NOTES - Part 02

According to Todor Simovski-Laki, former leader of the youth, in the above-mentioned villages in Voden Region: “The only thing that these people were guilty of is that they were Macedonians. They were primarily communists but felt more Macedonian than the CPG could tolerate.” I also learned the following from Simovski: During their last interrogation (torture) the Party made these people a promise that it would liquidate them to the last one… meaning it would liquidate the entire Macedonian battalion. One obvious thing that Dzhodzho could not see or perhaps did not want to see in all this was that the CPG wanted to discredit the battalion’s leaders in front of the Macedonian population, in addition to the “medical commission” turning back volunteers, it wanted to “completely” stop all volunteers from joining the battalion. There was even more… The CPG was sowing suspicion and distrust in the resistance movement in general, and thus minimizing the development of the Macedonian national liberation movement in comparison to the development in the democratic forces in Greece. Think about it… Because of what Dzhodzho said and did our Macedonian battalion was accused of torturing and liquidating respectable and patriotic Macedonians who were also old and loyal communists. Included among those we supposedly liquidated were Dimitar Leska and Gele Popov. We as leaders were made to look like a bunch of career-seeking political fools of the worst kind. I would never forgive Dzhodzho for what he did and if his “Greek friends” did not kill him I would have done it myself. (We will talk about him later, as we will show how his “Greek friends” took care of him and sent him to “swallow darkness”.)

While he was alive, Dzhodzho did not tell me a single word about his discussions with his “Greek friends”. Whatever he was told to do he did while he was in the hills of Mount Kaimakchalan and it was done within some of the people in his narrow circle. Obviously, he had to have received such a directive from the outside because no one knew anything about it while the entire battalion was being blackened and defamed. And it was no surprise that the volunteer

fighters from these villages who joined the battalion could be counted on the fingers of one hand…!

But, towards the end, Dzhodzho left his obedience behind and began to think for himself. He must have realized that he could not pin the entire guilt on me for evacuating the battalion. After all he did lie and deceived Foundoulakis and then evacuated his own fiancé out of Supotsko. This proved that he was part of the conspiracy. He also did not believe the “guarantees” his “Greek friends” made him and refused to turn the battalion back. Otherwise, there is no doubt he would have done it... It is unpleasant to think what would have happened, even today four decades later, if the battalion had been turned back. In any case, it would have been very bad for everyone!

After several days of rest, the battalion began moving again and arrived in Prilep. I was summoned to go to the Macedonian NOV and POJ Headquarters where General Apostolski issued me twenty military trucks. The motorized column arrived in Bitola. Unbeknown to us at that time the Lerin and Kostur Region battalion had also arrived in the Republic of Macedonia. Fearing the danger of being disarmed and dissolved, all the Macedonian partisan groups and units in Lerin and Kostur Regions did the same thing as the Voden battalion and retreated to the Republic of Macedonia. I was informed that they too were pursued and attacked by ELAS Greek units. When we arrived from Voden Region they were already here.

Bitola was boiling with partisans.

Of course, we were not guests here. We were in our own free Macedonian state, a federal unit of Federal Democratic Yugoslavia. The People’s Republic of Macedonia state and Party leadership was our leadership, we accepted it as ours… The reputation of the governing people here, as were Tito’s governing people, was enormous. We felt absolutely positive...

While we were still in Vatasha, Dzhodzho, with help from Rochko, came into contact with the Republic’s senior military and party officials. When he came back, with a bitter tone of voice, he said to me:

“You know what? It is not exactly what Rochko told us! But now...” waving his hand in circles, “there was no going back, so let it be what it will be…!”

But later, in Bitola, I saw him holding his head up high. We were both inducted together into the Political Commission for Aegean (Greek occupied) Macedonia. I, as a simple member, and Dzhodzho as a member of the Secretariat...

10 However, one should bear in mind that the CPG, during its CPG Central Committee X Plenum Declaration, in January 1944, and with the Treaty of Lebanon in May 1944, was the first to reach out and grab Yugoslav territories, demanding from its Allies “strategic security” for a Greek border to the north. This was confirmed by the fact that the CPY appeared to be conducting “defensive maneuvers” against such a move...

Dragan Kliakich, General Markos, Globus - Zagreb 1979, p. 75.

11 KOMEP 5/1943, editorial article.

12 STARMATH-STARMATA, Hronikon tis ethnikis antistasis 1940-1944, (To arms – to arms, chronicles of the national resistance 1940-1944), PLE (Party publishing department) edition, 1967, p. 27.

13 Neos Kosmos no. 9/1950.

14 STARMATA - STARMATA... p. 587.

15

16

17 Sources... cit. volume and book, p. 263.

18 From the “Wehrmacht Secret Archives”, v/k “To Vima”, July 11, 1963, or: Hristo Andonovski, “Macedonians under Greece in the fight against fascism”, Skopje 1968, p. 214.

