ORDERS FROM FOREIGN GODS - Part 03

After subordinating NOF, AFZH and NOMS, the CPG put the squeeze on the Macedonian people, particularly on the leadership and spared no expense to disgrace, criticize and accuse them of everything in the book at every opportunity. The NOF and AFZH leaders were later branded “traitors” and “unfaithful” even though they had done everything that was asked of them and gave their full loyalty to the Greeks. This should be a historic lesson for future generations or those who think of the Greeks as our “Christian brothers” and who feel that we can live (on our lands in Greek occupied Macedonia) with them “as brothers”!

The pressure put on the Macedonian people and the shift from the CPY to the CPG further divided the Macedonian people and widened the existing chasm between them. A negative image was imprinted in their minds and they began to mistrust one another. A certain uncertainty grew amongst them followed by fear. Our ethnic unity was shattered and the Macedonian people became “we and they”. The CPG no doubt knew how to turn us into “us and them” and certainly knew how to exploit “our division” and turn our perceived differences into bitter hatred. At this point the Greeks felt very comfortable being our friends and enemies at the same time. We became easy subjects to order and push around!

The CPG became the “mysterious factor that divided the Macedonian people, especially during the Greek Civil War. The Greeks were very crafty at dividing the Macedonian people between those who remained in Greece and those who fled to Yugoslavia after World War II and later returned.

After we were “sold out” to the Greeks by Tito and Kolishevski, through this rotten “brotherhood and unity” deal, the CPG demanded “obedience” of us. It demanded that we live and fight for the “Party” and do as the “Party” ordered. And the “Party” ordered that every single Macedonian participate in the so-called “struggle” without question and without feelings. The Greeks in their zeal to put us through the meat grinder became very biased and intolerant, particularly against NOF and AFZH which were stripped of all authority and freedom. The hostility, bias, criticisms and intolerance for the Macedonian people, particularly by Zahariadis, became increasingly intolerable.

(Moscow – Belgrade - the CPG)

(The following facts reveal key moments in NOF’s history - from the military archives: USSR, Yugoslavia and the CPG)

March 20, 1946 - Zahariadis left Athens and went to Prague. He used this trip as an opportunity to discuss his armed struggle in Greece with the communist party leaders and to seek assistance from them. But as it turned out, he received silence or advice that it was a bad idea to start a war at this point in time and that such a move would be foolish. The most notable leaders including Torez of France and Toliati of Italy told him that it was “dangerous to resort to arms” at this point in time. Georgi Dimitrov asserted that “the international situation does not allow an outbreak of a new armed conflict, especially one that would directly interfere in the affairs of the Western allies in the Balkans”.

All those leaders knew very well that Zahariadis had returned to Athens in May 1945, after being imprisoned in the Dachau Camp in Germany for nine years, which had left a strong impression on him and gave him a new attitude towards the world. He returned to Greece on a British plane and, immediately after returning, took up his former duties as CPG Secretary General and began to work.

Zahariadis laid out his Party’s aspiration for the newspaper “Rizospastis” by saying that the CPG “never attempted to seize power against the wishes of the people and he had never had to pursue a course of action against the Trotskyites, anarchists and idiots”.

At the same time the communist party leaders knew that “Aris Viluhiotis” was the “symbol of Greek guerrilla” whom Zahariadis publicly reprimanded by referring to him as an “adventurer” who with his “reckless behavior” prompted the Right to attack the Left. Subsequently, followed this, he was expelled from the Party and shortly afterwards was killed by the Right.

But during his meetings in Prague, Zahariadis did receive much information about Marshal Josip Broz Tito who “after his successful guerrilla movement in Yugoslavia, had aims at expanding the revolution all over the Balkans”.

Disappointed by the reception he received in Prague, Zahariadis, on his way back, decided to pay Tito a visit in Belgrade.

Zahariadis was well received by Tito who communicated with him in Russian and, after toasting him, Tito asked Zahariadis: “What do you think about the future of the Balkans?” To which Zahariadis replied: “Marshall, that’s why I come to you, being urged by many leaders who have much respect for you and for your success with the guerrilla movement in Yugoslavia.” Zahariadis then went into a detailed explanation in regards to the political situation in Greece, emphasizing that the people were ready to fight and to take power away from the Anglo-American imperialists.

