Introduction - Part 02

4. This trial provides, perhaps, a suitable opportunity of reviewing the attitude of the present Yugoslav Government to the Macedonian problem and to the traditional Macedonian parties. Yugoslav Macedonia is a barren and sterile country of small economic value. Its inhabitants throughout their history have been the thorn in the flesh of every Yugoslav Government. Its strategic importance, however, is great as it controls the Vardar Valley and the Monastir Pass. In consequence, ever since its acquisition by Serbia in 1912, the Government of Belgrade has hung on to it with fierce tenacity. From the strategic point of view it was equally important to Bulgaria and the latter, to support its claims at first fostered revolutionary Macedonian organization known as I.M.R.O. When this movement broke out into two warring factions, the Mihailovists and Protoguerovists, the Yugoslav Government found in the later a means to serve their own ends, for the latter were ready to accept Macedonian autonomy within the frontiers of Yugoslavia, besides being opposed to the Bulgarian Government then in power. The Protoguerovists, indeed, received secret subsidies from the Yugoslav Government. The rivals of this faction the Mihailovists on the other hand, who stood for complete Macedonian autonomy or at least the incorporation of Serbian Macedonia within Bulgaria, to form an autonomous state, did not fail, on the other hand, to make contact with the extreme Croat opponents of the Belgrade Government.

5. There is no reason to believe that the present Yugoslav Government was any less determined than its predecessors that Yugoslav Macedonia should be part of Yugoslavia. Indeed, it is

more than probable that this is part of the present Soviet plan for South-East Europe, for it is significant that Macedonian autonomy is, according to the reports I have seen from the British political representative at Sofia and His Majesty's Consul-General at Salonica, regarded as a reactionary plan sponsored by "foreign" Powers: It is, also interesting to note that the veteran Protoguerovist leader, Dimitar Vlahov, is a member of the present Presidium of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia, and that those who issued the dementi referred to in paragraph 1 so significantly omit the name of Mihailov from the great names of I.M.R.O, which is, in fact, there portrayed as a purely Protoguerovist organization. Indeed, it could not be otherwise, for Mihailov during the occupation of Yugoslavia lived in Zagreb in close personal contact with Pavelic with \V whom, the Assistant Minister for Foreign Affairs recently told me, he escaped at the time of the liberation. Mihailov is, therefore, branded in the eyes of the present Yugoslav regime with the same mark as Pavelic. In short, the old Serb alliance with the Protoguerovist faction remains in essence as it was before the war despite the changed circumstances of the time.

6, Nevertheless, Macedonia still remains a problem to the Yugoslav Government. The Federal Republic of Macedonia is, it is true, given greater independence in administration than any other of the Federal units in Yugoslavia. Even so, the present measure of control by Belgrade is, according to the reports I have received, intensely resented and this is somewhat confined by the complaints of the Bulgarian Opposition parties reported by Mr. Houstoun-Boswall in his telegram No.3, Saving, of the 4th February.

7. On the other hand, it must not be taken for granted that the present solution of the Macedonian problem, which has been up to date the Yugoslav Government's policy, and which has eschewed ally demand for the union of Greek and Bulgarian Macedonia with Serbian Macedonia, is the final solution. To judge from His Majesty's Consulate-General's letter to the Chancery at Athens of the 14th April, there is, already on foot a Yugoslav plan for the incorporation of Greek Macedonia within the borders of Yugoslavia. As yet, however such a movement is not officially sponsored, and the general Yugoslav attitude is restricted to one of platonic sympathy with allegedly persecuted blood brothers across the

border. Two factors probably militate against the Yugoslav Government officially sponsoring such a movement, let alone a movement for the union inside Yugoslavia of both Greek and Bulgarian Macedonia. The first is the effect of any Yugoslav claim to Bulgarian and Greek territory on the position of the present Bulgarian regime and the opposition in Greece, both of which enjoy vigorous Yugoslav support. In the second place the creation at this stage of a large autonomous Macedonian State might well endanger the position of the present highly centralized Government in Belgrade. On the other hand, in the event of a Yugoslav-Bulgarian union or of Greece coming into the Soviet orbit, the position would be entirely different. The retention of Yugoslav Macedonia by Yugoslavia would then cease to possess any strategic importance and a united Macedonia would be a practical proposition either as a unit of a Greater Yugoslavia, or of a Soviet-controlled Balkan Confederation.

