TO THE EDITORIAL BOARD “COMMUNIST” - SKOPJE - Part 01

TO THE EDITORIAL BOARD “COMMUNIST” - SKOPJE

Comrades,

The accompanying text “Discussion on the topic: The Communist Party of Greece and the Macedonian national question” refers to the extensive collection of CPG policy documents on the Macedonian national question that recently appeared in a text in the Macedonian archives in Skopje.

As fate would have it, I was at the forefront of the Macedonian liberation movement in that part of Macedonia during ELAS, that is, during the National Liberation War, and during DAG, or the Greek Civil War and, being a direct participant in both of those struggles, I felt obliged to intervene in defense of the truth.

I believe an attempt has being made to blur and conceal the truth about certain events in a carefully chosen selection of documents presented in the collection and in the commentary and preface of this work. This qualifies to be described as a genuine anti-Macedonian diversion of historical science... The attached text is the result of an analysis done on the collection with aims at clarifying events and getting to the truth, in terms of identifying the policies of the Greek leaders, and their actual role and function, which should be included in the collection.

The fact that Greek authors (former EAM, ELAS, DAG and CPG officials, some of them current CPG officials) are silent, that is, they avoid talking about the CPG and its destructive policies against the Macedonian people, and similarly -

The fact that here, among us, in our Institute for National History (INI), nothing has come to the surface after all the decades of work, even though people know that the CPG policies implemented against the Macedonian people were truly gruesome and shameful… speaks loudly that there are attempts made to obscure them...

Many people over time have entrusted INI with their historical documents so that they would be properly processed as historical

material but, obviously, this is not being done. Quite the opposite! According to the directives given to them, the people at INI have implemented a policy of concealment, that is, to hide the truth of what really took place and to conceal the Greek acts perpetrated against the Macedonian people, which in fact are political crimes.

This collection of documents is yet another confirmation and proof that our history is being altered as we speak in order to conceal the truth. In fact, this collection is an attempt to point our historiography in the wrong direction, and as mentioned in the preface, by use of a “scientific” methodology. With the selected documents and materials and the commentary in the preface, this collection is a facade behind which it is difficult to sense and identify the cruel anti-Macedonian acts perpetrated by our Greek “patriots” from the CPG leadership against the Macedonian people.

This, however, must not be allowed to happen. The “anti-Macedonian acts” committed by the CPG leadership must be disclosed to the CPG membership and to the public in general in defense of the Macedonian people… in the name of the Greek worker and communist movement… in the name of the Macedonian national liberation movement… in the name of the joint revolutionary struggle…. And you, comrades, need to step up and to do this immediately...

Should you need any more information, or any more details about this, do not hesitate to contact me. I am always available (my telephone number is 261-750)...

Skopje, 12. VII. 1982, Regards, Pavle Rakovski

Of course, I also sent the above document, with an appropriate cover letter, to the MACEDONIAN ARCHIVES...

Here is something (the beginning) from my document which amounted to over 70 pages.

Recently the “Macedonian Archives” published a collection of documents about the Communist Party of Greece’s policies regarding the Macedonian Question...

The collection, considered a significant accomplishment, was introduced to the public in the Saturday edition of the NOVA MAKEDONIJA newspaper, published on June 12, 1982.

And, of course, there are reasons why it was a significant accomplishment.

First, it filled a significant gap in our historiography by making two hundred and fifty (250) of the many existing documents available to historians and the general public. Second, it indisputably, convincingly and irrefutably pointed to the fact that Macedonians do not only exist but struggled to acquire their democratic rights and freedoms in the Greek state which, undoubtedly, is of great historical and political significance...

But, in the interest of forming a more complete picture of the historical truth, that is, of better informing the public, it is necessary to present some additional and important facts that are NOT INCLUDED in the collection. Here is brief summary:

A. – From the establishment of the CPG to the Fascist occupation.

1) During the first six years after the founding of the CPG, the Macedonian people were treated as Greeks. There was not a single word mentioned about Macedonians in any of the CPG official documents or in the Party program. They were treated like they were Greek people!

