a result of what NOF and AFZH had done!? What happened at the formation of NOF and AFZH in Skopje, under the leadership of the CPM/CPY, and what were they specifically instructed to do? Perhaps NOF and AFZH were, unconsciously, ordered by outsiders to import the “revolution” to Greek occupied Macedonia, pressured under the motto “If you’re not with us, you’re against us!” Is there anyone who can tell us anything about who made the decisions to take these actions?

Many questions – no answers; seeming like the whole story is shrouded in a half century old secret! …But there are other ways we can get our answers…

For example, what was Federal Yugoslavia’s position on the Macedonian issue? Given that Tito stood at the top of the Federal Yugoslav leadership and given what his statement to the “New York Times” in Moscow on April 26, 1945 was “If the Macedonians from the Greek regions of Macedonia express desire to unite with other Macedonians, Yugoslavia will respect their aspirations” then there would be no reason for us not to believe that Tito was fully committed to support whatever the Macedonian people strived for? Right?

Several days before that, on April 23, 1945, NOF was created in Skopje under the initiative of the CPY/CPM leadership and staffed with Macedonians from Greek occupied Macedonia.

Now let us see how NOF, AFZH and NOMS were created according to Pavle Rakovski, one of its founders. In his autobiography “My Suffering”, published by AEA, 2000 on page 341 Rakovski wrote:

“In the middle of April 1945, I received a message from Dzhodzho Urdov asking me to immediately leave for Skopje. I did. The political committee by then had already been dismissed. In its place, at the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Macedonia in Skopje on April 23, the National Liberation Front-NOF belonging to the Macedonians from Aegean Macedonia (its members were selected without a conference and without elections, but by cooption) was constituted or formed. Pascal Mitretvski (30) was given a free hand to choose four more people and reassemble the central governing body – a five-member Bureau. He called me and told me this then he asked me for my opinion about which other four people, besides him, did I think should lead this bureau? I suggested the following: Georgi Urdov-Dzhodzho, Ilo Dimakov-Goche, Naum Peiov, and Mahail Keramidzhiev. He thanked me and left. He then constituted the Bureau as follows: Paskal Mitrevski, Georgi Urdov-Dzhodzho, Mihail Keramidzhiev, Tanas Koroveshov and Pavle Rakovski.

I have already mentioned that I respected Mitrevski because he was trusted by the Socialist Republic of Macedonia Party state leadership. I appreciated and respected the man simply and openly. And it seems to me that is why he decided to choose me and include me in the NOF highest governing body.

Formed at the same time as NOF were the women’s organization AFZH and the youth organization NOMS. In fact, work was done to expand the activities of the same-named organizations from the Vardar to the Aegean part of Macedonia. Members from the top leadership, members from the NOF activists, members from other Macedonian political organizations and members from the military formations that were demobilized, including fighters and officers from the First Aegean Macedonian Brigade, and from the ranks of the Aegean Macedonian political refugees that had fled to Yugoslavia, were recruited to assist with the development of these organizations.

At that meeting I was assigned to coordinate field activities in Aegean Macedonia, with the people from P. R. Macedonia who led NOF. Among them were instructors from the CPM Central Committee. The first instructor was the Slovenian Miha Marinko, followed by Nikola Minchev and by Dimitar Dimitrievski - Peko.

After the first sitting, the five of us went to the field to lay NOF’s foundations. This was at Kostur, Lerin, Voden, Enidzhe-Vardar and Seres Regions…”

Did Tito (CPY/CPM) in the program goals and tasks communicated to him by Tsvetko Uzunovski – Abas, CPM Central Committee organizational secretary and Interior Minister of P. R. Macedonia of the NOF Aegean Macedonian leadership, allow for a Macedonian national strategy to secure the spiritual and physical survival of the people and for them to remain in their homeland, or was this not in favour of Yugoslav politics? In other words, what safeguards, if any, did Tito allow to be put in place in order to safeguard the Macedonian people in Greek occupied Macedonia to be protected from harm and from losing their lives and homes?