I am sending copies of this dispatch to His Majesty’s Ambassador at Athens and Moscow, His Majesty’s political representative in Sofia, His Majesty’s Council-General at Salonica, and his Majesty’s political advisor to Supreme Allied Command at Caserta.

I have, &c. GEORGE CLUTTON.

Balkan States 8 - August 22, 1946

Mr. Clutton to Mr. Bevin

No. 310

Belgrade, 13th August, 1946.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to report that the first Congress of the National Front of Macedonia was held at Skopje from the 2nd to the 4th August. The most prominent personalities attending the congress were Lazar Kolishevski, President of the People’s Republic of Macedonia and secretary of the Territorial Committee of the National Front of Macedonia; M. Neshkovich, the President of the Serbian Government; and M.Frane Frol, the Minister of Justice of the Federal Government. The congress was also attended by a delegation from Bulgarian Macedonia (Pirin), the leader of which was Krsto Stojchev, a Deputy of the Bulgarian Sobranje. There were also delegates from Greek or, as it is called here, Aegean Macedonia, and a delegate from Trieste, M. Eugen Laurenti.

2. The congress opened on Ilinden the anniversary of the rising against the Turks in Macedonia in 1903. Extremely long speeches were made by M. Kolishevski and by M. Neshkovich. The main points of these were the necessity for suppressing reaction, the union of Pirin with the Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, and the strugg1e of the Macedonians in Greece. M. Stoichev, the Bulgarian delegate, spoke in favour of the Inclusion of Pirin in the Republic of Macedonia and added that, as he had declared elsewhere, there were in the Bulgaria of the present day still remnants of Bulgarian chauvinism which wished to destroy the fraternal relations existing between the Fatherland Front of Bulgaria and Marshal Tito’s Yugoslavia.

3. Of greater interest, however, was the manifesto issued by the congress at its conclusion. This document begins by saying that, on the anniversary of the glorious rising of Ilinden and on the anniversary of the meeting of A.S.N.O.M., when the foundations

were laid for the realization of the Ideals of the Ilinden rising, the delegates, who had come from all parts of the country and who represented all classes and all nationalities in Macedonia, once again manifested the political union of the whole of the people and the unshakeable fraternity and union of the Macedonian people with all the national minorities in Macedonia. After praising the National Front, its leader, Marshal Tito and its policy, which had been created and executed by the best fighters for the rights of the working people, the Communist Party, the manifesto continues by saying, that the first congress of the front had the pleasure of welcoming guests in the persons of representatives of their brothers from Pirin and Aegean Macedonia. This had turned the congress into a manifestation of the wish of the Macedonian people of all parts of Macedonia to be free and united in the Republic of Yugoslavia. From its first days the programme of the National Front had been based on the principle that the people of Macedonia must be united in the Macedonian Republic. The realization of this ideal was to-day the ardent desire of the people. The strengthening cultural relations with Pirin and the national development of the people in that part of Macedonia would create all the conditions for the fulfillment of the wish for the union of these districts in the Macedonian Republic. This wish had also been manifested in the Vardar, i.e., Yugoslav district of Macedonia. By a fraternal understanding between the People's Republic of Yugoslavia and the Fatherland Front of Bulgaria, Bulgarian Macedonia should be united with the Republic of Macedonia.

4. Turning next to Aegean Macedonia, the manifesto says that the Macedonians in this region, who, with the democratic Greeks, waged a stubborn fight against their Monarcho-Fascist oppressors for the establishment of their national and democratic rights, had the undivided sympathy and moral support not only of the People’s Republic of Macedonia, but also of all the peoples of Yugoslavia. Taking its stand on the principle of the union of all the people of Macedonia within the framework of the Federative People's Republic of Yugoslavia, the National Front of Macedonia insisted, moreover, that these national and democratic rights should be given to the Slovenes and the Croats of Trieste and the Julian March. The congress therefore firmly demanded the inclusion of this national territory in the Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia.

5. The manifesto, after an exhortation to all sections of the community to liquidate the numerous types of local reaction in Macedonia and to unite within the National Front, ends by emphasizing the importance of the elections to the Constituent Sobranje of the People's Republic of Macedonia which are to take place on the 22nd September. The elections should be a new manifestation of the unity of the people and their determination to continue on their road, led by the National Front and its chief, Marshal Tito.

