PROSECUTION AND IMPRISONMENT OF THE GEMIDZHII - Part 02

“P. P-v (Pavel Shatev), the captured culprit who blew up the “Guadalquivir steamer,” wrote H. Kotsev, “loosened his tongue and told the authorities everything. As a result of that Garvanov, D. Mirchev and 5 or 6 others became suspects.” (H. Kotsev, 55.)

It is very important, from a practical and moral point of view, for any revolutionary to withhold information when questioned by an enemy entity. Weakness can be exploited by the police or by civilian entities and can have severe consequences for the movement. (The boundary of human endurance should not be forgotten. Our recent

history, from the First and Second Ilinden, is full of examples of heroes who, not wanting to fall into the hands of the enemy and endure torture and humiliation, committed suicide). Those who fall prey to torment and do break down are inflicted with great injustice before history, before the future generations. Those fainthearted revolutionaries who, without strong arguments, without taking into account all circumstances are the ones who are called “traitors”.

As for the Gemidzhii, there is no need for a wider explanation to show how the moral character of the survivors faded with the loss of Ortse, Kosta, Meche, Pingov, Trchkov and Tsvetko. But that does not mean that they deserve to be dishonoured so easily without deserving it. We think they do not deserve to be dishonoured.

Hristo Kotsev’s claim that Pavel Shatev betrayed Garvanov is not only not based on facts, but it is malicious. Silianov and Garvanov’s accusations are just that, accusations without proof. This raises the question: “Why did the Gemidzhii ‘betray’ only Garvanov and his comrades and not those of the more than 2,000 unknown Macedonian martyrs who filled the Ottoman prisons?”

It is true that the Gemidzhii admitted their deeds. They could not hide them, especially Shatev. He did not want to hide his own deeds. As for the discovery of the Gemidzhii circle, it was revealed by someone of the first three when they were arrested. The authorities discovered the names of the perpetrators from the surviving Gemidzhii themselves, how many they were and what each was supposed to do. But we certainly do not believe that it was Shatev who released information on members of the Macedonian Revolutionary Organization, and especially on Garvanov. We can say that with certainty.

First, Shatev remained calm and maintained to the end that he was Georgi Manasov from Kiustendil and that he had not studied in Solun. Shatev told the court, in front of Garvanov, that he did not know him as well as the other professors. So, how could he have “betrayed” people he did not know? Second, here is what Shatev said in his first memoirs, according to L. Miletich, about Bogdanov and Arsov’s arrest and behaviour: “Georgi Bogdanov was arrested in the morning of April 16, 1903, (it must have been April 17

because the main actions took place during the night of the 16/29). After he threw a bomb he hid himself in his house and stayed there. His house was next to the ‘Alhambra’ café where Milan Arsov threw a bomb. The police searching this area broke into Bogdanov’s room, arrested him and found a certain amount of dynamite. He looked a bit ‘disturbed’ in the prison. When the authorities brought Bogdanov to the courtroom with me and confronted him, he seemed confused: When they asked him: ‘Why did you throw a bomb at the Alhambra?’ (They thought he threw a bomb there). He said: ‘Milan threw a bomb into the Alhambra.’ And when they asked him: ‘Where did you throw a bomb?’ He said: ‘I threw one in Nonio.’ At that point the police were tipped off that there was another perpetrator named ‘Milan’. And after Bogdanov said that Milan was from Veles, all persons named Milan in Veles and Solun were collected and brought to the court. Then a policeman named Panaiot, from Veles, said that Milan Arsov was friends with Ortse and with me (Shatev), they let everyone go.

Milan Arsov was captured and arrested on May 9, 1903. Then, in order to determine if there was a connection between us (Gemidzhii) and the MRO Central Committee (the police knew that Garvanov was somehow mixed up with the Gemidzhii but had no proof), they asked Bogdanov: ‘Do you know Garvanov?’ Bogdanov said: ‘I do not know a Garvanov, but I do know that we wanted to kill a man named Garvanov.’ Bogdanov then told the court that we (Gemidzhii) received 36 liras from the same Garvanov. When the authorities later asked Arsov, if what Bogdanov said was true, that Garvanov gave us (Gemidzhii) 36 liras, Arsov replied: ‘It is true.’ But by then Garvanov had already been arrested.” (P. Shatev, The Solun assassin, 49-51.)

