INTRODUCTION - Part 05

There was one more safeguard added that is worth mentioning. IMRO now possessed the capacity to recall a rebellion by a 75% majority vote of its delegates. They could only be nominated from regional sub-committees within Macedonia; a safeguard that guaranteed there would be no more interference from Sofia and the Vrhovists. Defeated at the Rila Congress, the Right wing Vrhovists took up permanent residence in Sofia and continued to wage a terrorist war on the IMRO leadership. Both Nikola Karev, in 1905, and Dame Gruev, in 1906, were indirectly eliminated by terrorist acts of the Vrhovists. Bulgarian interference in Macedonia not only damaged the revolutionary movement but also put fear in the civilian population, ripening conditions for Balkan intervention. Greece and, later, Serbia were quick to take advantage of a weak IMRO and a frightened population. With the assistance of the Turkish military they were able to step up armed propaganda campaigns inside Macedonia. The aim was to kill two birds with one stone. By being the eyes and ears of the Turks, the Greek clergy spied on the Macedonians and disclosed information to Turkish authorities. The Turkish military in turn, stepped up activities to eradicate the remnants of the Cheti and their leaders. At the same time, in the midst of terror, the same Greek spies were offering Macedonians Hellenism as a way to salvation. "No one can deny that the Greeks owed much to the Turks. Indeed the victory of the Turks in 1903 was the salvation of Hellenism in Macedonia. From the outset the Greek clergy and notables devised means of passing information to the Turks. The Turkish authorities on their side welcomed this support" (pages 118, 119, Dakin, The Greek Struggle in Macedonia 1897-1913). The most notorious of the Greek clergy was the Metropolitan of Kostur, Archbishop Germanos Karavangelis. Karavangelis was sent to Macedonia by the Patriarch Constantine V who favoured the Athenian (the most nationalist) style of Hellenism and selected Karavangelis as the right man to do the job. Dakin portrays Karavangelis as a charismatic and capable figure of a man that is a credit to the human race (pages 119-127, The Greek Struggle in Macedonia 1897-1913). That, however, is far from the truth. Karavangelis was a ruthless killer and a disgrace to the Christian religion. Karavangelis was personally responsible for the assassination of hundreds of Macedonian patriots including priests, notables, teachers, and IMRO leaders. He was also personally responsible for Hellenizing hundreds of Macedonian villages, by force and by sheer terror. If you wish to know more about Karavangelis' terrorist actions in Macedonia read his biography (the original version) "Arheio Makedonikou Agona, Pinelopis Delta, Apomnimoneymata, Germanou Karavaggeli, Georgiou Dikonymou Makri, Panagioti Papatzanetea". Karavangelis' first priority after accepting the post as Metropolitan of Kostur was to raise an army. He couldn't import one, the Super Powers were watching, so he resorted to purchasing one. The most pliable and feeble-minded man who would sell his soul for gold was the self styled brigand Kote of Rula ("the darling of Athens"). Kote sold out his own people for Greek gold. From being the most revered Cheta leader, Kote became the most hated man in Macedonia. When Karavangelis decided who was to