6. There are two points of secondary interest in this manifesto. The first is the statement that the policy of the National Front has been created and executed by the Communist Party. As a rule, the Communist Party in Yugoslavia keeps well in the background, but there have been during the last few months several indications that the party is beginning to come more out into the open. Examples of this are Mosha Pijade's statement that the People's Committees were the creation of the Communist Party (see my dispatch No.196 of the 21st May). and Marshal Tito's statement at Split that he did not expect the Catholic Clergy to love either him or his, i.e., the Communist, Party (see paragraph 4 of my dispatch No.293 of. the 22nd July). Of like interest is also the linking up, I think for the first time, of Yugoslav territorial aspirations in both the north and south, the justice of Yugoslavia's claim to Trieste being based on the justness of the principle of the union of Pirin and Vardar to Macedonia.

7. The most significant feature of the manifesto, however, is that it is the first open indication of future Yugoslav policy towards Macedonia, admittedly in a form which the Yugoslav Government could repudiate if need be. His Majesty's Consul-General at Salonica has reported the agitation within his district for the incorporation of Greek Macedonia within the framework of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia. Little or no publicity has until the issue of this manifesto been given to such ideas inside Yugoslavia. It is true that, while the manifesto openly asks for the union of Pirin to Federative Macedonia, the references to Greek Macedonia are vaguer and amount to little more than platonic sympathy. Nevertheless, it is quite clear what is in the wind.

8. Whether this projected union of the three Macedonias within the framework of Yugoslavia is to coincide with the Federal Union of Bulgaria and Yugoslavia, as suggested in my dispatch No. 223 of the 6th June, cannot yet be said. Perhaps the question has hot even yet been decided. In this connexion I might add that I have twice asked officials of the Yugoslav Ministry for Foreign Affairs what significance should be attached to the manifesto. Their answers have been very evasive. One said that he had not yet read the press reports of the congress, and the other that he could not understand what the Macedonians were up to. They now had their own Macedonia, but he supposed that they now wanted something more. From this my conclusion is that Yugoslav plans are not yet fully crystallized.

I am sending copies of this dispatch to His Majesty’s Ambassador at Athens and Moscow, His Majesty’s Council-General at Salonica, His Majesty’s political representative in Sofia, and to His Majesty’s political advisor to Supreme Allied Command at Caserta.

I have, &c. GEORGE CLUTTON.

Balkan States 9 - September 4, 1946

Mr. Peake to Mr. Bevin

No. 324

Belgrade, 27th August, 1946.

Sir,

WITH reference to Mr. Clutton’s dispatch No. 310 of the 13th August, 1946, have the honour to report that the leading article in the issue of Borba for the 26th August was devoted to Greek, or, as the Yugoslav’s call it Aegean Macedonia. At the head of the article was a map, a copy of which I attach, showing the present national frontiers and also the ethnical frontier. As you will notice the latter embraces Salonica and almost all Greek Macedonia.

2. The article opens by saying that the frightful terror which is being carried on by Monarcho-Fascist bands in Greek Macedonia is already known to the Yugoslav public. Thousands of Macedonians and democratic Greek refugees are living witnesses of the murder and incendiarism which these bands are committing on “our brothers.” This terrorism has become much worse latterly, when the Monarcho-Fascist clique, which has not been able to find deep roots in the Greek people, began its attempt to purge Greek Macedonia of Macedonians and Greek democrats. Just now active purging of Greek Macedonia is going on- tens of villages are burning, women and children and powerless old men are being murdered, as in the most terrible period of the German occupation.

3. The district, in which a particularly violent terrorism is being carried on, and which is known under the name of Greek (Aegean) Macedonia, is, in f act, ethnically a part of Macedonia. In the whole of the Balkans there is no district which has passed through in the course of recent history such a bitter terrorism as has been suffered by the Macedonian population from the Greek imperialists. The ethnical history of Macedonia is then traced from 1896-1914, during the whole of which time it is shown that the Macedonians remained in an absolute majority in Greek Macedonia. After 1914, however,