Unable to hide his excitement, Tito, feeling comfortable being surrounded by his subordinates, Rankovich, Kardelli, Dzhilas, Tempo, Kolishevski and others, said: “Life does not go back, it moves forward. Revolutions bring progress in society and develop productive forces. On behalf of the Communist Party and the people, I promise you extensive assistance and whatever is needed to organize an Army. You know that, after World War II, we immediately thought of starting a revolution but even today in Aegean Macedonia the same revolutionary power exists in the citizens of Greece, the Macedonians. They are led by our experienced centres and have a long revolutionary tradition. We are willing to put under your command those forces and the forces available in the Bulkesh Camp.”

Tito then turned to Kolishevski and said: “Lazo, take notes and do everything to bring those forces together under the motto “brotherhood and unity” and put them under the authority of the CPG which it can use in its revolution.”

Here are the notes dictated for Kolishevski by Tito:

a/ NOF and AFZH are to break away from you (CPM) and be attached to the CPG. Do not get involved and do not give mixed orders on how to fight. Do not tell them to fight for a united Macedonia. And of course change their program goals and lead them to accept the CPG program goals;

b/ NOF is to form a central authority that will answer and report to a CPG Regional Committee;

c/ Put the armed Macedonian units in Aegean Macedonia under the command of military officers who are under the command of the CPG.

“But all this Comrade Nikos,” said Tito, “will have to be approved by the old man, Generalissimo Stalin before we can act on such a revolution.” But Tito already knew that Stalin was in the mood to cause trouble for the capitalists and was sure he would accept Zahariadis’s proposal.

Zahariadis excitedly then said: “I m ready to take this to the Generalissimo and get his approval”.

“Here’s to the future of the revolution!” said Tito, continuing, “Be determined, not afraid, don’t be afraid of casualties and overcome all difficulties, so you will succeed in your intentions. That’s what a revolution calls for! Grab everything firmly in your hands and, with great certainty, you can count on us!”

* * *

After his stay in Yugoslavia, at the end of March 1946, Zahariadis left for Moscow to have talks with the Soviet leadership.

His plans which he presented to the Soviets on behalf of the CPG, during his meeting with Stalin, Molotov and Andrei Zhdanov, were approved. Zahariadis also had a second, secret meeting with Stalin during which Stalin told Zahariadis to “begin a low key armed struggle, by gradually starting in the countryside and then moving into the cities, in order to prevent premature British military intervention, and then work to find compromise.”

While filling his pipe with tobacco, Stalin looked into Zahariadis’s eyes and asked: “Did you consult with Marshal Tito, because it looks like he will lead a future Balkan Federation?”

Looking confused and wishing to avoid the question, Zahariadis said: The Marshal is a great strategist and internationalist. He promised to give me 20,000 people who were “hunted down by the Monarcho-Fascist army” and are ready to bear arms.

Stalin then said: “According to my sources, Marshal Tito is already in Aegean Macedonia in Greece and has been there for a year. He has established Macedonian organizations and they have had great success in organizing the Macedonian people in their heroic struggle. NOF - the Anti-Fascist National Liberation Front and AFZH – the Macedonian Women’s Anti-Fascist Front are being led and managed directly by the CPM/CPY. After World War II, all of these fighters were persecuted by Markos. All those who formed the “Aegean National Brigade” are now in Greece and are struggling for a United Macedonia. What are you going to do with these Macedonian military and political formations? The old sense of a United Macedonia persists within them and they will struggle until a new sense prevails “a Socialist Revolution in Greece” and for them that too will be good. Socialism is the same everywhere…”

Zahariadis then took out a sheet of paper on which was written: “Agreement between the CPG and representatives of the Macedonian people”

By this agreement: “The Slavo-Macedonians from Greek Macedonia, on the one hand, will give their support to the CPG during the elections because they want the CPG to seize power. Only the CPG can fulfill their hopes with a favourable resolution to the Macedonian question. On the other hand they will defend the CPG with armed assistance in case of incidents occurring between the left and right during the elections.”

To that Stalin said: “Nu harasho! That is good. Macedonians are good fighters. They have shown themselves to be brave people!”

Zahariadis confirmed that “yes the Macedonians are good fighters and brave people” and added that “they can also be easily manipulated as history has shown!” After that Zahariadis informed Stalin of all existing military formations and political organizations which were to be transferred to his and the CPG’s control after Tito’s “brotherhood and unity” proposal was put into effect.

To this Stalin replied: “Yes of course, Marshal Tito has certainly shown his international views towards the Anglo-American imperialists.” After that Stalin added, “It’s all good. Proceed as you see fit and prepare a draft plan of your decisions for the CPG Central Committee. Be good, unobtrusive and generous and love the revolutionary thoughts of other socialist leaders.”