19 STARMATA - STARMATA... for more information on this see pages 330-333.

20 SARANDA HRONIA TU KKE (Forty years of CPG), Party edition 1958, p. 715.

21 Evangelos Averov, “Fotia ke tsekuri” (Fire and ax), Athens 1975, p. 171.

22 Saranda hronia tu KKE... p. 147.

23 “Aegean Macedonia in the national liberation war”, Volume I, Doc. 191, p. 522.

24 TO KKE AP TO 1931-1952, vasika dokumenta,... p. 75.

25 Aegean Macedonia in the National Liberation War, Volume I, Doc. 104, p. 407. The proclamation of the “Greek character” of Macedonia, by itself, was no guarantee that there would be no unpleasant surprises. The presence of the Macedonian national liberation movement, so to speak, was felt in the air all over the Macedonian territory. It was smoldering... So there was an imperative need to defend the “Greek character” of Macedonia, which demanded and required a series of successful preventive measures to stop the initiation and development of the Macedonian national liberation movement and, above all, to prevent the creation of Macedonian military units as was done in neighbouring Yugoslavia...

26 TO KKE AP TO 1931-1952,... p. 268.

27 Sources for the liberation war and revolution in Macedonia, 1941-1945, vol. I, book two, p. 320.

28 Instead of forming a military unit August 2, 1944 (Ilinden), as expected, Renos Mihaleas, ELAS IX Division representative, formed the Kostur-Lerin ELAS Macedonian battalion. This was done about a month and a half after the Voden Macedonian battalion was formed. Because of this Mihaleas ran into trouble with Leonidas Stringos, CPG Bureau secretary for Macedonia and Thrace. This is

what Renos Mihaleas wrote about that moment: “The Secretary: ‘Why did you establish an entire battalion when the order was to form only one unit in Lerin and Voden Regions…?’ Renos: ‘And what would have been the damage if divisions were formed…?’The Secretary: ‘You are naïve. If the Macedonians had divisions, we Greeks would not be in Macedonia…!’…” (I have personally seen a copy of this document at INI.)

29 Dragan Kliakich, “General Markos” p. 75.

30 Letovikov in its entirety is published in Volume I of the edition “Aegean Macedonia in the national liberation war”. Here I quoted Hristo Andonovski, “The truth about Aegean Macedonia”, Skopje 1971, which in fact has an original copy of this leaflet.

31 Dragan Kliakich, “General Markos”, p. 75.

32 Ibid.

33 Aegean Macedonia in the national liberation war, Volume I, Doc. 174, p. 238.

34 NEOS COSMOS number 2/1957, p. 8.

35 See: “The CPG and the Macedonian National Question 1918-1974”, documents on the attitude of the Communist Party of Greece towards the Macedonian National Question 1918-1974, selection, editorial, commentary and translation by Dr. Risto Kiriazovski, Macedonian Archives edition, Skopje 1982, p. VII...

36 In connection with this, see “Deep Night, the dawn is born”. I spoke about the circumstances under which TOMO was formed in detail twelve years ago:

After being well rested from inactivity in Bitola, I spoke to my supervisor Dzhodzho what at the time was secretary of the Political Committee. I met with him with the intent of being sent back into the field so that I could personally talk to the people there, see how they were doing, what they were thinking, and the like.

Dzhodzho approved.

As soon as the weather improved, sometime in mid-February 1945, I left for the village Staravina. I needed several days to get to know the situation at the border. On February 21, 1945, I arrived at the village Dolno Pozharsko (Gorno Pozharsko was abandoned and completely empty). I spoke with my host and told him:

“Bring over about a dozen people… your choice. Tell them Goche (Rakovski) is here and wants to talk to them…!”

About half an hour later they arrived. I knew them from before and they knew me because, some time ago, I had recruited over one hundred volunteers here, partisans who were willing to join the battalion. The people were happy to see me again and looked at me curiously from top to bottom because I was wearing a Bulgarian officer’s overcoat, English pants and an English jacket. My legs were grey from the mud and I was wearing “opintsi” (slippers made of pigskin) for shoes.

“What kind of an army are you... wearing opintsi…?” One of them asked me jokingly.

When one of my escorts heard the joke he brought me my shiny black boots.

I knew our people very well and I deliberately took my boots with me. They were made from a thick hard sole and could not be used for long traveling through the deep snow over Kaimakchalan. I tied my boots with a string and placed them over my shoulder.

We had a long talk.

We split up in the morning. I promised them that we would soon see each other again. And I would answer their basic questions: “What should they be doing…? How should they be struggling…? When should they be starting and with what…?”

I remained in the village and allowed myself plenty of time to think. I recruited their sons into the battalion and then took them over the

border to the People’s Republic of Macedonia. What was I going to do from here on…?

They needed answers… I had to answer them.

It was obvious: without a political organization on the ground, the withdrawal of the battalion seemed like an adventurous move. The very formation of a political organization (bringing our people together) would not only correct the isolated action taken by the battalion, but it would also give us political substance and an ultimate goal. So, it was necessary to do this… the sooner the better.

