EVENTS IN BITOLA AND OTHER PARTS OF MACEDONIA - Part 01

EVENTS IN BITOLA AND OTHER PARTS OF MACEDONIA

There was no confirmation of the suspicion that the Ottoman police were actually “silent” on the Gemidzhii matter and allowed them to operate as a pretext to justify persecuting the Macedonian population and to crush the movement. However, the Ottomans did use the Solun events as a pretext to mass murder and repress the population. While the mass murders were avoided, the arrests and bullying of the Exarchate part of the Macedonian population, in almost all of Macedonia, was unprecedented.

The violent Solun events had a strong echo in the interior of Macedonia. The Ottoman authorities, as a pretext of suspecting the Macedonians of preparing to carry out similar actions in other Macedonian cities, as well as signaling the start of an uprising, used European displeasure to begin repressions outside of Solun in order to behead the Macedonian Revolutionary Organization. The Solun events also fanaticized and united the Muslim population, which was now ready and willing to act against the Christians.

The prescribed solution for the Solun events prompted the Macedonian movement everywhere to defend itself in the spring of 1903. More armed cheti (military units) began to form and clash more frequently with the Ottoman army and police. At about the same time that the Gemidzhii were carrying out their actions in Solun, two significant clashes took place in Eastern Macedonia. According to a version given by the Ottoman authorities, one cheta, which numbered about 50 people, was completely destroyed. The Ottomans claim that among the dead they allegedly found two Bulgarian majors and two captains. The other cheta, numbering 46 people, was also allegedly destroyed with 29 killed and 17 captured. And while this information, especially the numbers of dead and captured, was difficult to accept, it was confirmed. About this Steg wrote to Delkasi as follows: “There was a significant clash in Banitsa, Seres Region, on May 4, 1903… If it is true, as we have found out from various sources, one Delchev from the Macedonian Revolutionary Movement was killed during the fighting. As is being claimed, he was one of the main organizers and his loss has caused irreparable damage…” (A.M. 238, French Consulate in Solun to Delkase, Solun, May 13, 1903.)

The Ottoman authorities used their cunning and skill to prove to the Europeans that the Solun events were actually carried out by members of the Macedonian Revolutionary Organization and that the Organization was closely connected with the Bulgarian government and worked under its directive. This was done under the framework of a well-known Ottoman propaganda policy designed to convince Europe that the Macedonian Revolutionary Movement was driven from the outside, from Bulgaria, and that the movement was not the result of Ottoman burdens on the local socio-economic conditions and the Sultan’s exploitation and terror tactics. The Ottomans, therefore, outwardly refused to accept the terms “Macedonian Organization”, “Macedonian Committee” and so on. From a European perspective, the Ottomans made it to be almost all “Bulgarian” and the struggle in Macedonia was all about expanding the Bulgarian borders into Macedonia and not liberating Macedonia. The same kind of thinking was used by the Greek diplomacy in their propaganda.

Now the High Port was keenly interested in convincing the Great Powers that the “anarchist crimes” in Solun were the work of the Macedonian Revolutionary Organization. The Ottomans actually wanted to “blame” the entire Macedonian population for the Solun events in order to justify their reprisals against them. One of the important “arguments” used by the Ottomans to convince the Great Powers that the Solun events were the work of the revolutionary organization was the use of dynamite against Ottoman soldiers in the street battles. The coincidences of the frequent clashes with the Ottoman army in April and early May, as well as the more frequent use of dynamite by the cheti, “was presented as evidence that the violence in Solun was committed by the revolutionary committee…” wrote Steg. (Ibid.) The Ottoman authorities did not make this claim to simply throw “sticks and stones” at the Exarchates in Macedonia. They made the claim in order to justify a policy of mass imprisonment and persecution. By this claim they did not just launch mass persecution against the Exarchates in Solun, they launched it against all of Macedonia.

In contrast to the Ottoman authorities who declared everyone who fought against them in Macedonia a “Bulgarian criminal” and had

no interest in distinguishing between the Macedonian Revolutionary Organization, the Supreme Committee and the Gemidzhii, some of the Great Power diplomats had different ideas. Some tried harder and did penetrate into the substance of the problem, discovering that it was the Gemidzhii, an independent group (from the MRO), who committed the “assassinations” in Solun. Here we have often quoted the French Consul General because his reports are more detailed and more objective than any others. Even though the French capitalists had suffered the worst from the Gemidzhii actions, and Steg had the right to be more bitter about it than his colleagues, he was the most accurate in evaluating and describing the events.