After the meeting Zahariadis said: “The CPG has now been transformed and in place of seeking a peaceful solution to the Greek problem it will seize power by force of arms through an armed struggle!”

Stalin knew that Tito and Zahariadis had an agreement because “Tito’s main concern was the protection of his new federation”. Knowing that Yugoslavia was 50% under the influence of the West, Tito firmly endeavored to keep the Yugoslav federation safe, something that he emphasized many times to the Security Service of the Yugoslav National Army General Staff: “…it is best to have a war outside the Yugoslav borders and to help it wholeheartedly than to have a war inside Yugoslavia.” Such an attitude was also good for Stalin because he wanted to preserve as much of the socialist camp as possible without getting involved in another war.

But by far neither Stalin nor Tito, at least according to the developments that followed, was willing to risk their own position in order to assure a communist victory in Greece or to aid the Unification of Macedonia.

Judging from what he told Zahariadis, Stalin did not envision “strong military action” in Greece in the near future. During their meetings, Stalin did not promise Zahariadis anything; no military, no material and no moral support… he only gave Zahariadis advice, including to respect Tito’s advice when it came to leading a revolution.

The next day Zahariadis traveled back to Belgrade where he informed Tito of all that had transpired and the two leaders reconciled the details of organizing assistance and cooperation for the struggle. Tito also advised Zahariadis of the do’s and don’ts regarding leading the revolution and helped him define the nature and prospects of the Democratic Army and the measures it would be undertaking in the future war.

Moscow judged Zahariadis as a bold revolutionary leader; at least that’s the impression he got from the Soviet leadership.

Stalin smiled as he sat in his woven armchair in the great hall and puffed on his tobacco pipe while Molotov, Zhdanov, Malenkov, Mikoyan, Kaganovich, Suslov, Baria, Bulganin and the other Politburo members drank “pertsovka” vodka. The waiters were busy providing first-class service.

Stalin was in a good mood while he wished Zahariadis “revolutionary success”.

Before departing, Zahariadis stood quietly and submissively before Generalissimo Stalin and managed to say a few mixed words in Russian: “Glubokouvazhaemi Tovarish Iosif Visarionovich, boljshoe spasibo. Zhelaju Vam krepkoe zdorovie I ushte mnogie leta da ne vodite vo socijalismot kon pobedata na komunizmot”.

Your advice will be our signpost and we will strive hard in our struggle against the Anglo-American imperialists until we achieve final victory for the working class in the world.

* * *

Zahariadis returned to Belgrade on April 8, 1946 and was received by Tito. Standing before Zahariadis Tito said: “Since we are revolutionaries and internationalists it is our duty to pay our debt to help ‘revolutions’ and I don’t see any reason why we shouldn’t be helping the revolution in Greece, which we began to realize. I can only give you my blessings Comrade Nikos. Gather everyone who can carry a rifle. This is normal in all revolutions and the public demands it.”

Tito then lit a cigar and continued walking through the spacious room bypassing the desk and asked: “What is the situation with the youth?”

“Excellent!” said Zahariadis.

Written on page 117, in the book entitled “Yugoslav Communism and the Macedonian Question”, by Steve E. Palmer and Robert R. King, Archon Books, 1971, was the following:

“The CPY’s interest in Greek Macedonia gradually faded away, with two exceptions. The first was an attack on the Papandreou government in November 1944 for allowing the ‘terror against the Macedonian people’ to take place. And the second was a bitter editorial attack in “Politika” at the end of December, because for over several months no initiatives were taken to see ‘what was boiling in the Greek pot’ (at that time NOF and AFZH were active under the leadership of the CPM/CPY). Several factors stood behind this CPY policy shift. Tito, who at the time was in close contact with Moscow, may have concluded that it was more important for the Greek Communists to come to power in Greece than for him to win over Aegean Macedonia. Also, all Macedonian combat units in Greek Macedonia were strongly inclined towards autonomy and Tito was somewhat limited by the existence of the Subasich rival government which still enjoyed support from the Western powers and was still necessary to be cautious. The CPY’s desires to reactivate its concerns for Greek Macedonia materialized only after these circumstances changed.”

And thus the triangle between Stalin, Tito and Zahariadis was closed. From a political game to a military disaster!

But why have we Macedonians from 1945 to this day, not been able to free ourselves from this terrible communist Triangle?

They led their own world politics, interfered in foreign affairs, constantly planned revolutions and strikes, but we, after following their lead, became victims of genocide and world wanderers.

After the Macedonian people in Greek occupied Macedonia were handed over, surrendered to the CPG, Yugoslavia stopped supporting NOF and AFZH and put its full support behind the CPG.