Then, on the other hand, we had our CPG comrades who fiercely attacked the battalion’s leadership, especially me and Dzhodzho. They accused us of being “adventurers”, “sell outs to alien agents”, “scoundrels”, “traitors” and so on and so forth… and that we would bring “ruin” to our people’s children…! In other words, they called the battalion’s withdrawal a savage adventure and a betrayal. So, it was necessary for us to dismantle these accusations and put things right. And that was only possible with the formation of a political and revolutionary organization.

So, instead of waiting for a directive from above, I decided to act alone in accordance with the imperative from below. I formed a political organization under the name: Secret Macedonian Liberation Organization - TOMO. Because I defied responsibility and decided on my own to transfer the battalion over the border to save it from being disarmed, dissolved and liquidated, I was now obligated to make a correction and take responsibility for establishing TOMO, in order to defend and justify this transfer. TOMO’s existence would confirm in the consciousness of our people that the transfer of the battalion was done to save it and that what they were hearing from the other side was lies…

Before noon the same day (February 22, 1945) I sent some of my trusted people to the surrounding villages to make contact with the most trusted people there and to ask them to come and see me...

One by one they gathered until late night. Fifteen in total came to see me. I appointed each TOMO board president of the TOMO

organization in their village. In total thirteen villages joined TOMO. They were Pozharsko, Strupino, Baovo, Tsakoni, Tresino, Gorno Rodovo, Dolno Rodovo, Sarakinovo, Krontselevo, Teovo, Nisia and two more whose names I don’t remember. After that I visited the terrain twice more, once during March and again during the first half of April 1945. At that time ELAS had not yet surrendered its arms. There was a garrison stationed in the town Supotsko and a two unit detachment in the village Tresino. One moonlit night I went to Tresino and visited the villages Dolno Rodovo and Sarakinovo. I stayed in Sarakinovo one day. Director Todor Anastasov and three fighters stayed with me. After that I went to the flatlands outside the village Tsakoni met with Hristo Andonovski. At that time TOMO was spreading rapidly and approaching the city Voden...

Now I want to say a few words about the name TOMO.

The word “Secret” in TOMO corresponded to the situation on the ground. It pointed to the need for profound secrecy because it was illegal both in regards to the government in Athens and in regards to the CPG. On top of that it hid in itself a bit of revolutionary romance, necessary for the rebellious human soul.

The words “Macedonian” and “Organization” referred to the fact that TOMO was an exclusively Macedonian national organization.

The word “Liberation” pointed to the fact that it was an ideological organization. It carried the justification for the ultimate goal of our struggle. The liberation was led by our battalion and was expected to be led and supported by all our people.

I spent my entire time between my two field trips in Staravina. I did not want to go back to Bitola. For me it was not worth making the trip back. At that time Mitrevski was sent to attend a political course in Belgrade, Keramidzhiev was absent from the brigade and Dzhodzho hung around his important office. There was inactivity all round... The way things were going the Political Commission was headed on its way out… causing its own abolition...

I stayed in a single room in a home in Staravina with a window facing Kaimakchalan. I sat there looking outside, thinking and

writing. I recorded many events in which I was directly and indirectly involved. I described the life of a Macedonian person and their existence under the Greek regimes. And, thanks to my friend Hristo Andonovski, I am now again in possession of the manuscript which I wrote at that time. I have been meaning to offer it for publication.

About mid-April 1945, I received a message from Dzhodzho requesting that I immediately leave for Skopje. I did as he ordered and found out that the political commission was already dissolved. Then, at the end of April, the National Liberation Front - NOF for the Macedonians in Aegean (Greek occupied) Macedonia was formed. Mitrevski was appointed its leader and given a free hand to choose four others and to assemble the central leadership body - a five-member Bureau. He called me in and told me the news himself. He then asked me for my opinion on which four he should choose to form the Bureau…

I suggested Georgi Urdov-Dzhodzho, Ilia Dimovski-Goche, Naum Peiov and Mihail Keramidzhiev.

He thanked me and went away. When it was formed the Bureau consisted of Paskal Mitrevski, Georgi Urdov-Dzhodzho, Mihail Keramidzhiev, Tanas Koroveshov and Pavle Rakovski.

As I mentioned earlier, at that time I had high regards for Mitrevski because of the trust the leadership of the Republic of Macedonia had placed on him. I appreciated and respected that simply and openly. And that, it seemed to me, is why I too was appointed to NOF’s top leadership body.

After the first session, the five of us were sent to the field to strike NOF’s foundation on the ground in Kostur, Lerin, Voden, Enidzhe-Vardar and Seres Regions. I was sent to Voden Region because of my popularity there and because of the fact that I was well-known to most of the people.

“Do you see how well it turned out for you? You already have a ready-made organization there…. All you have to do now its change its name…” said Dzhodzho to me...

37 “Aegean Macedonia at the national liberation war”, Volume II, Doc. 25, p. 56.

