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The Other Face of History

MACEDONIAN CONDITIONS - Part 01

By Stoian Kochov · Part 19 of 31 · About 36 minutes

MACEDONIAN CONDITIONS

(Paradigm of division - Stalin against Tito and Tito unmercifully ending ties with the Informburo while the Macedonians are caught in the middle of their game.)

On Zahariadis’s orders, NOF and AFZH leaders were dismissed and sent to DAG General Headquarters. So, let us ask the question: Did the Macedonians, particularly the leadership, have the capacity to understand that their allegiance to one or the other of the ideological divisions was in fact creating divisions in the Macedonian people and in Macedonia?

August 1, 1949. The newspaper “Pros ti niki” (To Victory), organ of DAG General Headquarters, (no. 168, published on August 3, 1949) carried the KOEM, NOF, AFZH and NOMS leadership response to the July 29, 1949 Skopje Conference attended by representatives of some 30,000 refugees from Aegean Macedonia (whose children, brothers and sisters were mobilized in the ranks of DAG and died in the battlefields of Gramos, Vicho and throughout Greece and who were now defending CPY politics).

Among other things the response said: “Several former activists of NOF and AFZH – Tito’s clique of traitors, who deserted from the ranks of DAG, are now treacherously calling on all Macedonians who are fighting in the ranks of DAG to desert. They are using slogans such as ‘Brothers, Macedonians! Drop your weapons and flee to Yugoslavia. No longer shed the blood of Macedonia for foreign interests. The Greeks lied to us and want to sacrifice us in this war’!”

A resolution was passed during the Skopje conference which said: “The Macedonian people from Aegean Macedonia will never forget the assistance provided by the Yugoslav people led by Marshal Tito and will always preserve their eternal love and gratitude.” The conference strongly condemned the CPG’s defamatory campaign and rejected its latest slanders.

Stalin against Tito and Tito against Stalin with the Macedonians at their mercy

During this ideological rivalry and political games played by Stalin and Tito in the period between 1948 and 1949, Stalin began to design a new concept, “The Vishinski Plan” to overthrow the Yugoslav leadership. This plan, among other things, envisioned a campaign to create an “independent Macedonian state”, which, under the auspices of the Infoburo, would encompass all Macedonians from “Pirin, Vardar and Aegean Macedonian”. The Inforburo slogan for creating a United Macedonian State called on all Macedonians from the Aegean and Vardar parts of Macedonia to work against Yugoslavia. For more information on this see: Milovan Djilas, “Razgovority so Stalin” (Talks with Stalin)," p. 175 - 178.

Milovan Djilas in his book “Vlast” wrote: “This harsh, violent and reckless conduct was a consequence of the view that Cominformizm must be uprooted from its roots.” “This view was not designed by any forum; it was designed by Tito himself who was the highest forum, if not unique, regarding these kinds of issues. By being witness to the Stalinist Soviet experience, which worked to fulfill personal desires and ambitions, Tito knew that after the Revolution Stalin could jeopardize him and the Yugoslav state by internal communist opposition. So, in the fall of 1948, Tito began to call for, and not only one time, sending people to jail and to the camps! And in this instance some served him well even if they had to work against their own people.” For more details see: “Utrinski Vesnik”, published July 3, 2006.

In the book “Yugoslav Communism and the Macedonian Question” by Steve E. Palmer and Robert R. King, Archon Books, 1971, on p. 117, the following was written: “Beyond the differences expressed by the Yugoslav and Soviet party leaders, in February 1948, Stalin changed direction by attempting to create a Bulgarian - Yugoslav Federation in order to subdue the Communist Party of Yugoslavia but was having difficulties convincing the Yugoslavs to accept his direction. In this confused situation, the Macedonian Question was completely avoided during the first Bulgarian Congress held in January 1948. But during the Pirin Macedonian Party conference, held at the end of April in Blagoevgrad, a hostile attitude was taken towards the initiatives of the Macedonians from Yugoslavia. When the CPY was excluded from the Cominform on June 28, 1948, there was a big break in relations between Yugoslavia and Moscow.”

After the Cominform resolution, the Bulgarian Party began to furiously attack the Yugoslavs and took immediate steps to eliminate Yugoslav influence on the Macedonians in Pirin Macedonia. During the CPB Central Committee Sixteenth Plenum, held on July 12, 1948, it was stated that: “A Federation of Southern Slavs and the eventual annexation of Pirin to create a United Macedonia was only possible if Yugoslavia were to remain faithful to a common Socialist Front (i.e. the Cominform).”

December 1948. During the CPB 5th Congress Dimitrov announced: “Our party has always defended our standpoint and it will continue to defend the position that Macedonia belongs to the Macedonians.” But then he added that national unity was possible “only within a federation of southern Slavs”.

