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Testimonials 2001

REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA

By Pande Petrovski · Part 21 of 30 · About 16 minutes

Read in Македонски

REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA PUBLIC PROSECUTOR OF THE REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA Str.dob. No. 31/2001 Skopje, August 6, 2001

To: THE CHIEF OF STAFF OF ARM GENERAL HEADQUARTERS Lt. General Pande Petrovski SKOPJE

Mr. Chief of Staff of General Headquarters,

You are required to provide us with documents and data, with a degree of secrecy which you will determine, so that this data can be used in an appropriate manner in performing the duties of the Attorney General for prosecution.

Please reply to this request as soon as possible.

/BG PUBLIC OB VINIGL THE REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA Stavre Dzikov

The above is a copy of the letter sent by Stavre Dzhikov, Public Prosecutor of the Republic of Macedonia.

When we look at the date when the questions from Stavre Dzhikov were sent to me and to Defense Minister Vlado Buckovski, we begin to understand what effects the leaked order, leaked through TV A-1, had on what took place.

Quote:

To the Chief of Staff of ARM General Headquarters General Pande Petrovski

Mr. Chief of Staff of General Headquarters,

“The Public Prosecutor’s Office is continuously taking measures and actions to prosecute the perpetrators of crimes carried out in the Republic of Macedonia in connection with the armed actions of the so-called NLA Albanian armed groups taken in order to threaten the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the Republic of Macedonia and its territorial whole and split part of its territory in order to create a Greater Albania or Greater Kosovo. For the longer part, these armed actions, perpetrated by Albanian terrorist groups, have caused enormous consequences in the life and health of the soldiers, officers and the civilian population, which has been subjected to unimaginable suffering, forcible expulsions from their century-old homes and exposed to great danger for long periods of time; all this manifested for the acceptance of occupied territories in Macedonia, which is contrary to the Constitution and laws.”

“By the powers of Article 144 parts 2 and 3 of the Criminal Code, the public prosecutor is prepared to take measures to examine the large number of statements made by citizens who claim to have been left without any protection or fulfillment of obligations of the defense of the territory and protection of citizens, especially pronounced in certain regions where citizens of the Macedonian population were forcibly expelled.”

He does not say why the people were expelled and why the police stations were abandoned, and why this population was given weapons and ammunition, and who had the right to give out weapons to civilians, etc., but he asked me the following questions:

“Because of that, I am requesting that you submit the necessary information and data as follows:

During the so-called one sided apparent termination of armed actions (the so-called unconditional ceasefire - which the Government of the Republic of Macedonia accepted) most brutal ethnic cleansing in several villages in the Tetovo region took place, including the villages Leshok, Teartse, Neproshteno, Dobroshte, Otunie, Iedoartse, Varvara, Setole and other villages in the region, whose residents were extremely humiliated in front of the barrels of automatic rifles brandished by the Albanian terrorists and then entire

villages with a Macedonian population were expelled, after which robbery and pillaging of homes and property and burning of houses took place.

1. In connection with this, please inform us if, according to the plan for the defense of that region, protection from attacks by Albanian terrorists was provided for these villages? If such protection was provided, then why was the region left defenseless and the population unprotected? Why was the Macedonian population of these villages left to endure such extreme and brutal humiliation and then expelled from its homes by the barrels of automatic rifles brandished by the Albanian terrorists? Why was this population not informed in time and why was there no adequate assistance provided for a temporary relocation before the Albanian terrorist groups had attacked?”

2. Based on which document and who guaranteed that the Tetovo -Iazhintse road was safe, was that road in fact secured? And if so, what then was the reason that several villages from that region with thousands of people, were left there for more than 25 days without protection and without basic livelihood? This was a disaster for that population! Attempts to deliver food and medicine on August 4, 2001 were prevented by part of the Albanian population and by the large group of armed Albanian terrorists who examined the convoy and did not allow its passage, so the convoy turned back.

You are required to provide us with documents and data, with a degree of secrecy which you will determine, so that this data can be used in an appropriate manner in performing the duties of the Attorney General for prosecution.

Please reply to this request as soon as possible.

Public Prosecutor of the Republic of Macedonia Stavre Dzhikov / signature and stamp

I received the request for information one day after the Tetovo campaign order was issued, but I did not answer him immediately, as Mr. Dzhikov demanded of me. I replied on September 26, 2001.

REPUBLIC OG MACEDONIA MINISTRY OF DEFENCE October 22, 2001 Skopje

General Pande Petrovski Advisor to the Defence Minister

TO THE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR OF THE REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA Mr. Stavre Dzhikov

5. As a soldier and as a citizen of the Republic of Macedonia, who was a direct witness to the events of the crisis in the Republic of Macedonia, I am personally interested in a full clarification of all aspects of the occurrence and the resolution of the crisis. I think that the citizens of the Republic of Macedonia have the right to know the whole truth about these events, particularly the consequences resulting from them in the highest degree, and how they were irreversibly affected in the crisis regions. Those responsible for this should and must give an account to the Macedonian citizens.