Zahariadis, during his stay in Belgrade, was awe-struck by the meeting he had with Marshal Tito, particularly by Tito’s determination to set up a central task force to help the Democratic Army of Greece. The task force, headed by Aleksandar Rankovich, consisted of General Iovo Kapichich, Deputy Federal Minister of Domestic Affairs, Lieutenant Colonel Slobodan Ucha Krstich, Lieutenant Colonel Mile Vrbitsa, Giuza Radovich, Marshal Milutinovich, Major Drago Miovich, Major Obradovich Trninich, Captain Giuro Giurits, Lieutenant Iovan Popovich, Lieutenant Rade Kosmanovich, Krste Pengovski, Shime Benchich and soldiers Lazar Seferovich and Boshko Jovanovich. There was also a special team comprised of medical staff. Included in this team were Lieutenant Colonel Velimir - Bratsa Maistorovich and Dr. Iovan Bielich. Their task was to organize a hospital to treat the wounded and a means of transporting wounded from the battlefields to the hospital. The task to acquire and supply weapons for the Democratic Army fighters fell to Major Vladimir Dekich, Major Sveta Stefanovich, Lieutenant Iovan Popovich and Lieutenant Petar Luchich. An impressive number of weapons and materials were acquired including cannons, machine guns, rifles, Panzers -Fausta, pistols, hand grenades, radio stations, overcoats, horses and lots of food worth upwards of five million dinars.

Zahariadis paid a visit to the Greek camp in Bulkes, Vojvodina where he observed the military training of the 5,000 fighters already inducted.

In his speech Zahariadis ordered all political refugees to use “an iron fist” against the Anglo-American imperialist and Monarcho-Fascist regime in Athens. He told them: “You are obligated to carry out the CPG solution. Arm yourselves with the weapons provided for you by Marshal Tito and return to Greece to fight against the Monarcho-Fascists because their regime aims to destroy the democratic forces and to install a fascist regime in Greece.” See: Dragan Kljakich, “Sovetizatsia Balkanske zone” – Confessions of Lazar Kolisevski, Belgrade, 1992, publisher “Radnichka Press”. When Zahariadis returned to Greece on April 9, 1946 he went to Solun where he gave a speech to his followers in which he warned the Greek government that the people would not stand for the abuse they were getting and that they would be forced to defend themselves by resorting to arms. The attack on the village Lithohori in Katerini Region during the night of March 30/31, 1946, on the eve of the elections, was just one example of what the future might bring.

In order to win over the Macedonians, on April 14, 1946, in Solun, Zahariadis said: “The government has directed its terror against the Slavo-Macedonians... Why are the Monarcho-Fascists carrying out such terror acts against the Slavo-Macedonians? Their first aim is to break their beliefs (the thoughts of NOF and AFZH), the Democratic People’s beliefs and second, they want to sow discord between the Greeks and the Slavo-Macedonians…”

* * *

In early June 1946, Zahariadis, without consulting anyone, appointed Markos Vafiadis to the Politburo, made him a member of the CPG Central Committee and put the former ELAS Captain in charge of the future Democratic Army of Greece (DAG). He then ordered Markos to leave for the mountains and take over leadership of the “partisan groups that were already active”.

British Ambassador Norton: “According to the envisaged plan, on August 25, 1946, Ioannidis and Rossos crossed over to Belgrade where, on September 1, 1946, they met with Markos Vafiadis who was there to consult with them on specific military and political issues. After going to Belgrade, Vafiadis returned to the Aegean part of Macedonia where, on October 28, 1946, he formed the Headquarters for the guerrilla forces. At the same time he appointed regional commanders who began to organize their fighters into armed units. In December 1946 these combined units were officially consolidated into the “Democratic Army of Greece” (DAG). Vafiadis was appointed Chief of the Democratic Army and was given the pseudonym General Markos.”

What is the truth? Was the “CPG recognition” agreed to by the Macedonians? Did the Organizations NOF and AFZH agree to the CPG being recognized!? Was the CPG recognized by those who, until yesterday, had manipulated us and turned us into their servants?

Historical facts show that: “Based on the decision made between Tito (CPY) and Zahariadis (CPG) on October 14, 1946, Karaivanov of the CPY and Ioannidis of the CPG later made the following declaration: “The Macedonian organizations NOF (AFZH NOMS) and its leadership are to be fully subordinated to the CPG and the small armed Macedonian military units are to be incorporated into DAG under the leadership of General Markos”.