Reactions from the U.S. and from the government in Athens

A Memorandum addressed to the central informative service of the U.S. Department of Defense claimed that: “…aims of the Soviet Union and neighbouring socialist countries were to bring the Communists to power in Greece by creating an independent Macedonia which was to enter into the Yugoslav composition and for Greek Thrace to join Bulgaria. In such a situation the Soviet Union would have a way into the Aegean Sea and full control over the Balkans.”

G. Marshal, U.S. Minister of Foreign Affairs, after arrived in Athens on February 14, said that the U.S. government is satisfied with the changes in Greece and, in the interests of the U.S. and the United Nations, Greece will receive help to preserve its independence and territorial integrity.

On December 27, 1947 the Greek government passed special legislation PR 509/47, “regarding state security measures and constitutional protection of its citizens”, according to which the CPG and EAM were outlawed. Then with U.S. approval, 650 people were arrested in Athens from December 25 to 28, suspected of being communists.

In this “created” setting in which there was no “realistic” hope of DAG winning militarily, the CPG began to warm up to the Greek government. On January 27, 1949 the Provisional Democratic Government, during a radio broadcast, offered a new peace proposal, as follows:

1). Review all treaties and agreements relating to the freedom and independence of this country, 2). Opposing armies are to maintain their territories, 3) Current proclamation for political amnesty, 4). Re-establishment of all political liberties,

5). Start negotiations to form a government acceptable to both sides. This government will precisely define Articles of Agreement to be signed and terms under which to hold free elections in two months.

However, as was in previous cases, this peace proposal too was deemed suspicious and unacceptable.

On February 1, 1949 British ambassador Norton informed Tsaldaris, Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs, that “There was no change in British policy towards the bandits (DAG Partisans)”.

On July 10, 1949 Tito closed the Yugoslav border to Greece and the CPG, under a KPSS directive, on July 23, 1949 broke ranks with the CPY. After that the Albanian government recommended to the CPG to begin “downgrading” the Macedonians…

NOF and AFZH cadres are ordered by Zahariadis to report to DAG General Headquarters

October 3, 1948. NOF cadres were asked to report to the village Rudari in Prespa, Lerin Region. There, Zahariadis informed them to go and join the ranks of DAG. Here is what Vera in her book “To Hell and Back” had to say: “Immediately I agreed. (This meeting was held in order to arrange which NOF cadre had to go where in DAG’s ranks.) You will go,” he said to me, “to the DAG 18th Brigade where you will serve as a political assistant commissar.” (Vera then was an example of a good Macedonian and was under the leadership of political Commissar Tashko Gushevski -Maki and Commander Pando Vaina.)

At the end of her autobiography Vera gave the following statement: “With our arrest there was no more NOF but the Organization continued to linger on outside of Greece and in 1951 was renamed “Ilinden”. As usual, the heads of “Ilinden” were hand picked by Nikos Zahariadis, which included Pando Vaina, Stavro Kochev etc. These “internal enemies” went to Bulgaria where they terminated NOF and “Ilinden’s” activities.

Official history since 1995

For his latest official description of the Macedonian and the CPY and CPG attitudes towards them, see Risto Kiriazovski’s book “Makedontiste i odnosite na KPJ i KPG (1945 -1949) – ofitsialni dokumenti so komentari”, 1995, Chapter 8, p. 201. Kiriazovski is now supporting a new position which opposes and contradicts what he had said in his earlier books published before 1995. “… It is time for the Macedonians from Greek occupied Macedonia, and beyond, to face the entire truth and for every stakeholder to take responsibility for what happened. It is time to name things by their true names. It is our obligation…”

Hunting down “Tito agents” and DAG combat unit deserters fleeing to Yugoslavia to seek protection from the CPM/CPY

Some of those deserters, until yesterday, were senior members of NOF and AFZH. They were now abandoning DAG to save their own skins. Did they forget that, for the last two years, they had been responsible for agitating the people, for creating a strong party apparatus and for maintaining high spirits in the Yugoslav party? All these members of NOF and AFZH were communists, loyal to the Parties, sent there by the CPY. This included Evdokia Foteva – Vera, leader of AFZH, who, on page 204 of her book “To Hell and Back”, said:

“…They, down in Aegean Macedonia, in the CPG, NOF, AFZH, NOMS, always served with intrigue (she was thinking of all those in DAG who had deserted during the Greek Civil War and fled to Yugoslavia - R. Macedonia)... Mincho (later her husband) and I were by nature truth-loving, brought up to be honest... We remained true to NOF of Aegean Macedonia to the end.”

