SUMMARY

SUMMARY

Since the beginning of the war, there were varying opinions and disunity in the top government officials in the Republic of Macedonia as to how the war was going to be resolved. There were impressions left, especially in the public that the leadership of the country was undecided about using the existing defense system, according to the Constitution, which called for using all means possible in the defense of the sovereignty and integrity of the state. This indecision, based on whether or not there was lack of courage, know-how, or if “purposely perpetrated” is not important. What is very important is to examine whether or not the government authorities took appropriate measures, as they were obligated to do by law, to defend the Republic of Macedonia. If they did not, then they aided the terrorists and are their direct accomplices.

These kinds of indecisions, for not taking legitimate measures, early in the war, were justified because allegedly there was a lack of information. The parties responsible for taking action were claiming they did not know “what was happening in the Republic of Macedonia?” Later, as it turned out, there was such information available. It was generated by ARM, by the Army border units which were reporting that they were being attacked on the territory of the Republic of Macedonia by foreign military forces, which the public and top government officials chose to call “border incidents”.

However, under public pressure, especially from the media, since this problem was raised to the international scene, i.e. because the Republic of Macedonia was a legitimate and sovereign state and had the right to use legal means to defend itself, to use all its defense capabilities, the state leadership has decided to take serious military action.

In the beginning, when we initiated the first military operations, the top state leadership again came into flux, i.e. it split into two factions; one faction was calling for radical military action against the aggressor and other faction was calling for the military crisis be resolved by political means - “the politicians caused it and therefore the politicians should resolve it.”

When the view prevailed that the Republic of Macedonia had a legitimate right to defend itself with its own security forces by undertaking military actions, the leadership initiated an operation in Tetovo Region. Unfortunately this operation was cut short. Three days later the security forces were ordered to stop all actions – instead of allowing it to finish the job and break the agents of war, ARM was ordered to stop and was placed in a static state. Why did this happen? It was our right to defend our country and yet “someone” chose to stop us. The question here is why and was this based on some kind of pre-arranged agreement. Someone will need to explain why this happened or we will have to conclude, and rightly so, that the military crisis had previously been agreed upon by external factors who had dealings with some of the political structures that were then in power in our country.

At the very beginning, when ARM and the police had the capability, determination and courage to cope and overcome this military crisis, “someone” was afraid that the aim for starting this military crisis would not be achieved if the crisis ended prematurely. That “someone” had previously developed tools to control the crisis and was happy to see it continue. Whoever did this certainly had the “tools” to further the course of the war by military means until it reached its climax with the direct involvement of NATO stopping the war and sitting everyone down at the negotiating table.

The people that caused the aggression did not sit at the negotiating table. In fact it was “others” who sat on the other side of the table representing the interests of the aggressor, and as such the purpose of the crisis was certainly realized and, I would dare to say, revealed.

The moment these “others” became unsure of whether they would achieve the aggressor’s ultimate goal before signing the agreement, was the moment when they caused unnecessary casualties outside of the zone of military action to “persuade” the Macedonian people that “there was no other solution but to sign the Ohrid Framework Agreement”. Undeniable is the fact that all these perpetrators who were involved were part of the state leadership. Whether this was done intentionally or for any other reason is not important, without the involvement of someone in the Macedonian state leadership the

“architect” who had planned this crisis would not have been able to realize his objectives.

The motives and objectives of those who worked on behalf of those who wanted “to divide the Republic of Macedonia” are inexplicable. It is a mystery why, instead of peacefully leading the Macedonian people, they had such a desire to cause chaos in their own country. At the beginning of the crisis resolution, of course, when they worked under the thesis of dividing the Republic of Macedonia, they could have only done that by using the security forces and military means.

When they were applying the tools to create the military crisis, the instrument of intimidation most used by the state leadership was the so-called “friendly intelligence services.” These so-called “friendly intelligence services” were systematically delivering “information”, by which, among other things, the number of terrorists estimated to be inside the Republic of Macedonia was 50,000. This caused the Macedonian top state leadership to hesitate in resolving the crisis by military means.