The testimony of the two Gemidzhii claiming that Garvanov gave them money was proof that Garvanov was involved with the Gemidzhii. And since the authorities knew, without any doubt, that Garvanov and his comrades were members of the MRO, they, without hesitation, should have concluded that Garvanov was also a member of the Gemidzhii circle. Now, as an associate of the Gemidzhii, Garvanov should have faced similar charges as the Gemidzhii and should have been tried by the same military court and not by the civil court as was decided. Earlier we noted that the

military court tried the relatives of the Gemidzhii, who were innocent of any crimes, and found them guilty only because they were related to the Gemidzhii.

But even though Arsov confirmed what Bogdanov had said about receiving money from Garvanov, Shatev, in his extensive memoirs, which he had personally written, does not repeat the above allegations and denies that Arsov was some kind of traitor.

After the verdicts were pronounced, the Gemidzhii were transferred to a central prison together with all the other prisoners including Garvanov. There were many disputes between Garvanov and Shatev with the main dispute being the “betrayal”. While in prison among the many Macedonians imprisoned with him, Garvanov deliberately spread the news about the Gemidzhii “betrayal” in order to compromise them. “For several weeks I tried to persuade Garvanov that neither Milan Arsov nor Georgi Bogdanov had said anything to compromise him on purpose at the time of the investigation or in front of the military court, but Ivan Garvanov persisted with his claim that he was a victim and that he had suffered from their betrayal.” (P. Shatev, Macedonia under slavery, 448-449.)

The allegations that Garvanov was a victim of a Gemidzhii betrayal took a new dimension during Garvanov’s trial. People in the prison began to revolt. A lot of the prisoners began to believe Garvanov. Shatev took it upon himself to write a statement which was then signed by Arsov and, through the prison director, sent it to the court. With that statement Arsov informed the court that he wanted to clarify some things about Garvanov and his group on trial. Arsov was allowed to appear before the court as a witness and read the following pre-prepared text:

“My lords, everything I, the undersigned and convicted in connection with the events in the city of April 28, 29 and 30, 1903, have said about the accused persons now being tried is recorded in the protocols of the military court. I ask the court to take a minute and see what I have said in relation to the defendants. However, today, when in the whole of Macedonia, the people are dissatisfied and rebellious... when the Macedonian people are fighting for justice and freedom, these gentlemen here have no courage to stand up

before the court and say what the people, with weapons in their hands, are fighting for. I ask the court to find the defendants innocent or, if they are guilty then they should repent for what they thought and did…”

“Have you anything else to say?” asked the president of the court.

“No!” replied Arsov and left the text he had read on the desk. (Ibid, 456.)

The reader, of course, might wonder if it was even possible for the Gemidzhii to take this issue as far as they did. Of course it was possible. They were sentenced to death and had nothing to lose. On the other hand, they wanted to clear the air and their good names for future generations. This was the only way the Gemidzhii could have fought back against those who wanted to discredit them and compromise their work.

As we have already pointed out, relations between the Gemidzhii and the MRO Central Committee were never great. Disagreements between them continued even now when many of them were in prison. Shatev challenged Garvanov about the loss of the 1,000 kilograms of dynamite. Garvanov denied that he had anything to do with the disappearance of that dynamite. Garvanov blamed Shatev for rushing the “assassinations” and not waiting for the uprising to take place first, as was desired by the MRO. Other prisoners were also present at these discussions. Feeling he was losing the argument, Garvanov at one point turned to the audience and said: “Don’t listen to him, he is not a people’s person, he is an anarchist!”

The written statement made by Arsov to the court, mentioned earlier, created another argument between Garvanov and the Gemidzhii. A question was raised that if Garvanov and his bunch were asked by the court if they members of the MRO Central Committee, would they answer honestly or deny it? Garvanov’s answer was that if he was asked before the uprising took place he would deny everything, but if he were asked during the uprising then he would declare before the court that he was a member of the Organization and state its goals. But Shatev insisted that Garvanov,

in either case, should admit that he is a member of the Organization and its leadership.

