Part II - Part 03

Fotev does not agree with what Dr. Risto Kiriazovski wrote about the Tsrnovishte meeting. Fotev does not agree that the meeting was a debate about the Macedonian National Question, Macedonia’s fate in the war, Naum Peiov’s participation, the Kostur District SNOF leadership and, especially, Naum Peoiv and the SNOF leadership which, according to Kiriazovski, persistently advocated that Greece should be organized under a federal principle composed of two federal republics; the People’s Republic of Greece and the People’s Republic of Aegean Macedonia. This, according to Kiriazovski, was possible and could have been accomplished had the SNOF leadership officially requested it because it was desired by the Macedonian people. This is what Fotev wrote about that: “What Kiriazovski is saying is absurd and unprecedented! The meeting in Tsrnovishte was not about Macedonia’s fate and not about discussing the Macedonian National Question. It was about

maintaining regular contact between the SNOF district administrations and about mutually informing each other on the status of the organizations and on the situation of the Macedonian people and their problems... A great and important issue, such as the creation of a People’ Republic of Aegean Macedonia, could not be, or be expected to achieve only at the good will of the CPG, because it did not depend exclusively on the CPG but on the entire organizational coalition including EAM and ELAS, as well as on the readiness of all progressive forces, the Greek people and even on the international factors, especially the anti-fascist allied and anti-Hitler coalition, which were directly interested in the future of Greece.” Regarding the claim that the leaders Mihailo Keramitchiev and Naum Peiov participated in the meeting, Fotev wrote: “That is a lie! Mihailo Keramitchiev was never a managing asset of SNOF. Keramitchiev became a participant of the PLM in Greek occupied Macedonia in February 1944; from 1941 to September 1943 he was living in Bulgaria, in Sofia. He returned to his native village Gabresh in October 1943 after Italy capitulated. In February 1944 he joined the ELAS reserves. Naum Peiov was not part of the SNOF District leadership. He became a SNOF activist for the first time during the 1st Conference held on April 12 and 13, 1944, and was appointed in charge of SNOF in Koreshtata sub-Region in Kostur Region.” (M. Fotev, views and notes, p. 27-28.)

After the Tsrnovishte meeting, SNOF intensified its activities in order to strengthen the organization with new fighters within ELAS and to reinforce the fight against the German and Bulgarian occupiers. (M. Fotev, about the counter-bands, p. 45.) Because there was no unique Macedonian national organization at that time, there were no requests made to have independent Macedonian partisan units. Fotev does not agree with claims made by Dr. Risto Kiriazovski who asserted that a “Slavo-Macedonian National Liberation Army (SNOV) was formed under SNOF’s initiative and with CPG consent, and that these unique military units were formed in the beginning of 1944 on Mount Vicho. According to Fotev: “No such decision was made to form SNOF armed forces, nor were they formed on Mount Vicho.” (M. Fotev, views and notes, p. 27.)

Very early in 1944, the partisans of ELAS in Kostur Region intensified their actions and on January 6, 1944 attacked the German

garrison and counter-bands in Rupishsta. Then, on January 11, 1944, they attacked the counter-bands in Dobrolishta and Chetirok, and on March 25, 1944 they attacked the counter-bands in the villages Izglebi and Gorentsi, all in Kostur Region. (Ibid, p. 53.)

In early April 1944 German forces in Kostur and Lerin Regions, along with pro-Bulgarian armed formations, began a spring offensive to break up the partisan units around Mount Vicho and in the wider area. Their advance, however, was prevented and they were forced to withdraw to their bases. On April 5, 1944 the partisans ambushed a motorized German unit near the village Klisura, in Dauli vicinity, killing 25 German soldiers. Upon the arrival of reinforcements from the village Sorovich, the same day, the Germans attacked the village Klisura. Klisura was then populated with Macedonians and Vlachs who were massively organized in the PLM. The Germans set the village on fire. Out of the 215 houses, they burned down to the ground 180 houses and slaughtered 285 inhabitants, men, women, children and old people. (M. Fotev, about the counter-bands, p. 53.) On April 12 and May 4, 1944 the Kostur and Lerin Region German units, along with about 200 counter-bandits, again attacked the partisan positions around Mount Vicho. The attacks were repulsed both times. During the battles the Germans and counter-bandits experienced heavy losses with 6 killed and 25 wounded. (Ibid, p. 53.)