On May 7, 1903, in his first comprehensive report regarding the Solun assassinations Steg wrote: “It is still difficult to determine the origin and the true extent of these events. We don’t have enough information to solve this crucial issue. Are the assassinations the work of an isolated group of revolutionaries with anarchist tendencies? Do they come from one of the two major committees: the Bulgarian committee or the internal association (by “Bulgarian Committee” Steg means the “Supreme Committee”, and by “internal association” he means the “MRO”) or are they a product of an agreement between the two committees or, ultimately, whether the committees or one of them, helps with their performance, without themselves having to conceive and conduct themselves?”

Both the diplomats and the general public were still unaware of who the Gemidzhii were and whether they worked alone or under the command of the MRO. The Ottoman authorities unfortunately were not interested in the details of this and in fact they did not want to know (they could have known because on April 30, 1903 they had P. Shatev in their hands). The only thing the Ottoman authorities were now interested in and preoccupied with, was the question: “How to destroy the Macedonian Revolutionary Organization and curb or stop the impending uprising”.

After Solun, Bitola was the next city to suffer the most.

By the morning of April 30, 1903, rumours about the Solun assassinations fully engulfed Bitola creating great panic in the people. At the same time military and police patrols intensified and

tension in the city began to grow rapidly. There were rumours being spread that as soon as the signal of an uprising was given, the entire Exarchate population would be slaughtered. Gotier, the French Vice-Consul in Bitola, spoke with Dr. B. Beshkov, acting manager in the Bulgarian agency (a diplomatic representative), and told him that it was in the interest of the population to be peaceful, because otherwise it would be threatened with a grim “catastrophe”. (Liberation struggle of the Bulgarians in Macedonia and Odrin 1902/1904. Diplomatic documents, Sofia, 1978, document No 48.)

In order for the rumours to appear as more than just rumours, the Ottoman authorities in Bitola decided to do something. By order of the Bitola chief of police they employed several former tax collectors, all “Greeks”. Then, accompanied by police officials, these “Greeks” were sent into the city streets to identify the houses in which Macedonian Exarchates lived. (Ibid, doc 50. The Bulgarian diplomat, mentioned earlier, thought that the “registration” of the houses was done in preparation for a massacre. But according to Gotier, the French Vice-Consul, the “survey” was done to facilitate the monitoring of suspicious persons. A.M.F. 238 - Vice-Consul of France in Bitola to Constan, Ambassador of the Republic of France in Tsari Grad, Bitola, May 5, 1903.) Of course, the aim behind all this was not that difficult to figure out. They made it clear to the Macedonian population that it was under their control and that if anything similar happened in Bitola, which had happened in Solun, or if an uprising was raised, the Macedonians would pay with their lives… they should expect a bloody revenge. By creating a climate of fear and pressure, the authorities wanted to push the Organization to leave Bitola and encourage opposition against it. On April 29, 1903 the Bitola Vali visited the Great Power consuls and informed them that his vilayet was in danger of being attacked because the Macedonian cheti were preparing for an uprising. The Vali, it seems, wanted the consuls to know that he was prepared to deal with the Macedonian population in the event of an uprising. Of course this threat was not made on behalf of the Ottoman government, but allegedly on behalf of the Muslim population.

Threats did not always materialize into action in those days but they did during the Ilinden Uprising.

Bitola was the centre of the district revolutionary movement from which every act and every clash in the mountains or villages was rehearsed. There was great tension building in that city and increased as the time of the uprising approached. The Muslim population in Bitola was very upset. Its rage was about to explode. It was now looking for a reason… for an excuse to explode and that reason was found in the Solun assassinations.

“The events that took place in Solun,” wrote Gotier, “have further heightened the turmoil in the Bitola population, and it is more than ever convinced that the city, being the seat of the main members of the revolutionary committee, is threatened and, very soon, a catastrophe will befall it more terrible than that of Solun.” (Gotier to Constan, Bitola, May 5, 1903.)

The Bitola Vali took strict measures to preserve the peace in Bitola. Patrols were sent around the city, one after another in close proximity, to monitor the mosques where Muslim fanatics usually started their crimes, and so on. But in spite of all that, there were circles in power that did not want peace. Quit the opposite…

On Wednesday May 6, 1903, during the Giurgevden (St. Georges) holiday, the Bitola consuls together with the Bitola Vali paid a visit to the Greek consul on the occasion that it was the Greek king’s name day. At about 11:30 am, at the moment when the champagne was being served, the Vali’s assistant entered the consulate and said something to the Vali. A minute or two later the Vali apologized to the guests and left. It was clear to everyone that something serious had happened. About half an hour later the city was “occupied” by the Ottoman military and the town centre and marketplace were closed down. Panic began to set in among the Bitola residents. Everyone was told to stay put wherever they were because the military had banned all movement in the streets. This was the situation until 4:30 pm, but the blockade yielded nothing. After that the military units that had occupied the city were replaced by military patrols. In about an hour all the streets were cleared and everyone ran back to their homes. The streets became deserted by nightfall except, of course, for the fast moving military patrols which maintained a watchful eye on things. But even though the city

was blockaded, there was news that murders had been committed in many places in the city that day. But really, what happened that day? Here is what was written in the Organization’s memoirs:

“In the morning of May 6, 1903, a number Ottoman troublemakers and professional criminals, accompanied by police officers and gendarmes, for no reason at all attacked the Christian population in the Bitola Bazaar and, with great rage, killed and wounded everyone with whom they came into contact. The terror targeted all Christians and in moments everyone left the marketplace in panic... The criminals, followed by the police, then triumphantly marched down the city streets, firing at the windows of houses and at every Christian they met on their way. The whole city trembled with fear. The panic was indescribable and unprecedented. The Christian people barricaded themselves in their homes expecting death to arrive at any moment...” (Macedonia and Odrin (1893-1903). Memoirs of the Internal Organization - 1904, 114.)

The reasons for the Bitola massacre were obvious to all those who were familiar and who followed revolutionary activities. The Solun assassinations were a good reason for the “Bashibozuks” (armed Muslim civilians) to come out in the streets of Bitola but more was needed, something that was specific to Bitola. So even though the massacres were committed by Ottoman criminals, the Ottoman authorities put the blame on the Macedonians. The Bitola Vali officially blamed the riots on the Exarchates who, according to him, allegedly attacked several Muslims and tried to blow up the gunpowder depot. “There can be no question about who attacked the gunpowder depot,” wrote M. Ristich, the Serbian general consul in Bitola, “the claims made by the Vali during his announcement are plain lies... My impression is that these events are a consequence of the general excitement... that has existed in these parts for a long time. That excitement was intensified by the Solun events and by the rumours that similar events might take place here in Bitola. These bloody events which manifested themselves should have never taken place. There was no justifiable reason for them…” (Reports from 1903 by the Serbian consuls, metropolitans and school inspectors in Macedonia. Editorial and comments: Liuben Lape, Skopje 1954, 202-205.)

The appearance of more armed rebels and cheti, in preparation for the imminent uprising, which by now was well-known to the Ottomans, prompted the Ottoman military authorities to expand their security services by adding infantry and cavalry patrols inside the city and beyond. A man named Giche Oshavkov from Debar, working as a tailor in Bitola, was an active and prolific supplier of weapons to the Organization. He was connected with some Turks and Albanians from Gostivar, who on his order transported hundreds of guns and munitions for the needs of the Organization. One of his employees, a Turk, was expected to arrive in Bitola on May 6, 1903 to deliver the weapons. But since his cargo could not have been brought to the city without being discovered, it was agreed that two members of the Organization would wait for him on the road under the village Tsapari and when the right signal was given, he was to unload the cargo in Tsapari.

While waiting for the supplier to arrive, the two MRO members, who were dressed like policemen from Tsapari, were spotted by one of those Ottoman patrols who fired on them and chased them towards the village. Surprised by the patrol’s gunfire, the villagers from Tsapari grabbed their rifles and opened fire on the patrol. And thus began the famous battle between the Ottoman military patrol and the Tsapari militia, which disturbed the entire region as well as the delegates at the Smilevo congress, who had to stop their work in order to send an armed force to aid the Tsapari militia.

In the meantime, the cargo sent from Debar on six horses arrived at the designated place, but instead of meeting with the two MRO people it encountered the Ottoman patrol and a fierce battle in Tsapari. Surprised and frantic with fear the man left for Bitola. Too impatient to wait, Giche and a friend, without knowing anything about what was happening, decided to go to “Dovlezhik” to find out what was happening with the delivery of the weapon. On the way they were surprised to run into the cargo headed for Bitola. They found out from the man what was taking place in Tsapari and realized that going towards Bitola would be very dangerous because they would be running into more Ottoman soldiers. Given the situation, Bitola would be sending reinforcements to Tsapari and any attempt to transfer the weapons to Bitola would be very risky. There was an old cemetery and a small churchyard nearby so, while

wondering what to do, they put the horses in the churchyard and summoned the cemetery caretaker to have a word with him.

Ginche said to him: “A while ago you said to me that you were disappointed that you had not been made a member of the Organization because you thought that we did not trust you. Well, you were wrong! We do trust you. Now, before the church, we would like you to take an oath that you will serve the Organization faithfully, and by doing that we will make you a member. And as a member your first task will be, a very risky task, to hide these weapon…”

And so, the caretaker took the oath, then dug up a number of empty graves and hid the guns and gunpowder in them.

Discovery of these weapons could have caused an affair with severe consequences. They were lucky that the delivery man was a Turk and this delivery ended well because, first, he was not stopped on the way and second, Oshavkov ran into him on his way to Tsapari. However, this transfer of weapons was the cause of the battle in Tsapari and that conflict, in turn, gave the “Bashibozuks” in Bitola reason for a massacre.

After the clash, two horsemen rushed to Bitola and passed on the news that an “uprising” was taking place in the village Tsapari. Learning of this, the Muslims began to gather at the administrative headquarters and prepared to attack any Christian who passed by.

With permission from Luka Dzherov, temporary leader of the organizational affairs in Bitola, because the other leaders were attending the Smilevo Congress, two of the ten rebels from Riste Samardzia’s cheta grabbed two rifles left for them by two Turks in an inn and took to the streets. With guns “sort of” hidden under their coats, they were spotted by some Muslims while passing through a Muslim neighbourhood. By now all the Muslims knew about the “uprising” in Tsapari, so naturally they assumed the “uprising” had arrived in Bitola. “The sum of those few events,” wrote Dzherov, “the comrades in the village Tsapari, the rebels in Bitola, the rumours of an inevitable uprising and the inevitable attack on Bitola... hardened the Turks to such an extent that they were forced

to kill every Macedonian on the road…” (Fighting in South-West Macedonia, according to Luka Dzherov and Lazar Dimitrov’s memoirs. Giorgi Abadzhiev, Skopje, 1952, 25-28.)

The reason that not too many Christians were massacred in the Bitola killings was because the Muslims began to gather in the afternoon when most of the people were at home as well as because the Bitola Bazaar was closed immediately, a lesson learned from Solun. After the Bazaar was closed the “Bashibozuks” raged through the streets but did not attack any Christian homes. Of course, this was prompted by the city Vali’s rapid intervention.

Needing to know what to do, as was signaled by the way the lights were lit in the houses, even in the Bair-Maalo houses, Luka Dzherov’s answer was: “Let the Turks demonstrate in the streets but shoot to kill if they attack the houses...”

Luka Dzherov, who, through the organizational network, followed events in detail, wrote: “…for the honour of Bitola, no one was frightened. The people in danger locked their gates but were ready to defend themselves with weapons and with anything else they had in their possession…”

Attempts to massacre Christians were again made the next day, on May 7, 1903, and ended with the killing of 3 elders in isolated streets.

On May 7, 8 and 9, 1903, almost all economic and social activities in Bitola were shut down. The city and the bazaars were closed. No one was out on the streets except for the army. The authorities insisted on opening the bazaar but the Christian vendors and population in general would not leave their homes. “Today’s (May 9, 1903) situation, as was yesterday’s situation, is similar to that which took place on Giurgovden (St. Georges day) at noon,” wrote M. Ristich, “the market is still closed and fear prevails among the population, so despite the insistence of the authorities it is unknown when and whether peace and calm can be restored…” (Reports from 1903, 204.)

“It is certain,” wrote Gotier, “that time is needed for the public to calm down from the May 6 anxiety caused by the attacks with bombs and dynamite perpetrated by the Committee (he was probably thinking of the Solun events). It is not easy to unexpectedly find a breakthrough in the midst of wild fanaticism that has been hiding in the shadows for a long time…” (A.M., F. 238, Vice-Consul of France to Constan, Bitola, May 11, 1903.)

The bloody Giurgevden Wednesday left a terrible impression on the consuls and the general population. One week after the Solun events the massacres were repeated, except here, without significant cause. The “cause”, as the Vali pointed out, seemed unconvincing. There were persistent rumours that the massacres were organized by interested parties inside government circles and that they wanted them to coincide with the fighting in Tsapari and the theft of the rifles. (The Tsapari villagers fought bravely but, surprised by the overpowering foe, were forced to leave the village and retreat to the mountains. There was no accurate information of victims left behind. The Vali, according to Silianov, reported 11 killed and 74 captured. But according to Silianov around 40 villagers were captured. The villagers who could not escape were tied and brought to Bitola, where they were tortured terribly. Later 18 of them were convicted and sent to jail.) These rumours found support in other rumours according to which, the day before Giurgevden, the Ottoman keeper of account books told his Christian cook not to go outside on May 6, 1903. On May 5 other Turks also advised their Christian friends not to leave their homes the next day.

The Bitola streets were drenched with innocent Macedonian blood. How many Christians were killed in Bitola? How many were killed in Solun? No one knows the exact numbers. According to the memoirs we looked at, we found 14 killed, which is close to the figure given by the Vali, and 40 wounded. According to Luka Dzherov, 50-60 people were killed and 30-40 were wounded. Dozens were arrested on accusations of being “rebels” and then severely tortured. Six died in prison.

The killed and the wounded were treated like animals. According to the testimony of the municipal hospital pharmacist, where the dead and wounded were taken, “the dead and wounded alike were tossed

over one another on garbage carts. When they arrived at the hospital they did not take them off the carts one by one, they dumped them all on the ground and the people from the hospital had to sort them out, who was dead and who was alive.” On May 10, 1903, when the Russian and Austrian consuls visited the prison and the hospital, they found a truly incomprehensible situation. All the wounded were considered prisoners and were treated in the prison hospital.

‘Why were these people not placed in the ward for ordinary wounded people?’ Rostkovski asked the head of the gendarmerie who was accompanying the consuls.

‘I do not know!’ he answered. “There is not enough space there,” added the pharmacist’s assistant.” (Reports from 1903, 206)

Every Christian person the police and authorities encountered and took off the streets during the turmoil, guilty or not, was taken to prison. Every Christian person who had been wounded by the “Bashibozuks” and left to die on the street, and was subsequently brought to the hospital, was assumed to be “guilty” even though their injuries were caused by the Muslim mob assisted by the authorities.

And in spite of the fact that everyone in Bitola knew (Ristich, the Serbian consul, said that the Organization “did not provide a direct cause” for these unhappy events…” Reports from 1903, 207.) that the Organization (MRO) did not fire a single bullet, did not attack the house of a single Muslim and did not give a single serious reason for the Bitola massacres (following the example at Solun), Hilmi Pasha, the Ottoman general inspector for the three villas (Solun, Bitola and Skopje), whose seat was then in Skopje, went in front of the Russian consul in Skopje and in front of a number of correspondents from the “Budapestanski Hirlap” and “Manchester Guardian” and gave inaccurate and tendentious information (lied) about the events. Here is what he said: “On May 6 several places in the marketplace were attacked and bullets were fired against the Muslims. Three Muslims were wounded, including one imam. All Muslims in the city were peaceful, much more peaceful than in Solun. The soldier who took part in dispersing the rioters killed 11 and wounded 9 people.

Two villagers in Tsapari were wounded and 12 killed. The Tsapari villagers took part in the Bitola riots which provoked the Muslims to start the massacre…” (Ibid, 200. For the Bitola events also see: D. Dimeski, The Giurgevden Massacre in Bitola 1903 - History VII, 2, Skopje 1971, 147.)

The Solun events influenced events in the third vilayet centre in Skopje, but the Skopje events were not as bloody as those in Solun and Bitola. There were no casualties in Skopje. The “Bashibozuks” did not storm the markets and streets, and the authorities were satisfied with the arrests they made of everyone from the Exarchate communities who they suspected, guilty or not. Hilmi-Pasha campaigned against the Organization (MRO) in Skopje. He used the Solun assassinations to the maximum to compromise the revolutionary movement. The Ottomans also lost no time to complain to foreign correspondents that they were being attacked and threatened by “anarchists”. In a conversation with a correspondent from the Manchester Guardian, Himli-Pasha ironically asked:

“Tell me Sir, after the events in Solun, did the European, or specifically the French press, sympathize with the rebels, who the French especially thanked for blowing up their ship in the port of Solun?” (Ibid, 186.)

The arrests were carried out under the pretext of preventing “planned” assassinations in the city. Unfortunately, after what had happened in Solun, no one had the courage to react. When Exarchate Metropolitan Sinesie went to “beg” for the release of some of the prisoners, Hilmi Pasha told him that it was this kind of “honest” people, merchants and teachers who carried out the assassinations in Solun.

“These kinds of assassinations are also expected here in Skopje,” said Hilmi-Pasha. “Do you guarantee that such things will not happen here? If you guarantee me that I will immediately release the persons in whom you are interested!”

Sinese, of course, could not give such a guarantee.

As for the rumours of attacks on the consulates in Skopje, there is no doubt that they were especially spread by his agents and by Hilmi-Pasha himself. Even though these rumours had no basis, the measures taken by the authorities were considered normal. Hilmi-Pasha placed guards in front of all the consulates except for the Bulgarian consulate which he declared to be safe and did not need guarding. This gesture had a message in it saying that the agency of a country, which “manages” the revolution in Macedonia, could not be jeopardized by “its own” people. By doing this, Himli-Pasha wanted to “remind” the European diplomats that the struggle in Macedonia and the “anarchist” actions were “conducted by Bulgaria”.

Another city affected by the Solun events, of course, was Veles, home of the Gemidzhii. After finding out that the majority of the Gemidzhii were from Veles, the Ottoman authorities dispatched Dzhemal- Bey, a member of the Military Court, to investigate. Upon his arrival in Veles, Dzhemal- Bey immediately arrested all the fathers, brothers and other relatives of the Gemidzhii. As was done in other places in Macedonia, people who did not have anything to do with the Organization or the assassins were also arrested. When the fourth shipment of dynamite was sent from Veles to Solun, the name “Gigo Sharlagandzhiata” was mentioned at the train station. This man was a famous manufacturer of “sharlagan” (vegetable oil) in Veles. After the assassinations, he was arrested and detained in prison for several months, even though he had done nothing wrong and had no idea of what the Gemidzhii were up to. The parents and relatives of the Gemidzhii, who knew nothing of what their sons were doing, were also found “guilty”. They were found guilty of giving birth to them and being close to them. They were all condemned. Twenty-three people from Veles were sent to Solun, brought before a military court and sentenced from 3 to 5 years in prison. Among them was Giosho Popiordanov, Ortse’s father.

* * *

We have no accurate figures of how many people were arrested and exposed to torture. According to official information, released by Chief Inspector Hilmi-Pasha to his government, there were 461

prisoners in the Bitola vilayet, 382 in the Solun vilayet and 281 in the Kosovo (Skopje) vilayet, for a total of 1,124 people.

However, as we pointed out earlier about those killed, no one believed the “official” figures for those who were imprisoned, especially since these figures were released by the Ottomans who tended to distort things. (Liberation struggle, doc. 93.) All contemporaries who wrote about these chaotic events agree that the arrests were massive like never before, and the tortures were brutal. The dungeons, which the Ottoman government praised, were not big enough to accommodate all the Macedonians who were arrested and jailed. When the Russian and Austro-Hungarian consuls in Skopje visited one of the prisons, they found it to be overcrowded. As a result, Hilmi-Pasha ordered his people to find and prepare houses where prisoners from this and from two other prisons, could be transferred. (Reports from 1903, 215.) Fontana, the English vice-consul in Skopje, on May 1, 1903, wrote: “The prison in Shtip was overcrowded with 150 people…” (Turkey, No 1 (1904), doc. 250.) The French consul in Solun in his May 7 and 13, 1903 reports to Delkase, pointed out that the prisons were “overcrowded” with arrested Exarchates from all social backgrounds. “The Christians are arrested,” wrote the newspaper ‘Di Informatsion’ on May 22, 1903, “and imprisoned in the Kan’l-kule prison and the cells in the Edi-Kule prison are full of prisoners. The hands and feet of the prisoners are tied...” (According to N. Silianov, 263.) There were people who went mad from being tortured. The famous revolutionary T. Lazarov was also captured and tortured. Petar Poparsov was brought in chains to a Skopje prison. Ivan Garvanov was also arrested. Almost all major merchants of Macedonian decent belonging to the Exarchate Church in Solun were arrested and jailed. The situation was no different in other parts of Macedonia. About 900 people were arrested in the Solun vilayet, around 850 were arrested in the Bitola vilayet and around 500 were arrested in the Skopje (Kosovo) vilayet. More than 2,200 Macedonians were arrested in total. The arrests lasted more than a month.

Using the Solun assassinations as an excuse for the mass arrests, Hilmi-Pasha was not interested or in a hurry to open the prison doors and release the Macedonians who he knew had nothing to do with the assassinations. But, especially after receiving constant news

that the conflicts between the Ottoman army and the Macedonian cheti kept escalating and that the preparations for a general uprising were intensifying, he knew that a large number of the prisoners he held were connected to the Macedonian Revolutionary Organization, even though he did not have any concrete evidence to send them to trial. So he kept them in the prisons. Of all those arrested in Skopje, 110 people were deemed “very suspicious”. Hilmi-Pasha often said: “He is a very dangerous person,” as he pointed to a prisoner. Of course for him, all the teachers and all the prominent Christian citizens were dangerous to his Empire. He considered all the teachers to be the chief leaders and the business people the material supporters of the revolutionary movement in Macedonia. While the surviving the Gemidzhii were still being tried, Hilmi-Pasha had no problem keeping a large number of Macedonian people in his prisons; and he did exactly that. The Ottoman authorities could not have possibly known in the beginning that the Gemidzhii were a very small group of conspirators. They could not even prove or disprove if there was any relationship between the MRO and the Gemidzhii. The general public too did not know about this but was expecting something to be revealed during the trials, something perhaps critical against the sultan. “The trials,” wrote Steg, “will bring bitter disappointment to those who expect that after more than a month, interesting details will be discovered about the link between the authors of the latest assassinations and the revolutionary committees. Indeed, it was said at the outset that members of the subversive committee from Sofia decided to commit a series of assassinations in Solun, but no evidence was given in that sense, so the verdict restricts the conclusion, which is quite sure and complete, for the personal participation of the defendants in the assassinations of April 28 and 29, 1903”. (A.M., F. 238, French Consulate in Solun to Delkase, Solun, June 12, 1903.)

But when claims, counter-claims and allegations could not be proven, especially to the Great Power representatives, the Russian and Austro-Hungarian MPs stepped in and pressured the Ottoman authorities to release a larger number of those arrested. Those prisoners who Hilmi-Pasha suspected of being members of MRO, but had no proof, he was planning to “relocate” without a trial. According to Fontana, Himli-Pasha planned to relocate over 100 “suspected” persons to other parts of the Ottoman Empire, perhaps

near the sea coast where they would be given land and kept under control. (Turkey, No 1 (1904), Doc. 136.) This, however, did not go well with the people and was met with disapproval from the “most interested” consuls in Skopje, the Russian and Austro-Hungarian consuls. The consuls insisted that Hilmi-Pasha publicly try or release the prisoners. The Russian Consul General in Solun, on orders from his ambassador in Tsari Grad, took a trip to Skopje and advised Hilmi-Pasha to instruct the Valis to give up their intentions of expelling suspects without a trial. Hilmi-Pasha unfortunately decided to ignore that advice. (A.M., F. 238, French Consulate in Solun to Delkase, Solun, June 12, 1903.)

The Ottoman authorities decided to use the Solun assassinations as an excuse to expel as many Macedonian people as possible, especially from Solun, while claiming that the entire Macedonian population was “morally responsible” for the actions of a few. As a result a massive number of people, particularly those who had moved to Solun in the recent past, were moved. The prisoners released were forced to go back to their native lands which they had abandoned a long time ago. This created a serious problem for the people. Their families were left without breadwinners and exposed to hunger. The men who were jailed and then expelled were also left with nothing to do, and they too were exposed to hunger. “My colleagues and I,” wrote Steg, “paid particular attention to the danger of being threatened by the loss of earnings for people who dealt in certain professions here, who, after losing their jobs in their villages, would increase the numbers of the rebels…”

By the beginning of July, 1903, about 200 people were forcibly expelled from Solun and sent to their native places. At the same time, about 600 people were released from the Solun prisons. At the end of June there were about 600 people in the prisons in the three vilayets. There were 250 people in the Skopje prison on July 2, of whom 35 were sent to prison outside of Macedonia. (Turkey, No 1 (1904), doc. 70, 74, 89, 127. According to Evgeniadis, in the first ten days there were 500-600 prisoners in the Solun prison -Makedonika, 81.)

Initially, the Ottoman authorities in Solun arrested everyone who was Macedonian including the Macedonian Patriarchates. As a

result Evgeniadis, the Greek consul, sent a list to the Foreign Minister of Greece, from which 24 Macedonian people were identified as Patriarchate. After a Greek intervention, the Patriarchates or so-called “Greeks”, as identified by the Greek government, were released. In critical situations the Ottoman authorities did not care to distinguish between Christians, regardless of their church affiliation. To them they were all equally dangerous. The Ottomans were well aware that, despite the hostility of official Greece to the High Port, the Christian population in Macedonia, as recognized by the Patriarchate Church, was just as dissatisfied with Ottoman rule as was the population recognized by the Exarchate Church. During the first attack by the army and “Bashibozuks” in Solun, 12 Patriarchates, almost all Greeks, were killed in addition to the large number of Exarchates. (Makedonika, 68, 70-71.)

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Impacted by the repressions in Solun, as well as in other cities, was also the prominent layer of Macedonians from the Exarchate camp, who in reality had nothing to do with the Gemidzhii and with the Macedonian Revolutionary Organization. “One can believe,” wrote Steg, “that, worried about their own interests, a great number of them were purposely keeping away from direct involvement in the revolutionary movement. However, the Ottoman authorities did not think so… thus openly claiming that every Exarchate was guilty of compassion, at least morally, for the revolutionaries and for the assassins. The next day, after the assassinations, the police began to search and seize the documents of many of the Solun merchants. More than 30 owners of commercial houses, some of which were very large, were detained pending an investigation. The authorities were looking to find anything that did not match between the materials they actually possessed and those shown in their documents. The police were flooded with trade documents it had seized during the searches. The consuls were concerned that this investigation could continue for a long time which would negatively impact their businesses and their obligations to their European traders.

The consequences of the economic life in Solun was quickly felt everywhere. Police measures to block any movement after 8 pm, in

addition to arresting curfew breakers, also impacted the economy. Distrust spread everywhere especially since it was not known who was going to be dragged into the abyss if there was a collapse in trade with the major Macedonian merchants. In Solun, it was customary to pay for goods in cash on the first Friday after the transaction. But the moment the city was disrupted everyone was asking to be paid up front in gold or silver.

The city tram company lost 300 francs a day. The gas company was unable to collect revenues and pay its staff. Almost all transport companies were losing customers. Income from use of the Solun port fell sharply. (AM, F. 238 French Consulate in Solun to Delkase, Solun, May 27, 1903.)

The European colony in Solun was pressed by fear that new assassinations might be carried out in retribution for the repressions brought on by the Muslims and Solun Jews. Both the Muslims and Jews believed that it was “European tolerance” of the revolutionaries that gave the Gemidzhii the courage to carry out the assassinations. The Solun authorities made statements claiming that Solun and the other Vilayets were now peaceful as a result of the mass arrests they had carried out. Unfortunately there was news coming from everywhere contradicting the authorities about how peaceful Macedonia was.

There was terrible stagnation in the economy not just in Solun but everywhere in Macedonia. The same situation found in Solun was also found in Bitola. Although the city was ruled by peace, economic activities in mid-May were at a complete standstill. The authorities tried to open the market but without success. On May 12, 1903 only one quarter of the stores were open. Apart from several Muslims, no other villagers came to Bitola on market day on May 11. The situation began to change somewhat starting on May 12. “Fear and concern had overcome the Christians, not from the Committee (MRO), but from the Muslims…” (Reports from 1903, 220.) Fear and mistrust were so great that they were the biggest reason why the population was hiding in its homes. Fear and mistrust were the greatest cause for stopping traffic everywhere and forcing the marketplace to close down. Tossing spoiled goods into the Dragor River became an everyday event in those days. Even a

rolling tin can in the moving water of the Dragor was reason for fear. Two Jews walking close by were frightened into thinking bombs were exploding in the distance, which gave them reason to flee the city and spread inaccurate news. Half an hour later there was no one in the Bazaar.

Crafts and trades ceased to function in Bitola. Even the usual villagers did not come to the city to buy and sell goods. An atmosphere of fear and uncertainty was maintained by the constant rumours being spread that there was an imminent attack coming from the MRO; and that bombs were exploding here and there; and that the Muslims are preparing to commit another massacre; and so on. The Christian population was looking forward to something “big” happening; freedom from Ottoman oppression. Much of the rumours and misinformation about alleged attacks from MRO seemed to be spread around by interested Muslim circles. Here is what was written about alleged events having taken place on May 6, 1903 in the official “Monastir” newspaper on May 13, 1903: “Last Wednesday some rebels, intending to provoke riots in various parts of the city, began to shoot at the Ottoman military and the Muslim population. Thanks to the rapid intervention of the army and the gendarmerie, these rebel intentions were cut short and peace and order was immediately restored. Several rebels were killed, and several Muslim and non-Muslims were wounded. Under the powerful protection of H.M. the Sultan, the city is now ruled by complete peace and order, every inhabitant does his work and does not cease to pray for the long and happy life of our supreme Master Sultan Hamid-Khan.” (Ibid, 221-222.)

These kinds of stories, written in the Ottoman newspapers, M. Ristich, the Serbian consul, called lies and fabrications. This same lie was sent to Hilmi-Pasha in Skopje by the Bitola Vali. It also appeared at the High Porte in Tsari Grad.

This is how M. Ristich summarized the atmosphere while writing about the truly difficult economic and psychological situation in which almost the entire Christian population had found itself in Bitola: “The Christian population lives with permanent expectation that something will happen which, once and for all, will force an end to this unbearable situation. This common danger from the Muslims