die, Kote became the executioner. In addition to regular pay for murder, Kote and his band of no-goods received additional rewards of gold coins for turning in desired body parts from their victims. While Kote was doing the murdering in the Macedonian villages, Karavangelis, in person with Turkish escorts, was Hellenizing. Nothing and no one could stand in his way. Those who Karavangelis couldn't buy or bribe he had killed. "By containing and fragmenting the Internal Organization in Western Macedonia, Kota (Kote) and Karavangelis not only caused the projected rising to be continually postponed but they also caused it to be undertaken prematurely; and eventually they both contributed towards its defeat and failure. True, most of the recorded action (the arrests, searches and attacks on villages and bands) were carried out by the Turks, but the Turks nearly always acted on information supplied by Karavangelis or his agents. It was Karavangelis again who prevailed upon the Turks to attack Smardeshi (Smurdersh) on 9/22 May 1903" (page 132, Dakin, The Greek Struggle in Macedonia 1897-1913). "After the Ilinden rising of August 1903, it was Karavangelis who, escorted by 600 Turkish soldiers, visited the villages, celebrating mass, speaking to the villagers and calling upon them to surrender arms. The result was that even such strongholds as Aposkepos (Aposkep), Zagoritsani (Zagoricheni) and Gabresi (Gabresh), which only a few months before had declared themselves Exarchist, now returned to the Patriarchist fold. Without the support of the Turks, it is doubtful whether Karavangelis's work would have been successful. It is equally doubtful, however, whether but for the activities of the Patriarchist counter-movement, the Turkish authorities could have dealt such a decisive blow to the Internal Organization (IMRO)" (page 135, Dakin, The Greek Struggle in Macedonia 1897-1913). Even my own small village Oshchima didn't escape the hand of Karavangelis. It was a Sunday morning when Georgios Tsantos (Varda) and his gang came to Oshchima looking to murder Pop Giorgi Popov. On the way they ran into a young man named Yane Zhigerov who was taking his mule to pasture. It is unknown what transpired but the young man was found dead, with his throat cut. After killing Yane, Varda broke into Oshchima's, Svety Nikola, church and killed Pop Giorgi, by stabbing him multiple times. He then skinned the beard off his face and cut off his blessing finger. Varda was prepared to kill many more had it not been for the Oshchimian Cheta led by Bozhin Temov who drove Varda and his hoodlums out of Oshchima at gunpoint. Pop Giorgi Popov's beard and finger were delivered to Karavangelis in exchange for gold. With regards to Kote from Rula, greed was stronger than loyalty. Lazo Papatraikov, an usher at Kote's wedding and a man who twice saved Kote's life, was on Karavangelis's hit list. After a skirmish with the Turks in Mariovo, word was out that IMRO leader Lazo Papatraikov had received a wound on the head and was on the run. Kote caught up to him at Turtska Polena in Oshchima and after a long chat the two men said their good byes and Kote left. On his way to Zhelevo, Kote sent some Zhelevtsi to kill and decapitate Lazo. Lazo's head was taken to Karavangelis to collect the reward. Lazo's headless body was buried behind the altar in the Sveti Nikola Church in Oshchima. The ultimate disgrace for Karavangelis came after the massacre of the village Zagoricheni. Refusing to bend to Hellenism, Zagoricheni, on direct orders from Karavangelis, was massacred to the last person the Greeks could lay their hands on, including the unborn children inside the wombs of pregnant women. Witnesses reported finding bodies of pregnant women with their abdomens cut open. The survivors who escaped the atrocity refused to bury the dead bodies of their neighbours. For days the dead were guarded until the European consuls in Bitola came to witness the atrocities for themselves. Here is what Brailsford had to say.

"The chef d'oevre of this Hellenic campaign was achieved at Zagoricheni, a large Bulgarian village (author's note: Macedonian village, there were no Bulgarian villages inside Macedonia) near Klissoura, which, like Mokreni, took a leading part in the uprising of 1903, and like Mokreni was burned by the Turks. A Greek band, which is said to have numbered over two hundred men under three Greek officers in uniform, surprised it by night (April 6-7, 1905) by using bugle calls which led the villagers to suppose that Turkish regulars were manoeuvering in the neighbourhood. They burned ten houses, and twenty-eight of the temporary homes erected amid the ruins of the last conflagration. They wounded seven persons and killed no less than sixty, among them seven women, twenty-two persons over sixty years of age, and five children under fifteen. There was a good deal of

