NATO KFOR CONFIDENTIAL

NATO/KFOR CONFIDENTIAL

Operations and Intelligence Exchange

CONTROL NUMBER YEAR: 2001 VL NO: 1608

1. ORIGINATOR: KFOR –

TIME SUBMITTED 1045, 28 Jun 01.

Time of response:

NCCC LOG NUMBER: 1608

2. SUBJECT: Apprehension of 27 men

3. EXCHANGED OPERATIONS or INTELLIGENCE:

MNB (E) reported that at 0530 this morning, they apprehended 27 military aged males at EM 436777. Four of them had combat related wounds and were air evacuated to CBS Hospital. The other 23 men are now being taken to Bondsteel Detention Camp. There were no reports of any weapons found.

4. DISSEMINATED TO: The MOD

5. REMARKS / ACTION TAKEN:

* * *

The above was a photocopy of a KFOR report detailing the extraction of 27 people. It is assumed that these were the 30 people that the NATO Secretary General was interested in and who, in his conversation with Trajkovcki, he had promised to provide their names.

I hope that one day, in the interest of history, the Albanian side of Arachinovo will tell its side of the story and describe the hell it experienced in those days. However, of all the events, humiliations, pressures, etc., the “architect” of the crisis in Macedonia managed to quickly sign a ceasefire agreement and sit at the table and reach a political solution. I am convinced that Arachinovo was purposely enacted in order to interrupt our military actions so that the crisis would be solved differently. This was done at the cost of having ARM and the Republic of Macedonia’s military humiliated, especially the courageous security forces who bravely defended the integrity of our state.

CONDITIONS AFTER THE MILITARY OPERATION IN ARACHINOVO

“Arachinovo” was needed in order for the military crisis in the Republic of Macedonia to be resolved by political means. To this end, among other things, the Coordinating Body was formed by the government. I do not intend to write about the work and contribution of this Body to the resolution of the military crisis because there are transcripts available for each session along with the conclusions reached. The Coordinating Body was mandated to conduct assessments of the situation and analyze and propose practical solutions to the government and to the president. It was meant to function something similar to the one in Yugoslavia which was mandated to address the problems in Kosovo.

The Coordinating Body was put in place to facilitate the work of the President and the Government because those bodies were involved in other engagements. The Coordinating Body was totally meant to contribute to the resolution of all the problems. In addition to that, it was expected to actively engage the Albanian factor of the “wider coalition”, and not just the state leadership as it had functioned before Arachinovo.

The International factors gave great importance to the work of this Body, particularly in its involvement in resolving the crisis by political means.

After several sessions, since the formation of this Body, it was found that solving the more important questions about the military crisis was hard work. However, the Body made major contributions to the cleaning and rehabilitation of the areas where military action had taken place, particularly in Tetovo, Kumanovo and especially in Arachinovo. Some of the ministers, especially those from VMRO-DPMNE, were not regularly present at all the meetings. Some boycotted the Body calling it a “debate club”. But still, the Coordinating Body settled, above all, the technical and political problems in resolving the military crisis.

In addition to the Coordinating Body, a Crisis Committee was established which handled all the information coming in 24 hours a

day. The head of the Crisis Committee was also a member of the Coordination Body - a Crisis Management Centre was also formed and placed under the authority of the Ministry of Defense. Included in the membership of the Crisis Management Centre were personalities from almost all of the ministries belonging to the Coordinating Body.

In addition to all the accredited international institutions and representatives of NATO, OSCE, etc. that remained in the Republic of Macedonia after “Arachinovo”, was also Peter Faith, personal representative to the NATO Secretary General, whose role was to coordinate all activities and to directly mediate between the Republic of Macedonia’s security forces and the so-called NLA. It is important at this point to mention that Peter Faith also mediated activities in Kosovo, i.e. in the dissolution of the so-called Liberation Army of Presevo Dolina: Presevo, Bujanovac and Medvedzhe. Peter Faith was in direct contact with the President of the Republic of Macedonia and acted quite arrogantly, even brazenly, which I found very strange. On one occasion, in front of the entire Macedonian state leadership, I asked him: “Tell me Mr. Faith, are you the commander of the so-called NLA, why do you assert yourself so strongly?!” This was when we were working towards a ceasefire. Peter Faith was in daily contact with the President, with all of us, with Ali Ahmeti and of course with the NATO Secretary General.

