TAKING MILITARY ACTION AGAINST THE “NLA”

TAKING MILITARY ACTION AGAINST THE “NLA”

On March 21, 2001, by Presidential decree from the President of the Republic Macedonia, I was reactivated and appointed Deputy Chief of ARM General Headquarters. By the same decree I was obliged to take command of the Tetovo operation dubbed “MH”.

Two days before that, on March 18, 2001, when I accepted my reactivation, I had a chance to view ARM’s condition in Tetovo Region and formed a team to execute the “Tetovo Operation”. In the team I engaged senior ARM personnel from those who had been retired the year before by the Minister of Defense because they were in the way of ARM’s reforms, i.e. those who were “putting the brakes” on the MPRI recommendations headed by retired Major General Richard Griffiths of the USA.

A new “rearranged” General Headquarters and leadership were formed in 2000 to command ARM.

The new General Headquarters formation was:

- For Chief of Staff of General Headquarters, appointed was Engineering Lieutenant General Jovo Andreeveski (with 43 years of work experience);

- For Deputy Chief of Staff of General Headquarters, appointed was Brigadier General Savo Janev, a quartermaster officer;

- For Director of General Headquarters, a new function introduced by the reorganization, appointed was Major General Tushi Zehedin;

- For Commander of the Corps (the only such unit in the entire territory of the Republic of Macedonia), appointed was Major General Giorgi Karakutovski - an artillery officer;

- For Commander of the Border Brigade, appointed was Major General Metodi Stamboliski.

- And for Commander of the First Infantry Brigade - as a unit for quick reactions and the single brigade promoted by the President of

the Republic of Macedonia in 2000, appointed was Brigadier General Adil Gazafer.

In January 2001 ARM was presented with this forward looking structure of leadership and command set by Decree by the President of the Republic of Macedonia. Liuben Paunovksi was appointed Minister of Defense.

When I again returned to active duty I was able to examine some of the documents pertaining to the operational performance in the villages Tanushevci - Brest - Malina Maala. I was amazed at what was happening! I found orders signed and issued by the Supreme Commander to engage a tank and implement, etc., which were not under the Supreme Commander’s authority. In fact, the Supreme Commander signed for, or approved, the entire operation. Every military operation must be planned very carefully to include times, places, which forces to be engage at what times and for how long and when the military operation is to be completed.

It was not clear to me why the Supreme Commander signed individual orders - and then I got my answer: because “this problem (attack on the Republic of Macedonia) was caused by the politicians, so they had to settle it”. In other words, the top military leaders required the police to solve the problem, since it was not in the border belt (the border belt, according to the Republic of Macedonia’s official rules, was within 100 metres of the border line except for Ohrid and Prespa Lakes where it is 500 metres), the Minister of Defense persistently demanded that the problem be solved by political means.

And as such no measures, actions or any other form of activity were taken by authorized persons or services (ministers, chiefs, etc.) to protect and defend their own territory in accordance with the Constitution and the Law on Defense. This inaction seemed treasonous and those behind it could have been considered as accomplices of the attackers threatening the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the Republic of Macedonia. Action was eventually taken, a month later, and only because of media and public pressure. This gave me an opportunity to review and analyze the events that

took place in the villages Tanushevtsi and Malina Maala, which took place during the period when I was still in retirement.

I was personally surprised when the top state leadership called me back. My surprise was that I did not know why the Prime Minister and the President were looking for me - I thought they needed some advice regarding the overall situation that had been presented to them from a military point of view. I never thought that they would reactivate me.

After several days of reviewing the situation with ARM and with what was happening in the field, we formed a team which developed a draft plan for dealing with the terrorist groups in Tetovo, or Shar Mountain and beyond.

THE “MH” TETOVO OPERATION

On March 21, at 22:00 hours we took our proposed plan for the preparation and execution of a military operation before the state leadership. The plan read:

“Draft Plan for Conducting the Operation”

“According to our findings, acting in the Tetovo terrain, in the villages Poroi, Shipkovitsa, Veitse, Germo and Kale are about 150 to 200 armed individuals who are fortified, established and fully in control of the space of the western and southern slopes of Shar Planina. In previous diversionary actions the terrorist groups (DTG) have shown that they are prepared and determined to hold those positions for a long time, especially the villages Shipkovitsa, Kale, Veitse and Germo, centrally structured in Kale.

“As Supreme Commander I propose that you issue the following order:

- To immediately start preparations to act against the diversionary-terrorist operational zone - right: Villages Slatino and Serdalitsa; left: Villages Brvenitsa, Popova Shapka and Veshala in depth of the Yugoslav state border of the given zone.