ARM DEVELOPMENT AND UTILIZATION ADVISER General Pande Petrovski

The above is a copy of the response given by General Pande Petrovski to the request made by the Public Prosecutor.

Reply to Article - 31/2001

In regards to article st. dov. no. 31/2001, which, in addition to making a request to respond to questions, basically expresses doubts about the use of ARM in the crisis regions, in terms of the role of

the then acting Chief of Staff of ARM General Headquarters, I submit the following answers and clarifications:

1. ARM, according to the Constitution of the Republic Macedonia and the Law of Defense, was used solely at the discretion of the President of the Republic of Macedonia, i.e. the Supreme Commander of the Army. During the crisis, caused by the actions and activities of Albanian terrorist groups in the Republic of Macedonia, especially during the time I was appointed Deputy Chief of Staff of General Headquarters, all decisions were approved by the Supreme Commander of the Army and were fully performed. There are documents, plans and decisions as evidence in the archives of General Headquarters of all planned and approved operations of the Army and also of performed operations and confirmation of hostilities.

2. Following a decision made by the political leadership of the Republic of Macedonia, under the unconditional ceasefire, as of July 5, 2001 ARM remained and kept its positions on the border with Yugoslavia towards Kosovo... ARM retained all its positions and did not allow the so-called NLA to expand outside of its existing positions...

Responsibility for the space in the Poroi - Iazhintse direction and the villages s/z and i/u in the direction specified, for this period of time, about which doubts were expressed about the responsibility and use of ARM, let me say that there were police stations and police checkpoints, at the same time ARM was responsible and held Iazhintse. Why did the Interior Ministry leave those positions, i.e. abandon the police stations and checkpoints? This abandonment is responsible for the displacement of citizens, especially people of Macedonian origin in these regions - responsibility for this, obviously must also be sought in the structures of the Ministry of the Interior…

“I am assuming, and that’s the way it should be, that the Public Prosecutor knew who authorized the ceasefire, i.e. who demanded that ceasefire should take place. I never asked for a ceasefire, not in my role as Chief of Staff of General Headquarters and not as a soldier. On the other hand, in terms of my professional military

ethics, for me it would be most discouraging to allow myself to look for a ceasefire in a much weaker opponent, especially if that opponent was the enemy of the Republic of Macedonia!”

The Army of the Republic of Macedonia was prepared to militarily defeat and destroy the terrorist groups that entered the Republic of Macedonia. In the role of Chief of Staff of General Headquarters, I, together with my associates and command staff on the ground, used our experience and expertise to break and destroy the terrorists. Why they were not completely broken and destroyed, only those at the top responsible for giving the orders can better answer that question - the Army arguably knew where our top political leadership and the international factors stood.

This is a complex question whose answer cannot be found in the structures of the Army. Respecting state institutions, the Army was carrying out the orders of the Supreme Commander, as well as those who were leaning towards the termination of certain operations. As well as for this: Why was the Army given orders to prevent further military actions within certain operations - the answer to that question can be found outside of the structures of the Army.

3. At the time when I was Chief Staff of ARM General Headquarters I planned an operation to eliminate the threat of terrorist groups in the area from the village Poroi to the village Odri and presented that plan at the meeting of the Security Council on August 6, 2001. Why was my plan at the time not approved? The decision for performing this operation obviously rested with the Supreme Commander. As Chief of Staff of General Headquarters I did not receive a response. In other words, my plan to perform the operation was not approved.

4. I am not sure who was planning the military crisis in Macedonia. Besides that, who and why was controlling and who and why did not allow the Army to resolve this crisis by military means, should be more than obvious. The Army was certainly not responsible for what happened and therefore the specific answers to these questions cannot be found within the Army’s structures. Therefore I too, as Chief of Staff of General Headquarters, demand answers be given to these questions.

5. As a soldier and as a citizen of the Republic of Macedonia who was a direct witness to the events of the crisis in the Republic of Macedonia, I am personally interested in a full clarification of all aspects of the occurrence and the resolution of the crisis. I think that the citizens of the Republic of Macedonia have the right to know the whole truth about these events, particularly the consequences resulting from them in the highest degree, and how they were irreversibly affected in the crisis regions. Those responsible for this should and must give an account to the Macedonian citizens.

General Pande Petrovski / Signature

Under whose suggestion or instruction the Public Prosecutor of the Republic of Macedonia decided to ask me these questions and to seek answers from me, I can only surmise. Why was it so important to find the truth about the military crisis in the Republic of Macedonia only two days after the incident in Karpalak took place? Why not before? Even more important than that was the fact that on August 5, 2001, General Headquarters received its orders to perform an operation in Tetovo over public television. Did no one, least of all the Public Prosecutor, have a problem with that? Yet on August 6, 2001 the Public Prosecutor demanded clarifications in writing from the Defense Ministry and from the Chief of Staff of General Headquarters! Why?