The SNOF 2nd Conference was held on April 2, 1944 in the village D’mbeni, Kostur Region, during which Paskal Mitrevski was again elected Secretary. (M. Fotev, about the counter-bands, p. 45, views and notes, p. 26-27.) SNOF gave itself priority to expand its forces in all districts of Greek occupied Macedonia. As a national revolutionary organization it also took it upon itself to act as the sole legitimate representative of the Macedonian people and as an equal to EAM, the anti-fascist coalition. This was the only way the Macedonian people in Greek occupied Macedonia felt they could become equal to the Greek people. (M. Fotev, about the counter-bands, p. 47.) The Macedonian national organization in Greek occupied Macedonia requested that only the CPG should be allowed to act in Greek occupied Macedonia and that all other Greek anti-fascist organizations, in which Macedonians were members, be dissolved. SNOF requested that all Macedonians be united and

organized under SNOF and that SNOF be recognized as a Macedonian national organization by EAM and ELAS. (Ibid, p. 47.)

The CPG’s response to the SNOF demands was the dissolution of SNOF in April 1944. (Ibid, p. 60.) The CPG leadership not only prevented SNOF from becoming an independent Macedonian political organization but killed its activities that aided the liberation movement of the Macedonian people in Greek occupied Macedonia. This was done at a time when the Macedonian army in the Republic of Macedonia was liberating most of the country and preparing for the convening body that was to constitute the Macedonian national state, which was made official at the end of November 1943 at the Second Session of AVNOJ, held in Iaitse on November 29 and 30, 1943, by declaring and creating a federal Yugoslavia with Macedonia as a founding member of the federation.

The Macedonian revolutionaries, the Macedonian communists, the Macedonian CPG cadres, the SNOF leadership… all accepted and implemented the decision made by the Greek Party leadership to end SNOF. They all accepted this, even though they all knew that this was an anti-Macedonian political act essentially committed by the Communist Party of Greece. The Macedonian fighters and the Macedonian people, however, trusted the Macedonian communists and expected from them the realization of their national and human rights, as equal to the Greek people, after the occupiers were driven out. Unfortunately, that never happened.

On May 14, 1944 the partisans attacked the counter-band detachment in the village Prekopana, Lerin Region. While the attack was taking place, German and counter-band reinforcements arrived from the neighbouring villages Chereshnitsa and Olishta. After a two-hour battle with superior enemy forces, the partisans retreated. Six partisans were killed and five wounded. (M. Fotev, about the counter-bands, p. 53.) At the end of May 1944 the German units withdrew from their positions in the cities in western Greek occupied Macedonia. On May 24, 1944 the Germans left Kostur and Rupishsta. As they were leaving they left the pro-Bulgarian counter-bands to defend their positions and those in the nearby villages. But as soon as the Germans left, units of the XXVIII ELAS Regiment attacked Kostur, Rupishta, as well as the villages Maniak, Tikveni

and Chetirok. Just as the attacks began, 50 counter-bandits retreated and through Lerin Region fled to Bulgaria. The others threw away their arms and ammunition and hid. Seventy-three were later captured. (Ibid, p. 53-54.) Included among those captured were two dangerous criminals, Risto Naskovski from the village Ezerets, Kostur Region, and Dime Kiosev from the village Maniak, Kostur Region. Included among those counter-bandits who were shot while attempting to escape was Nikola Shestevarov also known as Bai Kolio. (M. Fotev, about the counter-bands, p. 54.) Two other dangerous criminals were tried in the partisan court, condemned to death and executed. (Ibid, p. 54.)

Despite all the brutality inflicted on the Macedonian people by the occupiers and their quislings, they massively participated in the armed anti-fascist struggle with enthusiasm and faith. There was also a strong desire for the creation of independent Macedonian units. One part of the Macedonian partisan units left and decided to merge with the units of the Macedonian Army in the Republic of Macedonia. In May 1944 a larger group of Macedonian partisans and ELAS fighters, along with some behind the scenes activists in Kostur and Lerin Regions, led by Atanas Koroveshovski, broke away from ELAS, crossed over the Yugoslav border and joined the NLM units in the Republic of Macedonia. They joined the Macedonian partisan units on Mount Karaorman where they formed a battalion consisting of fighters from Greek occupied Macedonia. But shortly thereafter, towards the end of July 1944, they were sent back to Greek occupied Macedonia. (M. Fotev, about the counter-bands, p. 56.)

On May 28, 1944 German tanks attacked Kostur and Rupishsta, forcing the partisans to retreat. They arrested Luka Damianov, a leading figure of the pro-Bulgarian movement in Kostur Region, and shot him near the village Gorentsi as the main culprit for Kostur falling into the hands of the partisans. (M. Fotev, about the counter-bands, p. 54.) After Luka Damianov was liquidated, the pro-Bulgarian movement became disorganized. After the Germans withdrew from the cities, the partisans continued with their attacks on enemy positions. On May 24 to 28, 1944, during the last battles in the region, the occupying forces, the pro-Bulgarian counter-bands and the quisling Greek gendarmerie acquired many casualties with

211 killed, 114 wounded and 320, mostly counter-bandits, captured or surrendered to the partisans. (Ibid, p. 54.) Soon ELAS took control of all of the western part of Greek occupied Macedonia and its major road traffic along the Solun-Lerin-Bitola, Kozhani-Lerin and Kaliari-Bitola roads, and the Solun-Lerin-Bitola train line which were vital escape routes for the withdrawal of the German units heading north.