The same thing (Macedonians were referred to as Greeks) was done during the fascist occupation of Greece and subsequently during the national liberation war (ELAS), the Greek Civil War (DAG), and the period after the Greek Civil War (in immigration)… until this day. The CPG leadership applied a dual policy towards the Macedonian people; a declarative and a practical policy. In other words, the CPG said one thing and did another in regards to the Macedonian question. But, instead of publicly presenting all

elements of the CPG policies with equal emphasis, the collection has made an attempt to emphasize the declarative elements and to deemphasize the practical elements. In other words it is speaking up about what was said and keeping quiet about what was done. The collection would have been fine if everything was included. But it was not! Then, in the preface we read:

“With the documents and materials included, and by using a scientific basis, the purpose of this collection is to contribute to the clarification of the CPG’s policies on the Macedonian national question from the CPG’s founding in November 1918, to 1974, when the CPG officially last treated this question ... The available documents, in their entirety, represent the continuity of the CPG’s POLICIES and PRACTICES with regards to the Macedonian national question and the CPG’s attitude towards the Macedonian people from the Aegean (Greek occupied) part of Macedonia.”

In other words, this document claims that the CPG’s “verbal” policy was the practical and real policy… which is not true…!

I submitted the following text to INI:

30th Anniversary of ASNOM - ASNOM, NOB and the CPG

By P(avle) R(akovski)

Both the people’s revolution and the Macedonian national liberation movement in Greece were defeated by the international and domestic reactionary forces. They were defeated through the liquidation of the “Greek National Liberation Army” or ELAS in 1941 to 1944 and again, for a second time, when the “Democratic Army of Greece” or DAG was disastrously crushed in 1945 to 1949 in its own “fortified defensive positions”.

The main driving forces in DAG were the Macedonian fighters with the bulk of the fighting taking place in the northern part (Greek occupied Macedonia) of the Greek state. As a result, the Macedonian people suffered the most and acquitted the greatest losses. For this reason, it is understandable that the Macedonian

people would be interested in learning the truth of what happened, i.e. in understanding the real causes of the catastrophic disaster…

The Macedonian Academy of Arts and Sciences - MANU, in the framework of the 30th ASNOM anniversary celebration, organized a Symposium with the theme: “ASNOM – the realization of the ideas for creating a Macedonian state and its international echoes and reflections.”

Being the most notable member of NOF, Paskal Mitrevski, former NOF president of the Macedonians in Greek occupied Macedonia, took part in this Symposium with a presentation entitled: “The first organs of the people’s government and the formation of the Provisional Democratic Government of Greece during the Greek Civil War, 1945- 1949.”

Comrade Mitrevski presented the following basic concepts and events of that time (I quote):

1) “The Greek people, along with him and the Macedonian people, were among the first to rise in the fight against fascism…, and achieved significant successes and results, but because of foreign military intervention they fell under new slavery…” (under the then established Monarcho-fascist regime.)

2) “The resistance offered by the people... would inevitably lead to DAG’s establishment, and spur a painstaking struggle for the liberation of the country. One of the results of that struggle was the establishment of the Provisional Democratic Government of Greece and the recognition of the national rights and freedoms of the Macedonian people in the Aegean part of Macedonia…”

3) “This recognition was actually a significant benefit for the Macedonian people and, at the same time, a sort of echo of the ASNOM decisions.”

4) “In a comparative sense, there are certain degrees of diversity, both in terms of the approach and manner, among the acts adopted and decisions made by ASNOM and the corresponding acts adopted by the provisional democratic government of Greece. There are also

certain degrees of diversity among the motives and forms of their adoption... However, as an integral whole of the Macedonian people’s liberation struggle goals and interests, they are implicitly convergent...” (In simple words he wants to say that, with their similar content, they equally served the liberation struggle of the Macedonian people, that is, they lead to the same final goal).

5) “The first ASNOM session had a positive and strong echo on the fighters and on the broader Macedonian masses all throughout Aegean Macedonia.”

6) “Due to mistakes... omissions... weaknesses in the CPG and DAG leaderships... the democratic forces were faced with their final defeat...”

This, according to Comrade Mitrevski, was the “general true picture of events…” However, looking at things closely, more carefully and in a logical sense, we will be forced to conclude that much of this “general true picture of events” needs to be corrected.

