GENERAL

GENERAL PANDE PETROVSKI August 9, 2001 Skopje

Press Release

Several days after thinking about it, and after informing the Security Council at our August 8, 2001 meeting, and after meeting with the President and Commander in Chief of our armed forces, today, August 9, 2001, I decided to resign from my duty as Chief of Staff of ARM General Headquarters.

During the specified session of the Council I clearly and precisely expressed my unambiguous view that, as a man and as a military officer, with moral principles, I cannot stand at the head of General Headquarters and lead the Army of the Republic of Macedonia after

the killing of 2 officers and 8 soldiers from the army reserve who have lost their lives because of someone’s interest; whose main goal is to prevent the Ohrid political Agreement from being implemented.

Like I have done many times before, during this session I pointed out that I don’t want and will not allow whoever it may be to manipulate me personally or my function in order to realize narrow party or political interests, especially not while I am performing military operations. At the same time I have made it clear to the members of the Council that the tasks they want to lay on the Army, and how they should be implemented, will lead to a civil war in the country, which will have no winners, and we all together - we the citizens of this country will be the losers. At the same time let me remind you that in the end, eventually, we will have to sit at a round table and we will have to come to a political agreement.

This, I would like to especially emphasize by stating that people live in the regions in which the Albanian gangs and terrorists now operate. However, above all, these are citizens of the Republic of Macedonia. Therefore, I have stressed that I do not want and will not accept any pressure put on me to pursue certain political party aims, which essentially are against the interests of our citizens and the Republic of Macedonia.

In my long life and military experience I have always put the interests of my country, as a whole, first. It has been my main goal to be ready and always work in favour of my country, and that will remain so even after my departure from my current position and function.

General Pande Petrovski

The above is a copy of the press release issued by General Pande Petrovski

The proposed operation for August 6, 2001, which was approved by the President and called for relocating our units to Erebino in readiness should there be a need to engage them in freeing the Poroi - Iazhintse road, was executed later. From that aspect, on August 9, 2001 the units arrived and occupied their designated positions. On August 9, 2001 during the time the President was in General Headquarters, after we met with the commanders, he, I, Major General Metodi Stamboliski and Minister Vlado Buchkovski went to my office and agreed to perform scaled down actions to satisfy flaring passions. We agreed to perform the actions on August 9 and 10, 2001, at a place where a group of terrorists was stationed in the barracks just in front of Poroi. The action was successfully executed. After that something different started taking place; innocent Macedonian citizens were being kidnapped.

In those days the situation on the ground had become more and more difficult to control, especially at positions where the newly formed “Lions” units were stationed. The so-called NLA did not have the capacity or the ability to perform serious action against our positions. So, for some of the uncontrolled acts we performed against them, they took revenge by inflicting losses on us by other means; they attacked the roads where we were not present. These occurrences and terrorist acts were difficult to prevent especially in settlements where Albanians lived. I always emphasized that and insisted on doing only what was possible without causing casualties and property damage. That is why it was also important to secure empty and damaged buildings, etc.

Up to August 13, 2001, up to the day the Framework Agreement was signed, there were several instances when the situation could have gone out of control. We were engaged in monitoring the situation twenty-four hours a day so that there were no surprises.

On August 9, 2001, at 20:00 hours, General Risto Galevski came over to inform us that “a large number of terrorists were moving from Kosovo into our territory and were aiming to occupy Radusha”. He was asking us to send the army to defend Radusha. So I said to General Metodi Stamboliski: “This again is some kind of trap.” Because the day before the Interior Ministry had ordered their police force to withdraw from that region, i.e. to leave the village

and take a new position 2 km south and leave only a few police officers in the police station.

Radusha had been under full police control since March 29, 2001, when we carried out a military operation over the entire area. The space from Radusha along the Kosovo border to Iazhintse was not populated. The road Dvortse - Iazhintse was also under our control. But because the Kosovo - Macedonia border was a long stretch in the direction Krivets - Gracheni - Kuchkovo, we had it strongly reinforced with our security forces. North of Radusha, on the Kosovo border, there was a camp since UMPROFOR was in the Republic of Macedonia. This camp was occupied by a platoon of border guards and armoured vehicles that patrolled the entire area up to the Iazhintse guardhouse. If any terrorists showed up in that region after March 29, 2001 measures were taken to stop them. It was difficult for terrorist groups to get through because there were no settlements nearby for them to hide and the group was quickly broken up or retreated back to Krivenik in Kosovo.