To establish control over the roads, German command initiated a major offensive which lasted from July 3 to July 22, 1944, inloving an armed force of 12,000 and 3,000 quisling Greek government gendarmes, PAO units, Albanian Balists and whatever remained of the Pro-Bulgarian counter-bands. The July offensive was fierce with heavy casualties on both sides. The Germans and their quislings lost about 750, killed and wounded, and the partisans lost about 200 fighters. The offensive was halted on July 22, 1944 and the German forces and their quislings retreated back to their bases. (M. Fotev, about the counter-bands, p 54-55.) During this whole time the partisans received mass support and comprehensive assistance from the population, which sacrificed a great deal for the success of its liberation. During their military activities and particularly during their withdrawal, the occupying forces committed many crimes and devastated many settlements, mostly Macedonian. According to data collected by XXVIII ELAS Regiment Headquarters, provided to us by Fotev, 4,449 houses were burned down, 5,483 barns and other facilities for housing sheep and cattle were destroyed, 53 primary schools and 25 churches were wrecked, 161 people were killed, 427 men and women were arrested, 840 sheep and cattle were killed and 3, 497 cattle and 27,755 sheep and goats were stolen. (Ibid, p. 55.)

The CPG’s position on SNOF in the context of the pro-Bulgarian political movement

The Communist Party of Greece, as well as all the Greek civil parties, for the sake of preserving Greece and Greek interests, has governed against the existence of a Macedonia and of Macedonians in Greece. Every policy the CPG enacted has been contrary to Macedonian interests. The CPG never acknowledged the existence of the Macedonian nation, but only as “Slavophone” Greeks. Even though the Macedonian people massively participated in the joint

armed struggle with the Greek people against the fascist invaders, and sacrificed themselves in doing so, the CPG leadership still disbanded SNOF. It disbanded it in order to prevent it from becoming an independent Macedonian organization leading the Macedonian national liberation movement. The CPG leadership never trusted the Macedonian communists and fighters, even though they proved themselves to be capable and trusted allies in the armed struggle. The CPG never belied that the Macedonians would pledge allegiance to the Party and be loyal to Greece. From the beginning of the armed struggle against the fascist occupiers in Greek occupied Macedonia, the CPG always appointed Greeks in the Party leadership, in EAM, in the leadership of OKNE, the Party’s youth organization, and so on. The CPG always appointed Greeks even if they were former officials of the Greek regime and the Greek gendarmes and fascists. Following EAM’s establishment, Theodoros Mariolis-Lefteros, a Greek, was appointed EAM Regional Committee First Secretary even though he was a former sergeant of the dreaded Greek gendarmerie. Mihalis, another Greek, was appointed Regional Committee First Secretary of the Union of Communist Youth (OKNE), even though he was a former policeman. Georgios Venetios was appointed CPG Regional Committee Secretary of a three-member Secretariat in Kostur Region even though he was a local official of the Metaxas dictatorial regime and organizer of the fascist youth organization EON. Venetios joined EAM in April 1943. (M. Fotev about the counter-bands, p. 62.) Antonis Dilianis, an immigrant from Turkey, who after the occupation was employed as a teacher in the Macedonian village Ludovo, Kostur Region, was an agent of the Greek anti-Macedonian terrorist organization PAO. Dilianis was recruited into EAM in January 1943, and in March, 1943 he was appointed EAM Regional Committee Secretary. Dilianis falsely accused three Macedonian patriots from Ludovo of being associates of the “Macedono-Bulgarian Committee” movement; they were Vangel Peni, Kosta Dimou and Giorgi Bodov. At his insistence the CPG Regional Committee had them sentenced to death and killed. By order of the same CPG Regional Committee all possessions and movable property of the families of those killed, including their livestock, were confiscated. After almost a year of being an EAM official Dilianis, in March 1944, simply left EAM and returned to again work for PAO. (M. Fotev, about the counter-bands, p. 62-63.)