The Gemidzhii believed that, after what happened in Solun, the Ottoman government would never release anyone who was suspected of engaging in revolutionary activities. They also believed that given the circumstances these court proceedings would be attended by the public and journalists, as well as some of the consuls from the European consulates in Solun who were interested in finding out more about what happened. According to the Gemidzhii, it was best if Garvanov gave up on the idea that somehow he was going to be set free, admit that he was a member of the MRO Central Committee and concentrate on addressing the court with the truth of what was happening in Macedonia and agitate the foreigners in favour of the Macedonian cause.

“Don’t find yourselves in the same situation that Dr. Hristo Tatarchev, Hristo Matov and other defendants found themselves in court in 1901 when they denied that they were members of the MRO and insisted they had never heard of such an Organization.”

To that Garvanov answered: “I will think about it…”

As a rule Macedonian revolutionaries would never admit anything to the Ottomans in their courts. It was necessary to maintain silence because those belonging to the Organization or participating in revolutionary activities were often tried and found guilty, purely on suspicion with no evidence to support the charges. As was also well-known, anyone being a member of a revolutionary organization not only knew of the organization’s activities but also knew other people who were members. Admitting that one was a member of the Organization would be disastrous for the cause. So, no matter how much these people were tortured they would admit to nothing, earning great praise from the Macedonian people.

Suspected revolutionaries were usually tried behind closed doors. So, popularizing the revolutionary movement behind closed doors in the Ottoman courts was never a good idea. But in Garvanov’s case, where the trial was open to the public, because the Ottoman authorities wanted to show the outside world that their judiciary was

fair and democratic, Garvanov, according to the Gemidzhii, had a shot at making a difference for the Macedonian people. This trial was special, useful and very important because foreign journalists and consular representatives were attending it. But Garvanov was not one of those people who wanted to sacrifice anything for Macedonia. He did not want to go in front of this unfriendly court and openly and publicly proclaim the goals of the movement and that he was a part of it, risking the possibility that he might be severely condemned. The Gemidzhii who had the means to follow his trial understood that he denied all charges for the sole purpose of being acquitted or for receiving a lower sentence. Upset by this, the Gemidzhii decided to give the court the written statement, mentioned earlier, which not only denied the assertion that Garvanov was betrayed by the Gemidzhii, but also humiliated and degraded him as a revolutionary.

In the end, this question must be asked which is difficult to answer: “If the Gemidzhii betrayed Garvanov for giving them financial help, then why was Garvanov not tried by the military court?”

When the Ilinden Uprising was started, a new conflict emerged in “Edi-Kule” prison in Solun.

In the fall of 1902, Dr. Tatarchev and Matov, former members of the MRO Central Committee, were released from the Ottoman prison and left for Bulgaria. They arrived in Bulgaria at the time when the Gorno-Dzumaia Uprising was in full swing and when the Supremacists (Bulgarians) appointed themselves representatives of the Macedonian people before Europe. The Macedonian revolutionaries, headed by Gotse Delchev and Giorce Petrov, welcomed Tatarchev and Matov with much joy and hope that they would contribute to strengthening of the anti-Supremacist front in Macedonia and Bulgaria. But they were bitterly disappointed. When Tatarchev and Matov arrived in Sofia, they appeared as representatives of the “Central Committee”. This is what Giorce Petrov wrote about that: “They immediately showed us that they wanted to play the old priority role they had in Solun. In their view Garvanov was not leadership material so they immediately showed desire to have closer contact with the Bulgarian society and government and to create new relations between the MRO and

Bulgaria. As a result they began to get closer to the ‘more moderate’ Supremacists…” “This tactic,” wrote Petrov, “I call underhanded considering how much blood was shed and how many people were consumed... Matov and Tatarchev came to us recommending prudence and declaring us insignificant factors in the struggle and themselves relevant factors. This stunt by Matov and Tatarchev was as selfish as they come…” (Memoirs - Giorche Petrov, Skopje 1950, 119.)