Mistakes!? Omissions!? Weaknesses!? This is simplified to the extreme! It seems that the only weakness here is in our assessment of the events of that time. As far as I am aware, all the books that talk about the national liberation war in Greece, which are published here in Macedonia, talk only about the policy mistakes made by Greek leaders (CPG, EAM, ELAS, DAG). Their well-intentioned motives are not denied (although betrayal is betrayal regardless of the intentions of the perpetrator). However there are also the basic questions that need to be asked, namely:

a) The people’s revolution and ELAS, its army, suffered defeat not on the battlefield but by voluntarily surrendering to the enemy. ELAS held almost all of Greece, and there was no battle fought! If this is not betrayal, then what is…? (105)

b) The people’s revolution and DAG, its army, again suffered defeat. DAG was a small but mobile rebel army with its forces present everywhere and unreachable to its opponent. But, contrary to logic, DAG was pinned down in a frontal attack. In other words the mobile army was forced to stand still, like a motionless target, so

that its opponent could deliver a heavy blow against it. Its opponent, the Royal Army, was better trained, better equipped, better armed and ten times more numerous. The small but mobile army was “ordered” to fight at a front and this is why its opponent was able to smash it to pieces… And, if this too is not betrayal, then what is…? (106)

Behind both of the cases mentioned above, stood a definite general political line. This political line was not a “mistake”, an “omission” or a “weakness”, but a deliberate attempt to achieve specific goals. Everything that was done was part and parcel of a strict and consistent implementation of that general line. And to claim that the Greek leaders... wandered all over the place… did not know what they wanted and how to achieve it… did not follow the Party the line… at the very least are delusions and an escape from the truth.

Here is how ELAS and the people’s revolution were defeated:

During its CPG Central Committee VI Plenum, held in July 1941, the CPG leaders decided to call on all the Greek people, on all the parties and organizations including on all the bourgeois parties and organizations, to form a national front (EAM) against the fascist occupation, and for the people’s liberation. But what was characteristic of this is that it was not done by not organizing a massive armed struggle, not creating a liberation army, but by conducting illegal activities in the cities such as economic and political strikes, demonstrations and by fighting in the streets. (107)

This is what General Stefanos Sarafis, ELAS Supreme Commander, among other things, wrote about this in his famous book “O ELAS”: “The Greek people, under the leadership of the EAM organizations, began their resistance in cities with protests, strikes and other bold actions, and ultimately organized the partisan army…!” (Page 92.) At the same time (and this is also very characteristic) the CPG leadership completely ignored the disadvantaged Macedonian people in the Greek state and their needs in regards to their struggle for democratic rights and freedom. To have given attention to Macedonian people and to have spoken about the Macedonian national question, in fact, would have meant that the CPG would have to expose itself and raise this issue before the public and offer a

resolution. But what the CPG really wanted was to completely ignore the Macedonian issue.

This is how the CPG acted and this was the CPG’s real policy, both in terms of the Greek people’s liberation struggle, and in relation to the Macedonian national liberation movement, and there is no other way that it can be explained. Facts are facts and they have their own logic. Namely, the lightly armed proletariat, almost naked and constantly exposed to the heavy occupiers’ blows in the cities, would have no chance of a decisive victory. But, by taking this route, the CPG was able to exclude the possibility of starting a people’s (social) revolution, and thus avoided the danger of creating conditions for a practical resolution of the Macedonian national Question in Greece. The assumption here was that Greece would be liberated when the allies from the West and the Middle East came to liberate it. And with their help, Greece would re-establish its positions and borders in the north, and regain the Greek territories annexed by the Bulgarian fascists.

The other alternative would have been for the CPG to orient itself towards a social revolution, and instead of suppressing and “postponing it” (108), embracing it in a revolutionary decisive democracy consistent with that of the “Slav-speakers” in Macedonia which would have led to a confrontation with the domestic bourgeoisie and its patrons the Anglo-Americans. And, in the event of success, the Greek position and interests in Macedonia would become problematic. To work on that line would have meant to work against Greece...

In essence this was the CPG leadership’s general line followed in Greece. The CPG had to work in line with Greek national interests, but at the same time, it had to blur and conceal its true motives with arbitrary interpretations, so as not to draw the attention of the public. Unfortunately, this was not good for the people’s revolution in Greece and especially not for the Macedonian people...

But then things didn’t go the way the CPG wanted them to. The fascist terror in Greece gradually sent more and more people to the mountains who then formed partisan units and began to build a national revolutionary army (ELAS). By the middle of 1943 there

were many people who had left the cities and joined the partisan units operating in the mountains. All of these units were taken over by the Party leadership. In the meantime, a strong democratic national liberation movement was brewing in Macedonia among the “Slav-speaking” people. It was under these conditions that contact between the governing factors in Albania, Greece and Yugoslavia (Tempo) was made and an agreement was reached to create an alliance, and based on a military and political plan, to open a common Balkan General Headquarters… and so on.