Suddenly, before the signing of the Framework Agreement, the whole area became ripe for wider action against terrorist groups that had infiltrated the Republic of Macedonia from Kosovo. We knew that the so-called NLA had a training camp with recruits near Krivenik (in Kosovo, 1 km away from the Macedonian border). That particular area was inside Kosovo and the KFOR “South” brigade from the Czech Republic was responsible for it. The only suitable route for infiltration from Kosovo to Macedonia, in that entire space, was the River Radusha. This space was well-guarded by ARM and anyone attempting to enter Macedonia would have had to pass through ARM’s camp. But in spite of all that, in May and June 2001 ARM strengthened its units in Chashka with tanks, artillery and armoured personnel carriers. In total, ARM had enough forces in this region, including those that reinforced Rasche, equivalent to a full battalion. Given its current condition the so-called NLA had no chance of attacking from Kosovo, in a classical sense, by the forces that left Krivenik towards Chashka and Radusha which were acting in the territory of Kosovo. On several occasions I had mentioned to the KFOR commander that I was aware of the fact that a training camp, belonging to the so-called NLA, existed in Krivenik.

When we were informed by General Risto Galevski that “there were many terrorists in Radusha coming from Kosovo and that they were preparing to take Radusha”, and that we were asked to send our troops to defend Radusha, I began to worry, unaware that the police force had been withdrawn from that village.

Immediately after this we ordered a column of tanks and other military resources to start rolling out of Skopje to strengthen the border camp because in a situation such as this, with the police abandoning them, a surprise was possible.

It was crucial to save the Radusha camp from completely being destroyed by the terrorists who could then launch an attack from the Kosovo side and at the same time launch another from the village Radusha. I don’t know why, but before the attack the police withdraw completely and left our troops alone in the camp to lead a five hour battle, until ARM reinforcements arrived.

Provoked by these kinds of attacks and infiltration from Kosovo, a strong counter attack from the distance was carried out in the entire region in the next two days. The media, on the other hand, attributed this defense to the police. The thesis circulating was that: “In this region it was the police that defended the Republic of Macedonia.” But in fact the police had abandoned its post even before the hostilities began.

After the withdrawal of the police and after the 5 hour battle and withdrawal of our troops from Camp Radusha, the entire Radusha and Iazhintse space became a “Mecca” for the terrorists. After August 12, 2001 they were free to communicate with Kosovo and Radusha about Krivenik even though KFOR forces were on the other side of them.

Even though the group of our soldiers, who defended Radusha Camp, experienced a vicious attack from all sides, especially from the Kosovo side, they absorbed the attack, defended the camp and showed high professionalism, courage and perseverance. We from General Headquarters were in direct contact with them at all times and kept them active until the reinforcements arrived and pulled them out with no losses. The terrorist attack took place during the

dark of night because the terrorists knew they could not have stopped the attack if it had begun during the day on August 11, 2001. No one could have stopped ARM from performing acts against the terrorists even before they arrived… even on the other side of the Kosovo border.

The days before August 13, 2001 (before the Framework Agreement was signed) large scale provocations were expected at all times. Since the President had decided not to sign the Tetovo operation, Radusha was invented. The Ministry of the Interior had 100 Special Forces police officers in the Radusha police station. ARM had 24 soldiers in Radusha Camp who managed to hold their own.

During the course of the military operations, during the night when the worst attacks were carried out against our troops in the camp, I tried to contact the KFOR Commander but he did not respond so I left him a message. I said: “If the attack from the Kosovo side continues and if mortars continue to be fired, I will be forced to open fire and execute an attack and I will not be responsible for any KFOR units that may get in the way.” After that phone call I contacted President Trajkovski and told him what I said. Shortly afterwards, around 00:01 hours on August 11, 2001, the terrorists stopped their actions and we were able to extract our soldiers from the camp. In the night during the attack, one of our tanks that was engaged in the Krivenichka River became disabled. It was left in the river. Later the terrorists dragged it out and used it as a trophy, claiming that they had captured it from ARM.