the picture began to change. The Greek soldiers killed tens of thousands of Macedonians, they destroyed villages, they burnt down houses. In the place of their former inhabitants there came Greeks or philhellene “Aromuni.” The greatest ethnical change was caused by the enforced exchange of populations between Greeks and Turks after the Greek defeat in Asia Minor in 1922 and the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923. At that time the Greeks were forced by the Turks to take in all the Christian inhabitants, among whom “Karamanlija,” Greeks, Kurds and other Caucasian people predominated. The great part of these people were settled in Greek Macedonia. The Greeks, for their part, sent into Turkey all the Mohammedans, such as Turks, Mohammedan Macedonians, “Arbanassi” and “Aromuni.” Large numbers were also forced into Bulgaria from Macedonia. After this war, in which our Macedonian brothers fought heroically shoulder to shoulder with the Greek patriots, the Monarcho-Fascists had chased into Yugoslavia and Bulgaria about 20,000 Macedonians from Macedonia. As the result of this persecution 150,000 Macedonians had been displaced or killed from 1914 up till now. In the course of the years 1941-42 our partisan representatives personally completed a list of Macedonian families in Greek Macedonia, and they reckoned that there were still about 250,000 Macedonians there. If one also takes into account the places in which the Macedonians do not represent the absolute but only the relative majority, then this figure of 250,000 should be considerably greater.

4. What, the article goes on, can our brothers expect from the present regime in Greece? The latest terrorism which is being carried on in Greece only confirms that the Monarcho-Fascist bands are continuing the prodigious terrorism which was carried on by the reactionary cliques in the past, and that it is intended that this terrorism shall completely annihilate our brothers in Greek Macedonia. The Macedonians in Greece do not enjoy any kind of rights. It is forbidden for them to speak their national language even in their own homes. Absolutely no Macedonian schools exist. Even their local political organizations have been rendered powerless. Chauvinistic cliques try to sow hatred among the Greek and other nationals against Macedonians, and to destroy that fraternity which was created in the course of the war of liberation. But to-day, opposed to that reactionary Greek policy, there is not the old

Yugoslavia in which the Macedonians were oppressed equally with other peoples, but the new democratic Yugoslavia where all peoples have equal rights. The Macedonian people who fought with Greek partisans for their liberation expected, with reason, that this war would bring them, in the spirit of the proclamations of the Great Allies, the right to advance and unite themselves with their other brothers. With justice they expected, that finally all the Macedonian people would be united and break away from foreign slavery. But it is only the Macedonians in Yugoslavia who have succeeded in bringing about their own complete liberation; and while in the People’s Republic of Macedonia a new national life is awakening, on the other side of the frontier our brothers are suffering under the yoke of Monarcho-Fascist bands.

5. Greek imperialists have no right at all to hold Macedonians any longer under their intolerable yoke; ,they can no longer answer that Belgrade and Sofia are persecuting their Macedonian populations and that such people as free Macedonians in their own countries do not exist. They have even less right because they are stifling with all their force the democratic movement and the democracy of their people, accepting foreign support and giving over their country to the mercy, or otherwise of foreign exploitation. The people of Yugoslavia watched patiently what was happening to their brothers in Greek Macedonia. They believed, and today still believe, that the Greek people cannot oppose the fight of the Greek Macedonians for democracy and national independence. But the latest statements of responsible Greek circles, not only in Greece but also in the international arena, and also the frightful terrorism which is being carried on in Greek Macedonia, show that the Greek, reactionary circles have become the provokers of tumult in the Balkans and have decided to annihilate their Macedonian population. There is no hope at all that the reactionary Greek circles, who to-day with naked force and with the help of foreign troops keep themselves in power, will show the slightest wish for the solution of this problem in conformity with the demands and interests of the Macedonians in Greece. This problem has become part of the fight which is being carried on all over the world for peace, for democracy and for the self-determination of peoples. Therefore, the article concludes, our country cannot remain indifferent to the annihilation of our brothers

in Greece, nor to their rights and their demands for self-determination and union with their brothers in Yugoslavia.

6. The theme of this article again predominated in the Belgrade press of the 27th August, when all three papers carried leading articles, which in Borba and Politika were headed by another map. The tone of these articles was extremely violent.

7. I am sending copies of this dispatch to His Majesty's Ambassador at Athens, His Majesty's Political Representative at Sofia, His' Majesty's Political Adviser at Caserta, and to His Majesty's Consul-General at Salonica.

I have, &c, C. B. PEAKE.

Balkan States 10 - Conditions in Western Macedonia

Report of Tour by Mr. Vice-Consul Dodson Section 1

July 1st, 1949

R 6417/10127/19 Mr. Knight to Mr. Bevin

(No. 33) His Majesty’s Consul General in Salonica presents his compliments to His Majesty’s Principle Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit to him, with reference to Salonica dispatch No. 61 of 9th December, a copy of a dispatch to His Majesty’s Ambassador at Athens, No. 17 of 23rd June, regarding Mr. Vice-Consul Dodson’s tour of Western Macedonia.