In other words, all this was “arranged” at State Level between Yugoslavia and Greece, which means that it was done with strict adherence to all “State Level” Treaties including the 1913 Treaty of Bucharest; the Treaty by which Macedonia was partitioned.

But to truly understand Tito’s reasons and motivation for getting involved in Greek affairs after World War II one would have to do some more digging. According to explanations given by Yugoslav leaders, “it was done for internationalist impulses only”, which today are not very convincing explanations. Why? Because, this “problem” did not rear its ugly head until around the autumn of 1948 when Yugoslavia began to warm up to the Western powers.

After this, the leaders of NOF and AFZH found themselves burdened by a new faith that carried an old disease. Instead of being the enemies of the Greeks, the Macedonian leadership was squeezed to accept the Greeks as partners in a fatal game. Instead of delivering the Macedonian people from Greek occupied Macedonia from the Greek evil, as promised with offers of a united Macedonia, these messengers of doom from the CPY now delivered them to the evil itself and asked them to partner with it in a “brotherhood and unity” partnership. And so the time when Macedonia was to be de-Macedon-ized was not far behind. This naturally caused confrontation between those pushing for the partnership and those who wanted nothing to do with the CPG and the Greeks. And this bickering created a gaping fracture in relations between those people who had fled to Yugoslavia with the Aegean Brigade and those who had placed their trust in the “Party”. And so yesterday’s NOF and AFZH supporters became the Greekophiles, and those who fled to Yugoslavia became the “traitors” who, by leaving to save their own hides, left their people back home unprotected and at the mercy of their enemies.

When people today think about these things and try to rationalize why this happened to us Macedonians, they can’t help themselves but think of the old saying that: “People who don’t understand their past, will find it difficult to plan their future”. That being said, then let us ask the question: “What have we learned from our history? In the last half century after the Greek Civil War, what have we learned about our own experience in it? Do we know why we got involved in that war? Do we know who got us involved in that war? Do we know why we lost that war? Do we even know how and why we lost our ancestral homes?”

If we don’t know then isn’t it about time that we find out for the sake of those who lost relatives and for the sake of those who found themselves wandering the world as permanent refugees? Isn’t it time that we demand answers from those who put us in this situation (CPY/CPG) and apologies for what they did? How about we do this for our future generations, just to relieve them of the burden of having to look for answers themselves and to help them avoid making the same mistakes we made?

Let us not forget or abandon the fact that our origin is Greek occupied Macedonia, we have roots there, those lands belonged to our ancestors and not to the Greeks! We can’t dismiss what happened to us as a “random thing” or as a “coincidence”. What happened to us was neither random nor coincidence; it was planned and executed for a purpose!

It is a well known fact that the Greeks and some other Europeans wanted us destroyed, extinct, to exist no more, since the European Powers set foot in the Balkans. Why? We don’t know for sure, we can only speculate. Why did the Romans “divide” Macedonia? Macedonia was occupied by every empire that set foot in the Balkans, that is, until the 19th century, when its turn came to be liberated. But instead of being liberated, Macedonia was again occupied and partitioned! Is this because we bear some sort of curse that we are not even aware of, or are we like Zahariadis said to Stalin “a people easily manipulated?”

But besides what “outsiders” did to us, did not some of us volunteer to become part of this new “brotherhood and unity” partnership? Did those people not know who the Greeks were and what they had done to us over the years since we fell into their hands? What was that all about? What causes people to voluntarily wish to help their enemies? Is that not called “Vassalage?” Is it not true that our organizations became servants to our old evil master? Is this what Evdokia Foteva - Vera meant when she said “the CPG has recognized us”?

There is no other way of looking at it other than to admit that “yes our organizations became vassals, subordinates and servants to our old-new masters when their program goals were instantly switched from ‘struggling for a United Macedonia’ to ‘struggling for brotherhood and unity’ side by side with the Greeks; the same Greeks who were brought to our lands as colonists from Asia Minor and who turned us into their slaves in our own ancestral lands”. Did it not occur to our organization that “struggling for brotherhood and unity” side by side with these Greeks would lead to us lose our national identity?

Did it not occur to people that “there was no brotherhood and unity” between Macedonians and Greeks! If that is hard to believe then ask yourselves, “why would the Greeks not allow the Macedonian DAG fighters posted in the depths of Greece to speak Macedonian and use their Macedonian names?” Why was it “demanded” of them to speak Greek and use their Greek slave names?

We can spend days, weeks, months and years blaming others, foreigners, the CPY, the CPM, the CPG etc., for our misfortunes and for losing our lives, lands and homes but how do we rationalize the behaviour of our people in these circumstances? Knowing the truth also means knowing what we had done and the wrongs we committed against ourselves!