“Dimitar Trpovski, a friend of mine from my village, on April 11 – 12, took me to the Greek ‘Iafka’ (telegraph office) in Skopje so that I could visit with a group of NOF leaders who had deserted DAG and fled to Yugoslavia in 1948. Included among them were Mihail Keramitchiev, leader of the group, Vangel Aianovski - Oche, Steriana Vangelova -Slavianka, Lena Stoikova - Mirka and others, who immediately attacked me and told me that we had surrendered to the Greeks. I got angry and told them that they were despondent and deserters who had left their people in disarray and ran off to hide, to save their own skin and their own families, while we, who were loyal to the Party and to our people, remained there and were prepared to fight and die…” For more information see p. 85.

So, given that Vera has offered us her honest opinion about these people being “deserters” the question that comes to mind is: Were these people ever in favour of a United Macedonia in a Balkan federation or were they defending the Party (CPY) thesis that the Party would give the Macedonian people from Greek occupied Macedonia a Yugoslav solution? So, why did they leave Aegean Macedonia for the second time? The first time was when they left with the Aegean Brigade. Why did they leave after convincing and pushing so many Macedonian fighters to join DAG and fight in the battlefields all across Greece? Why did they leave the Macedonian fighters in the hands of the Greeks? Why did they not fight for what they preached, for a Macedonian solution?

This most striking condition outlines their commitment to the CPG and the reaction towards their own comrades whom they called deserters. Their focus and commitment should have been to Macedonia and they should have sought a solution that benefited the Macedonian people and not ask people “are you with Tito or with Zahariadis”? Unfortunately instead of promoting what was good for Macedonia and for the Macedonian people they allowed divisions to foster and alienated the people by asking them: “Are you with us and if you are not, then, you are not with everyone!” These kinds of statements were premeditated and had a devastating effect on Macedonian unity. I am more afraid of distortions of the truth than I am of having to mention this fact:

Liljana Panova in her book “End of an Illusion, the Greek Civil War and the Macedonians 1946-1949”, on page 159, wrote: “... Nikolova (Vera) confided in Aianovski – Oche and told him that the ‘CPG began to again implement its policy of creating divisions among NOF cadres’, and that ‘today there are three factions in NOF, one with Paskal Mitrovski, one with Pavle Rakovski and the third with Koichev’ and that the ‘CPG was again preparing something against NOF’.”

There was an explanation in a footnote that went something like this: “A meeting took place during the night of April 12 and 13. Attending the meeting were Rakovski, Nikolova, Tane Naumov, NOF Board Secretary of Lerin District, Keramitchiev, Dimovski - Gotse and Vangelova – Slavianka.”

So, from what Vera has told us, there was something going on with the Macedonians from Greek occupied Macedonia. Whatever it was it took place between 1940 and 1949, especially among our Macedonian leaders: “Propagandize, organize, lead the Macedonian people to war and then leave…” That is precisely what happened! It is a fact that our leadership in the organizations: CPG, KOEM, SNOF, SNOB, NOF, AFZH and NOMS led the people to war and then fled leaving them in the hands of our enemies to be slaughtered like lambs and to be exiled from their homeland forever!

Continuing to follow Vera, who so far has given us insight into her position and that, even though she was a leader and organizer in the struggle, she does not feel responsible for what happened because she feels she acted diligently and did everything that was required of her from the Communist Party.

But it also shows us that after so many people lost their homes, so many people became wanderers of the world and so many more people became victims of their doing, Vera, as a leader of AFZH who fought for a united Macedonia and then firmly accepted the CPG attitude that the Macedonian would be guaranteed “equality rights” the same as the Greeks and status quo with respect of the borders and nothing more, felt like a victim herself who was manipulated by the Greeks just like every Macedonian from Greek occupied Macedonia.

What about the “deserters” who defended the thesis that Yugoslavia had all the answers for the Macedonian people from Greek occupied Macedonia?

It is more than obvious that those who were against the CPY’s position were not “for” a “United Macedonia in a Balkan Federation”, as was later stated by the CPG. No, they were not for a United Macedonia as were not all Macedonians who took part in the 2nd NOF Congress. They were now “courting” the CPY and the Yugoslav authorities and claiming that they were a “pro-Yugoslav Macedonian movement” and were happy with the status quo regarding the borders!

All those leaders of ours now referred to as “deserters” have written their own historiographies, biographies and books of personal encounters after they came to Skopje. They even wrote about how the CPG attempted to convince them to return to Greece and establish their own Macedonian units. In other words, the Greeks were now hunting the very souls who had earlier left the battlefields to save themselves. They now wanted them to return to Greece and fight in the battles in Gramos.

But they were not interested in going back to Greece; they were more interested in “making history on behalf of Yugoslav interests”, and as a result they left no details about the Macedonians in Greek occupied Macedonia.