evidence to show that the local Turkish authorities were privy to this massacre, and some circumstances seemed to include the Archbishop of Castoria (Kostur). It is quite clear that no conflict or provocation preceded what was simply a deliberate massacre, and the only reason for choosing Zagoricheni was that it was an eager and patriotic Bulgarian center, and that it disobeyed the summons of the Greek Archbishop to return to the Patriarch fold" (pages 216-217, Macedonia its Races and their Future). After the massacre when it was discovered that Karavangelis was implicated, to escape punishment, the cowardly Archbishop of Kostur fled to Sveta Gora (Holy Mountain) where he spent two years in hiding before fleeing to Austria. Today, there is a statue of Karavangelis in Kostur to commemorate his great contributions to Hellenism. The Roumanie of Bucharest has published the text of a circular found by the Turks in some documents seized on the person of a Greek prisoner. It reads like a genuine Greek document, and its authenticity has not been questioned by the Greek organs. It is said to bear the seal of the Greek Committee. (Remember there were no Bulgarians or "Bulgars" in Macedonia). It read like this: "Brave defenders of Hellenism, I address you today in order to express the gratitude which the entire nation feels for all you have done and will yet do on behalf of the Fatherland. Continue the struggle against the Bulgarian assassins, and neglect no means of proving to the whole world that Macedonia is purely Greek. Exterminate the priests, the teachers, and the notables who compose the Bulgarian Committees. It is at length time to put in practice the saying: an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth. When it is a question of taking vengeance we must not spare the Bulgarians, even when they hide under the robes of a priest. Burn, shoot, assassinate, and purify the soil of Macedonia from all that is Exarchist. The Supreme Panhellenic Committee has decided to intensify the struggle by making use of your arms, O valiant combatants, and if for some time past the Committee has hardly seemed equal to the occasion, the reason is that official Greece hesitates. But what is official Greece to us, when we have the approbation of the whole Hellenic world? Forward, then, until you have wiped out the last Bulgarian in our Macedonia. Your names will be inscribed in letters of fire in the annals of the race. May Heaven grant that the day be near when the sun of Hellenism will shine on Macedonia; then there will be peace for us and for the Turks, with whom we stand on the best of terms. Let our motto be: Purge Macedonia of the Bulgars." I quote from M. Gaulis' admirable paper, La Macedoine (page 217, Brailsford, Macedonia its Races and their Future). Macedonians were well acquainted with the murderous activities of the Bulgarian Vrhovists whose new waves of terrorist bands began to penetrate the eastern borders of Macedonia in March of 1904. Fortunately, Yane Sandanski's forces were still in control of the Pirin district and more often than not, successfully repealed Bulgarian advances. In the west bands of young Turks, who deserted the army during the Ilinden rebellion, joined Albanian gangs, looting and killing indiscriminately. From the north Serbian bands began to penetrate Macedonian territory. By mid 1905, there were eleven bands numbering almost 100 men pillaging, murdering, razing entire villages, and wreaking their own special brand of terror. The most violent campaign was waged by the Greek terrorists who penetrated the south-central regions of Macedonia. By 1905 the Greeks imported a contingent of Cretans, a thousand-strong, reinforced by Turk deserters who roamed unhindered razing and slaughtering entire villages. By 1906, eight bands numbering over 400 men were operating in the Solun district alone and another twelve bands (600 men) around Bitola. Along with the intrusions of armed bands in Macedonia there reappeared the foreign schools and propaganda institutions directed by the Greek and Bulgarian churches.

The terrorist bands instilled fear in the Macedonian population and the churches were quick to take on the role of protector, setting the stage for the partitioning of Macedonia. Unfortunately for them, something else was brewing within Turkey, liberalism, headed by a small group of, European educated, young Turks.