Over and over we have proven to be a capable people and have a tradition by which to back our bravery and abilities to fight, except when it comes to rationalizing why we are fighting and what we are fighting for! Was there NO ONE in NOF and AFZH who could foresee where we were headed when they accepted responsibility from Marshal Tito and the other gods of war to accept the idea of fighting for “brotherhood and unity” with the Greeks? Were these same brave people, who were risking their lives in the battlefields, afraid of Tito and of standing up to these gods of war and refusing such a fateful partnership? Why didn’t anyone say a single word to Markos when he told them: “As of today you are soldiers of the Democratic Army of Greece and will fall under the command of more capable leaders and people who are more faithful and loyal to the CPG!”

Instead of standing up to Markos, the Macedonian leadership buckled under pressure and felt cold chills when Markos stripped them of their authority. They became terribly confused (like sold slaves) and submissively gave themselves to the Party as mere pawns, accepting their fate to be downgraded to mere fighters in the ranks of DAG. Where was their spirit and responsibility to their people? One of them was even quoted as saying: “We will fight alright, we will even awaken the dead and they too will fight for this holy revolution, we will fight together, living and dead!” I wonder if this person knew what he or she was fighting for? Our own extinction?!

Be mindful of what you tell Rakovski:

“…During our meeting with Kolishevski, while preparing to return to Aegean Macedonia to lay the foundations of the revolution, Kolishevski, in his cynical speech told us that: ‘…we the Macedonians are a talented people, with an appallingly visible international and revolutionary orientation, with a sense of tact and strategy!’ Tito had told Kolishevski that: ‘Now was the right moment’…”

Perhaps some day we will learn and understand what forces motivated some of our people to behave this way and to serve these gods of war in the way that they did at the cost of so much and of so many Macedonian lives.

On November 10, 1946 Zahariadis received orders from Stalin to slow down the fighter recruitment process during the winter of 1946-1947. Stalin rationalized this by saying that it was allegedly causing an international situation. Stalin also advised Zahariadis to focus more on the CPG’s political struggle and such. Unfortunately nobody bothered to tell the Macedonian organization because at that very time all Macedonians, young and old, were being recruited en masse into the ranks of DAG. Why did this happen? Were the Macedonian organizations completely oblivious of what was happening? Historically, have we always relied on strangers (CPY/CPG) to dictate policy and lay foundations for us?

After what has been said above, it should become obvious to the reader that the Macedonian organizations were following the directives of foreigners, outside organizations that simply and massively pushed the Macedonian people into a precarious war which ended in a disaster for them and for us all.

Strangers seem to do strange things by making villains into heroes and turning real heroes into villains. They want their character to identify with the people and will do what it takes to achieve that. And this is what happened to some members of NOF (32), some were turned into heroes and others into villains even though they basically carried out their functions as ordered.

CONFUSE THE PEOPLE, OR ...?!

After they were switched from the CPY to the CPG, the political messages coming from NOF and AFZH started to become unclear, even though they were still interpreted by some Macedonians as “national messages”. Immediately after Kolishevski made his recommendations we lost our sense of purpose. At this point NOF and AFZH should have stopped what they were doing. But instead they followed the given recommendation and continued with their recruitment policies and intensified the mobilization, leading more Macedonians into oblivion.

This tangled understanding of comforting illusions shows how darkness ruled the Macedonian leadership. Its success in “awakening the Macedonian consciousness” in 1946 was in fact too late and unnecessary for the CPY or for the CPG because it could add no significant value to the struggle. The only thing it did was trap the Macedonian people in the CPG vice from which there was no escape except by death and exile.

But, now let us go back to the place and time when the CPY and CPG started their manipulation of the Macedonian people. That would be Belgrade, April 2, 1946 when Tito of the CPY and Zahariadis of the CPG, in the absence of any Macedonian representation, decided that: The Macedonian people from Greek occupied Macedonia, led by NOF and managed by the CPY/CPM, were to be placed under the control of the CPG and that NOF’s program orders were to be modified to read: “NOF and AFZH will jointly struggle with the Greek people to save the Macedonian people from physical extermination”.

This was an ideological offensive, with its own cosmopolitanism (against the Macedonian national consciousness); a scary idea that would shake the Macedonian people down to their native roots.

Now the Macedonians were required to pay double the price and (self) sacrifice themselves for some vague goals.