38 Ibid, Doc. 47, p. 91.

39 Ibid, Doc. 54, p. 102.

40 Ibid, Doc. 54, p. 103.

41 Ibid, Doc. 54, p. 104.

42 Because of a heart defect that I was born with I could not walk fast or for long periods of time. As we were descending down the mountains to Lerin Valley, we passed the Lerin-Psoderi road. The exertion was too much for my heart so I passed out and remained unconscious. Because the group was in a hurry to cross the river and take shelter in a grove on the other side, it left me behind. The group was led by Hristo Kolenchev-Kokinos. Because it was close to the city Lerin, crossing of the river was very dangerous. However, one of the people in the group named Argir, from the Kostur villages, was very surprised that a “senior member of the NOF leadership” would be left behind just like that. He immediately left the safety of the grove on his own initiative and came back to see me. It was sometime after midnight and by then I was already conscious but fearing I might lose contact with the group I lay where they had left me. With Argir’s help I managed to eventually join the group. While in the grove they had decided to take a break and wait for us... A few days later, after I finished the work which I was sent to do, I had to cross the border with a special courier. While I was with the NOF District Committee for Lerin Region, I was told that Hristo Kolenchev-Kokinos, who knew the paths well, was going back over the border that same evening, and that I should go with him... I didn’t say anything. That night we took to the road.

It was about midnight when I began to feel the signs of exhaustion coming over me after which I suggested to Kolenchev that we take a ten or fifteen minute rest break. Nervously and through his clenched teeth Kolenchev whispered to me:

“We can’t, the border is in front of us...” and continued to walk away and disappeared in the dark of night...

Years later he made a false statement against me, accusing me of being an official soviet agent…!

I never had any other contact with Kolenchev. The only thing we had in common was that we both lived and grew up in Lerin. He was two years behind me in the gymnasium which means that we did not play together nor did we do our homework together. We never had the opportunity or any reason to argue or to hold a grudge. During the national liberation war and during the Macedonian national liberation movement I was working in Voden Region and he was working here in Lerin and Kostur Regions. This walking and returning across the border was the first and only time we were together. So, I don’t know why he had an almost pathological antipathy towards me…?

I have not written anything about this episode. That is why I did it here and now… it was an unpleasant episode in my life...

43 Vangel Aianovski-Oche, “Aegean Storms”, INI 1975, p. 233.

44 Ibid, p. 4-6.

45 “Aegean Macedonia at the national liberation war”, vol. III, p. 378, 380 and 381, or document number 171.

46 Those working for the organization “Ohrana” were members of a counter-autonomist military formation based in the city Voden. To put the Macedonians down, our Greek friends were accusing the leading activists of the Macedonian national liberation movement of being members of “Ohrana”. This was immediately after the Macedonian units split from ELAS, which the CPG Bureau for Macedonia declared “a treacherous counterrevolutionary act”. So, it is no surprise that General Markos, in his biography by Dragan Kliakich, called these Macedonian units a “Trojan horse” in ELAS which played a treacherous role! On page 74 of his biography Markos had Kliakich write that “Dimchev, the agent of the Bulgarian organization ‘Ohrana’ managed to round up Macedonians

in Voden and in about a month or two he gathered about 700 of them. He then armed them and, alongside the Germans, had them terrorizing the population... Dimchev, the Bulgarian agent, stubbornly believed that the Macedonians would be inclined and would succeed in winning over a large number of Macedonians. That is why he tried to establish a connection with the Macedonian partisan battalion that operated in Kaimakchalan. Dimchev met with Dzhodzho Urdov, partisan commissar of the Macedonian battalion, in the village Teovo, near Voden. Dimchev then suggested that the Macedonian battalion join the counter-band units while Commissar Dzhodzho asked that all counter-band units join his battalion, except for those who committed violent acts… They would be brought to justice…” and so on.

As we can see from the above, Markos would like us to believe that there was a connection between Bulgarian agent Dimchev and the ELAS Macedonian battalion! This, however, was nothing more than a deliberate low blow on Markos’s part hoping to mislead the uninformed reader into believing that the Macedonian battalion had really played a treacherous role in the ranks of ELAS. But in reality things were completely different. At that time, that is in mid-September after Bulgaria had switched sides, because of his position Markos knew very well that Andon Kalchev, organizer and head of “Ohrana” and the autonomist movement in Western Macedonia, demanded that he be accepted by ELAS so that he could fight against the Germans. In a letter dated September 16, 1944, Gianis Antoniadis-Teofilos, member of the CPG Bureau for Macedonia and Thrace, wrote to Leonidas Stringos-Aleksos, then secretary of the same Bureau, “that Kalchev”, among other things, “wanted to come over to our side. Concerning this, we are negotiating with him to also bring over his supporters…!” (See: THE CPG AND THE MACEDONIAN NATIONAL QUESTION 1918-1974, Skopje, 1982, Doc 93, p. 233, edited by Dr. Risto Kiriazovski.) Dzhodzho and Dimchev met at Dimchev’s request within the framework of these negotiations. As is well-known, the negotiations between Teofilos and Kalchev and between Dzhodzho and Dimchev ended in success. I don’t know what took place in the Teofilos and Kalchev negotiations but I do know exactly what took place between Dzhodzho and Dimchev. Simply put we could not allow or accept entangling the Macedonian fighters in Voden Region to become part