The initiative to end the military crisis by political means - with aims: “to end the crisis that disrupted the Republic of Macedonia’s peaceful democratic development and was a direct threat to regional stability” - led to the signing of an unconditional ceasefire agreement. Among other things, Peter Faith sent a letter to Ilia Filipovski, Vice President of the Government of the Republic of Macedonia. (The letter is included further down in this book.)

Personally I was not committed to accepting or rejecting any of the terms and conditions proposed by mediator Peter Faith. The first request for signing an agreement was made on July 7, 2001, in a letter entitled: “Permanent ceasefire; accepted by all sides!” I don’t recall who compiled the text in the letter but myself (Pande Petrovski) and General Risto Galevski were also asked to sign it

even though we were not members of the Government of the Republic of Macedonia.

We accepted our obligations - given that the Government had decided to fully respect the obligations of the Agreement, from both sides, as per Peter Faith’s direction.

The Agreement, among other things, specified that a ceasefire meant that all weapons were to be taken away, including the placement of mines and other improvised explosive devices, as well as for the security forces to remain in their current position and not to use the ceasefire as an opportunity to change or improve their positions. Nevertheless, the Agreement did allow the use of proportional force, if necessary, but only for self-defense and defense of others or to take measures against an attack “in a soft limited extent, intensity and duration necessary for defense and nothing more”.

Certainly, all these obligations were meant for both parties, where above all they were obligations made compulsory by NATO.

After signing the agreement, the terrorist groups, especially in Tetovo, started with provocations and attempts to expand their territory, especially in the villages where Macedonians only or mixed Albanians and Macedonians lived. They particularly targeted places where Interior Ministry police forces existed and provoked them in an attempt to get them to break the ceasefire.

The police force was in charge of guarding the road Tetovo - Poroi -Iazhints deployed from the village Leshok. In other villages the police were deployed as follows: 20 police officers in the village Teartse, 70 in the village Vratnitsa, 120 in the village Iazhintse, 25 in the village Iegunovtse, 100 in the village Patae, 50 in the village Zhelche, 70 police officers in police stations, reserves. There were also 5 police checkpoints with 15 police officers each, at the time of the signing of the Agreement (July 5, 2001).

Besides securing these regions, the Interior Ministry’s police also provided services for all the main roads connecting Skopje - Tetovo - Gostivar - Mavrovo - Debar, i.e. all the areas that were not covered by military actions up until June 5, 2001.

According to ARM reports, most of the terrorists were located as follows:

The group of terrorists that was extracted by NATO from the village Arachinovo, as per our agreement, was stationed in the villages Nikushtak, Vishtutsa and Ropalts with the wounded stationed in the village Grushino. No military actions took place in May and June of 2001 in this part of the region. But no sooner had they arrived here than the terrorists began to organize defensive positions in front of the village Nikushtak. The local residents were not in agreement with that and began to violently protest. But the terrorists retaliated and on June 27, 2001 burned down 10 houses. After that they relocated themselves to the village Nikushtak, which lasted from 14:30 hours to 18:00 hours. To calm the situation down representatives from the International Community came and dressed 30 of the most hardened terrorists in KFOR uniforms and, along with 4 other heavy wounded terrorists, extracted them from that area (as reported by the Commander of OTG - 1).

On June 28, 2001, with help from the International Red Cross, all the lightly wounded terrorists were taken from Arachinovo to the village Grushino where they were then extracted without our knowledge from Grushino and taken somewhere unknown to us.