The CPG leadership, led by Georgios Siantos, however, had an immediate response. It first criticized the CPG-ELAS representatives for their “naïve” nature in this matter, and then renounced the already accepted and signed Agreement and declared it invalid. And, instead of joining the Balkan people’s revolutionary alliance, the CPG connected itself to the English. ELAS was put under English command and under the control of the British General Staff for the Middle East. British officers then rapidly began to join all ELAS unit headquarters. At the same time, the CPG opened a frontal attack against the “Slavophones” and against their liberation movement.

This is how the CPG conducted itself and carried out its policies both in terms of the people’s revolutions in the neighbouring nations, and in terms of the revolutionary struggle of the “Slavophones” here at home in Greek occupied Macedonia. However, there is no doubt that, had the CPG joined the people’s revolution alliance with the neighbouring nations, there would have been an inevitable confrontation with the domestic bourgeoisie and its patrons the Anglo-Americans. On the other hand, if the CPG had joined the Balkan alliance it would have changed the class and social character of the revolution in Greece and would have created favourable conditions for developing a stronger Macedonian liberation movement. This would have established the right conditions for a practical resolution to the Macedonian National Question. In other words, Greece would have lost its part of Macedonia… and this would have been a treasonous act against Greece.

This is why our “Greek patriots”, the CPG leadership, rejected the Balkan people’s revolution alliance, turned to the English and the domestic bourgeoisie, and allowed all ELAS unit headquarters to be staffed with British officers. This, in effect, was insurance for the prevention of the “national struggle” turning into a social revolution.

With all that out of the way, the CPG then turned its attention to dismantling, breaking up and disabling the Macedonian national liberation movement from being launched...

These were the actual events and the logic behind them as to why they took place. They are clear and unambiguous and reveal the ideas, aims and actions of those who perpetrated them. To blur them and conceal them by arbitrary interpretations, not to bring them to light in the public eye and in the eye of the CPG membership is, obviously, doing a bad service to both the Greek people’s revolutionary struggle and to our Macedonian struggle.

This is what Chris Wounthouse, a well-known British Intelligence Service agent and former head of the British military mission in Greece, wrote: “If the resistance movement in Greece was not staffed with British officers, not only Greece but all of Europe would have gone in quite a different direction... The presence of the British military mission in Greece prevented the Communists from putting Greece under absolute control in 1943-1944. If the Communists took power in Greece in September 1944, when the Germans were withdrawing, it would have been difficult to take that power away from them in the eyes of the world public, and Greece today would be behind the Iron Curtain...” (109)

As one can clearly see Chris Wounthouse had no reasons to worry about covering up the betrayal of those who invited the British officers to join all ELAS unit headquarters. He competently and authoritatively points out the far-reaching consequences of this policy.

What possible reasons could we have not to do the same…? (Expose the truth.)

And as I have previously mentioned, on July 2, 1943, on the occasion of the dissolution of the Third International, the CPG Central Committee addressed the Greek people with a proclamation in which it said that it was waiting for its final goal and that socialism, the proletarian party, the Communist Party of Greece… are all fighting today for national liberation, and after that war was over they will be fighting for a people’s democracy…!

So, from the above statement the CPG publicly admitted that the struggle for the Greek people’s social liberation was “postponed” until the war for liberation was over. In other words the Greek people were publicly denied their chance to fight for social justice when the time was right. Then when the armed struggle ended, the CPG leadership promised to start a new struggle against the bourgeoisie, as was specified in its proclamation. This, however, was done only at rallies in order to “win the majority vote”. (110)

But that’s not all. ELAS in its nature was a people’s revolutionary army whose command structure consisted mostly of communists who could have easily transitioned from a “national struggle” into a “social revolution”. The proclamation was only a preventative measure to suppress communist tendencies among the communist leaders and masses.

What possible reasons could we have to hide this information from the public and from the CPG membership…?

On July 5, 1943, a document was signed in which “ELAS was granted the status of an allied army under the command of (British) General Staff for the Middle East. All operations that it was to undertake were to be carried out on orders from (British) General Staff…” wrote Sarafis, ELAS Commander-in-Chief, in his famous book: “O ELAS”. (111)

According to Vasilis Bardzhotas, member of the CPG Central Committee Politburo and political commissar of DAG headquarters: “All large units, divisions and groups of divisions were in fact in the hands of the British Intelligence Service!” (112) And so the entire situation found itself... in experienced hands. Our CPG leadership

and “Greek patriots” could now sigh in relief because the future of Greece was in good hands...