During the meeting, attended by the NOF leadership which included Mitrevski, Rakovski and Urdov, Tsvetko Uzunovski said: Today Yugoslavia became the Centre of the revolution in the Balkans. The Macedonian question became a Yugoslav question because the CPY formed the Party and the political organizations NOF, AFZH and NOMS, which you will lead. The task of these organizations is to turn the Macedonian people in Aegean Macedonia towards a Yugoslav orientation. Now, the Macedonian people and the Macedonian movement are under the leadership of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia. The Macedonian people from Aegean Macedonia will now find their full establishment only within Federal Yugoslavia, which is for Aegean Macedonia to join Yugoslavia. (AM. Archive of Macedonia. F -20/276 F-20/196).

The Greek leadership option is described by CPG Secretary Nikos Zahariadis, in the book by ΠΕΤΡΟΣ ΑΝΤΑΙΟΣ, “ΝΙΚΟΣ ΖΑΗΑΡΙΑ∆ΗΣ − ΘΥΤΗΣ ΚΑΙ ΘΥΜΑ” page 414.

Here is what Petros wrote:

“The 3rd Extraordinary Congress of the Socialist Party of Greece was held in the year during which Zahariadis, with a group of party cadres who had completed their studies at the KOUTV party school in Moscow, returned from the Soviet Union to Greece (1924). During that same Congress the Party name was changed from Socialist Party of Greece to Communist Party of Greece (KKE). Some internal issues were cleared up and a number of resolutions were adopted including those of the 3rd Communist International Congress, those of the Balkan Communist conferences, specifically the 7th Conference of the Balkan Communist Federation, which dealt with the so-called “Macedonian” issue. And by adopting this resolution we in effect put the first loop of the noose around the KKE’s neck. All this was done on behalf of the international proletariat.”

This is how Zahariadis felt about us Macedonians all along; that “we were a noose around his Party’s neck”! And how did we Macedonians, especially those who were in leadership positions, feel about Zahariadis? They treated him like a god and swore by him! Many gave their lives for him. This was not only humiliating but pathetic and sick! He pointed us in the direction of extermination while calling it a path to victory and we blindly followed him. We even sang songs about him, when we were happy and when we were angry, and called him “our greatest son!” How pathetic was that?! Ah, I can’t even describe how much this hurts today -our civilized hypocrisy!?

According to author Antheos, Zahariadis said: “Unlike the Bulgarian (31) delegation, the Yugoslav and Greek delegates voted for the position that would allow Macedonia and Thrace autonomy, believing that we met our international duty and complicated the Bulgarian chauvinistic views regarding this issue.”

What was the Comintern policy regarding this issue? Did Zahariadis adhere to this policy and how did he deal with the noose which was imposed on him by the Comintern?

Zahariadis was the leader of the Greek communist movement and secretary general of the CPG (KKE) from 1936 to 1956. He persistently preached confidence to the ranks of the CPG and treated it like a cult. He also believed that the KPSS and Stalin were infallible. Then why did he support the Party Line of the Greek leadership from 1924 to 1936 and in contradiction to that, say to his predecessors and the CPG that the “Macedonian Question” was a noose?! By saying that, does he not also contradict his own beliefs about the KPSS and Stalin?

If Zahariadis said this back in 1924, it meant that he had systematically supported the official Party Line of Janis Kordatos and the immediate Socialist Workers Party of Greece leadership, which during the Party’s Third Extraordinary Congress (and since its formation in 1918) adopted a resolution which was against the policy of the Comintern regarding a “united and independent Macedonia”, because such a policy was not in favour of the Greek historical reality. So, what exactly was the historical reality of the Greek communists?

The objective historical reality for these communists was: defense of the colonists! That reality came into effect after Greek occupied Macedonia was colonized by more than 630,000 settlers from Asia Minor. This was done with agreements: The Neuilly Convention between Greece and Bulgaria and the Treaty of Lausanne between Greece and Turkey.