Salonica, 23rd June, 1949 – Enclosure

(No. 17) Salonica, 23rd June, 1949

Sir,

I have the honour to transmit to your Excellency the accompanying report by Mr. Vice-Consul Dodson on a recent tour of Western Macedonia. Mr. Dodson had previously visited this region at the end of November last, and his account of that journey was enclosed in my dispatch No. 41 of 9th December, 1948.

2. It was not expected from what is generally known of the adverse conditions still prevailing in Western Macedonia, that the military and economic situation in that area would show any marked improvement as compared with that of over six months earlier. Even so much of the report makes, I think, rather depressing reading in view of the undoubtedly imposed state of morale, both military and civilian, noticeable during the past few months throughout Northern Greece. Mr. Dodson considers that the improved morale in Western Macedonia is to be attributed to military successes elsewhere, particularly further south, rather than to any amelioration of the local

situation; and in a region where so many villages remain empty of their inhabitants, and towns overcrowded with refugees living in such distressful conditions, the situation which still produces such conditions cannot be regarded as anything but serious.

I am sending a copy of this dispatch to His Majesty’s Principle Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and His Majesty’s Ambassador at Belgrade.

I have, &c. W. L. C. Knight.

Enclosure to Dispatch No. 17

I made a short tour in Western Macedonia between 10th and 14th June. I drove to Kozani on the afternoon of 10th June, and the following morning went by road to Kastoria together with Mr. A. M. Homes, British Police and Prisons Mission Liaison Office in Western Macedonia, who very kindly accompanied me throughout the rest of the tour. We spent Sunday visiting the neighbourhood of Kastoria and returned via Argos Orestikon to Kozani on the Monday. On Tuesday 14th June, we paid quick visit to Servia before leaving for Salonica.

2. In Kastoria we called on the mayor and on Major-General Vasilas, commanding 10th Division. All attempts to find the acting nomarch proved fruitless. On the Sunday morning we drove out to the village of Tikhion, north-east of Kastoria, and that afternoon crossed the lake by boat to visit the village of Mavrokhori. We had to abandon a visit to Nestorion, as the need for traveling with the convoy involved spending a night there, for which we had insufficient time. Similar reasons prevented our visiting Grevena from Kozani. We stayed in Kastoria with No. 2 U.N.S.C.O.B. observer group, the vice-chairman of which, Lieut.-Commander Barret, very kindly put us up. He had returned from the frontier only two hours before we arrived, and all the other members of the group were out on duty at various points.

3. On our way to Kastoria we had called on the police authorities in Neapolis, and on the return journey we called on the Mayor of Argos Orestikon, who took us around his refugee camps. We missed

the daily convoy to Kozani as a result, and had some difficulty in persuading the military authorities to allow us to proceed despite the fact that the whole road appeared to be alive with troops.

4. In Kozani I called on Colonel Smijth Windham, commanding the British Military Mission liaison unit attached to Headquarters “B” Corps and was very kindly made a guest of the Mission’s hospitable mess. I also called on the Gendarmerie High Commander for Western Macedonia and at the Nomarchia. The latter was a waste of time as the acting nomarch was away and the official who received me as well as those who he summoned to his aid during our conversation, clearly had little idea of what was going on.

5. The situation in Western Macedonia is very different from the prevailing in Central and Eastern Macedonia and in Thrace. One senses the difference as one climbs up the Kastania pass, at the southern end of Vermion mountains, which divide the comparatively peaceful Central Macedonian region from the wilder area of Western Macedonia. Life seems to take on a new tempo and the mountains, rising range behind range westwards to the peaks of Smolokas and Grammos in Pindus and northwards to Vitsi, a new threat. There is in Kozani an atmosphere of urgency non-existent in Salonica. Whereas at Headquarters “C” Corps, one will discuss, over a cup of coffee, the prospects of a G.N.A. sweep against a rebel band in some far-away frontier are or be told about the latest mining incident, it requires only two minutes in the busy and business-like offices of the British liaison unit attached to “B” Corps to realize that there they are dealing with a war. Their maps are marked up for two or three operations at once and these are going on all around them. While talking to Colonel Smijth-Windham after dinner on the night of my arrival I pointed to a light in the hills south-west of Servia. “Yes,” he said “that’s a bandit light; that’s probably Ferraios.”