About the extraction of the wounded, Mr. Francois, head of the Red Cross in the Republic of Macedonia, explained that he had approval from the Coordinating Body dealing with the crisis and from the Government of the Republic of Macedonia’s Minister of Labour and Social Policy. After the collision between the locals of Nikushtak and the terrorists, on June 29, 2001, the terrorists retreated to the north end of the village Nikushtak. However, none of the villages in Kumanovo, which had not experienced any action in the previous months, wanted the terrorists from Arachinovo in their village. So, in the end the terrorists were mostly distributed in the village Mateiche, Otlia, Lipkovo, Slupchane and Vaksintse.

Lipkovo and the entire surrounding region were under ARM control, especially the road Arachinovo - Nikushtak - Umin Dol -Kumanovo. All movements at this time were under the strict control

of ARM, and so were all the roads in the villages Mateiche - Otlia -Lipkovo - Slupchane - Vaksintse. The roads leading to the Kosovo border via Skopje Tsrna Gora were closed. And as such the terrorists in Karadak region were isolated in only several villages with no prospect of any action or improvement in their positions. Brigadier General Miroslav Stoianovski with his anti-terrorist combat units and the units of the First Army Corps, previously deployed there, took over the entire command for further actions.

In Tetovo Region where the units of the Second Corps were deployed: Popova Shapka, Shar Planina, Gostivar, Strazha, Debar, Struga and the overpass Strazha - Kichevo were under full ARM control and no so-called NLA provocation of any kind was tolerated.

The map shows that the Tetovo - Iazhintse road was secured by the police, from police stations and from reserve police stations and not by ARM.

ARM, before the signing of the ceasefire Agreement, in its composition had 18,468 members - the human factor, 54 tanks with trained attendants, 40 howitzers 122 m/m, 10 light rocket launchers 128 m/m with service staff, multiple rocket launcher conduits 128 mm, 4 armoured transport vehicles with 135 attendants, helicopters “MI - 24-8,”, “MI - 8-4”; “MI - 17”.

According to available information, before the signing of the ceasefire Agreement, the so-called NLA at that time was half-beaten and without reserves or a regular supply of light arms. All it had was mostly light infantry weapons and poorly trained new recruits. The number of terrorists in all those so-called Brigades numbered about 50 to 100 fighters in 111 brigade, about 350 to 500 fighters in 112 brigade, about 300 to 400 fighters in 113 brigade and about 175 to 225 fighters in 114 brigade. The so-called special units consisted of about 40 to 50 fighters. The total number of terrorists was about 915 to 1775, deployed from Kumanovo to Skopje and from Tetovo to Debar. In charge of the General Headquarters of the so-called NLA, deployed in Prizren, was G’zim Ostreni and Ali Ahmeti “Abaz” as political director.

The Government of the Republic of Macedonia received a letter from Peter Faith. The letter was written in response to a request made by Boris Trajkovski, President of the Republic of Macedonia. Following is that letter in its entirety:

“In response to a letter received from President Boris Trajkovski on June 14, 2001, in which he sought help from NATO to disarm the ethnic Albanian armed groups, I have the honour to inform you that the ethnic Albanian armed groups have given their commitment to be disarmed, which represents one of the elements of NAC (North Atlantic Council) for NATO to provide assistance for this purpose in close coordination with your authorities. The authorities of the Republic of Macedonia will be informed of the detailed military plan for the collection of weapons compiled by the commander of Task Force ‘Harvest’ right after NAC decides to authorize the realignment of forces. As you know the prerequisites for this displacement are as follows:

- Permanent ceasefire respected by all parties; - General political agreement between the main political parties; - Agreement with the authorities of the Republic of Macedonia on the status of Task Force Harvest and conditions on which Task Force Harvest will carry out its mission; - Plan prepared by NATO and accepted by the Government of the Republic of Macedonia that defines the modalities and the time and space for the decommissioning of weapons, including explicit consent of the ethnic Albanian armed groups for their willingness to completely surrender their arms.