of the “Ohrana” units, as Dimchev had demanded. Our position was to disband “Ohrana”, take over its weapons and accept those who wanted to join our battalion. Those who didn’t want to join and had not committed any crimes were free to leave and go home. Those who had committed crimes would be punished. Dimchev, however, saw no guarantee for his own safety in all this and rejected our proposal. When the “Ohrana” fighters discovered why their leaders would not allow them to join our battalion, they made their own decision. They deserted “Ohrana” and joined our battalion en masse... To use Marko’s words, “Dimchev was left in a lurch”. In other words “Ohrana” was liquidated without firing a shot! This left Marko’s accusations, mentioned above, baseless…

47 As was mentioned earlier, the Asfalia (Greek security services) handed Zahariadis over to the Gestapo in May 1941. The Gestapo handed him to the British Intelligence Service in May 1945. Zahariadis was not harmed in any way during that time. After a three-week stay in London, on May 29, 1945, a special English plane took him from London to Athens.

Zahariadis returned their favour admirably. Namely:

In the presence of the still large and well-organized democratic force, headed by the CPG-EAM, the British had a great need for a well-executed propaganda campaign that would alleviate the consequences of an open British military intervention against ELAS.

In other words the British were in need of strengthening their relations with the Greeks in control, who would provide them with a comfortable return to Greece with as little military forces and cost as possible...

This was a great propaganda offensive of huge scale and duration and, unfortunately, of huge effect. But Zahariadis, it should be recognized, performed admirably and with great skill not only through the CPG but also on behalf of the CPG. By flashing around the Greek-Bulgarian fictional scarecrow known as the “Slavic danger” to Greece, he effectively justified the British military and political presence in Greece, as a “national need”, to secure Greece’s northern borders.

And by doing this he managed to suppress the Greek people’s resistance, which then undermined the uprising and DAG’s victory, leading to its final defeat and to the defeat of the democratic forces (the Left) in Greece… which was the British goal all along...

After the fact, after the situation, as was carried out by Secretary General Zahariadis, was analyzed during the CPG Central Committee’s VI expanded plenary session, held in March 1956, Zahariadis was removed from his position as leader of the Party. He was later exiled from Greece.

He persistently, but without success, strived to obtain a visa to return to Greece so that he could be with his friends the domestic reactionaries and with his sponsors the Anglo-Americans.

He even went on a hunger strike, but without success. He died in 1973 lonely, completely abandoned and despised…

48 “Istoria”, 2/1981, p. 293.

49 TO KKE AP TO 1931-1952... p. 149.

50 “Istoria”, 2/1981, p. 291.

51 Vangel Aianovski-Oche, “Aegean Storms”, p. 234.

52 Dragan Kliakich, “General Markos”, p. 122.

53 Ibid.

54 “Glasnik” 2-3/1977, p. 204.

55 Ibid.

56 Ibid.

57 This was written by Dr. Risto Kiriazovski on page 294.

58 From the interview with the Zagreb-based VUS, January 29, 1977, p. 53.

59 DIMOKRATIKOS STRATOS, organ of DAG Headquarters, no. 1/1949, p. 27.

60 Dragan Kliakich, “General Markos”, p. 249.

61 The following document is characteristic of that behaviour. A MEMORANDUM from 161 Macedonians, prisoners in the Pavlos Melas prisons in Solun, was given to the United Nations Inquiry Commission. The MEMORANDUM was protesting against the Greek political right defaming NOF, alleging that NOF was reportedly fighting for Macedonia’s Autonomy. It was well-known by then however, that NOF, the Macedonian anti-fascist liberation movement, fought against and liquidated the autonomist counter-band movement that was organized and managed by the occupiers. The MEMORANDUM was dated March 1, 1947.

The MEMORANDUM was handed over to the UN Inquiry Commission by Kostas Siriniotis, a Greek lawyer, journalist and director of the Solun Party newspaper LAIKI FONI, an organ of the CPG Bureau for Macedonia and Thrace. Kostas Siriniotis was also a prisoner serving a jail sentence in the same jail as the Macedonians, when he was interviewed by the Inquiry Commission regarding the situation in Greece.