Macedonia the Young Turk Uprising and the Balkan Wars of 1912-1913

The Murzsteg Reform Program was the last hope for the Super Powers to salvage the Ottoman Empire in Macedonia. While the Murzsteg Reform Program proved fruitless for the Macedonians, it raised hopes for Greece, Bulgaria, and Serbia. Item 3 of the Murzsteg Reform Program, which stated “as soon as the rebellion is put down, the Super Powers would demand an administrative reorganization of the Macedonian territory based on nationalities”, caught the eye of the Greek, Bulgarian, and Serbian protagonists. It was well known that there were no Greek, Bulgarian or Serbian nationalities living in Macedonia but that didn’t stop the new Balkan States from inventing them. The wheels of the protagonists were turning when they attempted to kill two birds with one stone by cleverly substituting “nationality” for “religious affiliation”. By the end of the 19th century, the Christian Millet of Ottoman Macedonia was already divided into two millets (the Greek Patriarchist Millet and the Bulgarian Exarchist Millet). First, since there was no Macedonian Millet there was no “governing body” to represent a Macedonian religious denomination. Second, since all Christians in Macedonia already belonged to one millet or another, it was easy to make “nationality” claims on behalf of “religious affiliation”. In modern terms, all Macedonians belonging to the Patriarchist fold were considered to be Greek by nationality. Similarly, all those Macedonians belonging to the Exarchist fold were considered to be Bulgarian by nationality. By introducing Serbian churches and schools, Serbia later used similar tactics to claim the existence of a Serbian nationality inside Macedonia. All Macedonians belonging to the Patriarchist church were given Greek or “Hellenized” names. Similarly, all Macedonians belonging to the Exarchist church were given Bulgarian names. In many instances brothers, born of the same parents, were given different last names because they happened to go to different churches. Their choice of church had nothing to do with loyalty to one faction or the other, but rather with the church’s location relative to home. Each brother attended the church nearest to his house as he had always done. The sad part was that now with every spoonful of religion came a dose of venomous propaganda. Brother was pitted against brother, one fighting for “Hellenism” and the other for “Bulgarism”. At the beginning of the Ilinden rebellion most Macedonian villages belonged to the Exarchate Church. With increased Greek activities through Karavangelis and others like him, however, the tide was turning. The Greek success was mainly due to the Turkish-Greek alliance and the Turkish militia’s assistance. The Macedonian people were frightened to a point of being willing to do anything to escape further punishment. The alliance, which gave the Greeks the upper hand, did not go unnoticed by the Bulgarians. British fears of a Turkish-Bulgarian war were alleviated when Bulgaria on April 8th, 1904 signed a peace agreement with Turkey. Bulgaria promised to reduce subversive actions in Macedonia in exchange for Turkish promises to implement the Murzsteg Reform Program and to extend it to the Endrene (Macedonian Dardanelles) region. Russia was not too happy about the agreement, especially since Bulgaria herself was beginning to make moves towards Endrene. Being of strategic importance, Russia was hoping to eventually annex Endrene for herself. The prospect of declining Bulgarian intrusions inside Macedonia was welcome news for Karavangelis. The Greeks could now import fighters from Crete, to fight the Macedonian Cheti, side by side with their Turkish allies without Bulgarian interference. Unfortunately, while they reduced military intrusions, the Bulgarians stepped up Exarchist activities creating stiff competition for the Greeks. The clergy on both sides were going after the same flock as both sides appointed themselves protectors and guardians of the people. In the eyes of the world, they became ambassadors of the Christian flock in Macedonia.

This competition to attract parishioners created friction between the opposing factions. Friction turned to violence in villages where both groups existed and fought for control over the village church. The Turks were indifferent to the squabbling due to its religious nature, and remained neutral in church disputes. When fights erupted, the Turks padlocked the church so neither group could use it. As competition for control of the village churches intensified so did brigand warfare. Local squabbling never went unnoticed and both Patriarchists and Exarchists sent their hatchet men to eliminate the so-called “troublemakers”. Many priests, teachers, notables, and community leaders lost their lives this way.

The Western Powers had little faith in the Turks and their old Ottoman conservative Islamic values but preferred the status quo maintained in Macedonia. There were two factors at play that hindered the Powers from taking action. The first was the lucrative Ottoman import-export markets upon which the Ottoman consumer was dependent for a variety of goods, and a moneymaking venture for the Western Capitalists which they did not want to lose. The second was the power struggle between the Super Powers themselves over Balkan domination. The Powers were locked in a diplomatic embrace where none could freely maneuver without upsetting the others. Each of the Super Powers knew that a sudden or massive shift in any one’s policies would result in an engagement that would involve all of them. No one wanted a “world war” on his hands. Britain, at one point, contemplated creating an autonomous Macedonia but knew that Russia and Austria would be against it. “It was fortunate for Greece at this juncture that Lansdowne’s plans foundered in a sea of European politics and that both Russia and Austria opposed Macedonian autonomy” (page 152, Dakin, The Greek Struggle in Macedonia 1897-1913). This is an important fact for ALL to know, which is contrary to “Greek propaganda”, that no Macedonians existed before 1945. Here is documented proof that a Macedonian nation did exist prior to the 19th century and came very close to achieving independence. The Ilinden rebellion was ALL about Macedonia and about Macedonians asserting their desire to live as equals in the world. The Super Powers, especially Britain and Russia, owe it to the Macedonian people to come clean and put an end to the incessant “Greek propaganda”. It no longer makes any sense to keep the Macedonian people from taking their rightful place in the world. They are certainly not a threat to anyone. Those who committed crimes against the Macedonian people and continue to deny their existence obviously have a problem. But why punish the victims, for being victims? The Western powers were not happy with the way Turkey was dealing with the reforms in Macedonia but at the same time they could not agree among themselves about finding a viable solution. The Ilinden uprising was a wakeup call to how urgently reforms were needed. “During the later part of the C19th new social forces had emerged within Turkey. Given the conditions of absolutism within the Empire, the emergence of liberalism seemed inevitable. This new creed took the form of political agitation, calling for a broad spectrum of reforms. It was headed by an embryonic Turkish bourgeoisie, and supported by an European-educated intelligentsia” (page 125, Radin, IMRO and the Macedonian Question). The Young Turk movement had been active for at least thirty years, ever since Turkish students were allowed to attend European schools on mass. Among other things, the Young Turks were in favour of granting self-government to Macedonia, Thrace, and Albania and believed that the Ottoman Empire could be salvaged via reforms. When the 1903 Ilinden rebellion started, many of these European educated students had already joined the ranks of the Turkish military as junior officers. The atrocities committed and the methods used in dealing with the rebels during the Ilinden aftermath, however, went against the principles of these young men and many deserted the Turkish army. Some joined roving Albanian bands in hopes of eliciting their assistance to form an opposition to the Sultan. Some attempted to establish contacts with IMRO, hoping that IMRO would join them to rise against the Sultan. By 1905, the Young Turks organized under the banner of “Union and Progress” and established themselves in Solun, away from the grasp of the Sultan in Tsari Grad (Constantinople). It was not too long before they gained some measure of control over the local Turkish army, especially in Macedonia. It was not difficult to convince soldiers serving in Macedonia that anything was better than killing and murdering women and children.