Purpose of the operation:

- To attack and destroy the DTG in the given zone and to establish full control and operation of the state government.

- Readiness for the operation, 2 days,

- Units for the special actions to be obtained from the Ministry of the Interior,

- All planned ARM and Ministry of the Interior forces are to be placed under a unified command which will be led and managed by the Deputy Chief of Staff of General Headquarters,

- The operation is to organize - Use of:

Support Forces, Security forces, Heavy forces, Landing forces”.

The proposal was accepted by the Supreme Commander and everyone from the state leadership.

After the ideological part of operation “MH” was accepted, the previously selected team of officers began to work on the development of the full plan.

I decided: The main forces to participate in this military operation would be the units from 2. Army Corps (Bitola) which I commanded 5 years ago. I strongly believe in those officers and they fully know me and were familiar with my leadership style.

On March 22, 23 and 24, 2001, I spent most of my time on the ground in preparation for the operation to be certain that everything that we agreed on would be done and that President Boris Trajkovski would sign off on the Plan on March 23, 2001, after he returned from an official business trip. (He was in Geneva on business.)

On March 23, 2001 I was on the ground in Tetovo for the entire day discussing the operation. I returned around 19:00 hours and was called by Prime Minister Georgievski.

At his Cabinet I briefed him of what I thought, of the decisions made and tasks to be performed by ARM and when and where we were planning to engage the Operation.

Besides that, I also briefed him of the actual military operational plan and how it was going to be implemented: Time, place and means of engaging the units on March 25 and 26, 2001.

When I was done he said: “Now go to General Headquarters and around 21:00 hours, when President Boris Trajkovski arrives, we will come and he will sign this Plan”. (Plan “MH” to perform the combat operation.)

I waited for President Boris Trajkovski to sign the plan of action until 24:00 hours. The next day, Friday March 23, 2001, I went to Minister Liuben Paunovski’s office, he was still there waiting for the President to arrive. I said to him: “Minister, are we still going to wait? What is the problem? Is there any information that verifies that the President is even coming?” He said he had no such information, but would immediately check.

At one o’clock in the morning, on March 24, 2001, Minister Liuben Paunovski spoke with President Boris Trajkovski on the telephone. After talking to him Paunovski said” “General, go and get some rest, the signing will take place on March 24, 2001 at about 12:00 hours.

I was already up at 7 o’clock in the morning of March 24, 2001 and checking on the units to make sure that during the nights of March 23 and 24 they occupied their positions in accordance with the operational plan which, up to now, had not been signed and approved.

In order to condition our forces and to achieve surprise on March 23 and 24, 2001, I ordered the units to exercise the artillery and helicopters in the areas where the terrorist groups were observed or in new positions.

Vlado Popovski, member of the Security Council in the Republic of Macedonia, called me on the telephone around 12:00 and asked: “Pande, where are you, I want to see you for a minute?” I said: “I am in my office waiting for the President.” He said: “I am coming right now!” I thought to myself there has to be something amiss when Vlado Popovski shows up and not the President of the Republic of Macedonia.

When Vlado Popovski arrived in my office, at that very moment I was giving Colonel Josip Boshevski orders, by telephone, to attack a terrorist group that had been observed.

After greeting each other, I looked at Popovski with a serious look and said: “Vlado, please sit down, stay for a little. Can I offer you something?”

“Sorry, I can’t. I don’t have the time,” he replied.

“What is so urgent, Vlado?” I asked.

“Please, Pande, let me ask you one more time. Can you break up the terrorists in Tetovo?”

I had no idea why Vlado now, at this very moment, was asking me this question. In my own style I replied: “Don’t you worry about that, I will tear them to pieces! Is this why you came here, to ask me that?”

“Well, I came here to tell you this!” he said. “The President is hesitating, someone in Geneva scared him about something and all day he has been hesitating to sign the decision to perform the military operation. Now we will go to visit him with Ljubomir Frckovski, the Prime Minister and some others to persuade him.”

“Please, Vlado, the plan needs to be signed by tonight because the operation starts early tomorrow morning - all units are tense and ready for action. Will this take place!? I am ready for action, as you can see for yourself; I am only waiting for the President. Liuben Paunovksi, the Minister of Defense, said to me that he was going to

come at 12 noon to sign the plan.” Later I said: “Didn’t the Prime Minister himself openly say that the decision was already made and that the only thing remaining was for the commanders to decide when to begin the offensive?”

Immediately after our short conversation Vlado Popovski left. He left me wondering what was going on? Why didn’t the President want to sign and approve the “MH” combat operation!? I could not help myself but think of negative thoughts. If he does not approve the plan… the units are at their positions and ready to act…! Tomorrow I will order them to attack… no matter what happens... One thing I was not sure of however, was whether the Ministry of Internal Affairs was going to support me or not?