After this the entire situation began to roll downhill, faster and faster. On July 18, 1943, a document was signed in which EDES and EKKA, the quisling forces organized by the domestic bourgeoisie and the English, which fought against EAM-ELAS while collaborating with the occupiers, were recognized as... liberation forces. But there was more… A joint Chief of Staff was established. “On July 29, 1943, the first meeting at the British military mission headquarters was called, in which the following appointments were decided:

- From the British military mission: Colonel Eddy, then head of the Mission. Lieutenant Colonel Chris, his assistant and deputy. Major Wallace, political adviser, representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of England. Captain Ross, Eddy’s adjutant.

- From ELAS: Colonel Sarafis, ELAS Supreme Commander. Comrade Aris Velouhiotis, political commissar of ELAS Headquarters. Comrade Samariniotis.

- From EDES: Colonel Napoleon Zervas and Komninos Piroamglou. Additionally, Colonel Mavromatis and Major Gikopoulos, designated as permanent representatives of EDES in the Joint Chiefs of Staff...

- Later, representatives of EKKA joined in…! (Sarafis) (113)

By doing this the British were formally and de facto recognized as the leaders in the struggle and given the right to interfere in Greece’s internal affairs. The British took advantage of that and began to solve the problems in Greece by pitting Greeks against Greeks... for their own benefit, of course. Namely, by combining all the quisling forces under their command including EDES, EKKA, PAO, IVE, Andon Chaush, etc., they organized a massive blow against ELAS in northern Greece.

ELAS, however, emerged victorious only thanks to its fighters and to the support they received from the broad masses...

In the meantime the CPG started an aggressive campaign against the Macedonian people and against their liberation movement which was completely out of character. In other words, the CPG, through its central organs the by-weekly magazine “Neos kosmos” and the newspaper “Rizospatis”, began a propaganda campaign telling the Greek people and the world public that Macedonia under Greece (Greek occupied Macedonia), after the exchange of populations, became so Greek that it was as Greek as any other Greek district in Old Greece. (114) In other words, the CPG was telling the world that there were no Macedonians in Greek occupied Macedonia… only Greeks. But then General Stefanos Sarafis, commander of ELAS, went on to testify about the “Slavophones” present in ELAS. He wrote the following in his book “O ELAS” after visiting the village Perivoli (Kostur Region) to inspect the 2nd Battalion of the 28th ELAS Brigade: “The entire 2nd Battalion is made up of Slavophone Greeks…” In other words it was made up of Macedonians. (115) He was referring to the Lerin-Kostur Macedonian battalion led by Ilia Dimovski-Goche from Statitsa.

And then we have General Evripidis Bakirdzhis, commander of the ELAS Group of divisions in Macedonia, who in the spirit of the CPG’s above-mentioned central organs, together with the Party newsletter “Laiki foni”, in a special interview, also informed the world that the “Slavophones” were nothing more than “Bulgarophone Greeks”! (116)

In other words, for these people (CPG) there were no Macedonians in (Greek occupied) Macedonia, only “Slavophone” Greeks, belonging to the “Slavophone” part of the Greek people. It was no wonder that the National Council (“Ethnikon Simvoulion”) of “Democratic Greece”, just born in the flames of the revolution, when it convened in May 1944 somewhere in the free territory, completely ignored the Macedonian people, that is, it treated them as Greek people and proclaimed the Greek character of Macedonia. (117)

We should have known that this was always part of the famous Greek Bourgeois anti-Macedonian policy, now being implemented through the CPG and through the revolution...

We became aware that we were not alone, when the Macedonian people began to form the People’s Republic of Macedonia in the composition of Yugoslavia under the AVNOJ (National Anti-Fascist Liberation Council of Yugoslavia) and then ASNOM (Anti-fascist Assembly of the National Liberation of Macedonia) conditions, when huge masses began to appear in this part of (Greek occupied) Macedonia so they too could be mobilized and organized into a huge force.