The mission of Task Force Harvest will be tasked to conduct limited operations in the Republic of Macedonia in order to collect and remove weapons and ammunition from disarmed ethnic Albanian groups as part of the resolution of the crisis in the country. The Force will be deployed in a limited time period in which the operation of collecting arms will not exceed 30 days. The Force will consist of a multinational single size brigade.

As you know, NATO legal advisers and those from your side are currently working on a formal agreement that will define the status and personnel of Task Force Harvest, including an Agreement that

spells out your request. Task Force Harvest is authorized to use force for self-defense and for the protection and implementation of the mission, including the possibility of removing any party that would hinder the implementation of the mission as it is defined here.

Task Force Harvest will passively collect all weapons and ammunition surrendered by the ethnic Albanian armed groups and will coordinate its destruction. All collected ammunition and explosives will be destroyed in the country. All collected weapons will be removed and destroyed in a third party country, unless Task Force Harvest Command believes that it is not safe. Representatives of the Republic of Macedonia will be invited by Task Force Harvest Command to observe the operation.

First, those members of the armed groups who turn in their weapons and ammunition will not be detained, except in certain cases. This is a measure taken to protect the forces, for self-defense purposes and to efficiently implement the mission.

In performing its mission, Task Force Harvest will make arrangements to connect with your central and local authorities in order to facilitate the creation and necessary coordination to ensure full transparency in the execution of the operation. There will be no state security forces present during the weapon’s collection operation in any of the areas designated as locations for those tasks. Representatives from the Republic of Macedonia, authorized by Task Force Harvest Command, will be invited to observe the operation.

You are invited to accept responsibility for the security and freedom of movement for NATO forces and International Community personnel involved in the disarmament process in the Republic of Macedonia and take all possible measures to minimize the risk to their safety out of the weapons collection locations and to temporarily relocate your security forces as determine by NATO so that the disarming process can be realized.

I think there are a number of other measures that your government must also take in order for this operation to succeed. First, as a measure of confidence building you are required to stop all military

air operations during the operation, with the exception of those made for regular logistics needs and casualty evacuation in an emergency that will be carried out in coordination with Task Force Harvest Command. Furthermore, you are required to pull all heavy weaponry and garrison forces away from the ethnic Albanian groups, during the collection of weapons, taking into account requirements for the protection of the Macedonian security forces.

Second, as provided in the Plan and Program, members of the ethnic Albanian armed groups should be given opportunities for reintegration into society, including adequate amnesty, in order to overcome the crisis.

Third, after the operation is completed, the state security forces, with the participation of ethnic Albanian police officers, will carry out normal peacetime law enforcement duties in all parts of the country without opposition or interference. During the implementation, security forces will strictly abide by international humanitarian standards and general principles of human rights and will accept monitoring by the OSCE and EUM. Your authorities must ensure that no irregular forces or armed civilian groups are activated in the crisis regions.

I would be grateful if I can get your written confirmation that the content of this letter constitutes the basis for implementing the operation.”

Sincerely, Peter Faith Personal Representative to the NATO Secretary General

All the recommendations in the letter were accepted, including giving the terrorists amnesty and reintegrating them into society by the Government of the Republic of Macedonia. And how did the other side respond? How did the so-called NLA and its Political Director Ali “Abaz” Ahmeti and NLA Chief of Staff G’zim Ostreni respond to this?

In a report, in early June 2001, among other things, it was said that: “At 18:12 hours, Ali Ahmeti and G’zim Ostreni sharply informed

Commander ‘Ilir’ (who at the time was in Shar Planina) that the so-called NLA, from the moment of its creation to now, had done its best at a political level, because it managed to confuse the entire international community with the signing of an agreement between the PDP, DPA, the European Union, NATO and the Macedonian political parties, as a first step in starting negotiations between the Macedonians and representatives of the so-called NLA...” According to Ahmeti, Tahir N. and another person from the PKK were headed for Kumanovo the same day because some politicians were expected to go to Kosovo for talks”...