For the Greek communists, since the population exchanges and since the ethnic demographic changes in Greek occupied Macedonia took place, there was no place for the Comintern position to support a “united and independent Macedonia”. This means that the CPG did everything it could to not upset the Greek bourgeoisie and to not create conditions where an authoritarian regime would be imposed in Greece. The introduction of the Mataxas dictatorship and measures taken against the Macedonians, they felt, was not their concern.

So we lived among communists who led us to believe that: “The national question was only the interest of the bourgeois” and that the working class struggle had no place in “National Questions”.

At that time we did not realize what was happening and we believed everything that Zahariadis told us because he represented the communists at the highest level and the communists were in support of the working class. We believed Zahariadis because we believed in Leninist and Marxist principles. And because we believed Zahariadis, we followed him and he led us to our genocide and to our expulsion from our ancestral homes.

From our experience with the Greek communists and what we know about their conduct, we can conclude that, after the ethnic composition change in Greek occupied Macedonia, the Greeks were never in favour of equitably solving the “Macedonian Question”. Our research has also shown, and so have many military and political analysts (Greeks, Russians, Croats and Americans), that there are reservations as to what Zahariadis was really doing during this struggle: Was he really fighting a socialist revolution in Greece for equal rights and equality for all people; rights to self-determination for the Macedonians and others during the Greek Civil War, or was he there to fulfill some other Western Power objective?

It is a fact that the CPG privately did not support the Comintern views on the Macedonian national question which means that it had no intention of granting the Macedonian any rights or independence. It is a fact that the CPG publicly supported “equal rights for the Macedonians” meaning that it wanted to use the Macedonians for some other purpose. And in retrospect the CPG “used” the Macedonians in furthering its development of the Greek liberation movement under its control. Even during the days of SNOF the Greeks insisted that the Macedonian population remain under EAM and under the CPG and fight under their strategic objectives.

Secretary General Zahariadis’s own personal manipulations regarding the depth of the Macedonian tragedy in the Greek Civil War (1945-1950) is well known. Even though Zahariadis called for the total mobilization of the entire Macedonian population through NOF during the Greek Civil War, he knew that all this contribution and action against the Greek government would be ineffective and pointless. He admitted this himself. In fact, such action, he believed would be suicidal! The irony is that he led this conflict and he caused this tragedy! No matter what Zahariadis said, the noose he was referring to being placed over the CPG and on the neck of the Greek people, as it turned out, was actually being prepared to be placed over the neck of the Macedonian people. And that’s exactly what happened!

We the Macedonians, all through the Greek Civil War years, were prevented from manifesting our will for unity, but served as slaves to the “Party” and to the “Leader”, who “used” us and then “threw” us into the ideological waste basket.

It was normal for the Greek communists to divide and enslave us. Once they changed the ethnic composition of our lands, they made the colonists from Asia Minor our masters and we became their slaves…

After the war it became very clear to every Macedonian that we fought for our own demise. In other words, our involvement in the Greek Civil War was exactly as it turned out! They fooled us into picking up guns, we did and they “justifiably” killed us. The Greek communists lied to us and dragged us into a deep ideological and political crisis. We took the bait and we were exterminated. That is exactly what happened and that is the “raw” unfathomable, unbelievable truth! What Greek authorities “dreamed” of doing for many years, the communists accomplished in just half a decade!

It is well known that the Papandreou government in Cairo, even then demanded of the CPG and ELAS, specifically from CPG Secretary Siantos, that:

“They ‘liquidate’ all Greek (Slavo-phone) political organizations and military formations in northern Greece. It would be a historical mistake for the Greeks and for the Greek state if the Slavo-phone formations SNOF and SOB are part of the liberation of the cities: Kostur, Lerin, Voden and other territories now occupied by the Germans and the Italians.”