So what does this all mean? There is an old saying: “If you don’t know why you suffered a setback, you are no smarter than you were before.” Even half a century later, surely someone must want to know how and why we got mixed up in this Greek Civil War.

We were sold on many illusions. We did whatever we could without realizing that we were harming ourselves. Our national goals were blurred at best and our leaders were efficiently manipulated by our enemies no less. We were naïve and we were sold on a lot of goods that were unrealistic and unattainable. We had big dreams and big aspirations and foreigners and strangers took advantage of us and turned our dreams against us. And that very well, I believe, sums it up.

Nineteen forty nine was a year of vicious fighting and burning emotions. Only the misguided and ordinary mobilized peasants remained in the DAG units. Most of our NOF leaders fled without even saying good bye to us... The liquidation of DAG entered a dramatic stage and the deadly trap for the Macedonians was set… It was then a matter of time before the Macedonians were made homeless and wanderers of the world.

It is true that all politics are dirty, but then there are dirtier politics, vicious and horrible politics. Those were the politics of those people who called upon the Macedonian people to rise and fight in a revolution that had no turning back. I do not know if history has even seen a similar example made of a nation.

Unwanted, painful truths - Communist camp of future mortals

Not everyone sat silent, but for them death camps were invented. And as we approached the end of the war and the end of the Democratic Army of Greece, more Albanians were forced to take account of their involvement in Greek events. This naturally compromised them and exposed them to various hazardous attacks especially from NATO. And because of that, on May 5, 1949 Mehmet Shehu, Albanian Minister of the Interior, ordered the camps organized near the Greek-Albanian border to be disbanded. These camps were erected to hold Greek citizens, sentenced to death by the Democratic Army courts.

Most of the prisoners held in these camps were Macedonians accused of being agents of Yugoslavia and working for the Yugoslav intelligence Services: OZNA, KOS and judgments were carried out on the spot.

Similar camps also existed in Prespa. The prisoners here were almost entirely old people who publicly condemned NOF, AFZH and DAG for what they had done to their children. They were all mothers, fathers and wives of soldiers who currently served in DAG or who had already perished. They were the parents of two or three children mobilized into DAG. They were supporters of DAG and the war effort and now they sat in jail while their properties and crops were neglected, unattended and rotting in the fields.

So what happened and what killed the spirit of these people to defect en masse?!

Official historiography has been written about reprisals against Macedonian fighters in DAG units and about the affairs of Macedonian fighters in Gramos and Vicho, about whom it said: The Security Services and DAG’s Court Service worked hard at eliminating all Macedonians who agitate in favour of Yugoslavia. Many Macedonians were arrested on July 5, 1949 and judgments were passed by DAG’s Court. After that it was the “Buf” and “African” affair, the “isolation camps for Macedonians in Vicho Region”, “the Kajmakchalan Squad” and many others. People were convicted of “deserting” and according to their testimonies they deserted because “they had no faith in the CPG’s decision making process and mistrusted the CPG Central Committee’s actions towards the Macedonian fighters...”

The CPG and DAG General Headquarters, on the other hand, were accusing Macedonians of being directed by various intelligence services and by three diversionary centres. The first was operated by the CPM and personally guided by Kolishevski. The second was controlled by OZNA and the third was controlled by group II of the Yugoslav General Headquarters.

Convinced of this, the CPG and DAG General Headquarters decided to send a high-level delegation to Skopje. The delegation arrived in Skopje on February 8, 1949 and had its first meeting at 11 am the same day. Lazo Kolishevski and Tsvetko Uzunovski attended on behalf of the CPM and Miltiadis Porfirogenos and Nikos Georgiadis attended on behalf of the CPG, while Pascal Mitretvski served as translator.

The following points were made on behalf of the CPG Central Committee:

1. Hostility is developing in the ranks of the Macedonian element, which is working against the joint struggle between the Greek and the Macedonian people...

2. Along with the Macedonians, there are also Greek refugees now located in Yugoslavia. This is creating an unfriendly situation…

3. At the centre of this propaganda against our movement is a group of Macedonians, cadres, who left Greece under NOF’s direction and are now working against CPG and DAG interests, urging Macedonian fighters to desert the fighting units etc.

After returning to Greece from Belgrade on April 7, 1949, P. Rosos went to DAG General Headquarters and conveyed to the leaders what he had learned from the so-called Macedonian NOF and AFZH “deserters” who were now living in Skopje; who had earlier fled to Yugoslavia to avoid persecution from the Greek authorities. Among other things Rosos said that they had told him to tell the Macedonian fighters “to not be fools and fight and die for DAG’s benefit…” For more information see Kiriazovski 1995.

The sense that somehow the Macedonians were a political factor is lost

Was there an exit from the chaos?

