MILITARY OPERATION IN SKOPJE TSRNA GORA “MH -1”

MILITARY OPERATION IN SKOPJE TSRNA GORA “MH -1”

After we completed the first day of our military campaign in Tetovo, the next day, March 26, 2001, we agreed with Major General Iovo Andreevski to start preparations for the campaign in Skopje Tsrna Gora where we were going to engage the First Army Corps -Kumanovo, which at the time had free resources and was available for that operation. Besides those, we also had other free military resources, primarily the intelligence battalion and the military police battalion. My goal was to use the success of the Tetovo operation and, on the whole, clean up the entire terrain up to the Kosovo border. My aim was to take control of all important buildings and communications connecting Kosovo to the Republic of Macedonia.

The same day, March 26, 2001, we agreed with Major General Iovo Andreevski to ask the Commander of the First Army Corps -Kumanovo to bring up the readiness status of his units and to propose a plan at the March 27, 2001 meeting before the top state leadership.

In his capacity as Chief of Staff of General Headquarters, Iovo Andreevski accepted the proposal since there were no other options put forward. I also told him that the same proposal would be brought up at the top state leadership meeting in the evening of the same day.

Late night on March 27, 2001 the following proposal was made to the top state leadership:

“Start preparations for carrying out the operation in the zone:

- Left: Villages Rasche and Iazhintse;

- Right: Kumanovo, village Tabanovtse, the deep ravine along the Kosovo border at Skopje Tsrna Gora.

The goal of the operation is to extract the terrorists from the designated area and take full control of that space.

First Army Corps - Kumanovo is to be engaged to perform this operation. As a carrier, the border brigade is to be reinforced with the scout battalion, military police battalion and all Ministry of Interior police forces in that region.

The main forces are to engage the terrorists of Skopje Tsrna Gora and the auxiliary forces are to engage them in the direction: Villages Kuchkovo and Chashka.

The operation is to be deployed in two phases: in phase I, vigorous actions in a circular form must take place to dissect, attack the terrorists and isolate them in the settlements where there are civilians. In phase II, with assistance from the Ministry of the Interior, we are to perform a thorough cleaning of the area and establish a fully functioning government.

Engaged in the operation will be:

- Attack Forces, - Landing Forces, - Fire support Forces, and - Ground control Forces.

The 430 members of the Ministry of the Interior that were in the police station are to be engaged.”

The proposal was fully accepted by everyone who was present. It was then decided that we immediately start preparations for the operation and, on March 28, 2001, take the Plan to President Boris Trajkovski for his signature. I then asked everyone not to discuss the plan in public, primarily for the safety of our units and in order to achieve a surprise on the ground.

By noon, on March 27, 2001, the complete operational plan and accompanying documentation were ready and approved by President Boris Trajkovski, without any problems.

We had to work quickly, there was no time, we had to use the success of the “Tetovo combat operation” and in that context I spoke with Iovo Andreevski. I said: “Iovo, please help us out with the

auxiliary units in the direction of Kuchkovo and Chashka and I and my group will help out in Kumanovo.” Iovo replied: “Please General Pande, there are no terrorists in the Skopje Tsrna Gora vicinity.” So I said: “Iovo, there is nothing better than that. In that case we will take all the important topographic buildings and routes to Kosovo and we will hold the state of affairs of the entire region in our hands.”

According to the operational plan, in the evening and night of March 27, 2001 part of the units were required to perform a march and encircle the areas in question, especially the areas around the villages Tanushevtsi, Malino Maalo and Brest. Parts of the Kumanovo units were to march along the old road over the villages Umin Dol, Arachinovo and Ramno and take their attack positions.

In the afternoon of the same day, I was informed that the units from Kumanovo stopped the march in Skopje, stayed in the “Ilinden” barracks overnight and did not go directly to their positions. I got on the telephone, called the commander of the First Army Corps -Kumanovo and asked him: “Why were the units not taken directly to their designated locations. Why were they diverted and have remained in Skopje?” He said that there was a change in plan approved by Major General Iovo Andreevski, the Chief of staff of General Headquarters.

This was indeed very strange. The plan I was following was not only approved but Iovo Andreevski was not familiar with its detail. Also, before approving a change in the plan he was supposed to inform me. Nevertheless, in order to find out what was going on I contacted Iovo Andreevski directly and asked him: “Iovo, why did you authorize Major General Gorgi Karakutovski to change the plan regarding deployment of the units?” He said: “General Pande, I did not order the changes. It was Giorgi who proposed the amendment to the plan and the operation, I just accepted his recommendation.” Nervously I said” “What does this have to do with you or with Giorgi Karakutovski? Do you not realize that we will be going to battle tomorrow?! These units are needed to prepare the ground for an offensive and not to sit in the barracks!” He then said: “But, General Pande, I did not know anything, Brigadier General Adil Gazafer is leading the units.” My answer to Iovo was: “Listen to me

General Lieutenant Colonel Iovo, you are to immediately order Major General Giorgi Karakutovski to continue the march with the units! I will have to inform President Boris Trajkovski about this, but you call Giorgi Karakutovski and ask him to come to General Headquarters at around 18:00 hours today so that, once again, I can spell out the specific tasks for tomorrow!”

