Introduction - Part 04

11. It was only natural that so lofty an address should produce something of an anti-climax, but the Russian Archbishop Nikolai, who received an immense ovation, did his best to maintain this high level. He described the work of the Russian Orthodox Church in the course of a thousand years of history, and went on to speak of what had been accomplished by its sister churches, including that in Bulgaria, whose people he averred had been so unfortunately deceived by their rulers at the beginning of the war. After this the proceedings rather faded away in a general discussion of cultural aims.

12. A necessary tonic was provided by the publication the same evening of the Congress Manifesto, whose terms, in their wearisome familiarity, indicated where the original draft had almost certainly been prepared. “Who” it demanded querulously, “would want a new

war? A new war is only needed by imperialist conquerors. Freedom-loving people of the world”, it continued, “fight against the attempts of imperialist conquerors to enslave us. Strengthen the links of eternal friendship with the liberator and protector of all Slavs, the great Soviet Union”.

13. The following day, a mild sensation was provided by a speech from the Patriarch Gavrilo, who had returned to Yugoslavia less than three weeks earlier. He had been received by Marshal Tito a few days before the Congress started, and it was understood that their meeting had been cordial, but when he failed to put in an appearance at the previous day’s session during which so many Christian sentiments had been uttered, it was though that he must still be in the shadows. The Patriarch’s aim was clearly to prove his entire respectability to the Government. Reciprocal love and fraternal collaboration would he said build the future happiness of the Slavs. Moreover, Slav solidarity was guided by their centuries of protector, mother Russia (loud applause), and by the noble Russian people, headed by the great Stalin. (The whole Congress stood and, for some minutes, gave frenzied applause). Some what surprisingly, the Patriarch then went on to mention the founder of the Christian religion, whose Name he had not figured much in speeches made in this country recently and to whom he ascribed qualities and ideals not dissimilar to those which had so freely, but far more fervently, been attributed to Comrade Stalin by other speakers. This tribute received but faint applause. He ended with a little doxology to the Church, the Priesthood and Marshal Tito, and this was excellently received.

14. On the same day, the citizens of Belgrade (about 200,000 according to the newspapers) flocked to the Square of the Republic to demonstrate their affection for their Slav brothers, having thoughtfully provided themselves beforehand with appropriate banners and such slogans as “Long live the best friend of the Slavs, Generalissimo Stalin” and “Greetings to our brother nation, Bulgaria”.

15. So far as Belgrade was concerned, this was the culminating point in the proceedings. The following day the delegates went off to Zagreb, where they were met by 100,000 rapturous hosts. The night

before their departure, Marshal Tito gave to the Congress a lavish reception, to which none but Slavs were invited, and marked consideration was paid to the delegates from the United States, the Argentine, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. The visit to Zagreb was mostly devoted to sight seeing, there being more opportunities of this kind there than in Belgrade, and it was crowned by a particularly elaborate reception given by the Croatian Government in the evening, at which there were peasant dances, the performers in national costume, being invited to the reception which followed. The celebrations in Zagreb were followed by similar festivities at Ljubljana, where once again was assembled a vast crowd which had stood for hours along the line to greet the special train. The doings at Ljubljana were not protracted, the delegates leaving almost immediately for Bled, where the lake was especially illuminated in their honour. Finally, after an unostentatious return to Belgrade, the Congress dispersed on the 16th December.

16. Such then is the record of the proceedings, so far as it has been published in the press. The Czechoslovak and Polish Ambassadors here, in speaking to me about the Congress before it met said that, so far as their respective delegations were concerned, no one was coming who was competent to discuss political questions, nor did either of them think that politics would figure much in the proceedings. Neither M. Korbel nor M. Wende were themselves delegates, and the latter, who called on me on the day the Congress broke up confessed that he had not as yet read any of the speeches, though he was hoping, when he has a little more leisure, to do so. On the whole, I am inclined to think that political discussions were not a feature of the Congress, nor indeed would the atmosphere had been propitious for them.