6. I could not find that the situation in Western Macedonia had changed much, if at all, since I last visited the area in December 1948, apart from a general improvement in morale. Military dispositions in the area seem little changed from six months ago. In places, perhaps, the rebels have been driven a little higher up the mountains, but the general picture remains the same. The Vitsi front

runs more or less in a straight line from Florina to Kastoria and the triangle of Greek territory north-west of it is entirely in rebel hands. The line is held by two G.N.A. divisions, who depend on their supplies on the two main lines of road communications; Kozani-Ptolemais-Florina and Kozani-Neapolis-Kastoria. Between these roads the Siniatsikon mountains provide a line of communications for the rebels and a jumping-off ground for raids and mine laying expeditions. West of the Aliakmon lies the other main rebel position on Mount Grammos, south of which the Pindus range affords the rebels another line of communications. South of Kozani is a semi-circle of mountains, Vourinos and Flamouri in the bend of the Aliakmon and Kamvounia and Pieria south-east of it, which forms the rebel road to Olympus. This whole semi-circle, together with the Khassia mountains to the south of the Aliakmon bend, is almost entirely under rebel control. Indeed as we drove from Kozani to Servia on the 14th June Mr. Holmes told me that, apart from the tiny fringe of low-lying land around Velvendos and Servia, there were no garrisons beyond the Aliakmon at all. We were told in Servia that two nights before our visit parts of two rebel brigades had moved from Pieria into Kamvounia across the open ground between Servia and the Aliakmon rather than bother to take the mountain route.

7. The G.N.A. forces on Grammos and Vitsi are dug into positions, though Major General Vasilas, whose 10th Division is on the left of the Vitsi front, pointed out that they were nevertheless fighting a positional war offensively. He claimed to have killed 144 bandits, who had attempted to reach Vitsi from Kaimakchalan, in a battle fought the day before our visit. Behind these two front lines the remaining G.N.A. forces are engaged in keeping open the lines of communication, holding the main centers of population and carrying out sweeps against any rebel concentrations which may be reported. In other, words they are holding the position in Western Macedonia until the, mountain areas in central Greece have been cleared of rebels.

8. The rebels, according information given me by the British Military Mission, have between 4,000-5,000 troops on Grammos and approximately 4,000 on Vitsi. These latter are made up principally of four rebel brigades, all of which are reported to be under strength and one of which to be composed principally of

women. In addition the rebels have a heavy concentration of guns on Vitsi. It is into these two mountain strongholds that the rebel supplies from Albania are brought. It appears that initially supplies are sent in bulk by road from Korce to the village of Vidove, just inside the Albanian frontier. Here they are broken up and the supplies for Grammos are sent on via the village of Slimnitsa. Supplies for the, Vitsi area are taken back by road to Bilisht and then driven over the border to Krystalopigi. The heights overlooking this road where it enters Greek territory are, unfortunately in rebel hands and it is impossible for the ,U.N.S.C.O.B. observers to see the lorries crossing the frontier, although I was told that, the sound of their engines was plainly audible at night.

9. The rebels seem to be expecting an attack on Vitsi, and their present strategy appears to be to prevent the G .N .A. from effecting any large-scale concentration of forces by sending small bands out in various directions, to pursue which the G.N.A. must disperse its troops. A number of these pursuit operations were certainly in progress while I was in the area. On our way from Argos Orestikon to Neapolis on 13th June we passed several columns of troops making their way up on to western Siniatsikon in pursuit, as we afterwards learned at “B” Corps Headquarters, of a reported band concentration. Only 6 miles from Kozani we saw a further force making its way onto Vourinos. I stopped to talk to the Brigade Commander, who told me that a rebel column with fifty mules was reported to have moved the night before from the area north of Siatista over into Vourinos. His brigade was moving up onto Vourinos from the north and east and further forces from Siatista were to move from the west. It was then 3 p.m. and the long lines of men and mu1es, moving across the corn-fields towards the foothills on the first stage of their march, must have been very visible to anyone watching from the peaks above. The following morning I was told at “B” Corps Headquarters that both these operations had drawn blank. Simultaneously with these operations other “B” Corps troops were assisting “A” Corps in an operation in the Khassia mountains against the Brigades of Ferraios and Bandekos.