It was no different with ELAS military appointments in Greek occupied Macedonia. As it did with Party organizational appointments, the CPG did with military appointments in ELAS. Instead of appointing Macedonians to lead the Macedonian dominated units, the CPG appointed Greeks, even if they were fascists and enemies of the communists. The CPG appointed former officers of the Greek army and the Greek police and active members of the quisling Greek government to lead ELAS units. In early March 1943, appointed in the first Kostur detachment were Kirtsidakis, a Greek from Crete, as reserve lieutenant and head of market inspection in Kostur Region, Kosta Zizis, a Greek from the Peloponnesus, as reserve lieutenant serving in the prefecture in Kostur, Mandaropoulos, active Master Sergeant of the quisling Greek gendarmerie, and Pashalis Baskakis, active Master Sergeant in the quisling Greek police, who served in the Metaxas dictatorial regime from 1936 to 1940. Baskakis was also a police chief in Rupishsta and Chetirok, Kostur Region, and was responsible for persecuting and cruelly torturing Macedonian patriots and communists. All of these Greeks who joined the first partisan detachment were active participants in the services of the quisling Greek government. There were others too who joined the first partisan detachment, including Theodoros Efremidis, reserve lieutenant of the Greek army, and Nikos Papathanasiou, also a reserve lieutenant and a known nationalist and Greek police collaborator. (Ibid, p. 63.) After they joined the partisan units they were all appointed officers and given command duties. According to Fotev: “The CPG Regional Committee, EAM and ELAS partisan headquarters in Kostur Region welcomed these Greeks into the partisan ranks without doing identity checks or checking their intentions as to why they desired to enter the ranks of ELAS. They were appointed without due attention as to how they would be received by the fighters and the people in Kostur Region who knew who they were, who knew their origin and their past. They, immediately without hesitation, appointed them officers and entrusted them with command duties.” (M. Fotev, about the counter-bands, p. 63.) But in no time at all they showed their true intentions. They were there to basically disrupt and break down the partisan movement. Papathanassiou, who commanded a partisan detachment of 70 partisans, dissolved it and then deserted. Other officers also

deserted and later led armed Greek anti-Macedonian terrorist gangs belonging to PAO. Kirtsidakis and a group of Greek officers took up residence in the village Zabardeni, at the time exclusively inhabited by colonists and settlers from Asia Minor, and founded a terrorist gang of about 40 Greek counter-bandits. On April 5, 1943, in an insidious way, they captured and disarmed a group of Macedonian partisans who entered the village. Included among the captured Macedonian partisans were Tomo Changov, Sterio Mavpandza and Taki Popdimitrovski. (M. Fotev, about the counter-bands, p. 63.) On April 9, 1943 armed members of PAO, in an ambush near the village Imeri, Kozhani Region, captured the partisan leaders Lazo Trpovski and Kerasidis Simos and liquidated them in a cruel manner. (Ibid, p. 64.) The same day ELAS partisans broke up the PAO band in Zabardeni and captured the deserters Kirtsidakis, Mandaropoulos and Efremidis, mentioned earlier, then tried them in the partisan court and sentenced them to death by firing squad. (Ibid, p. 63-64.)

Even after all these incidents, the CPG and ELAS leaderships still did not take necessary measures to clean up these Greeks and enemy agents who had infiltrated the partisan movement. On the contrary, all these “nationalist” and well-known “royalist” military and police officers were purposely given “command positions in ELAS”. (Ibid, p. 64.) Included among these Greek officers were General Dimaratos, Commander of IX ELAS Division, Lieutenant Colonel Moskovitis, Commander of LIII Regiment, and Major Lazaridis, Commander of XXVIII Regiment. About 70% of the commanders and officers in ELAS IX Division, which operated in western Greek occupied Macedonia, were former Greek army personnel. (M. Fotev, about the counter-bands, p. 64.) Unfortunately there was no room to promote proven Macedonian revolutionaries and fighters into senior command positions in the ELAS partisan units. According to Fotev: “The ELAS command structure was not created that way because there was an ‘absence of revolutionary vigilance’ in the CPG and ELAS leaderships, but essentially because that is how the structure was purposely designed and implemented to serve the Greek policies in Greek occupied Macedonia.”

This CPG policy was incorporated into official party documents and was essentially anti-Macedonian. In its January 1942 CPG Central

Committee Plenum, the Party decided to treat the Macedonian people as a “Slavophone minority” so as not to let them fall under the influence of Bulgarian demagogy. According to Fotev: “Here is the kind of attitude the CPG Central Committee took during its 8th Plenum in January 1942: ‘Our party has to develop all its activities to teach the national minorities, especially the ‘Slavophone’ Macedonians to avoid being seduced by hatred because of national oppression, Greek capitalist demagogy and the current occupiers, particularly the Bulgarian imperialists who are satellites of Hitler and Mussolini’...” (Ibid, 58-59.) Fotev evaluated the above CPG paragraph as a “national insult to the Macedonian people” in Greek occupied Macedonia who, under CPG leadership, massively participated in the armed anti-fascist struggle and proved to the CPG that they wanted the German-Italian-Bulgarian occupation to end. But instead of ending their occupation, the CPG “moved them from the current occupiers back to the slavery of the Greek monarchic regimes, another more lasting and more difficult occupier.” (Ibid, p. 64.) The Macedonian nation was and remains true to its revolutionary traditions, always struggling against all oppressors, and there was no danger of the Macedonian people partnering themselves with the occupiers, “a fact that the CPG leadership should have known well.” (Ibid, p. 59.) The CPG should also have known that, from the date of its existence, more than 50% of the Macedonian people in Greek occupied Macedonia not only had joined it but were most active, particularly in the OKNE youth organization and in other CPG youth organizations. (Ibid, p. 59.) According to Fotev, the CPG leadership’s attitude and anti-Macedonian policies were deliberate because the Macedonian people never gave the CPG a reason not to trust them. Fotev earlier said that the CPG preferred to have Greek fascists in leadership positions over Macedonians. The CPG, EAM, EPON and other socialist organizations always appointed Greeks over Macedonians into their leading positions in the anti-fascist movement but, according to Fotev, they also appointed pro-Bulgarian elements, some by force, because of circumstances connected with the revolutionary events of the time. It had been known that some of these appointees, “still in 1941 had embraced the Great Bulgarian policy on the Macedonian Question and directly or indirectly helped the pro-Bulgarian movement in Greek occupied Macedonia”. (M. Fotev, about the counter-bands, p. 65.) Those appointments were