After observing the actions of the Young Turks, the IMRO leadership was convinced that it was better to work with them than against them. The Young Turks also offered self-government and significant agrarian reforms, if they gained power, which was attractive to most IMRO leaders. Dame Gruev and Nikola Karev were already dead, which left IMRO in the hands of Gjorce Petrov, who favoured a policy of urban-led insurrection. Popularity and the strength of the rebellion, however, lay in the hands of the legendary Yane Sandanski. He was in favour of supporting the Young Turk regime, especially their prospective agrarian reform programs.

The actions of the Young Turks did not go unnoticed by the Sultan who complained to the Super Powers but did not receive an immediate reaction. The coup d’etat did not materialize until “rising star” Enver Beg from Albania was summoned to Tsari Grad to receive a military promotion from the Sultan. Fearing it was an assassination attempt, Enver Beg and his followers fled to the mountains and called for the revolution to begin. The rebellion first materialized in the larger cities in the form of demonstrations. On June 22nd, 1908, Solun alone drew over 20,000 protesters. By July 3rd, the Young Turk officers took control of most of the Sultan’s forces and by July 22nd all of Macedonia was free. True to their word, the Young Turks released all political prisoners and began to work on reforms. Their first act was to send the Sultan an ultimatum to reinstate the 1876 Constitution. Being in no position to resist, Sultan Abdul Hamid II reluctantly obliged. As soon as the constitution was reinstated, amnesty was proclaimed for all those under arms, including the Cheti and all foreign bands. The Macedonians, Serbians, and Bulgarians took advantage of the amnesty, came down from the mountains and surrendered their arms. The Greeks who had the most to lose were at first hesitant but warmed up to the idea. They had dreams that they might reclaim their former glory in the Phanar. As it turned out, however, the Young Turks were very suspicious of the Greeks and watched them with caution. The Greek dream to rule from the Phanar did not materialize. In time, by deactivating and expelling armed bands, the Young Turk regime brought some stability to Macedonia. The Young Turk regime, headquartered in Solun, survived unobstructed for over six months. Then, with support from Yane Sandanki’s Cheta, the Young Turks attacked and successfully took Tsari Grad. Unfortunately, by now it was becoming evident that the Young Turk regime was too dependent on the Turkish establishment and bureaucracy for its survival. As a result, it had to subordinate most of its reform programs to safeguard its own power. In actual fact, after all this time in power, the Young Turk regime did very little to alleviate the social and economic problems in the Macedonian villages. To prompt the Young Turks to deliver on their promises, Sandanski had a plan of his own. He proposed that in exchange for IMRO’s help, the Young Turks were required to redistribute much needed land in favour of the poor (landless) Macedonians. Additionally, to ensure the land reforms were put in place according to agreements, Sandanski requested that he personally be given the task of organizing a peasant militia to supervise the implementation. Unfortunately, while Sandaski’s proposals were widely accepted by the Macedonian peasants, they attracted negative attention abroad. The first to complain were the Greeks as follows; “The consequences of Sandanski’s plan, as unfortunately confirmed by events, would be terrible (for us). Unless something else, like a war, or an agreement between the European Powers, settles the Macedonian question in our favour, it is my opinion that there can be no doubt that settlement of the agrarian question would create possibilities for the final settlement of the Macedonian question...” (page 127, Radin, IMRO and the Macedonian Question). Sandanski’s move for cooperation with the Young Turks was a radical departure from IMRO’s policies (seizure of power by revolutionary means). To take advantage of the new situation and stay on course, IMRO created an offshoot branch dubbed the “National (or Peoples’) Federative Party”(NFP). The NFP was officially launched in early 1909 and worked with (pressured) the Young Turk regime to develop a quasi-parliamentary system and to preserve the national and territorial integrity of Macedonia within an Ottoman Federation. By the time the NFP was organized and ready to deal with the issues at hand, the Young Turk regime was losing momentum and stagnating.