Culmination of this intimidation from the so-called “friendly intelligence services” was reached on the day the Ohrid Framework Agreement was signed, i.e. the day before that the following information was released (which I will quote in full because on August 13, 2001 the so-called NLA “planned an operation to take over Sarai.” ):

“The attack was planned on the object called Veternik in the woods near the village Gorno Svilare, where units of the so-called NLA were deployed with strength of about 300 to 400 members armed with automatic rifles, 12.7mm caliber machine guns, and most certainly 82 mm mortars. The commander of this unit was Nuredin Azbi, owner of the restaurant ‘Lozana’ in Porta Vlae (Skopje), commander of the lower units was his brother Ramadan, the famous Odzha Sulio (i.e. little Sulio) from Gorno Svilare and his son. The aim of this unit was to launch an attack in the direction: Dolno Svilare - Kondovo - Sarai and to take Sarai. An additional task for this unit was to launch an attack on the village Rashche, and to assist the so-called NLA unit located inside the village Dvorche near

Radusha. The terrorist unit of the so-called ANA numbered about 600 members armed with 82 mm and 120 mm mortars. Commander of this unit was Alit, from Dolno Svilare, who had completed military training in Peshkopeia, Albania.”

The attack on Sarai was scheduled to start on August 13, 2001 and end the same day or on the next day, Monday August 14, 2001.

The record shown that the so-called NLA did not perform, not even a single operation, in the past seven months, except for the ambushes and shameful murders they committed outside the zones of military action. While ARM, for months, continued to provoke them to come out and fight, they hid among the civilian population, that is, until August 13, 2001 when they, as we are told, “were planning an operation to seize Sarai”. Where did this information, or I should say, misinformation come from? Who was in most need for this kind of “misinformation”? Was this incentive for those who were hesitating to sign the Ohrid Framework Agreement? Or was it something else? There were many so-called “intelligence reports” like this one, but this one, quoted above, was particularly suspicious because it was delivered the day before the signing of the Ohrid Framework Agreement.

Our services were well aware of the condition in which the so-called NLA had found itself, but in spite of our efforts to inform them, right from the start, “someone” tried to mislead the people with frightening misinformation.

The so-called NLA was never independent right from the start. It belonged to the UCMPB formation and composition until this organization was dissolved on May 25, 2001 by KFOR, when Yugoslav units entered the Bujanovac - Presevo border area. Until then UCMPB and the KLA were part of one command led by Emrush Dzhemail.

The NLA leadership had planned to enter northern Macedonia in case of a military escalation in southern Serbia; in case the Yugoslav army entered Sector “B” after May 24, 2001. As we have shown, some of those forces, about 170 to 200 fighters, did enter the Republic of Macedonia as part of the so-called NLA. After that,

with the dissolution of UCMPB by KFOR, the so-called NLA received apparent independence. Then, on May 25, 2001 the NLA became KFOR’s pet with its own General Headquarters located in Prizren, Kosovo. G’zimi Ostreni was appointed Commander and Ali Ahmeti - “Abas”, political director. Their formations had a so-called Division with a brigade called “Tanushevtsi” and another one called “Tetovo”.

NATO - KFOR’s assessment of the so-called NLA:

“The NLA ranks were composed of Macedonian Albanians from northwestern Macedonia and Kosovo. They were experienced fighters. There was no evidence of the presence of fighters from Albania.”

“The NLA had the ability to recruit fighters in the Republic of Macedonia, in Kosovo and in the Diaspora. It is estimated that 150 former members of UCMPB joined the NLA...”

“The NLA had the ability to continue with low level insurgencies indefinitely, but would have had difficulty carrying out larger operations...”

“The NLA was forced to limit or stop its activities until it was sufficiently re-equipped…”

Before Arachinovo the situation of the so-called NLA was critical. The terrorist group was falling apart and thus we were forced to sign a ceasefire Agreement. The following is an official NLA report on the state that the NLA was in at that time:

“In the meantime the 112th Brigade Mudzhdin Aliu, with 300 people based near Tetovo, appears to be suffering from low morale, a problem which undoubtedly contributed to its inability to independently provoke or engage the Macedonian forces...” “The soldiers of the 112th Brigade have become dissatisfied with life on the ground, and from the middle of June 2001 have been preparing to riot or leave the unit altogether. The command of the so-called NLA has stubbornly failed to acknowledge the problem and see to the wishes of its members and has regularly misled them to stay the

course...” “The dissatisfaction in 112 Brigade, together with how the so-called NLA leadership has responded to it, highlights the extent to which the NLA’s commitment and strength has fluctuated in such a short period of time...”