transparent and essentially meaningless and without justification. By doing this, according to Fotev, the CPG had aims to employ these “former activists of the pro-Bulgarian movement” to influence the debauched movement and have it disbanded”. (Ibid.) Mincho Fotev calls these CPG leadership methods “faulty, impulsive and reckless with long-term consequences...” (Ibid, p. 58 and 65.)

The CPG information blockade

The CPG leadership established and maintained a complete informational blockade against the Macedonian people in Greek occupied Macedonia, particularly against the Macedonian ELAS partisans, about events in the other parts of Macedonia. The local newspapers, newsletters and other media did not write or transmit information from other mediums regarding the course of events, especially about the victorious end of the people’s liberation war in the Republic of Macedonia. The first time the Macedonian people heard about this was towards the end of 1943 and early 1944. This information was obtained directly from the Macedonian army units traveling through the territory of Greek occupied Macedonia. (M. Fotev, about the counter-bands, p. 66-67.) After that the information blockade continued to be rigorously enforced. Party newspapers did not publish any information about the ASNOM meeting held on August 2, 1944, and about the drafting of the Macedonian national state constitution and the Republic of Macedonia being an equal founding member of the Yugoslav federation. (M. Fotev, about the counter-bands, p. 66.)

Just then the CPG leadership decided to indiscriminately and massively fill the Party with people who had alien, communist political and ideological beliefs. The CPG began to accept “former gendarmes, Greek counter-bandits, pro-Bulgarian counter-bandits, active members and officials from the Greek fascist organizations who served Metaxas during his dictatorship (1936-1940), black marketers who operated during the occupation (1941-1943) and others. There was no one who was anti-Macedonian, who came knocking on its doors, that the CPG turned away. The CPG filled all its higher party forums and key functions in ELAS, EAM, EPON, etc., with anti-Macedonians without considering the consequences.” (Ibid, p. 66.) With such a composition in its grassroots

organizations, the CPG lost its vanguard role but won a position as the leading political force in Greece during the anti-fascist struggle although, according to data presented at the 7th Congress, held in October 1945, the CPG had 450,000 Party members but without the young EPON communists. (Fotev, about the counter-bands, p. 66.)

For the CPG and EAM there was no Macedonian Question existing in Greece. During the entire anti-fascist armed struggle these organizations, through a wide network of bodies, agitation and propaganda, by media means including newspapers, newsletters and other media, promoted Greek only policies. The CPG, EAM and EPON agitation and propaganda departments, through their ELAS brigades and divisions, especially in Greek occupied Macedonia, by all possible means, through newsletters, brochures, flyers and other means, conducted their systematic and intensive propaganda campaigns by calling the armed liberation struggle against the fascist occupiers “a Greek revolution” associated with Greece’s past; with the legendary exploits of the Greek rebel armies in battles against the Turks in 1821, the struggles of the Greek people, especially the working class against anti-people bourgeois regimes fighting for democratic political and social rights…” (Ibid, p. 67.) Every combat action and partisan demonstration of bravery against the occupiers was equated to a staged major Greek historical event. Even attacks against the pro-Bulgarian counter-bands were celebrated as events of the Greek national revolutionary past. (Ibid, p. 67.) In their daily exploits, ELAS units sang songs about Greek heroes the likes of Theodoros Kolokotronis, Rigas Ferraios, Karaiskakis, Athanasios Diakos and others. (Ibid, p. 68.) No ELAS fighter was allowed to mention or sing about the Macedonian people’s national revolutionary traditions. No one was allowed to even mention the Macedonian revolutionary giants like Gotse Delchev, Dame Gruev, Iane Sandanski or any other Ilinden uprising heroes. They were not even allowed to think about the historical battles and the heroic feats of the glorious Ilinden Uprising; Macedonian fighters charging against the Turkish army in Neveska, Klisura, etc., fighting for their national and social rights. No one was allowed to mention that the majority of the partisans in ELAS were Macedonians, even though some of the ELAS fighters were also “Ilinden fighters”. (Ibid, p. 67.) The CPG leadership purposely and systematically ignored the Macedonian people.