By now it was obvious to IMRO that without “grass roots” support from the Turkish establishment, the regime was fighting a losing battle. Its rise to power resulted from a coup and the regime itself was no more than a “dictatorship”. The Young Turk regime was a “Western backed idea”, an “alternate solution” to a problem with no end. The majority of IMRO leaders could no longer agree to provide continued support and were contemplating breaking off relations with the Young Turks. To make matters worse, a class struggle (socialism) was brewing in Europe causing unrest between the rich and poor; dividing people along class lines. The so-called “religious wars” between the Patriarchists and Exarchists were also having their effects, further dividing IMRO and the Macedonian people. By 1910, armed propaganda in Macedonia

was replaced by Greek, Bulgarian, and Serbian “Political Clubs” which continually worked against NFP agendas and the NFP leaders. While Russia was having mixed feelings about the Young Turk regime, the European powers, especially Britain who through intrigue created the regime, were relieved to be rid of the old reform programs. Britain approved of the cooperation between NFP and the Young Turks, which caused further fracturing between the NFP (who wanted to create an autonomous Macedonia inside an Ottoman Federation) and “grass roots” IMRO (who wanted independence by armed rebellion). Unfortunately, the Young Turk regime, with all its promises, did not meet expectations and reverted to the old Turkish way of rule. To stave off attempted coups by extremist factions, the Young Turk regime resorted to dictatorial rule in place of fostering liberal programs. This clampdown manifested itself in a number of repressive laws in Macedonia including the laws on strikes, political associations, and armed bands. This policy reversal again destabilized Macedonian society by bringing back the old oppressive political climate. The NFP and all other political, cultural, and professional organizations were effectively banned, forcing IMRO to go underground. The Macedonian people, in the meantime, were thrown back into anarchy and things went downhill from there. The Young Turk regime predicted its own demise. To save itself, between 1910 and 1911, it re-settled almost a quarter of a million Turks in Macedonia, hoping to maintain control of Macedonia if it was ejected from Tsari Grad. They faced several fronts, however, including the Albanian revolution in 1909-1912, the Italian-Turkish war in Libya in 1911, domestic opposition, the resurgence of armed bands, and finally the Sultan’s new loyal army. The Young Turk regime could no longer maintain a hold on power and on July 13, 1912, capitulated to the Sultan. In the meantime, the Super Powers were locked in a struggle of their own where none could maneuver without upsetting the delicate balance of the status quo. While the Super Powers were held in balance by their own political vices, the new Balkan nations were flexing their economic and military muscles. Alliances like the Serbian-Bulgarian league against Greek-Turkish collusion or the Greek-Romanian league against Bulgarian aims at Macedonia came and went. On the surface it seemed that everything was normal but deep inside a rift was developing. The rift became apparent when Russian-Austrian relations began to seriously cool. Dividing lines were drawn as Russia began to warm up to Britain and France while Austria began to warm up to Germany. Italy remained neutral for a while and took a few shots at Turkey but was prohibited (by the other powers) from attacking the centers of Turkish power. (It was through these campaigns that Italy occupied the Dodecanese). Even though Italy was restrained from further campaigns, it weakened Turkey enough for the three new Balkan States to consider campaigns of their own. Italy’s actions were also a sign of things to come and created an atmosphere of urgency for the new states to expedite their own plans for territorial annexation. Everyone wanted a piece of Macedonia but no one dared stick out his neck to get it. The three wolves of the Balkans, with Russian help, realized that each alone could not accomplish what the three could do together. They swallowed their pride, put their differences aside, and by the end of 1911 they started negotiations. As a way of preventing Austrian aspirations in the Balkans, Russia invited the idea of a Serbian-Bulgarian league. Russia hoped that, jointly, Serbia and Bulgaria would be able to withstand Austrian advances in Macedonia without her involvement. After getting them to agree to talk, Serbia and Bulgaria listed their terms but could not reach an agreement. Autonomy for Macedonia was one major issue of contention upon which they could not agree. While Sofia supported the idea of autonomy Belgrade opposed it.