Why was it like that? Why was I targeted, as mentioned in the above document, and then “Karpalak happened”?! I submitted my resignation in front of the Security Council that same day, August 8, 2001.

All this was certainly motivated by individuals in the Government of the Republic of Macedonia to promote the idea that “Minister Vlado Buchkovski and General Pande Petrovski did not want to carry out the Supreme Commander’s orders!” And look… “Karpalak happened!”

Much later Professor Liubomir Frchkovski, who at the time was adviser to the President, in a biweekly “Forum” after the talks in Ohrid, talking about the talks, among other things, said: “That which

we were attempting to confirm and convince of, all the time, happened on August 5, 2001.” Unfortunately he did not say exactly what they were attempting to confirm and who they were trying to convince! He mentioned no names as to who was involved in this. He continued: “Namely there was a line in SDSM which blocked the Army from performing actions. The President sent a written order to ARM to perform an operation but the staff of General Headquarters tried to hide that order, which is why we tried through A1 television that evening to publicly announce it so that the Ministry of Defense could no longer hide it.” I have no comment regarding this statement because, as I pointed out, there is no such “order” in the archives of the General Headquarters with which ARM refused to comply. Every decision was taken to the Security Council of which Dr. Frchkovski was not a member and did not attend its sessions. Also, after that order was publicly announced on August 5, 2001, like I said earlier, General Headquarters did prepare a plan and presented it to the entire Security Council at its meeting.

I am writing about all this, not to defend myself or the Ministry of Defense, but to bring light to the heinous crimes that were committed in Karpalak at that time when innocent young soldiers, fighters and defenders of the Republic of Macedonia were killed for nothing. I am writing about this to testify to the truth about what really happened in those days and bring it out in the open. Five days before the signing of the Framework Agreement, and one day before the Karpalak incident, all controversial issues regarding the Framework Agreement were already reconciled. It is my obligation to tell the historical truth about the innocent fighters who were killed outside of the areas of military action. In all the military operations in which our soldiers were involved, in all the actions that ARM undertook in every possible terrain, we lost only three fighters - all the others were killed in cowardly ways. If someone was planning to kill members of ARM for no reason then they could do it elsewhere, on public roads where army members traveled on a daily basis. Just like they did! It seems that someone needed to give an “example” of what was possible before the Agreement was signed. That “someone” will now have to carry the innocent victims on their conscience. Did that “someone” have a need to postpone or to accelerate the signing of the Framework Agreement? Only time will tell. I am certain about one thing however; Karpalak would not have

taken place if the Supreme Commander had ignored his “advisors” before the Agreement was signed. I can also tell you this; even now I am not clear on who ordered the August 6, 2001 withdrawal of the police from Karpalak and why the Ministry of Defense and General Headquarters were not informed about it. Obviously, someone did this on purpose! If we were to examine events that took place in a chronological order leading to “Karpalak” we would conclude that someone planned “Karpalak” for a specific purpose, like someone had planned Arachinovo; but the objective behind Arachinovo was already achieved: all ARM military actions were terminated and the problem began to be addressed by negotiations with direct participation of the international community. And with “Karpalak”, the aim may have been: either to delay the signing of the Ohrid Agreement, if the “architect” of this heinous crime was from the Macedonian bloc, or to speed up the signing of the Ohrid Agreement if the “architect” was not from the Macedonian bloc.

The Security Council meeting in Ohrid was scheduled for August 8, 2001.

After what happened in Karpalak on August 8, 2001, I firmly decided it was time for me to step down from my position as Chief of Staff of General Headquarters. It wanted to resign on August 6, 2001, during the meeting when the Council was demanding that the Minister of Defense resign, but then when a decision was reached the situation calmed down and the session on August 6, 2001 ended with a conclusion to start an operation in Erebino.

As a military man and as a citizen of the Republic of Macedonia, I was devastated when I found out that innocent people had been killed for nothing! Why did these young men have to die? More sinister, why did they have to die because someone decided to play political games during the military crisis? Even though I wrote August 8, 2001 in my notebook as the date of my resignation, I did not want to explain myself about why I had resigned, so I only wrote: “Because of all that took place I withdraw from my duties.” Of all the people that found out that I resigned, only Stoian Andov was sincere enough to go on television and publicly announce my resignation. But, as Andov made an attempt, he was immediately interrupted and did not get to say what he wanted to say.

After the heinous crimes were committed in Karpalak the entire situation could have easily gone out of control and developed into a full blown civil war.

This was a dishonest act and the worst thing about it was that in such dishonest acts the innocent tend to suffer; those who are least responsible for what had happened.

There are no winners in a civil war, only losers: on both sides - and if that were to happen here we would have had more involvement on the part of the international community with a much greater force, attempting to contain it, of that I was sure.