During the second half of 1943, by CPG directive, ELAS brigade and division Headquarters was instructed to form EPON youth detachments responsible for implementing cultural and artistic theater and choral programs and activities. Cultural events and staged dramas about the struggles of the Greek people, along with Greek revolutionary songs, Greek national poetry and Greek folk dances, were organized to appear in as many settlements in Greek occupied Macedonia as possible. Nothing Macedonian was ever mentioned… (Ibid, p. 68.) In September 1943 the CPG leadership opened Greek elementary schools in the areas under ELAS control in the western part of Greek occupied Macedonia, so that Macedonian children would be taught Greek. (Ibid.) The Macedonian people, including the Macedonian veterans of the liberation war, protested bitterly. (Ibid.)

The CPG openly denied the Macedonian people’s most elementary rights by not only robbing the Macedonian children of learning their mother tongue, but by forcing them to learn the language of their Greek occupier. This was done especially after the Macedonian people heroically fought side by side with the Greek people in their common struggle against the German, Italian and Bulgarian occupiers and their national traitors. (Ibid.) The CPG, through its deeds, proved that it never wanted to recognize the Macedonian people in Greek occupied Macedonia as a nation or as a national minority. It proved that it only supported, implemented and adopted a policy of integration and assimilation. It also proved that it refused to acknowledge the existence of the unresolved Macedonian National Question in Greece.

The CPG’s refusal to accept the existence of a “Macedonian Question” was made very clear by Leonidas Stringos, CPG Regional Committee Secretary for Greek occupied Macedonia and Thrace, during the District Plenary meeting in May 1944, held in the village Zhupan. Stringos stated that: “There is no Macedonian National Question for the CPG.” He proved his point by making reference to the demographic changes in Greek occupied Macedonia which now, he said, hold true that 90% of the population living in Greek occupied Macedonia is Greek. (M. Fotev, developments through NOF, p. 11.) According to Stringos and the CPG, Greek occupied

Macedonia was now an “integral part of Greece”. (M. Fotev, developments through NOF, p. 11). Stringos did not hesitate to also mention that the Party was “wrong” in agreeing to establish SNOF and that, as soon as it realized it had made a mistake, it corrected it with SNOF’s dissolution. Stringos said: “We made a big mistake by allowing the creation of SNOF, it was our fault which we duly observed by disbanding it...” (M. Fotev, developments through NOF, p. 11.)

Fotev, however, has a different explanation as to why the CPG disbanded SNOF. According to one of the CPG leaders, who explained this to Fotev, SNOF was dissolved because of inconsistencies and opportunism. According to Fotev: “Objectively speaking, SNOF was dissolved in 1944, but not as Stringos had claimed. It was dissolved because of CPG leadership inconsistencies and as an expression of the opportunistic and chauvinistic Greek attitude towards the Macedonian National Question.” (M. Fotev, developments, p. 11.) But in reality it was done for exactly the same reasons as mentioned by Stringos; to rob the Macedonian people of their “national equality”. According to Fotev this view was taken in the all-Greek CPG December 1942 Conference during which the CPG Regional Committee staff and officials, for Greek occupied Macedonia and Thrace, “preached to the Macedonian people that all Macedonians will receive equality and will live free in Greece after they achieve victory over the fascist axis…” (M. Fotev, about the counter-bands, p. 69.) Of course this was only done to attract the Macedonian people into the conflict in order for the Greeks to achieve their own political aims. (M. Fotev, about the counter-bands, p. 69). Senior CPG, EAM and ELAS officials held the view that there were no Macedonians in Greek occupied Macedonia, but only “Slavophone” Greeks. In fact Stefanos Sarafis, Supreme Commander of ELAS, and Evripidis Bardzis, Commander of the ELAS divisions in Greek occupied Macedonia, called the Macedonian fighters in ELAS “Slavophones”. (M. Fotev, development through NOF, p. 11.) Because of that, according to Fotev, the CPG, EAM and ELAS did not regard the Macedonians as an ethnic group. According to Fotev: “The CPG and EAM leaderships treated the Macedonian people, in Greek occupied Macedonia, only as a ‘Slavophone’ linguistic group, similar to the

Vlachs, Roma, Armenians and Jews living in Greece.” (M. Fotev, developments through NOF, p. 11.)