There was mention among the Macedonians: objectivity and obligation towards one’s own nation.

All this, once again, confirms the fact that we lost our chance. It escaped us. We ran away from it. Instead of gaining our freedom, we gained sorrow, distress, pain and anguish which caused us to divide and turn on each other. We divided and ruined our people. We disoriented ourselves and took on new burdens that would haunt our future.

On top of all that, we left our homeland behind; we abandoned it as our return to it became uncertain. Our future too became uncertain, undefined, because it depended on our past. And what exactly was our past? Well that entirely depends on who you talk to! More precisely, that depends on whose history books you read! Since there were no victors amongst us Macedonians from Greek occupied Macedonia, and we hardly had support from anyone, we left that part of our history to be written by others, most likely by those who perpetrated this scheme against us. So, what kind of history do we expect to be reading? Well, there are some things that are certain. We know, or should know, that what happened to us and the crimes committed against us, including the crime of our permanent exile from our ancestral homes, were a fact, a horrible event that actually took place. But what we don’t know for sure is if these crimes were intentional or accidental and who perpetrated them against us? For this we will have to blame those who wrote our integral history and who purposely hid the truth from us, included among them are the CPM, CPY and the CPG. We know the CPG lost the war and tried to blame the Macedonians for it. We also know about the Greek attitude towards the Macedonians. What we don’t know for certain is the CPY’s attitude towards the Macedonian people from Greek occupied Macedonia and its involvement in the Macedonian organizations? Why did the CPY create NOF and AFZH on April 23, 1945? Why did they send these organizations to Greece to start a war and what was their role from April 23, 1945 to mid- October 1946 when they were led by the CPM/CPY?

What was done was wrong with grave consequences for the Macedonian people, surely the architects of this ill game must have known that! Claiming that NOF was sent there to protect the people and act against the Monarcho-Fascist terror, does not explain anything and is a poor attempt to justify the CPM/CPY’s action because a decision to disarm ELAS, the existing protector of the people, had already been made so there was no need to “protect the people” at that time. Also NOF and AFZH were created before the Athens regime organized and was able to apply mass terror against the people.

So at this point, allow me to pose a fundamental question: “How long are we expected to sit here with our eyes shut as evidence about this is piling before us?!

We can clearly see from the Macedonian absence in high level military and political positions that we, the Macedonians, were either incapable or not allowed to lead anything larger that a military unit. Given this fact, then why does our integral history say that the “Macedonians were a military and political factor in the Greek Civil War?” If it is true that the Macedonians were NOT a political and military factor, which is a more plausible scenario than the other way around, then what was the purpose of involving the Macedonian people in the war en masse?! Did we simply put our entire trust in Zahariadis and do what we were told without thinking? How does that then make us a political and military factor in the war?

One thing is clear: From my long and extensive research I have discovered that the NOF and AFZH leadership, even with its split loyalties, some loyal to the CPY and others loyal to the CPG, was honoured and well looked after by the Party. The ordinary Macedonian fighters, those who bled and died for this war, on the other hand, were left out to dry! They were not only abandoned, they were also persecuted for “ideological principles” which most did not even understand. In the end it was they who lost everything, including their ancestral homes, and became permanent refugees roaming the world. They were the ones who experienced genocide!

Is there another truth? Is there even a single person, a NOF or AFZH leader perhaps, who can attest to the truth as to why these things happened to us? And if there is can we believe and trust such a person? Unfortunately, to this day, no one from NOF or AFZH has admitted that they did anything wrong themselves or have apologized to the Macedonian people for what happened to them. And that for me has been a great sore point.

After DAG’s 50th anniversary, a group of researchers from “Rizospastis”, organ of the CPG Central Committee, decided to publish an article entitled “50 years after DAG”. The article was a sequel published in 90 parts during 1996 and 1997.

The article was a revision of what took place and the approaches taken during the 6th Plenum (1956), the 7th Plenum (1957) and during the 8th CPG Congress (1961). The overview covered the CPG’s politics when the party was led by Nikos Zahariadis, particularly during the period from 1945 to 1949 and evaluated the mistakes made and the harm some of those “mistakes” had on the development of events and the decisive role in the war.

Here are some facts: … Regarding the December battle which lasted 33 days resulting in ELAS’s defeat and the February 12, 1945 Varkiza agreement being signed, the authors of the article “50 years after DAG” accepted Stalin’s position with regards to the conflict between the English and ELAS in Athens. As a result of this, KPSS, CPG and APT delegations met in January 1950 in Moscow, during which Stalin said that the Varkiza agreement should not have taken place and that ELAS should continue the fighting outside of Athens. According to Zahariadis’s notes, Georgi Dimitrov sent him a telegram on January 15, 1945 recommending that the CPG leadership endeavour to deal with the English to find a peaceful resolution to the conflict. To this, the note said, Stalin reacted sharply by saying, “Dimitrov is not the Central Committee of KPSS.”