10. The military authorities appear fairly satisfied with the present situation. The more sober certainly look for no final victory this year, but Colonel Smijth- Windham told me that he considered that

if Central Greece could be cleared of rebels by the autumn and the G.N.A. be left with only the frontier and the areas immediately behind it to worry about, a big improvement would have been made. He did not think that the rebel morale was at present very high and believed that many were on very short rations. At the same time he thought that the present and, as he saw it, unsatisfactory situation for the rebels had been caused very largely by their own political mistakes, particularly the dismissal of Markos and the. N.O.F. declaration, and he admitted that if a political mistake of similar magnitude were to be made by the Greek Government the situation might easily change for the worse. He had a poor opinion of the rebel forces and considered that with any really determined army the war could be finished in six months. The reluctance, amounting almost to refusal, of all Greek commanders to move at night was a major factor in prolonging the fighting.

11. But although the local military situation is little different from what it was six months ago, public morale has certainly improved. There has clearly been some amelioration of the security situation in the immediate vicinity of the towns to account for the fact that all local authorities tell one that the situation is better, but in the main this improved morale must spring from reports of successes further south and from the new confidence felt by and in the army. It is perhaps easy to over-emphasize this development. When I asked the Mayor of Kastoria - an educated man and a Macedonian - what he thought of the present state of the public mind, he said it was difficult to talk in terms of morale about the reactions of the Macedonian peasant. They had been inured to…(the rest of the report is missing).

British Consulate-General, Salonica - March 16, 1945

Sir,

I have the honour to report that I toured Eastern Macedonia and Thrace by car from March 8th -11th last, visiting in particular the towns of Serres, Drama, Kavalla, Xanthi and Komotini, making Kavalla my headquarters. I was accompanied throughout by Mr. Wm. M. Gwynn, American Consul-General in Salonica.

2. Traveling by road presented no difficulties whatsoever, and the surface everywhere was better than could have been expected. Only on the stretch from Salonica to the Struma was any destruction evident, but a temporary wooden bridge has now been constructed across the Struma and other bridges and culverts repaired in a rough and ready fashion so that traveling time between Salonica and Serres is now almost normal. From Serres onwards there were practically no signs of blown bridges or damaged roads. The railway is also functioning on a reduced scale from Rodhopolis to Alexandroupolis, lignite from Serres being used as fue1. Throughout Eastern Macedonia and Thrace communications and public utilities have remained large1y intact, the chief material damage caused by the Bulgarian occupation being the burning of mountain villages and the carrying off of cattle, draught animals and agricultura1 produce. Conditions ere thus much more favourable for a rapid economic recovery than in Western Macedonia. We were everywhere received with the utmost friendliness, sometimes to the point of embarrassment and not a single untoward incident marred our journey.

3. Only a brief stay was made at Serres, but it was sufficient to impart an impression of considerable poverty, malnutrition and insufficient clothing in what should normally be a prosperous town. Most shops wore shut, and the few that were open were but poorly stocked with articles or very inferior quality. British troops had not yet occupied the town, but security was reported to be good.

4. More time was spent in Drama on both the outward and return journeys. It gave signs of much greater animation and economic conditions seemed definitely better. A company of the Gurka Rifles

had arrived there the previous day (March 7th), and I was able to obtain the impressions of the Officer commanding, Captain Aurick, who had already formed severa1 local contacts. He had not found the ELAS officer in charge of the guard company by any means as co-operative as he could have wished. He held, it appeared, the mistaken view that he was responsible for disarming the Nationalist Bands, and likewise that he could continue to carry out his functions in his own way until the National Guard arrived to relive him. He was also maintaining a force of some 200 armed guards instead of the one hundred laid down in the Agreement of Varkiza. Captain Aurick considered that ELAS should confine itself to policing the town, and that for this purposes one hundred was entirely adequate. I therefore interviewed the ELAS officer to give him a more realistic view of his own position, stressing the point that Captain Aurick was the local representative of the Commander-in-Chief, and that he must take orders from him. I also told him that he had nothing whatsoever to do with the disarmament of the Nationalist Bands; that was a matter for the Greek Government and their local representatives, in this case the British troops. No difficulty was being made, however, as to the handing over of the arms surrendered by ELAS, which was due to take place the next day and has since been done.