According to Fotev, a lot of the blame for this should be placed on the leading Macedonian revolutionaries and CPG officials, the likes of Lazo Trpovski, Atanas Karadzha, Petro Pilaev, Trifun Hadzhiianev, Trpe Kalimanovski and others, who showed no determination to protest SNOF’s violent dissolution. By CPG and EAM decision, in May 1944, an ELAS unit, commanded by Aristotelis Huturas-Arianos, “in the most brutal manner”, arrested the SNOF District leadership in Kostur Region. (M. Fotev, about the counter-bands, p. 71.) To show his loyalty to the CPG, Lazo Dimovski-Oshenski, SNOF District Committee Second Secretary, elected at the 2nd SNOF Conference, during the inquiry, falsely accused members of the SNOF leadership as being anti-party elements and Macedonian nationalists. Based on his false testimony, the SNOF leaders were accused of being autonomists and nationalists who worked under “foreign directives”. (Ibid, p. 71.) Immediately after that the CPG leadership dissolved SNOF. To prove their loyalty to the CPG, the aforementioned “Macedonian revolutionaries and communists” dedicated themselves to implementing CPG policies... (Ibid, p. 69.)

Because of the anti-Macedonian CPG position and policies, the partisan movement in ELAS, in western Greek occupied Macedonia, from March to September 1944, until Bulgaria’s capitulation, “went through a difficult crisis”. By infiltrating ELAS with their agents, and with assistance from the quisling Greek police, PAO armed units, EDES and the Vlach Legion, the occupiers strengthened their armed struggle against the partisans and not only terrorized the population in the liberated territory in Greek occupied Macedonia, but also managed to establish their own bases in the villages inhabited by Greeks, especially by the Christian Turkish colonists and settlers from Asia Minor. (Ibid, p. 64.) On top of that, the occupier’s agents and Greek quislings who infiltrated ELAS, especially command positions, caused internal strife in the partisan units. The heaviest armed conflicts took place in the villages Konstanta and Zabardeni, undertaken to liquidate the Macedonian fighters. (Ibid.)

The situation was heavily exploited by the pro-Bulgarian organizations “Macedono-Bulgarian Committee” and “Ohrana” to improve their own position and to expand their influence in Voden, Lerin and, especially, Kostur Region. (M. Fotev, about the counter-bands, p. 64-65.) The CPG leadership found itself in a compromising position where it had to make temporary concessions.

The “Gotse” Macedonian battalion within the ELAS composition

In July 1944 negotiations took place between representatives of the NOV and PO Headquarters in the Republic of Macedonia and ELAS for the formation of separate Macedonian units as part of the ELAS composition. (M. Fotev, views and notes. p. 18-19.) When an agreement was reached, the CPG leadership decided to form a Macedonian battalion. On August 2, 1944, during the 41st anniversary of the Ilinden Uprising, a meeting was held in the village Pozdivishta, near Mount Vicho, during which the Macedonian battalion was formed. This meeting coincided with another meeting, held in the Sveti Prohor Pchinski Monastery, during which ASNOM proclaimed the constitution of the Macedonian national state, the Republic of Macedonia, as an equal federal unit of Democratic Federal Yugoslavia. The same day 13 armed pro-Bulgarian counter-bandits were captured and publicly tried for committing serious crimes against the people and for killing partisans. They were sentenced to death and executed in the village Pozdivishta, Kostur Region. (M. Fotev, about the counter-bands, p. 56.) The first regular Macedonian units in the all-Macedonian battalion in Greek occupied Macedonia were placed within the ELAS XXVIII Regiment. In ELAS the Macedonian battalion was registered in II-A, and was known by its popular name the “Gotse battalion”. (M. Fotev, views and notes, p. 18.) The Macedonian Gotse battalion was created in the presence of CPG officials Renos Mihaelas, a representative of the ELAS IX Division, and Andoni Andonopoulos-Periklis, CPG Regional Committee First Secretary for Kostur Region, who solemnly declared that they would form a Macedonian brigade and a division. (M. Fotev, about the counter-bands, p. 71-72.)

The Gotse battalion consisted of four units with a total of 500 Macedonian fighters from Kostur and Lerin Regions; about 200 partisans, who had previously served in the units of the XXVIII Regiment, about 200 from the ELAS reserve forces, about 40 from the SNOF, CPG and EAM non-combatants, and about 60 from the battalion which had returned from Karaorman. (M. Fotev, views and notes, p. 18.) Atanas Koroveshovski was appointed commander of the battalion. Unfortunately, the CPG Regional Committee for Kostur Region immediately dismissed him because he had left ELAS and had fled with the fighters to Karaorman. Kosmas Spanos Amindas was put in his place but the battalion fighters refused to accept him and the command position was given to Ilia Dimovski-Gotse. (Ibid, p. 18.) Political Commissar Risto Kolencev-Kokino and Chief of Staff Dimitar Tupurkovski-Titan remained as part of the Battalion Headquarters. (M. Fotev, about the counter-bands, p. 56.) The Macedonian battalion fighters wore similar partisan hats and had the same badges as all the other ELAS units, not the five-pointed star. (M. Fotev, views and notes, p. 19.)