When the Macedonian people began to resolutely prepare for a struggle en masse… the CPG, recognizing that it was their natural and legitimate right, began to organize itself and develop its own struggle in order to emerge from its humiliating position of having ignored a completely disadvantaged and subjugated people…

It was precisely at this time and under these conditions that the “Greek patriots” from the CPG leadership responded with their consistent application of their well-established line for a “national front”, i.e. for “national unity” with the domestic bourgeoisie. This was the right time for them to implement their anti-Macedonian policy of non-recognition and denying the very existence of the Macedonian people. This was the CPG’s decisive struggle for suppressing and ultimately choking the Macedonian national liberation movement in Greece.

Anyone who is familiar with the history of the CPG knows very well that these anti-Macedonian tendencies were representative of the long-standing CPG “Macedonian disease” which the CPG contracted when it was first established in November 1918 and, depending on the conditions, one way or another, surfaced in its policies of practice against the Macedonian people. (118) In other words, this CPG “disease” did not start or was caused by the establishment of ASNOM and its solutions.

However, it did surface and take shape and sharpness during given historical moments including the moment of ASNOM. Namely, the solutions offered by ASNOM and the emergence of the People’s Republic of Macedonia, which unusually ignited the revolutionary struggle in this part (Greek occupied) of Macedonia, was the

contributory force, which for the first time forced the CPG’s “Macedonian disease” into the open. This was the first time it was stripped naked from the CPG’s demagogic disguises and false democracy in relation to the Macedonian people.

This is how it was. The CPG’s decision to take a harder stand against the Macedonian people in Greece was a reflection of the decisions made at ASNOM.

But that was not all. As early as January 1944, at its CPG Central Committee X Plenum, the CPG leadership publicly opted for… “Strengthening Greek national interests!” in the north part of Greece. The CPG, at its X Plenum, specifically proclaimed that it will fight against its northern neighbours on its “strategic borders” the same way the domestic bourgeoisies were fighting”. (119) In other words the party of the proletariat, i.e. the Communist Party of Greece, was placed under the yoke of the domestic bourgeoisie cart to jointly widen the Greek state borders by annexing new foreign territories to the north…

On May 20, 1944, the Treaty of Lebanon was signed, with which:

a) The CPG, EAM and ELAS leaderships voluntarily and officially renounced any pretensions to take power in Greece and recognized the bourgeois government in exile as the “legitimate government of Greece” and as the “government of national unity”.

b) Once again the CPG publicly and officially stood in the same position as the domestic bourgeoisie against its neighbours with a request for “full approval of Greece’s national rights” which, among other things, meant a request to occupy and annex the rest of Macedonia (the Republic of Macedonia and Bulgarian occupied Macedonia) and Northern Epirus (Southern Albania). (120)

c) The soldiers and officers in the Greek military formations in the Middle East, who supported the CPG, EAM and ELAS, found themselves in a precarious position being treacherously accused of being involved in anti-national activities. This, however, was a ruse to conceal and justify the English intervention to defame and cleanse them.

d) The traitors acknowledged that ELAS was not a “non-partisan national army,” and the creation of an army, as a matter of time, would be left to the authority of the bourgeois government and the British General Staff for the Middle East. In other words it was time to decide when to raise the question of dissolving ELAS... (121)

The Treaty of Caserta was signed on September 26, 1944. By way of this Treaty the English were able to invade Athens and the Greek territory that the Germans were abandoning. The English did not invade Greece to chase out the Germans but to oppose ELAS. (122) That is, to prevent ELAS from taking important strategic positions in Athens and other places. The CPG leadership made sure this plan was successfully implemented. They then accepted British General Skobi as the supreme commander of the armed forces in Greece, that is, they subordinated ELAS to him, so that ELAS units could not move or act on their own, except under his orders. (123)

At the end, after a provoked military conflict in Athens (December 1944), the CPG leadership signed the Varkiza Agreement to disarm and dissolve ELAS. The Agreement was signed by Georgios Siantos and Mitsos Partsalidis. With the exception of some reserve units operating in Athens, ELAS was disarmed, dissolved and liquidated all throughout Greece. The ELAS reserve units were eventually defeated by the combined government in exile forces and by the English. (124)

In analyzing its own actions, the CPG, during its Third CPG Conference, decided to declare Georgios Siantos, Secretary of the Central Committee, a traitor, arguing that: “The betrayal against the revolution was consciously carried out by Georgios Siantos alone…” (125) There can be no doubt that, as surely as it was betrayal, it was not carried out by Siantos alone.

But what kind of reason could we have, to see things differently than what they actually are when we are talking about... some kind of mistakes made by the Greek leaders in their politics…?