Why was Stalin recommending this? Was it because he wanted an agreement with Tito? No, it was because he wanted to safeguard the socialist system in Yugoslavia and in the other Eastern European countries by drawing the fire away from them. His idea was not to over-power but to interfere in Greek affairs and used the Macedonians to do it… Who better than the Macedonians who, for many years, longed for their independence and for a united Macedonia.

But one thing still remains unclear, even over 60 years later: “Whose sacrifices are we?” “Who pushed us into sacrificing ourselves to a point of extinction?”

9. 1 WHY DID THE WAR NOT END WITH US AS IT DID WITH EVERYONE ELSE ON MAY 9, 1945?!

Getting to the truth regarding the Macedonian tragedy in Greece!

While going through the archival documents of the various countries in the world that were involved in the Greek Civil War, I looked through the military and political archives of Great Britain, the Soviet Union, Greece, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia. I was specifically looking for information on the Yugoslav involvement in the Greek Civil War. One of the main reasons listed for this was:

“... The communist movements in Yugoslavia and Greece did not recognize the 1943 division of zones of influence between Stalin and Churchill. Yugoslavia was influenced 50:50 and Greece 90:10 in favour of Britain and the United States. In addition, a common feature of these movements was that the Communists in both countries fought against the return of monarchy and for the expulsion of fascists.”

Was it true that Greece and Yugoslavia did not respect the agreement between Stalin, Churchill and Roosevelt?

Stalin’s first intervention - Against the CPY Yugoslav leadership and Tito:

“… Stalin insisted that everyone adhere to his agreements with Britain and the United States. He even forced Tito to respect his wishes. Consequently, after the war, Tito created a ‘compromised’ provisional government in which he included former Monarcho-Fascist Ivan Subasich, as Minister of External Affairs.”

The CPG Greek leadership

“... Stalin, over the Soviet military mission, in fact, ordered the CPG leadership to accept the Lebanon Agreement. Acting on Stalin’s directive the CPG Central Committee, on August 2 and 3, 1944, made a decision to accept the Lebanon Agreement and later the final Varkiza agreement signed on February 12, 1945 in Varkiza, a resort located near Athens. The Varkiza Agreement was signed by the resistance movement, CPG and EAM on one side and the Plastiras Greek government and British General Scobey on the other. With this agreement the Greek military was placed under English Middle East Command.” (12 February 1945). With this agreement, EAM and ELAS were practically handed over to the right.

KOS and UDBA documents: “... As per Stalin and Churchill’s 1943 agreement, Yugoslavia was placed under the USSR zone of influence. Tito, on the other hand, came out of World War II as an anti-Fascist movement leader and a close associate of Stalin but after 1943 Tito also created links with Britain and later with the U.S.A.”

“... After Stalin’s decision in 1948 to eject Tito from the ‘communist community’, Tito reactivated his ties with Britain and the United States, which he built by withdrawing from Trieste and abandoning the city after the war.”

In 1948, when Yugoslavia’s internal peace and order was being threatened by Stalin, Tito fought by any means possible, even by illegal means, to defend himself from the Inforburo, from his communist neighbours and from Stalin. He did this with help from the U.S. and managed to maintain Yugoslavia’s independence with moderate changes to communism, which, compared to other Communist countries, was a democratic setting decades ahead.

And what did Stalin, the greatest god of them all, do?

Stalin organized a new “evil” to blatantly manipulate the Macedonian people by devising a strategy to abuse the Macedonian Question: See the book: “Jugoslavija u Hladmot patu: Odnosi s velikim silama 1949-1955” by Darko Belickj, Zagreb: Globus, 1988, 31. 51.

“Between 1948 and 1949, Stalin began to implement a new concept called the ‘Vishinski Plan’ designed to overthrow the Yugoslav leadership. With this plan, among other things, he envisaged a campaign of creating an ‘Independent Macedonian State’, which, under the auspices of Inforburo, would encompass the ‘Pirin, Vardar and Aegean Macedonians’. The idea behind this was that in order to create this Macedonian state, the Macedonian people would have to break away from the Yugoslav people by starting an internal conflict inside Yugoslavia. In other words, all the Macedonian people from Pirin, Vardar and Aegean Macedonia would have to fight against Yugoslavia.”

Well, this is how the “red gods” manipulated and played us Macedonians and we, 60 years later, with our so-called “history of the Aegeans” are “preaching” that the Greek Civil War was a “Revolution” and that we were a military and political factor in it!?