The battalion served as a special unit for only two months. (Ibid, p. 19.) At the same time the Macedonian battalion fought against the German occupying forces and performed actions to disarm the pro-Bulgarian “Macedono-Bulgarian Committee” counter-band movement. During August and September it disarmed the counter-bands in the villages Mokreni, Bobishta, Zagorichani, Komunichevo and other villages where the counter-bandits surrendered their arms en masse and some voluntarily joined the ranks of the Macedonian battalion and fought bravely. According to Fotev, included among those who joined the partisans and fought bravely were Vasil Zigenga from the village Zagorichani and Sulio from the village Tsereshnitsa. During the same period the following counter-band positions and village strongholds were destroyed: Prekopana, Chereshnitsa, Olishta, Tiolishta, Setoma, Shestrevo and others. (Ibid, 56.) All counter-bandits who were proven to have committed treason and crimes against the people were condemned to death and shot. Included among those shot were Pando Makriev, Stavro Temo, Pando Gamvrola from the village Komunichevo, and others. (Ibid, p. 56.) Some, the likes of Risto Rukov, Apostol Gamvrola, Stavro Gurgushev and many others, fled from Greek occupied Macedonia and went to Bulgaria before Bulgaria capitulated. (Ibid.)

At that time, in early September 1944, the Macedonian battalion attacked German positions on the Greek-Albanian border thoroughfare along the road to Lerin, destroyed the watchtowers and disabled the Korcha-Lerin and Lerin-Kostur thoroughfare. (Ibid.) On September 3, 1944 the first platoon of the 3rd unit, commanded by Mihail Apostolov-Graniti from the village Krchishta and by political commissar Traiche Tsafara from the village Smrdesh, led by detachment political commissar Mincho Fotev, entered the city Kostur just as the German military units were withdrawing. Following the 3rd unit, Commander Tashko Boinov’s platoon entered and after that units of the ELAS XXVIII Regiment led by Iani Pachura who, as a high ranking officer, assumed responsibility for the city. (Ibid, p. 56-57.) The headquarters of the ELAS Regiment did not allow the Macedonian unit to take over the city. In fact the Macedonian units were sharply criticized by Headquarters for taking action without prior authorization and therefore were ordered to withdraw from the city. (M. Fotev, views and notes, p. 20.)

Bulgaria capitulated on September 9, 1944. With its capitulation and withdrawal of its army units and with the withdrawal of the German forces from Greece, a new situation was created in Greek occupied Macedonia. At this point the CPG saw to it to make it a priority, in the interests of Greece, to restore Greece to its prewar Versailles borders. The Party leadership took action to make sure no separate Macedonian units existed in ELAS. Instead of recognizing the Macedonian contribution, the CPG and EAM did a complete reversal and not only did not recognize the Macedonian contribution but refused to recognize the Macedonian people in Greek occupied Macedonia, and consequently the Macedonian national liberation movement (PLM).

According to Fotev: “The CPG denied the Macedonian people their right to create their national people’s liberation movement, a right they had earned as a result of their participation in World War II and the disastrous consequences they suffered.” (M. Fotev, about the counter-bands, p. 58.) The only reason the Macedonian people were even recognized as “Slavo-Macedonians” was so that they could be mobilize into the armed struggle against the fascist occupiers to

liberate Greece. In no way were the Macedonians ever recognized or accepted as equals with the Greek people. It was more than obvious that SNOF was created, as a temporary measure, because it was needed to fight against the occupying forces and against the pro-Bulgarian movement in Greek occupied Macedonia. According to Fotev: “SNOF was needed, but only as a tool in Greek hands, to fight against the Great Bulgarian policy and against the pro-Bulgarian counter-bands.” (Ibid, p. 48.) This was a Greek ploy to fool the Macedonian people into believing that they were fighting for their rights and to engage them en masse and then to rob them of all gains they had made, even though those gains were made for a common cause, as was the case with the anti-fascist struggle. According to Fotev, about 80% of the Macedonian people were organized and actively participated in the struggle against the occupiers and domestic traitors. (Ibid, p. 60.) The CPG and EAM caused strong resentment among the Macedonian communists in the SNOF leadership and in the partisan units. The decision to dissolve SNOF, as well as the intolerant Greek attitude towards the Macedonian battalion, was counter-revolutionary and an anti-Macedonian act. (Ibid, p. 72.) What is even more amazing is that the CPG leadership accused the battalion of cooperating with the English, and that “through the airport in the town Rupishsta, the battalion was supplied with arms and ammunition” at a time when that airport “was under ELAS supervision…” (Ibid, p. 72.) This is what the Macedonian people had to put up with all through the conflict, which had far-reaching consequences.