Being opportunists and ideologically close to the Supreme Committee, Tatarchev and Matov were more inclined towards finding understanding with others like themselves in the ranks of the Revolutionary Organization in official circles in Bulgaria and in the Supreme Committee than in standing shoulder to shoulder with the determined and practicing revolutionaries following the aspirations of the Macedonian people. Their opportunism became an expression in everything they did.

Until Tatarchev and Matov arrived in Bulgaria, MRO and its principles were represented and protected by Gotse Delchev and Giorche Petrov who, in fact, were the first foreign representatives of MRO in Bulgaria. These principles were well-defended until Garvanov became president of the Central Committee and Dimitar Stefanov and Tushe Deliovanov were appointed officials outside the Macedonian border. But the role of the outside the border officials was completely changed with Tatarchev and Matov’s arrival in Bulgaria.

On August 10, 1903, just after the start of the Ilinden Uprising, Tatarchev and Matov dispatched the famous “internal organization’s declaration” to the foreign diplomatic representatives in Sofia, explaining the reasons for the uprising and making demands on behalf of the insurgents. They were demanding the appointment of a Christian governor in Macedonia and the introduction of international control over the implementation of reforms in accordance with suggestions made by the Great Powers.

The usual conflict between the Gemidzhii and Garvanov did not escalate when Tatarchev and Matov appointed themselves representatives and spokesmen of the revolutionary organization,

but it did when they dispatched the above-mentioned declaration to the Great Powers. Shatev was furious and condemned the action taken by Tatarchev and Matov in Bulgaria to inform the Great Powers as destructive and counterproductive. He considered their action not only harmful to the ongoing Ilinden Uprising but also to the true character of the Macedonian struggle, making it look like it had been orchestrated by the Bulgarian government. In fact, he believed that what Tatarchev and Matov had done in Bulgaria compromised the strength of the Macedonian movement. And because Garvanov fully approved of their actions, Chatev asked him the following question:

“...Indeed, Mr. Garvanov, please tell me how will the European and Balkan authorities and stakeholders interpret the fact that Hristo Matov, at the outset of the Uprising, informed the diplomatic representatives, not in Turkey but in Bulgaria? Did the concerned Great Powers not have diplomatic representatives here in Turkey? Why did they have to be informed by IMRO officials outside of the border, in Sofia of all places, which - rightly or not – has been a suspect in encouraging the insurgency and other actions in Macedonia?” (P. Shatev, 451-452.)

Garvanov and his comrades were tried and convicted and two months later, in the fall of 1903, were sent to prison. The four Gemidzhii were locked up in the Edi-Kule prison waiting for their death sentences.

In the spring of 1904, the Sultan decreed a general amnesty for political prisoners and all those who were sentenced to long prison terms were released. Garvanov was released before serving a year. In total 600 people were released. All the people from Veles were also released except for Ilia Popiordanov, who was found to be an associate of the Gemidzhii and was sentenced to 10 years in prison. From what we know, Garvanov, Mirchev and I. Kondov, who were all released, had been exiled to Rhodes. According to Shatev, Garvanov has been sentenced for a few years and not for 101 years as he had claimed. And from this we can conclude that he was never charged as an associate of the Gemidzhii.

* * *

Even though much of the top Organization’s leadership knew about the work of the Gemidzhii, it appears most of its ranks were not aware of them and it certainly caused much surprise when they were found out. The Gemidzhii were inspiring and admired for their courage and self-sacrifice but not so much for the severe consequences that they caused for the Organization.

We don’t know exactly how the top leaders of the Organization’s governing structures responded to the Gemidzhii actions but we do know that Gotse Delchev did not have much time to react because he himself was killed only days after Ortse, Kosta and Meche died. Gotse too spilled his blood on Macedonian soil in Banitsa, joining the young men from Veles. Unfortunately, little to nothing was said about the Gemidzhii and about the Solun assassinations in the memoirs of the many prominent Macedonian revolutionary leaders.