Considering the fact that the NOF and AFZH members, working in the field from one end of Macedonia to the other, rejected their Greek names and took back their Macedonian names, one cannot help but wonder: “why did these 161 Macedonians sign their protest Memorandum with their “Slavophone Greek” names starting with Germanos Epitropoulos, Simos Vosenidis, Evtimios Usilkis, Simos Manialidis, Pantelis Kosmasopoulos, etc., and ending with Ioanis Karaianis, Evstatios Mitskas, Periklis Kirzatis, K. Doinidis, Dimitrios Pirzonas, Dimitrios Mitsos and Nikos Zirtas…? It is not hard to see that Kostas Sirinitis, the official CPG lawyer, was involved here. He “expertly” explained to the Macedonians that in order for the Memorandum to be credible and take root, it must be signed with the names that were recorded in the prison

documentation. “It had to be that way…” and by doing so this Greek “patriot” managed to swindle the Macedonians into representing themselves as “Slavophone Greeks” and NOF as a Greek-Supremacist or “Grkoman” movement... This MEMORANDUM was included among the 250 other documents in the collection: CPG AND THE MACEDONIAN NATIONAL QUESTION 1918-1974, in Dr. Risto Kiriazovski’s editorial, commentary and translation under order number 173, p. 406-409. Kiriazovski noted that the signatures were original…!

62 “Istoria”, 2/1981, p. 294.

63 Ibid.

64 TO KKE AP TO 1931-1952, p. 195. Or: DIMOKRATIKOS STRATOS 2/49.

65 Ibid, p. 74.

66 KOEM leadership resolution, brochure, “Nea Elada”, 1949, p. 8.

67 On p. 174-175 and 179-184 in the famous INI edition “Macedonians and the Civil War in Greece” by Naum Peiov, all these villages are identified by name and region and by the number of inhabitants that remained or disappeared.

68 Ibid, p. 271.

69 TO KKE AP TO 1918-1952, p. 110.

70 Ibid, p. 205.

71 “NOF was created by Tito and Kolishevski... Its founding leadership core consisted of Mitrevski, Keramidziev, Gotse, Rakovski and others, with the sole aim of enhancing Belgrade’s interests in Aegean (Greek occupied) Macedonia. Belgrade’s intent was to use the ‘Slavo-Macedonian question’ for the realization of its own national plans - the accession of Aegean Macedonia...” Zahariadis wrote this. It was then adopted by a CPG Macedonian special counsel. After that it was reviewed and accepted by the CPG

Central Committee Politburo. This is how the Greek side saw and understood things. Also see ibid, p. 271.

72 “Istoria” / 1981, p. 292.

73 Aegean Macedonia at the national liberation war, Vol. VI, Doc. 26, p. 71.

74 Ibid, p. 13, Doc. no. 6.

75 Ibid, p. 74, Doc. no. 26.

76 Ibid, p. 55, Doc. no. 20.

77 Ibid, 54, Doc. no. 19.

78 Ibid, p. 120-121, Doc. no. 55.

79 Ibid, p. 112, Doc. no. 49.

80 See part of the abstract in Volume VI of “Aegean Macedonia at the national liberation war” edition, p. 147, Doc. no. 70.

81 Ibid, documents number 8, 9, 10, and 11, p. 15-18.

82 “Istoria” no. 2/1981, p. 296.

83 I informed the publisher, the Archives of Macedonia, by letter in connection with this. In a letter of reply, Director Aleksiev informed me that the document was taken from the DAG Headquarters newspaper and was published on the basis of the materials preserved from the Prague Congress. He suggested to me, that if I was in possession of my speech, to provide him with a transcript. I immediately did that. But because my speech was published in its entirety in the Congress newspaper, I requested to see the materials from the Prague Congress and on the basis of that it was revealed that it was a forgery. They took my telephone number so that they could inform me when to come back. After a month or two passed, I stopped believing their promises...

84 Aegean Macedonia at the national liberation war, vol. VI, p. 337.

85 KOEM leadership resolution, 20.6.1949, brochure, ed. “Elevteri Elada”, June 1949, p. 12.

86 Ibid, p. 5.

87 Ibid, p. 13.

88 Aianovski, “Aegean Storms”, p. 406.

89 “Istoria” no. 2/1981, p. 289.

90 Ibid, p. 290-291.

91 Ibid, p. 289.

92 Ibid.

93 Josif Popovski, “The Macedonian question in the pages of ‘Rizospastis’ between the two wars”, “Kultura” - Skopje 1982, p. 236 and 239.

94 “Istoria” 2/1981, p. 292.

95 Aegean Macedonia at the national liberation war, vol. VI, p. 481.

96 Ibid, Volume I, p. 56-57.

97 Ibid, Volume V, p. 45 and volume VI, p. 154.

98 Ibid, Vol. VI, p. 458.

99 Purchased by INI.

100 At that time the editorial board of “Sovremenost” (Contemporary) publicly accepted to publish one my texts. Unfortunately they did not do that, even with a positive review from academician Mihailo Apostolski. Not less characteristic was the case with the “Glasnik” (Messenger) editorial board. I offered them two

articles which they reviewed and accepted for publication in the next issue of “Glasnik”. A few months later, “Glasnik” came out without my articles. With help from the director of INI, I sent them a letter asking for an explanation. I wanted to know why the “accepted” articles were rejected. They responded with... “silence!” On the occasion of the 38th anniversary of the formation of the Voden battalion, I offered a text to “Nova Makedonija” in which I described the conditions under which the ELAS Voden Macedonian Battalion was founded and acted. They asked Dr. Orde Ivanovski to review it. Ivanovski did not review it because he claimed “it was not in his field”. They intended to give it to Dr. Risto Kiriazovski but I told them to “give it to anyone but him!” and I explained why. The text was not only stopped, but photocopies of it were seen at Vangel Aianovski-Oche and Dr. Risto Kiriazovski’s place. That’s how it was… they operated above the law...