This is how the so-called NLA stood before Arachinovo. Our state leadership accepted a ceasefire from a foe that was falling apart and then pursued a course to solve the crisis by political means because, in its mind and without confirming this with its military leadership, it assumed “ARM was unable to resolve the crisis by military means!?” Surely, at least part of the state leadership must have consciously known that this was wrong?!

The state leadership, i.e. the Government of the Republic of Macedonia was outsmarted to sign an unconditional ceasefire Agreement. Was this because it wanted to be intentionally outsmarted or because of incompetence or from ignorance, which I doubt, I don’t know. Even a greater mistake in its part, was to allow conditions to be set by Peter Faith, personal envoy to the NATO Secretary General, about whom we wrote earlier in this book.

What happened during the ceasefire and how many innocent people fell victim to the cowardly ways of the terrorists has also been highlighted in this book. Who was in need, after the ceasefire in the Republic of Macedonia, to start a general chaos in order to provoke a civil war for which there could be no military solution; which then would be solved only by political means and through the international community. All this needs to be well investigated. The tragic events that took place after the ceasefire were enacted by those who started the military crisis to justify to the people that indeed the crisis was real. But, as it turned out, good fortune favoured the Macedonian people and a civil war was avoided. Tragically too many innocent and honest people, including the brave Macedonian fighters, had to die by the treacherous and cowardly ways of the terrorists, in order to place blame elsewhere for what had happened in the Republic of Macedonia?! Who is better equipped to understand this than the elected government officials! The rest of us who were directly involved in the resolution of the crisis had honest, patriotic and professional intentions to defend the Republic of Macedonia from this aggressor. We were all sadly, at

every turn, hampered in every military operation we conducted and not by the enemy, but by our own top leadership. We led the war by all the means and strength that ARM possessed in peacetime, in a peaceful situation. From that aspect, in those days and today the participants of this war, particularly those who gave their lives and those who were left permanently maimed, cannot answer these questions but definitely need them to be answered. Someone from the then government was talking about declaring a war situation in the Republic of Macedonia but never bothered to take the necessary measures to equip the security forces to deal with a crisis situation, not even in a small part of the Macedonian territory.

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Subject: Announcements regarding the attack on Sarai

A so-called NLA unit has been deployed at the object called Veternik in the woods near the village of Gorno Svilare which, according to our source, numbers about 300 to 400 terrorists armed with AP, PM 12.7 mm caliber and probably has 82 mm mortars (the source does not rule out this possibility).

The commander of this unit was Nuredin Azbi, owner of the restaurant ‘Lozana’ in Porta Vlae. Commander of the lower units was his brother Ramadan, the famous Odzha Sulio (i.e. little Sulio from Gorno Svilare, former president of the Islamic Religious Community) and his son.

The aim of this unit was to launch an attack in the direction: Dolno Svilare - Kondovo - Sarai and to take Sarai. An additional task for this unit was to launch an attack on the village Rashche and to assist the so-called NLA unit located inside the village Dvorche near Radusha. The terrorist unit of the so-called ANA numbered about 600 members armed with 82 mm and 120 mm mortars. Commander of this unit was Alit, from Dolno Svilare, who had completed military training in Peshkopeia, Albania.”

The attack on Sarai was scheduled to start on August 13, 2001 and end the same day or on the next day, Monday August 14, 2001.

According to our source, there were 80 young people from the village Dolno Svilare in the so-called NLA unit stationed in the Veternik forest and an even larger number of young people from the village Gorno Svilare. These people received a daily ration of 30 gm of food and drink. The injured and wounded are taken to the Gorno Slivare Clinic where they are looked after by Fani, from the village Rashche, who serves as their doctor.

Despite the fierce hostilities in the village Boiane, our source said that the so-called NLA units that are fighting in that region have not abandoned their positions.

The houses in the village Rashche that are not loyal to the NLA have been characteristically marked. These houses have been marked with a cloth and a small bar of soap which, according to our source, means that members of the house who cooperate with the Macedonian security forces will be liquidated.

Supplement: NLA units are stationed in the villages Gorno and Dolno Svilare, Kopanitsa, Dvorche and other places of action.

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