Late in the afternoon I returned from the field and went to General Headquarters. I invited Major General Stamboliski into my office and asked him: “General Metodi Stamobliski, what happened to the units on the ground? Do you know why the units from Kumanovo were diverted to the “Ilinden” barracks in Skopje?” He said: “The military police units went according to plan, as ordered; the other units went in the direction of the villages Kuchkovo and Grachani.” In brief I then said: “Someone is intentionally screwing around with our preparations for the operation, but listen, early tomorrow morning I will be leaving for Kumanovo with some of the leadership and you stay here, at General Headquarters, and let’s keep in touch on a regular basis!”

A while later Brigadier General Dragan Andreevski and Major General Giorgi Karakutovski came to my office. I also invited General Lieutenant Colonel Iovo Andreevski to join us. By now I was calm because I was certain that the error that was made earlier with the units was corrected. So calmly, I once again went over the plans and repeated the steps that were needed to be taken by the auxiliary and main forces during the course of the next day. Eye to eye I then repeated to General Lieutenant Colonel Iovo Andreevski what we had spoken about over the telephone and emphasized to him: “Okay, General Iovo, Giorgi Karakutovski was your chief of staff in your Corps for many years, so you should know him well. I have never worked with him!” Chief Iovo then said: “Well, General Pande, he is quite shy and wants something all the time, he boasts about everything, and continuously sends telegrams.” I then said: “Well, now here in front of everyone I am going to again repeat the tasks for tomorrow and I expect you, as his chief of Staff, to become a little more involved!?” To this he said: “But Pande, everyone is trying to avoid me.” So I said: “Put that aside, a long night is ahead of us and tomorrow will be an even longer and more difficult day. I am leaving early tomorrow morning and I am going to Kumanovo, I

need you to go with Brigadier General Dragan Andreevski in the direction of the auxiliary forces.”

I asked Major General Giorgi Karakutovski to remain in my office and in front of Iovo Andreevski I slowly and calmly repeated the tasks for the next day’s operation and when I was done I said to both of them: “You still have enough time during the night to set up the initial positions as planned. The entire Corps command is at your disposal. Is there anything that is not clear about tomorrow’s operation? Or are there any problems?” Giorgi looked at me with a strange look and said: “General, everything is clear, the tasks will be carried out, now let us go!” I said: “Good, tomorrow at 05:00 hours I will be at your command post!” I called in Brigadier General Dragan Andreevski who was responsible for carrying out the attack using the auxiliary forces and, in a similar manner, went over the plans with him. I then asked General Metodi Stamobliski to remain in General Headquarters.

However, I soon realized that these officers now found themselves in a situation where they had to start a war with their own units, and everything was difficult in the beginning. They were responsible for the lives of their soldiers and officers; it was a great responsibility so they insisted on being there, present among them to help them better perform their task.

I called Major General Metodi Stamboliski again and asked him to come to my office. Once again we went over the overall situation for tomorrow to make sure that we didn’t accidentally miss something. After reviewing the situation I said to Major General Stamboliski: “I am worried about Major General Giorgi Karakutovski, I am not sure that he will get to his position on time as planned. We will need to fully engage ourselves, especially you, your staff and chiefs. I will take the chief of artillery and the chief of the armoured mechanized units with me and will go in Kumanovo.”

In the meantime I thought about how nervous I had been during the first military operation in Tetovo and the anxiety I experienced during the plan approval process and how this operation had problems from the start, problems that began with individuals, and how certain measures had to be taken and how direct command of

the units had to be assumed in order to achieve success. According to information available to us I did not expect serious resistance from the terrorists in Skopje Tsrna Gora Region, but my goal was: to plug up the escape route from Skopje Tsrna Gora to Kosovo and take over all routes and tactical facilities and establish full control of the region. I convinced myself that the terrorist problem in the Republic of Macedonia could be resolved in 10 to 15 days since the Tetovo operation was initiated on March 25, 2001. And not only was I convinced, but I had sufficient military capabilities to do it. ARM had enough forces to deal with the terrorists who then numbered no more than 200 to 250 in the entire region.

Command 1K - str. dov. no. 200-236 - March 28, 2001