5. With regard to the disarming of the Nationalist Bands of Anton Tsaous, I found a certain amount of confusion. Two days previously the Officer Commanding H.M.S. "Kimberley" at Kavalla had visited the headquarters of these bands, accompanied by the ELAS officer who had previously commanded the 6th ELAS division at Kavalla, and had told the bands that they must be prepared to surrender their arms the following Sunday, although he had wished in the first place to collect them forthwith. This had caused some perturbation to the Nationalist Bands, who saw themselves disarmed while ELAS still had 200 armed men at their disposal, plus demobilized men who had retained their arms and could be mustered against the Nationalists. Apparently, Captain Aurick dealt with this situation by agreeing that the Nationalists should retain 25% of their arms until ELAS disarmament was completed. Subsequently another British officer, acting independently and on his own initiative, also took a hand in the disarmament of the same Nationalist Bands, but when I left the position was that some measure of co-ordination bad been achieved

and the handing over of 75% of the Nationalists’ arms was to take place on the 13th instant. It has in addition since been agreed that, pending the arrival of the National Guards, Nationalists my carry arms north of a given line as a protection against Bulgarian bands.

6. Prior to my leaving Salonica I had sent Anton Tsaous himself and he had raised the question of his return to Drama. I suggested to him that he should remain where he was until such time as Government officials and the National Guard had taken over Drama. This line is clearly advisable, as Anton Tsaous could only return at present under British military protection, which would in itself create a definite impression that we are lending him support. It is in any case, I think, too much to hope for that there will not be further clashes between Nationa1ists and Communists in the Drama area, were the Nationalists are particularly strong in the country districts and have many reasons for taking revenge on their pollitica1 opponents. For this reason I consider Drama the most sensitive spot of all the places visited, and particular attention should be given to it by the Greek authorities. There can be no doubt that complaints of the conduct of both sides are current here to a greater extent than elsewhere. The Nationalists complain that the EP guard are beating up their sympathizers, cutting off their electric light and carrying on propaganda against the Government. EAM/KKE elements, on the other hand, are complaining of attacks made on their members by Nationalists. It was impossible in the short time at my disposal to investigate in any detail the va1idity or these charges, although in the Municipal hospital I found a follower of Anton Tsaous who had been taken prisoner in a recent clash and almost lynched by the mob when he was brought into Drama. Seated by his bed was an ELAS soldier who had been wounded in the same engagement, together with a number of the EP who had been put as guard over the Nationalist. They had buried their quarrels and were perfectly happy together. When I asked the EP guard why he was in charge of a prisoner who had automatically been released under the recent agreement, he pointed to his cap where, in addition to the EP badge, he was disporting the flags of all the Allies and expressed a readiness to serve whatever authority was now the proper one.

7. Stopping again at Drama on the return journey on March 11th, I attempted to see the Nomark and Demark, but it was Sunday and

they could not be found; nevertheless, I had a long conversation with the Demark’s assistant, principally about the economic requirements of the town. Each inhabitant was receiving a daily bread ration of 400 grams, the price per ration being 7.5 levas, which is equivalent, at the rate of 6 levas to 1 drachma, to1.25 drachma or 0.5d. Grain, he said, was in very short supply and would only last a short time. When the Bulgarians evacuated, the authorities had managed to retain a quantity or 2,200,000 okes, but some five or six hundred tons of this quantity had had to be distributed for seed to peasants in the mountains and to others whose farms had been burned down. The Assistant Mayor also complained of a shortage of fats, olive oil and sugar, adding that the population as a whole was suffering severely from malnutrition as a result of the Bulgarian occupation when the bread ration had been only half of what it is now and of lower quality. Scabies was said to be rampant among the children due to lack of sugar. My informant considered that the Agreement of Varkiza had been generally welcomed, that the security position in the town was good, but that Anton Tsaous' followers were responsible for disorders outside. I asked him whether he had heard of any complaints about the conduct of the Indian troops in Drama (having heard from Captain Aurick that the communists were beginning a propaganda campaign against them) but he declared that nothing of the sort had came to his hearing. I should add that the report of communist propaganda against the Indian troops is correct, Drama is the only place whore this has occurred. In Western Macedonia the communist policy is to welcome the British and Indian troops, whist turning a comparatively cold shoulder to the National Guard. Subsequent reports received from the military authorities indicate the situation at Drama is developing f'avourably. British troops are increasingly warmly welcomed and the unco-operative ELAS officer in charge of the EP Company has vanished from the scene.

8. Kavalla presented a scene of unwonted activity. The advance party of the 7th Indian Brigade had arrived the previous day to arrange accommodation for the Brigade Headquarters and Battalion that are to follow. On the day of our advent officials M.L. and UNDRA had arrived. The following day, March 9th, H.M.S. “Sirius” and the Greek destroyer “Ierax” entered the port, where H.M.S. "Kimberley" was already moored. The next afternoon an