The situation was made even worse because many of the leaders and high ranking politicians, including many from the CPG, were in effect anti-Macedonian. Politicians, even in the Civil War, nursed dangerous anachronisms towards our national existence, openly attacking political opponents who supported the Macedonians and those who saw no benefit from such a war.

It is true, by doing what we did we caused ourselves a lot of grief and we dealt a blow to our identity. That is the truth and it may be part of a foreign strategy where people who, through manipulating NOF and AFZH, wished to cause us harm. The actions undertaken by NOF and AFZH in the early years may have prompted the Greek government to first commit unprecedented terror and persecution against the Macedonian people, and later to take military action to physically exterminate them. The situation was so bad, people were forced to leave their homes and flee to Yugoslavia, end up in prison on the dry islands or die at the hands of those causing the terror. Historically our weakness has been our “national question” which was used to manipulate us and turn us into victims. In 1903 the Bulgarians used our national sentiments to start an uprising against the Ottomans unprepared and thus we not only paid the price in human losses and suffering but we lost our chance to liberate ourselves and fell prey to our neighbours, who only 10 years later, invaded, occupied and portioned our Macedonia. It would appear that less than a half a century later, we were again manipulated and dragged into a confusing war during which we lost more lives, our homes and native lands. So, how did this happen? This time our national sentiment, through ideological manipulation, got us into trouble.

When NOF, AFZH and NOMS showed up in Greek occupied Macedonia, as instructed by the CPY, they began a campaign to Unite Macedonia. Looking at this from a Greek point of view, these Macedonian Organizations were there to “carve out” part of Greece and give it to Yugoslavia. This was seen as an attack on the integrity of Greece and the Greeks have always been protective of the integrity of their country to a point of convulsion. So, the natural thing for the Greeks to do was literally “destroy” the threat and us along with it.

So, the emergence of NOF, AFZH and NOMS in Greek occupied Macedonia turned the region into hell. Their presence created a gray area, a dangerous place to live and it became a breeding ground for military and strategic competition between ideologies with different aims.

If we step back and analyze the situation from a national interest point of view, we will conclude that it was not wise, particularly at that point in time, for the Macedonian people to pick up weapons in their hands. By doing so, they not only sanctioned their own demise, but they gave Greece an opportunity to destroy the Macedonian identity while claiming self-defense. Yes, Macedonians did pick up weapons and yes there were plans to sever Greek occupied Macedonia from Greece and that was enough reason for Greece to turn its weapons on its citizens, destroy them and get away with murder because it was done in self-defense. The architects of these schemes must have known exactly how to play the game and, in retrospect, they got exactly what they wanted, a de-Macedonian-ized Macedonia! For the Macedonian people this was an illogical war because it was started at the wrong time and for the wrong reasons. It couldn’t have been a war to “Unite Macedonia”, or as some call it “the continuation of Ilinden”, because by the time it was started the Great Powers had already decided on borders and on spheres of influence! It also couldn’t have been

a war against “Fascism” because fascism by then was already defeated and the fascists had surrendered!

But there is still that burning question “Why was the Greek Civil War started?”

Was it started to destroy communism in Greece? Was it started to fulfill the British wish to get rid of the Macedonian presence in Greece? Was it Greece’s way of dealing with the “Macedonian Question” once and for all? Or was it a combination of some or of all of the above?

One thing that we can conclude from this experience is that in spite of what has historically happened to the Macedonian people, the Macedonian Spirit proved to be alive and well during the Greek Civil War because, in spite of all their faults, NOF and AFZH had managed to awaken it, even if it was led to genocide.

Unfortunately awakening the Macedonian spirit at the wrong time proved to be a disaster. Over half a century has passed and Macedonians who participated in the war are still wanderers of the world, not being allowed to return to their homes.

Someone let the evil out in Greece; it did not fall from the sky; but who?

Developing Partisan forces and General Markos’s cunning recruitment tactics

The political climate and political processes in early 1946 created the need for the Left (CPG and EAM) to begin to again arm itself. Severe persecution of the Left and the Macedonian people by the new Athens government was a catalyst for an attitudes change, including that of thousands of soldiers and officers, all supporters and members of the CPG and ELAS, where they felt they needed to pick up guns in order to defend themselves against the hostile and aggressive Athens government.

But what is astonishing is that NOF, under the direction of the CPM/CPY, as early as 1945 had already started a mass mobilization program of mobilizing the Macedonian population into the ranks of NOF and AFZH. This obviously is proof that something was being carefully planned for the future of the Macedonian people.