Things were done the same way even under Secretary General Nikos Zahariadis’s watch. The CPG leadership, while the CPG was

still headed by Secretary General Nikos Zahariadis after the Greek Civil War ended, in its CPG Central Committee VI Extended Plenum in March 1956, condemned Zahariadis and removed him from the Party leadership because he was responsible for justifying the English presence in Greece, which weakened the resistance movement and undermined DAG’s victory... The CPG leaders avoided using the term “betrayal” to describe what Zahariadis had done because they themselves were also involved…

But the facts are the facts and they are here to stay. Namely, faced with the newly emerging situation in the north (ASNOM, i.e. the formation of the Republic of Macedonia in the Yugoslav composition and the founding of NOF the national revolutionary organization for the Macedonians in the Greek occupied part of Macedonia), the CPG, at its CPG Central Committee XII Plenum, held in June 1945, declared that there was an uncertainty that was threatening the Greek positions and borders in the north. The CPG resolutely opposed any territorial claim by any party against Greece. The preservation of territorial integrity was the first task of every Greek patriot! (126) This was why the CPG turned to England, whose presence and support was considered to be “Greece’s saving grace”. The XII Plenum Resolution also proclaimed England as Greece’s “great friend” (127) and after that, to the end, the English line was being implemented.

While cooperating with England and reconciling its internal plans domestically, the CPG was simultaneously working on plans to suppress and break the Macedonian national liberation movement in Greek occupied Macedonia...

Basically this was the general line followed by the CPG leadership while it was led by Nikos Zahariadis. And by doing so the Macedonian people’s fate was left in these “patriotic Greek” hands who, as mentioned above, had a single aim… get rid of the Macedonian liberation movement along with the Macedonian people. And that is exactly what happened in the end. And the fact that none of these Macedonians were allowed to return to their homes in Greek occupied Macedonia after the war was over, proves it.

This is what Leonidas Stringos, member of the Politburo, said:

“Had our Party decided, in the course of 1946-1947, to start an armed struggle, with a decisive mobilization policy to increase DAG’s military effectiveness, the issue of reserves, one of the most basic issues, would have been successfully resolved in a timely manner. But, in the meantime, Zahariadis told us that ‘our forces in Macedonia should not have more than two thousand fighters’…!” (128) This means that Zahariadis did not want the buildup of a strong Macedonian force in Greek occupied Macedonia. Why? When clearly such a force would have helped DAG’s military effectiveness!

This is what Panagiotis Mavromatis, member of the Central Committee and the Provincial Bureau for Macedonia-Thrace, said:

“After the II Plenum took place in February 1946, the Provincial Bureau informed Zahariadis that over 25,000 volunteer fighters could be mobilized within a month. To this Zahariadis replied: “There is no need, the entire idea of starting an armed conflict is only a bluff…!” (129)

DAG Headquarters:

A letter from DAG Headquarters was sent to the CPG Central Committee Politburo in January 1947, asking for people, military equipment and other materials, so that DAG could successfully oppose and break its opponents’ impending general offensive. The request was rejected saying that the CPG’s motivation was not to take power through an armed struggle... (130)

General Markos, Supreme Commander of DAG:

The period between 1946 and 1947 was most suitable for developing the armed struggle, even for taking power... Over almost the entire 1946, the CPG leadership showed apathy over the drama that ordinary members of the Party and former ELAS fighters had to experience at the hands of the Greek government. Then, when the issue of seizing power was raised by activists from field party committees in the first months of 1947, Zahariadis’s position was:

“We are not going to take power for the time being. We will see, maybe in 1948…!” During this time, the Party leadership kept insisting that the Party’s primary tasks were to solve economic problems and work on “symphiliosis” (reconciliation) issues. The ELAS fighters were forbidden from becoming partisans. And those who insisted, because they could no longer stomach the unbearable terror committed by the Monarcho-fascists against them, were called “cowards”, “suspicious people” and “provocateurs”! (131)

There were many such criticisms and accusations… The actions the CPG took, which worked against the Greek people’s revolutionary struggle, stemmed precisely from the CPG’s established general line of “democratic co-operation” with England and “reconciliation” with its opponent the domestic bourgeoisie. Even though the entire CPG leadership voted to adopt this line, the CPG leaders later voted to condemn only Zahariadis for it.