March 24, 2001 was a nightmare day for me because I was faced with a serious dilemma and negative thoughts wondering what had happened to our leadership!?

Time was on the side of the terrorists and those who directed the crisis. In the beginning when we attempted to resolve the crisis by military means we found large opposition; the brakes kept being put on. Indecision or intentional braking - the brakes were put on in an effort not to solve the crisis. I did not know what to think so I remained alone in my office. General Iovo Andreevski, the Chief of Staff, advocated that the crisis be solved by political means and so did Minister Liuben Paunovski. “There is no need for the military to get involved” they kept saying.

My reply to all those comments was that: “This was the job of the military; these are violations of the territorial integrity of the Republic Macedonia. Terrorists have occupied and are holding western Macedonia. Don’t you understand that?! How can you think this way!? We need to defend our state; it is our obligation and responsibility!” I could not understand why they thought this way and what they thought the function of the Army was if not to provide security and defense for the Republic Macedonia.

In the evening of March 24, 2001, at 18:00 hours, Prime Minister Georgievski called me and asked me where I was and what was new? I said: “I have been waiting since 12:00 hours for a decision to

approve the plan and to start the operation tomorrow.” “Okay then,” he said, “come over to my office”. About 10 minutes later I was in his office and immediately said: “Well Mr. Prime Minister, what’s going on, are we going to fight or not!?” He said: “It would be good, Pande, if I could have a look at the plan one more time.” I don’t know how I explained to him how we were going to pull off the military operation and all its details, but after my explanation he said: “Go to General Headquarters and wait there for me, I will be back.” But he did not say when he was coming back.

I was emotionally exhausted. It was already 20:00 hours (March 24, 2001). I did not know what to tell the commanders about the offensive the next day. I was constantly in radio and telephone contact with them. I kept them informed and they kept me informed regarding their readiness but constantly kept asking when they should be ready. The responsibility for initiating the offensive was resting strictly with me personally. I did not want the commanders, by any of my gestures, to feel that something odd was happening to the state leadership - especially to the Supreme Commander.

On March 24, 2001 at 21:00 hours, members of the leadership from the Ministry of Defense began to arrive at Minister Liuben Paunovski’s office. I thought that this was good; the “MH” operation would finally be approved.

I too went to the Ministry of Defense office where, besides Minister Liuben Paunovski, I also found Stoian Andov, Dosta Dimovska, Zvonko Kashirski, Dragi Grozdanovski and some others. It was already 21:30 hours. After the usual greetings, I pulled out the operational map and prepared the documents that needed signing. We waited for the President and for the Prime Minister to arrive. We sat, talked and waited in a difficult and tense atmosphere. I tried to lighten the atmosphere but only with Stoian Andov and Dosta Dimovska, the others kept quiet. The Prime Minister arrived at about 23:00 hours. He was not very happy but greeted me with a head shake, perhaps a sign that everything was going to be alright. Ten to fifteen minutes later President Boris Trajkovski arrived but I had not seen him so angry and sullen. He sat in his usual seat, looked at me and immediately said: “Let me have a look at the plan of operation one more time!”

Today, once again, I don’t know how many times I explained the “MH” plan in detail.

After I went over the plan, Prime Minister Georgievski, Interior Minister Dosta Dimovska and Stoian Andov all encouraged President Boris Trajkovski, that there was nothing more to be done and that he needed to sign the plan. All the others kept silent. Boris Trajkovski called in Chief of Staff Iovo Andreevski to get his opinion. Shaken up, Iovo, without hesitation said: “I do not know anything, it is up to you, you decide!”

The President had many questions like: “How many casualties will there be?” “Will there also be civilian casualties?” “Will there be any surprises?” Etc.

By now it was 01:00 hours, the morning of March 25, 2001. I could no longer afford to stall. My units were in position and their commanders were waiting for the signal to start the attack. They should have had their orders by now and used the cover of night to get closer to the terrorists undetected. Unfortunately the President still had not approved the operation. After reflecting on what was said, I got up, marched over to the Supreme Commander and, in the voice of a soldier, said: “Mr. President, if in a few minutes you do not sign the plan and you do not approve the operation that is expected to commence today at 07:00 hours in the morning, it will be too late and all this will be for nothing. So I don’t know why I am here, why you invited me here!” Everyone went silent as they waited for the President to answer. I was all broken up inside and immediately turned to my own thoughts. The President looked at me for a moment and said: “Okay then, give me that map!” (The map with the operational plan and other details.) I went and took the map and all other relevant documents and put them in front of him. He crossed himself, signed the documents and said: “May God lead us, help us and protect us!” In addition to the President, another signature was required; that of the Chief of Staff of General Headquarters as the originator of the documents. So I said to Iovo Andreevski: “Okay Iovo put your thumb print here; but if you don’t want to sign I will sign on your behalf.” He said: “It must be easy for you because you don’t have to sign.” So I said firmly to him: “I

am leading the war here, why would a signature be a problem for me?!” Even though General Iovo Andreevski had not even read the plan, he had no choice but to sign because many from the Republic of Macedonia’s state top leadership were present and watching him.