It is becoming more and more obvious that Arachinovo was invented to end the military activities in favour of pursuing a political solution. This was not just the choice of the so-called NLA; this solution was favoured by the international community, particularly by NATO. Even though the security forces in the Republic of Macedonia were in their highest degree of readiness, after the military crisis began, and even though the so-called NLA was no match for them and was in serious trouble in terms of maintaining an armed struggle, NATO and the international factors still preferred a political solution over a military victory for Macedonia. The so-called NLA, at the time, had no more than 750 to 1500 poorly armed terrorists, about which the West was well aware, and ARM had about 20,000 respectively well armed soldiers, military equipment and armament and the support, both military and political, of a few friendly countries. Still, circumstances were created so that an Agreement for an unconditional ceasefire (surrender for Macedonia) would be signed. This was the first step towards bringing a political end to the military crisis. Should we not have acted the way the “managers” of this “invented” military crisis intended us to act, then everything that was undertaken in the last four months on the part of the terrorists: the military actions, including the victims of the “ethnic Albanian armed groups” would be for nothing? Yes, the “managers” of this “invented” military crisis in the Republic of Macedonia did their best to make us take this direction and we did...

The unconditional ceasefire Agreement was signed by two generals from the Republic of Macedonia - the Chief of Staff of General Headquarters and the Commander of the police forces. The

Agreement was signed on behalf of the Government of the Republic of Macedonia, even though the two generals were not members of the government and were not involved in the discussions that led to drafting the Agreement. On the other side of the Agreement was Peter Faith - personal envoy to the NATO Secretary General, of course. With a written request from the President of the Republic of Macedonia, made before the Arachinovo operation, i.e. as it stands in the reply of the letter from Peter Faith addressed to the Government of the Republic of Macedonia: “Reply to a letter by President Trajkovski from June 14, 2001, which was asking for assistance from NATO for the disarming of the ethnic Albanian armed groups.”

I was not familiar with the content of the letter written by President Boris Trajkovski but I was quite clear with the answers provided by Peter Faith.

In all the conditions set forth for the disarmament of the “ethnic Albanian armed groups” the first was the ceasefire Agreement.

In that Agreement, deemed conditional, sent to Peter Faith and signed by me (Pande Petrovski) and by General Risto Galevski, written in the form of a letter, the following was said:

“Dear Mr. Peter Faith

It is an honour to inform you of the following:

We are prepared to end the crisis which undermines the peaceful democratic development of the Republic of Macedonia and which poses direct threat to the stability of this region. Believing that an unconditional ceasefire, for which the conditions are confirmed below, is a concrete step towards a broader objective to solving the crisis.

NATO’s intention to assist in disarming and disbanding the armed “ethnic Albanian groups” is welcome. The presence of the NATO mission for this purpose is welcome. Welcomed are also the preconditions for NATO’s deployment, and for providing assistance in the process of disarmament, in particular:

- That a general, unconditional and permanent ceasefire must be achieved, and

- That sufficient progress in dialogue between the various political parties must be achieved, as defined by NATO and by the EU.

Reaffirming its commitment to implement the plan for building confidence measures without delay, regarding which the Government of the Republic of Macedonia has decided the following:

1. Unconditional respect and adherence to the ceasefire; refrain from all military actions; refrain from use of force and illegal actions against the ethnic Albanian armed groups;

2. Recognize and adhere to the extended Geneva Conventions Protocol (Protocol II) of August 12, 1949, regarding the protection of victims of international conflict;

3. The ceasefire applies to all ARM security forces. The Government of the Republic of Macedonia will ensure that the provisions of this document also apply to all irregular forces and armed civilian groups;

4. The definition “armed forces” includes groups and individuals from all sides who accept the authority and command of the Government of the Republic of Macedonia, including regular forces, police forces, border police, army and police reserves, military police, intelligence services, Ministry of Interior local police and special anti-terrorism and police forces which maintain public order and peace;

5. Securing international observers;

6. Provisions of the ceasefire will go into effect starting on July 6, 2001 at 00:01 hours.