I think that these “red gods” were deeply involved in the conspiracy against the Macedonian people in Greek occupied Macedonia and knew very well that Greece would destroy the Macedonians down to the last one if given a chance. This is why they started the conflict in Greece. In retrospect, facts speak for themselves. It was a completely predictable scenario and it played out exactly as planned. The left instigated the problem by sending NOF and AFZH to start a war and the right finished us off by death and by exile. We, on the other hand, have learned nothing from our history and from our past mistakes. So, it is no wonder that we lost our native hearth forever…

Conflict of a similar nature

(See: Pero Simich’s book “Mystery of the Century”, p. 235)

“The official cause for the sudden disagreement between Tito and Stalin in the beginning of 1948 can be found in the privileged positions of the hundreds of Soviet soldiers and civilian instructors in the Yugoslav army and other communist institutions in Yugoslavia.

… It is difficult to understand what could have made the red king of Moscow go off like that with regards to Tito. Was it Tito’s air of independence? Did it have something to do with Albania? Were Tito’s ambitions too great? Or was it the song that the Yugoslav people composed about him?

Comrade Tito is worthy of Making the entire Balkans his And a part of Europe too…

All of the above probably angered Stalin.

Was the Macedonian tragedy part of this song: “Making the entire Balkans his?” Was this before or after he reactivated his connections with Britain and the U.S.?

(Events described are based on the book “Balkans from 1804 to 1999” by Misha Glenny, British writer and journalist)

“... From 1946 to 1948 Tito (KOS) sent Svetozar Vukmanovik – Tempo to Greece. Tempo had gained experience in organizing the partisan movement in the Republic of Macedonia and in that respect was qualified to organize the Partisan movement in Greece. According to KOS documents, besides Tempo, Lazar Kolishevski was also in contact with DAG’s General Markos Vafiadis and so were Dimitrie Aleksovski, General Mihailo Apostolski...

While Aleksandar Rankovich maintained official contact with DAG, Josip Giorgia, Tito’s diplomat at the United Nations, demanded self-determination rights for the Macedonians in Greece. Oscar Davicho and Mihailo Lalich wrote stories about DAG’s struggle against the Monarcho-Fascists and a documentary film was made based on their recorded accounts. At one point KOS notified Tito and Rankovic that the Monarcho-Fascists in Athens were afraid that the Macedonians from the Republic of Macedonia might want to join DAG and fight alongside with their Macedonian compatriots in Greece.

Besides training, logistics and command collaboration, Tito and KOS also helped DAG in other ways. The Serbian wing of KOS was given responsibility for providing DAG with medical and intelligence services using DAG and partisans from Aegean Macedonia. Dr. Velimir Majstorovic, a military surgeon and chief of a special hospital for the wounded, was put in charge of the medical services. He was to provide medical assistance to the people from Aegean Macedonia in a hospital located in Katlanovo, near Skopje. Other personnel assigned to provide assistance included Colonel Slobodan Krstich - Ucha, Tito’s legendary associate, General Jovo Kapichich, as well as Major Jovan Popovich, artillery instructor in the Yugoslav Army.”

Ivan Karaivanov, Soviet NKVD agent and Comintern instructor was also Tito’s special intelligence service agent.

Immediate associates and instructors working with General Markos Vafiadis were: Giuza Radovich, Obrad Trninich, MiloVrbitsa, Velimir Dotsnich, Svetislav Stojanovich and Petar Lutsich; all Serbian KOS.

As aid, in the first year alone the Yugoslav army delivered 3,134 anti-infantry mines, 6,550 anti-tank mines and 9,177 pounds of special explosives, rifles and MG-15 machine guns. Sloboan Markovich was given responsibility to safeguard Vafiadis’s safety while escorting him to and from Belgrade.

Just remember who this Vafiadis character was: He was a Christian Turkish colonist brought to Macedonia from Asia Minor to replace Macedonians exiled by the Greek State. He was now General Markos Vafiadis! This is what Vafiadis told General Chakalottos after his return to Athens.

On many occasions Mr. Mitsotakis has stated that the Greek Civil War was a painful time for Greece, made very painful by the communists. The Greeks however, have managed by design to provide their experience to the most prominent historians in the West. We the Macedonians on the other hand, for the last 60 years, have relied on others to write our history, a silent history serving the interests of Yugoslavia and Tito.

The so-called “General” Markos Vafiadis was born in the village Tosie in 1906 in Asia Minor. He graduated from fourth grade in public school before he was exiled by the Turkish authorities and brought to Macedonia as a colonist by the Greek authorities.