Finally, for the sake of expediting the negotiations, all parties agreed that the “autonomy question” would be left separate and dealt with after the annexation of Macedonia. Russia made it clear to both parties that they couldn’t invade Macedonia without her permission and only if Turkey became a threat to the Christian population. In the meantime, Serbia was encouraged to take steps to annex Albania and Kosovo. A draft Serbian-Bulgarian agreement was reached and signed on March 13th, 1912. Included in the agreement was a crude delineation of prospective boundaries and

suggestions that the final boundaries might be settled by force of arms. The Russians also insisted that Tsar Nikolas II would arbitrate any disputes regarding the exact territorial limits. Even before the Serbian-Bulgarian agreement was finalized, Greece was already having discussions with Bulgaria about negotiating a Greek-Bulgarian agreement. The Greek-Bulgarian negotiations, like the Serbian-Bulgarian negotiations, were conducted in secret known only to the Greek King, Prime Minister Venizelos, and their negotiator “The Times” correspondent J. D. Bourchier, an old friend of Venizelos. Like the Serbs, the Greeks had always opposed the idea of Macedonian autonomy but the Bulgarians were unwilling to proceed until Greece agreed to the autonomy. The Greek-Bulgarian treaty was signed on May 30th 1912, both parties promising not to attack one another and to come to each other’s defense should Turkey attack them. The “Balkan League of Nations” was spawned in June 1912 and shortly after Turkey was given a signed ultimatum bearing the League’s signature, which in short, read “deliver the promised reforms in Macedonia or prepare to be invaded”. There was much intrigue, agreements, counter agreements, and secret deals between the League of Nations (Greece, Bulgaria, and Serbia) but from the outset each was determined to exploit any situation that developed, purely for its own gain. “The League of Nations in fact was simply a device for synchronizing a military effort upon the part of the four powers (Greece, Bulgaria, Serbia and Montenegro) who had come to realize that the simplest way to settle the Turkish question, before it was too late and while circumstances were favourable, was to attack Turkey simultaneously and present the European powers with a fait accompli” (page 440, Dakin, The Greek Struggle in Macedonia 1897-1913). All that remained now was to provoke Turkey into committing an offence against the Christian population and the invasion would become a reality. Using proven techniques of terrorism to prepare the battleground, Vrhovists, masquerading as IMRO agents, conducted many raids inside Macedonia murdering, raping, and plundering villages in hopes that the Macedonian bands would be blamed. When the Turks investigated the disturbances, both Patriarchist and Exarchist authorities corroborated their stories and pinned these acts on the Macedonians. As expected, the Turks responded swiftly and dealt with the situation in the usual manner. Unfortunately for the Turks, their actions were welcome news to the League’s spies who dispatched them to the European press. The Turks, in the eyes of the world, committed atrocities against the Christians in Macedonia and something had to be done. It was now up to the Super Powers to decide the course of action. Along with documents of Turkish atrocities, the foreign press was also receiving well-camouflaged League propaganda. The League had commenced extensive propaganda campaigns against the Turks, detailing every Turkish act for European consumption. A war was imminent but, according to the League’s propaganda, it was a necessary war to “liberate” the enslaved Christians from Turkish oppression. The League, through extensive media campaigns, called on all Christians in Macedonia to join the League and oust the oppressive Turk. Here is what Yane Sandanski had to say; “We ought to work on the awakening of the consciousness of the Macedonian masses that they are an independent nation...because those who seek to ‘liberate them’... will actually be coming to enslave them...” (page 134, Radin, IMRO and the Macedonian Question). As I mentioned earlier, the Western Powers had not exhausted the full potential of the Ottoman markets and were unwilling to let the Ottoman regime in Macedonia collapse. At the same time Britain, France, Italy, and Russia were greatly concerned about the aggressive attitudes of Germany outside of the Balkans. More importantly, they were concerned that the Turkish regime was leaning towards a Turkish-German alliance.