I took the map and other documents and without saying a word, saluted, stormed out of the office, joined a group of officers who were waiting for me outside and who were headed for Tetovo and went to my office. At that point I said to General Metodia Stamboliski to immediately make and deliver copies to the various designated places and then file the document in the archives. From my office, through the various links, I officially issued the necessary orders. By then it was March 25, 2001, 02:30 hours in the morning.

When I came out of my office to leave for Tetovo, Colonel Stoian Petrovski stopped me to tell me: “General, everyone is gone. The President went with Iovo to his office”. I said to Stoian, “Thank you for the information but I am no longer interested in them. All I am interested now is to know if we are ready in Tetovo. We don’t have much time?” He gave me a short answer: “Everything has long been ready.”

I am writing all this down to give the reader an understanding that, from the beginning since I became involved in the resolution of the crisis, I was met with resistance, indecision and uncertainty. The most difficult part in all of this was my understanding of President Boris Trajkovski’s behaviour. As a civilian who is not a military professional, without looking at his competent constitutional powers, he hesitated and delayed using ARM. But then, on the other hand, the Chief of Staff of General Headquarters, Major General Iovo Andreevski, who was expected to provide his support to convince the Supreme Commander to use ARM, was very reluctant. Only he knows why he behaved this way but let that be his honour forever!

But, as it turned out, the President of the Republic of Macedonia and Supreme Commander of the military eventually authorized the use of military force to resolve the crisis. (Later, according to data obtained by the Ministry of Defense, the beginning of the crisis was evaluated as follows by the external factor:

During the first phase of the crisis, the Macedonian leadership advocated for vigorous actions on a wider scale, to eliminate all Albanian strongholds in their territory. The top political leadership however, especially with Albanian political leaders in the Macedonian government and parliament, wanted more time and involvement of international forces (NATO and KFOR) in solving the problem. Although NATO, besides further securing its facilities in Kumanovo, Skopje, Tetovo and Petrovets, did nothing to calm the situation, justifying this attitude with the idea that KFOR had no mandate to carry out military actions in the territory of the Republic of Macedonia, nor to act together with the Macedonian forces. The authorities on the Macedonian side evaluated this as “lack of concrete support or assistance when it comes to the Albanian factor”. This was also interpreted as a signal to take appropriate measures on their own, after which government forces launched their anti-terrorist activities. In the beginning of the military campaign the village population was evacuated. The Albanian leaders in Tanushevtsi insisted that this be evaluated as a “humanitarian disaster”.

In spite of the initial denial that there was a connection between this crisis in the Republic of Macedonia and those in Kosovo and South Serbia, the political military circles began to discuss this possibility. It was considered that the crisis will be resolved with the consent of NATO, which at the time needed to strengthen its international forces in Kosovo and at the border with the Republic of Macedonia.

Additional problems encountered in securing the border drew in the Americans and the involvement of US military associates who were simultaneously in contact with the NLA and with the Macedonian forces. (According to data obtained by the Ministry of Defense). Later “the same group of US military advisers” who were in contact with the NLA also helped the Macedonian military. The well-known American company MPRI was led by Richard Griffiths, a retired general, who was on good terms with Agim Chehu, was helping the Albanians with their terrorist actions and was also involved with the armed forces in the Republic Macedonia in the so-called “Program for Stabilization and dissuasion”)

From the beginning of my involvement in the resolution of the crisis I realized that: if we continue to operate this way we will have serious problems resolving the crisis by military means using ARM military assets. The main reason for this was the top army leadership; it was against using APM. This is why, during the assembly of the top state leadership, when I was appointed Deputy Chief of Staff of General Headquarters I made my feelings known. In front of everyone at the assembly I said: “Mr. President, I will accept this responsibility, but I will require from you full authority regarding my engagement and you know that General Iovo Andreevski does not like to be my supervisor and only he alone knows why. Therefore, in the event of a dispute, I will ask that you make a final decision.” After I said that, General Iovo Andreevski called me to tell me something in his own style. He said: “General, if you are a soldier then stay there because my rank is Lieutenant Colonel.”