Reactions and other events in Greece

1. On April 17, 1946 the Solun right wing newspaper “Nea Alithia” (New Truth) published an article entitled “Our Sudetenland”, speaking about the Macedonians and how they qualified to be Sudetenland-ers and as such,

the newspaper wrote: “... in the interest of peace and security in Greece, these people should be liquidated…”

2. The newspaper “Ethnikos Kirikas” wrote: “…Greece should soon expel 80, 000 Slavo-Macedonians…”

The same was said in the weekly Republican newspaper “Eleftheros Typos” on January 28, 1946 in an article entitled: “Let the Slavo-Macedonian leave our Macedonia - let them go where they want to go…”

* * *

The Western power position towards the left in Greece was very clear. Unfortunately we can’t say the same about Russia’s position which was not only unclear but strange. Stalin’s message to Yugoslavia was: “Let them mess with capitalism but don’t let them win.” And as far as supporting them, just give them verbal support. And thus was born Yugoslavia’s two pronged policy; a public one where official Yugoslavia respected Greece’s integrity and a private one which encouraged the Macedonian people in Greek occupied Macedonia to join the armed struggle.

The Great Allied Powers, in general, were not against the creation of a Macedonian state. Unfortunately they could not agree among themselves what the future Macedonian state would look like. The USSR wanted the Macedonian territories to be annexed by federal Yugoslavia. The U.S. and Britain did not want the amalgamation of Macedonian territories because it was not beneficial to Greece. So the main role in preventing any plans of uniting the Macedonian territories in the future was placed in the hands of the UK.

As a matter of fact, the United Kingdom asked the United States to become involved in Macedonian affairs. This can be verified by the telegram addressed to the U.S. State Department sent by Barnes, an American diplomat in Sofia, on January 26, 1945. The contents of this telegram were revealed to the Bulgarian government: Among other things, the telegram said: “His Majesty’s Government is not of the opinion to approve the formation of an exclusive federation between Bulgaria and Yugoslavia. But we are willing to agree with the federation of all Balkan countries composed of current allies and their enemies, with the possibility of Turkey’s involvement as well. Similarly, His Majesty also strongly opposes the creation of a Greater Macedonia, in which the territory of

Greece would be included, but we are ready to approve a future Macedonian state within Yugoslavia...

His Majesty makes it clear that any annexation of territory from Bulgaria with the Yugoslav Federal State Macedonia, without UN consent, would be considered, in his Majesty’s opinion, something that the Bulgarian government has no right to do.”

This British threat against the union of the Macedonian territories occupied by Greece and Bulgaria, the America State Department accepted as a “fait accompli” even though the United States had been arguing that the desire of the local population should be respected. In a telegram dated February 24, 1945, addressed to the British Embassy in Washington, the U.S. State Department replied as follows: “…the U.S. position is that the pre-war borders of Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Greece in the Macedonian territory should be respected as lawful and any revision should only be performed with respect to the desire of the population and with international support, after the war is over and during peacetime.”

As can be seen here, the United States respected the desire of the local population only in principle because it succumbed to British Government pressure. So in order to allow the British to tailor make a Balkan policy, the U.S. stepped over its own principles with regards to respecting the wishes of the people. “The U.S. government agrees,” it said in the same telegram, “with the British government’s view that there is no legitimate basis for supporting Macedonia, be it an independent state, as part of Yugoslavia, or part of a large Slavic Union, and to relinquish Greek territory on the grounds that the territory is Macedonian.”

In this way the UK won over American support to protect its pet, Greece. British pressure on its allies, as well as on Bulgaria and Yugoslavia, strongly shook Yugoslav - Bulgarian plans to unite Macedonia in federal Yugoslavia. In conclusion: British political influence over the future of Macedonia and over the Macedonian people in Greek occupied Macedonia, unfortunately, managed to legitimize Macedonia’s division.

And what was the attitude of the British ambassador in Athens?

In November 1944, Mr. P.A. Leeper brought up the idea of displacing 120,000 “Slavo-Macedonians” from their indigenous homeland in Greece and driving them north and out of the Greek border. Leeper suggested this to UK Foreign Minister Anthony Eden in a letter dated November 24, 1944. Here is an extract from that letter: