SECRETARY OF STATE FOR DOMINION AFFAIRS - Part 02

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR DOMINION AFFAIRS

Rec’d 4:54 a.m. Feb. 28th.

Telegram - June 6, 1945

From the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs To the Secretary of State for External Affairs Canada

CIRCULAR D. 999

My telegram circular D. 437 of March 13th.

Greek Government have expressed to us and to United States Government concern over efforts now being made to promote a Yugoslav-Bulgarian Federation. Greek Government say that this would be tantamount to a Slavic hegemony over Balkans threatening Salonica and eastern and western Thrace; that having in mind this possible menace they feel justified in asking for a strategic rectification of the Greco-Bulgarian frontier by cession of Bulgarian territory; and that only such conditions as would give Greek people a sense of security will permit them to view without apprehension a possible future Balkan Federation.

2. Greek Government asked us to warn Yugoslav Government against any claims or designs prejudicial to territorial integrity of Greece in Macedonia or to Greek claims in northern Epirus.

3. In reply, we are informing Greek Government of warning given to Yugoslav and Bulgarian Governments last January against formation of a Yugoslav-Bulgarian Federation or creation of a greater Macedonian State involving claims on Greek territory (my telegram Circular D. 182). We do not propose to inform them of warning (my telegram Circular D. 365) given to Tito against conclusion of a Yugoslav-Bulgarian treaty (in favour of which Soviet Government had expressed themselves - see my telegram Circular D. 200)

4. We doubt whether Greek territorial claims against Bulgaria, Yugoslavia and Albania are justified and are confining ourselves to informing Greek Government that we can enter into no commitments at this stage.

5. State Department, who enquired our views, have been informed of our reply.

Telegram 388 - London, March 3rd, 1945

From the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs To the Secretary of State for External Affairs Canada

CIRCULAR D. 388

Yugoslavia

In response to statement of our views on question of Yugoslav-Bulgarian Federation and a Greater Macedonia contained in my telegram Circular D. 1of January 1st , United States Government have now replied as follows.

2. United States Government hold view that prewar frontiers of Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Greece in Macedonian area must be considered legal boundaries and that any revision should only be allowed in accordance with freely expressed wish or populations concerned and as part or a general peace settlement.

3. United States Government would not object if, in reconstitution or Yugoslavia, Government and people of that country wished to set up a regional and de-centralized administration under which south eastern Yugoslavia would have a certain autonomous character. They, however, share our view that there is no legitimate basis for any claim made on behalf of “Macedonia”, whether as an independent State or as a part of Yugoslavia or of a larger South Slav Federation, to territory within the boundaries of Greece on the ground that such territory is “Macedonian”.

4. While the United States Government favour the retention or the present frontier between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, they would not object to any settlement beneficial to the general welfare of the region provided it represented the real wishes of the people concerned, including those Yugoslavs still in enemy occupied territory.

Telegram - London, March 26th, 1949

Circular H. 75. Saving. My telegram 23rd February Circular H. 50. Saving

Greece and the Yugoslav – Cominform Dispute – Position during the War

1. During the German occupation of Greece it was policy of the Communist Party of Greece (K.K.E.) to make use of the National resistance movement in order to seize power and establish a Communist state. With this end in view, the Communists formed a resistance organization known as the National Resistance Front (E.A.M.), which was on the surface a non-political union of different resistance groups, but was in practice completely dominated by K.K.E. E.A.M. made it its business to suppress all rival resistance groups, if necessary by force, and by the end of 1944 it was left alone in the field.

2. Meanwhile the resistance movement in Yugoslavia was known by the similar name of O.F. (Liberation Front) or N.O.F. (National Liberation Front). Its counter part among the Slav-Macedonians of Northern Greece was S.N.O.F. (Slavo-Macedonian National Liberation Front) or, later, simply N.O.F., which remained under E.A.M. control until September 1944, when the leader of the Slav-Macedonian Units, Gotseff (Elias Dimakis) broke with E.A.M. and lead his men to Skopje (Yugoslavia) where a federal republic of Macedonia had been set up within the Yugoslav federation. (After January 1946, N.O.F. activity, directed from Yugoslavia reappeared in Northern Greece working in conjunction with the increasing rebel activities of K.K.E.).

3. During the occupation the aim of the N.O.F. and K.K.E. were in one respect identical that is to say that both were more interested in achieving power after the war than in actually driving out the Germans. Apart from this, however, their aim was inherently contradictory: whereas K.K.E. sought to establish a new regime with authority throughout the whole of Greece, N.O.F. were bent on setting up a new People’s Republic of Macedonia to be formed by the union of the Pirin (Bulgarian), Vardar (Yugoslav) and Aegean

(Greek) areas of Macedonia. So long as Soviet Russia was primarily interested in winning the war, she was able to play down these differences and even a certain amount of co-operation was witnessed between the two parties. At the conclusion of the war, the only chance in the situation was only that the policy dictated by Moscow became that of a destroying the established Greek Government at all costs preparatory to the setting up of some sort of Communist-Controlled regime. The precise form which that regime would take was not specified and Moscow was thus still able to keep well in the background the conflict of interest between N’O’F’ and K.K.E.

Developments following from the Yugoslav-Cominform dispute

4. On the outbreak of the Yugoslav-Cominform dispute, the Russians seem to have realized:

(a) That they could no longer hope to control the Yugoslav-dominated N.O.F., and (b) that, so long as Greece’s northern neighbours were divided amongst themselves, plans for destroying her government must be for the moment put aside.

They therefore re-shaped their policy, and it now seems that their main objective is to set up a People's Republic of Macedonia, under Bulgarian influence. In this way, they would hope to divert the autonomous aspirations of the Slavo-Macedonians in Greece from the Yugoslav to the traditional Bulgarian channel. As a long tem objective the Russians probably had in mind the value of a land bridge to Albania, at present very hard hit by the isolated position in which her anti-Titoism has placed her. (My telegram Circular H. 3l Saving).

5. This change of policy has had two visible results. The first was the purge of K.K.E. (my telegram under reference); this purge was presumably designed to remove from office any nationalist deviationists who might have objected to a policy involving the sacrifice of Greek territory. The second was the setting up of a rival N.O.F. under Bulgarian influence based on Aegean Macedonia. The activities of this body are reported in my immediately following telegram.