Now let us follow some other events:

In August 1948, Zahariadis appointed himself head of the high DAG military council. He became the highest authority in the DAG leadership. By his own appointment Zahariadis was able to seize General Markos’s authority as Supreme Commander. Later, in November of the same year, Markos was completely removed from DAG and excluded from the Politburo and the CPG Central Committee. This, according to Zahariadis, was done because... Markos was an opportunist… However, according to the flow of events and the logic behind them, the real cause for Marko’s removal was something else...

Markos was of the opinion that DAG should remain a mobile partisan army with fast maneuverability. This was most suitable for a small rebel army, such as DAG, if it wanted to achieve success against a more numerous and modern armed adversary. DAG units were in constant motion and had the ability to hit and run and deliver sudden and unexpected blows. With unexpected rapid concentrations the partisans were able create a favourable ratio of forces capable of attacking an enemy ten times larger in number and even achieve victories. As is well-known, the British lost their ability to finance and support the war effort in Greece but rather

than surrendering to the partisans they asked the Americans to intervene. With an injection of new American funds and assistance the Greek government was able to create new military divisions in the winter of 1948 and spring of 1949, modernizing the Greek army and expanding it to over three hundred thousand well-armed soldiers. But the problem they faced was that DAG was mobile and inaccessible. Every attack was futile because DAG was present everywhere but was nowhere to be found…!

Then the most incredible thing happened. Markos was removed from DAG and his other positions in the Party… with barely saving his own head…!

Contrary to Zahariadis’s wishes to maintain “friendly relations” with the English and to follow the line of “reconciliation” with the domestic bourgeoisie and with the government in Athens, which was set up by England, Markos allowed DAG to grow and, combined with the general strikes, demonstrations and street fighting in the various centres, kept fighting back against the establishment in Athens. If continued this would have inevitably led to the removal of the reactionaries from power. It was because of this that Zahariadis had Markos removed. Zahariadis, in his report during the CPG Central Committee’s XII Plenum, had long explored the possibility and need for England’s “friendly presence” in Greece, finding it to be necessary in order “to ensure that the Greek position and Greek borders in the north” were secure. An indispensable prerequisite for this was the reconciliation with the domestic bourgeoisie. DAG, born of intolerable terror, was actually not needed. On the contrary, its vigilant and numerical growth was very carefully monitored to make sure it never reached the critical point that would jeopardize England’s presence in Greece. And yet, after all that, it turned out to be quite insufficient. Years passed, Greek governments in Athens fell one after another, and England itself was still forced to “protect Greece”, even if it had to leave it in American hands. (132)

General Markos’s removal from DAG was an obvious and inescapable Anglo-American need...

After removing Markos from DAG command, Zahariadis stripped DAG of its maneuverability and its ability to conduct partisan warfare, which was DAG’s basic strength, and shackled DAG to the ground to take a frontal, stationary “defensive position”.

This was the beginning of the end for DAG and for the uprising in Greece in general. Zahariadis decided to change the game. Now DAG’s opponent knew at all times where DAG’s forces were and always had the initiative and the ability to attack them and, of course, it did attack them at every opportunity. The government forces were ten times larger and armed with the most modern arms which included aviation, heavy artillery, and tanks. They were fighting against a lightly armed stationary army without aviation, heavy artillery or tanks.

The results of this are well-known: DAG was beaten to pulp…

Shortly after DAG suffered a catastrophic defeat, one of the opposing generals said: The good Greek God (meaning the bourgeoisie in Greece) wanted Zahariadis to win over Markos…! Otherwise, today Greece (the bourgeoisie in Greece) would not exist…!

And that is true... But the question here is: was there an agent of the “good God”, i.e. the opponent in the CPG and DAG leaderships headed by Zahariadis…? We don’t know for sure but we will let history and time take care of that. As for now, it is not that important for us to know. Something else, however, is far more important: it was important that the opponent was allowed to break DAG and finally defeat the people’s revolution in Greece. There is no doubt that betrayal was involved... Why was Greece’s position and Greece’s northern border in danger? With help from NOF was Tito going to usurp Greek occupied Macedonia? (133) Why was there a general line established calling for the CPG’s “reconciliation” with the domestic bourgeoisie, its domestic enemy? Why did the CPG want to co-operate with England, its enemy, to solve Greek problems? Why was the armed struggle excluded as the main means in the CPG’s politics? And, was there really a need for an armed uprising? But for objective reasons, it was inevitable that DAG was going to happen but its ability to advance was hampered by lack of