There is also proof that measures were taken right across Greece to prevent the Left from legitimately participating in the country’s political process. Feeling quizzed out, the Left forces began to re-orientate themselves and started to massively mobilize into DAG reserves. And it would be no exaggeration to say that of the 25, 000 fighters mobilized into the ranks of DAG, 50% were Macedonians, most of whom were forcibly mobilized. Looking at this in proportion, it means that half of the fighters came from the Greek population of 6 million and the other half came from the Macedonian population of no more than 300 thousand people. So in terms of percentages the Greek population contributed 0.21% of its total population while the Macedonian population contributed 4.17 %, that ratio being 20 to 1. In the long term, throughout the entire Greek Civil War, the total Greek contribution amounted to 18-20 thousand fighters while the Macedonian contribution amounted to 15-20 thousand fighters.

According to General Zafiropulos’s findings, the Partisan force during 1946 grew as follows:

To April 1946------------ 950 May----------------------- 1,300 June----------------------- 2,700 July------------------------ 3,500 August-------------------- 3,600 September---------------- 4,490 October------------------- 5,930 November---------------- 7,450 December---------------- 9, 285

This means that the ratio between the number of government troops and those of the partisan force were 10 to 1. But in terms of military armaments they were unparalleled.

For more information see: Κισαβος, “Ο εµφυλιος πολεµος 1946−1949”.

“... When I arrived in Belgrade,” said Markos, “I immediately met with Comrade Ioannidis in an office where I saw the two leaders of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia; Tempo (Vukmanovich) and Rankovich. They asked me what was required of DAG so that they could help. I told them that we needed to arm 18,000 fighters. When Ioannidis heard me say that he stood up and said to me: ‘Markos, are you out of touch? What are you going to do with the arms for 18,000 fighters? You only need enough arms to arm 4-5 thousand and no more’….” (Kivasos, p. 94. Further on Kivasos wrote:

“I then asked Markos: ‘Why Comrade Markos, after returning from Belgrade to Greece, did you change the Party Line?’ Also present there

was Doctor Sakelariou. Markos then replied: ‘Not I, it was Ioannidis who changed the Party Line when I was in Belgrade, Comrade Georgi’…”

Thus, it is safe to say that the “Party Line” was changed by Ioannidis and the Yugoslavs which gained Markos particular personal sympathy from Tito and the Yugoslavs a sympathy which exists to this day.

In his book, Kisavos confirms that after returning from Belgrade to Greece, Markos, at his headquarters, decided to send home all the extra volunteers who came to join the ranks of DAG. Around 2,000 volunteers were sent home. Unfortunately, after returning to their homes these men were ruthlessly hunted down and destroyed by government forces. Kisavos also cites another example, such as the one about Costas Aridas, Trikala Political Commission Secretary, who together with a larger group of cadres from Thessaly had decided to join the struggle and were turned back. Upon their return home these people were all arrested and executed. (P. 88).

Kisavos also wrote about another incident, a more tragic and shameful case:

“A group of around 250 young armed volunteers from the Kalambaka District refused to leave when they were told to go home. Instead of going home, these volunteers organized themselves into three units on their own initiative and decided to fight on their own against the entire hostile government army. This was during the time when the Greek army was organizing a large scale military operation and its troops were present everywhere. Spiros Yarras, from the village Kastraki, Kalambaka District, was in charge of the volunteer group. These men proved to be excellent fighters and fought fiercely in a bitter battle without any losses. But instead of being commended for their bravery and success, Markos and his Headquarter staff disciplined them for disobedience and placed Spiros Yarras in the list of people under suspicion.

Contrary to what the Greeks were doing, it was NOF and AFZH policy, as set out by the CPM/CPY, to popularize the struggle and recruit the entire Macedonian nation.

So, if Markos’s political strategy and tactics were to de-popularize the armed struggle (as per Stalin’s attitude) and turn back experienced ELAS fighters, then where do we look for answers to explain the logic of what NOF was doing? Why did NOF carry out an unprecedented recruitment campaign in the Macedonian villages? (This certainly must have been Tito and Zahariadis’s policy...) (See Report generated by the top NOF leadership, dated February 9, 1946, “Organizational Structure of NOF in Aegean Macedonia”: Am. Collection “Aegean Macedonia in the Second World War 1945-1949,” AE: 86 and 87. published in the edition entitled: “Aegean Macedonia in the Second World War in 1946,” T.SH..., Doc 42 and 43. Pg. 97, 100, 103 - 106.)

Here is part of that report:

Villages / CPG member / member of NOF / NOMS / SKOJ / AFZH

Kostur Constituency

1. Prespa Region A. German District ....................... 16 villages B. Africa District ............................ 7 villages