However, there is no doubt as to what kind of impression the Gemidzhii left on those who were engaged in the final preparations for the Uprising, who saw Macedonia turn into a huge military camp, into a huge jail in which Macedonia’s most intellectual forces were thrown, and the huge amount of terror and intimidation that was used to break the Organization...

At the time when news of the Solun assassinations was spreading throughout Macedonia, the top-ranking Bitola Revolutionary District leaders were assembled in the village Smilevo for a Congress. Here is how the news was received according to Vasil Chakalarov, a delegate from the Kostur District, who left us valuable information about the Congress. Chakalarov described the reception of the news and Damian Gruev’s reaction as follows:

“A letter arrived from Bitola. It was sent by Luka Dzhepov. It wrote: ‘The Ottoman bank in Solun has been blown up with dynamite. Bombs are being thrown all throughout the city... A French ship has been sunk… All this was done by our people. The culprit who blew up the ship has been caught...” That surprised us. Damian Gruev became upset and, more or less, said the following:

“To hell with them! When I was in Solun those pests were boasting of doing something but did not wait until the day of the uprising like we asked them. They are worthless people, not worth more than 250 liras. They are about 15 to 16 misunderstood souls. They constantly intimidate our brothers in Solun, threatening that if we did not give them money or if any of them were caught, they would ignite their dynamite. As soon as one of us is lost, they say, we will spare no one… They constantly intimidated us in this way. I made suggestions to destroy them, but here too I encountered difficulties. We could not capture them all at once, it was impossible. Capturing them individually was very risky because they were prepared to put their plans inто action, and that is what they did… To hell with them!”

Chakalarov continues: “Sarafov took me to the side and told me that he sent them (Gemidzhii) to Solun and that they were completing their mission as ordered. Sarafov said he gave them more than 300 liras to do this. Sarafov said he did not know why they enacted their plans earlier than expected, but it seemed to him that they (Gemidzhii) may have encountered some sort of danger that forced them to act immediately. Whatever it may have been, Sarafov seemed happy with the actions they took. Sarafov also said: ‘Let Gruev and his supporters say whatever they want. The way Gruev thinks, the Uprising may not start until next year. Let it be however it wants to be…’

And so, Sarafov was delighted with the news from Solun.” (Original Protocols from the Smilevo Congress - Il. Ilinden, IX, 7 (87), Sofia August 1937, 8.)

Sarafov, in his own memoirs, said he was surprised by the Gemidzhii enacting their plans early. He admits that he did not expect them to act so soon. “I knew,” he wrote, “that they were in discussions and had an understanding with Garvanov and Delchev about when to schedule their actions…” Later we found out that the reason for expediting their plans was to avoid their tunnel being discovered by the Ottomans who wanted to dig on the street above it. There was also some mistrust… The leaders of the Gemidzhii circle did not trust Garvanov and his comrades with such

information about their work. (Damian Gruev’s memoirs, Boris Sarafov..., 89-90.)

Even though the Gemidzhii had warned the MRO Central Committee in Solun about their actions, the Committee took no measures to protect itself and its people in order to avoid arrests in the event of the assassinations being enacted.

And, sure enough, the entire MRO Central Committee was arrested after the Solun assassinations and the Organization was left without a Central Committee. Being left without a Central Committee, its functions, in some ways, were taken over by Tatarchev and Matov who were not in Macedonia and could not play the role of central leaders during the uprising. Management of the insurrection was actually left to the district leaders. About this Sarafov wrote: “After the assassinations... Solun was already lost as a centre and therefore every district was left to take care of itself. Even our Smilevo Congress resolutions were completely independent of the Central Committee. It never occurred to anyone to propose sending our decision to withdraw from the Central Committee. Accordingly, Gruev had no respect for any Central Committee, especially for Garvanov.” (Ibid.)

We should point out here that, in addition to the Central Committee, there were a few other senior leaders arrested after the Solun assassinations, but not many. This is because at that time almost all the regional leaders, who were more or less compromised, were in the mountains and out of reach of the authorities. The mass arrests, therefore, had little impact on the regional governing structure of the Macedonian Revolutionary Organization.