101 Purchased by INI.

102 “For as long as the national consciousness of the Macedonian people was maturing and the national liberation movement was getting better on its feet and in the struggle against foreign propaganda and against armed actions in Macedonia, even the neighbouring aspirants around Macedonia became more concerned and manifested their aspirations towards Macedonia even more openly, because... they knew that the Macedonians were not Serbians or Bulgarians but equally far from it. All of this forced responsible political circles to leave the old road that Macedonians are Serbians and Bulgarians, which would not bring them the desired results, and try to come to an agreement on how to divide Macedonia. This new view manifested itself in the ‘Serbian-Bulgarian Agreement’ with their 1912 ‘secret annex’...” (Dr. Petar Stoianov, Macedonia during the Balkan and First World War 1912-1918, INI Skopje 1969, p. 229.)

When the 1912 “Serbian-Bulgarian Agreement” was created, Milovan G. Milovanovich, then president of the Serbian government, said: “We are ready for everything and we will enter into any combination, with God or with the devil if we need to, in order to resolve the Macedonian question in our favour, without

which Serbia cannot live…” (Branko Perovich et al., First Balkan way 1912-1913, Belgrade 1959, p. 84.)

Dr. Stoian Danev, then President of the Bulgarian National Assembly, recognizing the goals of the Macedonian National Liberation Movement, openly admitted that: “Bulgaria declared the war because the Macedonian Bulgarians had lost their cause and went their own way!” (Dimitar Mitrev, Literature and the past, Skopje, 1959, p. 103.)

103 On p. 33-35 of this text I cited the testimonies of Evangelos Gianopoulos and Evangelos Averos. Evangelos Gianopoulos was former commander of an ELAS battalion and now a minister in the PAOK government. Evangelos Gianopoulos was head of the opposition in the Greek parliament. This text illustrates beautifully why, to their dismay, the CPG did not let them take a change on taking power, or just “grabbing” the government which, according to Minister Gianopoulos, they could have done in a matter of four hours...

104 A whole decade later, General Markos, in a special interview with the Athens newspaper TA NEA and with the Solun newspaper ELINIKOS VORAS, finally said: “Zahariadis loved that catastrophe... He worked for it with a plan... We were betrayed by the leadership of the Party!” (See ELINIKOS VORAS, August 3, 1978.) Markos also said: “At the time I still had not come to the conclusion that Zahariadis was a provocateur... Zahariadis played the English and American game…” Dim. Gusidis, a correspondent asked Markos: “What evidence do you have for all the accusations you made today? Are there any documents…?” Markos’s reply was: “I have documents... And the events speak for themselves…!” (See TA NEA, August 22, 1978)...

105 Written in the capital edition of the PLE (Party publishing department) “ST ARMATA - ST ARMATA”, hronikon tis etnikis Antistasis 1940-1944, (To arms – to arms, chronicle of the national resistance 1940-1944), 1967, p. 24, was: “One could see that the ARMED STRUGGLE WAS NEGLECTED. It was not well-organized and promoted, although there were possibilities for this with objective and favourable conditions!”

106 As I have already mentioned: on behalf of the CPG Central Committee, the Party leadership in its Proclamation dated July 2, 1943, on the occasion of the dissolution of the Comintern, announced that: “Waiting for the ultimate goal - the Socialist Party of the Proletariat and the Communist Party of Greece are today fighting for national liberation, and then, after the war is over, they will fight for a people’s democracy...” (See: ST ARMATA... p. 587.) Meaning, the fight for the social liberation of the Greek people was suspended… was not led… was “put off” for after the war.

107 The Wehrmacht Secret Archives, v/k TO VIMA dated July 11, 1963, according to Hristo Andonovski “MACEDONIANS UNDER GREECE IN THE FIGHT AGAINST FASCISM”, 1940-1944, Skopje 1968, p. 214.

108 ST ARMATA... p. 587.

109 Sarafis, O ELAS, p. 120...

110 NEOS COSMOS, No. 9/1950 Bardzhotas’s article: I POLITIKI STELEHON TU KKE STON KERO TIS ETHNIKIS ANTISTASIS (CPG Personnel Policy During the National Resistance)...