Appointed by the CPG, Vafiadis was given the role to lead the war effort on his return to Greece. His appointment was announced by the Greek newspapers “Ta Nea” and “Epikera” printed in Athens. The newspapers also carried a story about his meeting with General Tsakalotos in Athens during the Greek Civil War. Tsakalotos then was his opponent in charge of the government army. (Quoted in previous chapters) See: “Nova Makedonija”, February 25, 1992.

In the last book: “ΕΜΦΥΛΙΟΣ ΠΟΛΕΜΟΣ − 60− ΗΡΟΝΙΑ ΑΠΟ ΤΗ ΛΗΞΗ ΤΟΥ”. (GRAGIANSKATA VOJNA – 60 GODINI OD ZAVRSHETOKOT - NEJZINIOT KRAJ.

See: ΕΛΕΥΘΕΡΟΤΥΠΙΑ− ∆ΟΜΝΑΣ ΚΟΦΦΑ (p. 97)

(Why did Bulgaria or Albania not do what Yugoslavia did?!)

“... The Yugoslav state existed on our northern Greek border. Yugoslavia was key in the development of the Greek Civil War in our country. This border, a common point between our two states, was both a promising and disappointing line necessary for delivering supplies to the Democratic Army of Greece. But it was not just its geographical location that had significance, there were other factors. In 1945 Yugoslavia was a strong, important and influential factor in the Balkans and Greece was its neighbour. Yugoslavia undeniably carried serious authority. The government in Belgrade was seen as very strong and a leader in the resistance movement against the Axis which had gained growing respect from the major allies, regardless to which party they belonged. The communists had proven that they were a political force in those years and could work with the multi-ethnic population present in Yugoslavia and at the same time were able to heal the open wounds of the multi-nation state.”

West of Yugoslavia was poverty-stricken Albania, where achievements were sought through the courts as a way of strengthening the country in the postwar period. East of Yugoslavia was Bulgaria, an Axis partner, who had to wait for the signing of the Peace Treaty and the conditions imposed on it. This took until February 1947 before all positions were defined and the politics of diplomacy settled.

I want to emphasize here that there was one specific “point” which bound Yugoslavia to Greece. Since the formation of “Democratic Macedonia” in 1945 in Federal Yugoslavia, its capital Skopje became an important place with some autonomy where local level issues were handled.

“… Politics in Belgrade very quickly proved to be a mixture of many elements of contradiction. Mixed fear and respect developing on one side, and promises, revolutions and Balkan perspectives developing on the other side.” p. 102

Nikos Zahariadis’s position on Tito and Yugoslavia

Now let us have a look at Nikos Zahariadis’s assessments regarding Yugoslavia. Zahariadis at the time was CPG Central Committee General Secretary and President of the DAG Military Council. After the Greek Civil War ended, during the CPG Central Committee 6th Plenum, in October 1949, Zahariadis said:

“… Here we need to tell the truth openly, that, if the groveling role of the provocateur Tito was known in 1946, the CPG would not have decided to again take up arms. The CPG would have taken a different path, a more persistent, harder, longer path because now it is obvious that we could not have started on this path without having secured our backs, and exactly at the moment when the Monarcho-Fascists were receiving versatile assistance from the Anglo-Americans…”

During the CPG Central Committee Plenum in 1950, while speaking about problems experienced and about DAG’s defeat, Zahariadis said:

“If I had known earlier what Tito was going to do, I would have reconsidered whether to take up arms and fight in the Greek Civil War.” p. 422 For more details see: “Το ΚΚΕ. Επισηµα Κε µενα .τοµ. 7οϕ , σελ.15.

What secrets and sins did Tito hide? 272 It is also interesting to know what Tito thought when he spoke with Fitzroy McLean (60) during a meeting. See: “Μελετες για τον εµφυλιο πολεµο (1945−1949)” (Analysis of the Civil War (1945-1949) p. 336/337, article by Joze Pirjevichch. FO371/78716/R 4691.

With the Tito-Stalin break and after the loss of the Greek Civil War.

“... The meeting that took place with Tito on May 5, 1949 was a prerequisite to McLean’s mission. It was a dinner meeting during which many issues and layers of issues were discussed concerning Yugoslavia and its position, i.e. relationship with the West. Some of these issues applied to Greece. Tito did not hide the fact that he was of great help to the Andartes (DAG) in past years. But now the situation had changed and he said that Yugoslavia could not by itself refuse the right of asylum to political refugees. But those refugees were now kept deep inside the country and beyond the borders. It was understood that Tito could promise that in future he would not allow these people to return to Greece to resume fighting. And he would no longer provide any help to the Andartes (DAG). He also said that this information must not be revealed to the public because it would result in a very complex situation…” FO371/78716/R4691.

Tito’s promise about this was kept top secret. No one was allowed to know about it because it would have damaged the Yugoslav Marshal’s reputation.

Putting our faith in false gods