When Russia proposed the idea of a “Balkan League of Nations” it was welcome news for Britain, France, and Italy. The League was viewed as an anti-German front, a way of ejecting the Ottoman regime from Europe and at the same time, safeguarding (British, French, and Italian) interests and expansionary ambitions. The not so obvious Russian motive for sponsoring the League, was to guarantee its own influence in the Balkans perhaps through Serbia or Bulgaria or both.

On October 18th, 1912 Montenegro declared war on Turkey with the League following suit. The battles that ensued were fought almost entirely on Macedonian soil, once again causing the Macedonians to suffer from someone else’s war. Russia, the architect of the Balkan League was against a war in 1912 and so were France and Britain. A war at this point might throw off the delicate diplomatic balance and escalate into a “world war”. Russia feared that the half-millennium old Ottoman Empire might not be as easy a target as the League had estimated. Britain and France feared a backlash from Germany and Austria, now that Turkey was warming up to them as a prospective ally. To stop the League’s aggressive actions, both Britain and France threatened them with economic sanctions but that was not enough to suppress the appetites of the three hungry Balkan wolves. The League’s plan was to surround the Turkish army in Macedonia and force it out to Tsari Grad. To everyone’s surprise, however, the League won a crushing and unexpected victory in just six weeks. Five Ottoman divisions were surrounded and defeated in two battles, in Bitola and Kumanovo. With the exception of Sandanski and a force of 400 Macedonians who fought back and liberated Melnik and Nevrokop, the League received no opposition from the Macedonians. In fact, the enthusiasm created by the “liberators” not only helped the League fight harder but also encouraged thousands of Macedonians to enlist in the League’s armies. “A Macedonian Militia force of 14,000 fought under the Bulgarian command in the East. The ‘Volunteer regiment’, directed by IMRO veterans, consisted of a thousand Macedonians, Turks and Albanians. In the Serbian and Greek armies, Macedonian detachments such as the ‘National Guard’ and the ‘Holy Band’, were given the task of encircling the Turks to fight their retreat” (page 143, Radin, IMRO and the Macedonian Question). Even Chakalarov, the protector of the Lerin and Kostur regions, joined the fight to help the League get rid of the Turks. The League’s victories and intense propaganda were so convincing that the entire Macedonian nation welcomed the “liberators” with open arms. The moment the three wolves evicted the Turkish army from Macedonia, they quickly worked out a partitioning strategy along the following lines: Serbia was to receive the northwestern portion of Macedonia, which included Skopje, Bitola, south to west of Lerin, east to Gevgelija, and west to the Albanian Mountains. Bulgaria was to receive all of Thrace, west to Gevgelija, south to the Aegean Sea, and east from Solun. Greece was to receive north to Lerin, west to the Albanian Mountains, all of Epirus, and east to Solun. “To ensure their hegemony and quell any dissent, the occupying forces set up the apparatus of government and, by legislative decrees, extended their own constitutions to these new bodies, from which Macedonians were absent. Indeed, in many provincial centres, such as Gevgelija, a double or triple condominium was established, much to the detriment of the Macedonian citizens” (page 143, Radin, IMRO and the Macedonian Question). In view of the Macedonian contribution to the League’s success in evicting the Turks, in December 12th, 1912, Sandanski called for Macedonian autonomy. The League’s occupying armies, however, refused to budge and initiated a violent assimilation program. The Macedonian fighters, who fought side by side with the League’s armies, found themselves policed by a joint League command ensuring that no resistance or independent action would arise. The League also pursued Sandanski and his men. Sandanski resisted and stayed active in the Pirin Region until his assassination in 1915 by Bulgarian agents. The changing conditions inside Macedonia forced the IMRO leadership to seek refuge in foreign cities away from home. Some of the more prominent leaders moved to St. Petersburg and joined the Macedonian community living there. This small group of Macedonians consistently lobbied for Macedonian Statehood and, in the war’s aftermath, acted as a government in exile.

The most outspoken advocate of the Macedonian leaders was Dimitar Chupovski who published the “Macedonian Voice” and continuously protested to the Super Powers against Macedonia’s partition. In June 1913 he wrote; “The division of Macedonia among the brother nations is the most unjust act in the history of these nations – it is trampling on the rights of man, and a disgrace for the entire Slav race” (page 145, Radin, IMRO and the