111 Sarafis 142...

112 Written in the August 16, 1943 edition of KOMEP (abbreviation for KOMUNISTIKI EPITEORISI - Communist Revision) No. 16, was: “There is no longer national confusion in Greek Macedonia… The Slavic and Turkish populations have been evicted according to the conventions... The Greek population has been collected from all countries in the Balkans and from Asia Minor and brought to Greek Macedonia... which became as Greek as any other Greek region of Old Greece…” (p. 331.) At about the same time in the summer of 1943, RIZOSPASTIS published its renowned thesis in which, among other things, was said: “Macedonia, after the exchange of populations, is as Greek as the Athens district of Attica…!”

113 Sarafis, O ELAS, 1946, p. 331...

114 AEGEAN MACEDONIA IN THE NATIONAL LIBERATION WAR, Volume I, document number 191, p. 522...

115 Ibid, document number 104, p. 407...

116 The CPG Founding Congress, in November 1918, called for the right to self-determination for the Greek population outside the Greek state (Cyprus, Northern Epirus, etc.) but did not do the same for Macedonian people who came under Greek rule five years earlier. In the first six years after it was founded, the CPG programs did not have a single word about the existence or rights of the Macedonian people. There was more to it than that… The CPG treated the Macedonian people as... Greeks... The first time the CPG recognized the existence of the Macedonian people inside Greece and their rights to self-determination was during the CPG’s 3rd Extraordinary Congress held in December 1924, in the presence of Comintern representatives in the Balkan Communist Federation. Greek leaders accepted this recognition in the spirit of the new line. In other words to do the same in Aegean (Greek occupied) Macedonia as was done in Vardar (Serbian occupied) and in Pirin (Bulgarian occupied) Macedonia (VMRO (United)). But instead of doing that, the Greeks were very careful not to place the Macedonian people under the influence of the new line and to avoid creating a Macedonian liberation movement. But, in response to pressures from the above-mentioned international forums, the CPG in its V Congress, held in March 1934, declared that there were no Macedonians in Greece. The CPG did this through a delegate from a densely populated Macedonian area in Western Macedonia. Delegate K. Vermitis emphasized that there was “no basis” for a Macedonian national question in Macedonia because the Macedonian people were already Hellenized and did not exist as a separate non-Greek nation. (Vermitis’s comments were published in the March 6th, 1934 partisan journal “MARKSSISTIKI BIBLIOTIKI”, number 6/1934.) However, after this congress, the CPG was forced to join the VMRO (United) formation, which in Greece turned out to be a fictitious organization. The CPG simply told a number of Macedonians in its ranks that from now on they were the VMRO (United). The stillborn VMRO (United) Central Committee was absolutely prevented from doing anything. Their

printing press with Cyrillic letters, which VMRO (United) purchased and Andrea Chipov managed with the intention of establishing contact with the broad Macedonian masses by issuing a Macedonian newspaper, was seized: “The conditions in Greece did not allow the issuance of a Slavic newspaper…!” VMRO (United) also tried to import the newspapers “Macedonian Works” and “Balkan Federation” from abroad but soon that too was prohibited by the CPG Party leadership (Zahariadis). The person who purchased and distributed the newspapers in Solun, a man named Georgi Krontselchev, was beaten and immediately liquidated by the police...

117 For the declaration made during the X Plenum in January 1944. See: SARANTA HRONIA TU KKE (Forty years of CPG), Central Committee of the CPG 1958 edition, p. 505, or: ST ARMATA... p. 586...

118 The eighth chapter (or article) of the Lebanon Agreement called for “full national rights for Greece”. According to this chapter (or article) this practically meant: “Creating a new free and Greater Greece”. (See: HRONIKON TU AGONA; ST ARMATA ST ARMATA, ISTORIA TIS ETHNIKIS ANTISTASIS, edition “GIANAKOS”, volume III p. 200.) As I mentioned earlier, a few months before this, in January 1944, the CPG leadership, during its CPG Central Committee X Plenum, made this line the official Party line “for strategic borders”. In the spirit of all this, a document entitled “Greece Has the Right!” came to light, and was published by the press. It was then distributed all throughout Greece as a leaflet in which it was specifically requested that:

a) The northern borders of Greece are to include Northern Epirus (Albanian territory-PR), because with the secret London Treaty of 1915 and with the Venizelos-Tigoni Treaty of 1919, i.e. when Albania’s division was planned, this area was granted to Greece.

b) The entire mountain range in the Rhodope Mountains and the Sultan Dere, Egri Dere, Dri Dere, Ali Chelebi plains, in other words, the entire Pirin Macedonia region should be given to Greece in order to secure its northern borders.

c) Regulating Greece’s borders towards Yugoslavia so that Greece could have an opportunity to protect the flow, through which the German forces penetrated Greece in 1941. Thus, the Solun Hinterland would have to be expanded.

d) The issue of borders towards neighbouring and friendly Turkey was not settled. But if the question regarding the Dardanelles and Constantinople were to be raised, Greece’s views on that issue, which have long been known, should not be ignored.