17. The Congress, in my view, had a simpler and a three fold aim; in the first place to achieve the maximum publicity in the Slav press for the superiority of the Slav democracy over the ancient and outmoded forms as used in the West; secondly to penetrate the Western hemisphere with these same and finally make plain the absolute predominance of Russia and the Slav Confederation. The greatest consideration was shown to the delegates from the Americas, New Zealand and Australia, and it is particularly significant that the Marshal specially received the U.S. and

Canadian delegates, an honour not accorded to the Soviet Delegation. No pains were spared to remind them of their kinship with their brothers Slavs and to assure that, on their return to their countries of adoption, they would spread the leaven with which they had been studiously provided. The Slav Congress will be an annual affair, and no effort or expense will be too much to improve it as an organ of publicity for enlightenment both at home and abroad. Each of the smaller Slav countries will be made to serve as a spearhead of Russian propaganda when occasion offers, but this will I believe apply in particular to Yugoslavia who, I have little doubt, both in her own eyes and in those of Russia, has a special role to play among the satellites.

18. The question remains whether we can afford to stand by and watch this formidable organ of propaganda perfect itself, without making an effective reply. Moreover, it will not merely be an organ of propaganda, but a potential means of penetrating and disrupting the political life of countries where there are any considerable number of Slav immigrants. The question is one which affects not only the United States and Latin America, but also the British Commonwealth of Nations, for there is a Slav minority in Canada and Australia. At the same time it raises issued on which I am in no position anything but an incomplete opinion, for any counter measure would involve a deliberate offensive propaganda campaign against every Slav country and the Soviet Union in particular. There are no Anglo-Saxon minorities behind the Iron Curtain where racial or religious feelings can be exploited for political ends, and in the circumstances therefore and defense other than reliance on the fundamental health and resistance to disease of the democratic political organism must be offense.

I am sending a copy of this dispatch to Moscow, Prague, Warsaw, Sofia and Washington.

I have the honour to be, with the highest respect, Sir, Your most obedient, humble Servant, (Sgd.) Charles Peake.

The right Honourable C.R. Attles, P.C., M.P., etc., etc.

British Embassy – Belgrade - January 2nd, 1946

??/1/47

Dear Department,

Will you please refer to your printed dispatch No. 1102 of the 3rd December (R.17049/298/67) enclosing a copy from a letter from the Office of the High Commissioner for Canada concerning the departure from Canada of three Bulgarian and Macedonian delegates to the Pan-Slav Congress.

2. As we reported on our dispatch No. 425 R.592/24/92 of the 20th December, in all ten delegates to the Pan-Slav Congress arrived from Canada. They did not play any very noticeable part in the proceedings of the Congress. Four of them, three of whom are off to visit relations in Bulgaria, namely Andrej Hristov, Lambo Sotirov, Andrej Palmirov and Nikola Kiris, were entertained to a cocktail party at the Embassy on December 30th.

3. They did not appear to have been particularly impressed by the series of speeches, banquets, conducted tours and demonstrations put on in their honour, and although they said that they admired what was being done in Yugoslavia in the way of reconstruction, they were only keen to return to Canada which, they said, was so much more advanced in all material matters. As for the new “new democracy” of which there was so much talk in Yugoslavia, Hristov said that he had had no hesitation in telling his fellow delegates that in Canada also there was a type of democracy which he regarded as being nothing inferior to that in the Slav countries.

4. Although they had a few opportunities of obtaining independent information on the current state of affairs in this country they said that they realized there was some dissatisfaction with the regime, though they believed this to be merely on the part of those formerly of the richer classes. Kiris, who said that he intended to write on the new Yugoslavia for the Greek paper in Toronto, said that he believed that 60 per cent of the peasantry supported the present government.

5. Palmirov, the head of the Macedonian League in Toronto, who had visited Skopje, had been impressed by the enthusiasm of the Macedonians who were at last being allowed to run their own affairs and to have their own language in schools. He compared this state of affairs favourably with that existing in Greece where he alleged that the Macedonians were not allowed to have their own schools, but he went on to say that it did not matter at all whether the Macedonians were under Yugoslav, Greek or Bulgarian rule. So long as they were allowed to use their own language they would be contented.

6. All four of the delegates appear to have been very grateful for having been asked to a British Embassy which, they said, amidst the alien atmosphere here, reminded them of their home in Canada. While it is possible that in such surroundings they tended to stress more than usually their preferences for Canada to the Balkans and their loyalty to the British Empire, we have no doubt that if the organizers of the Pan-Slav Congress hoped to find a potential 5th column in these particular Canadian delegates they were grievously disappointed. Indeed Hristov remarked that while his generation of Macedonians in Canada might be interested in preserving their Macedonian culture, their sons have no interest in their countries of origin and were just plain good Canadians.

We are sending a copy of this letter to Sofia.

Yours ever, Chancery, T.M.F

British Embassy – Moscow - May 2, 1944

My telegram No. 1128.

1. Taken in conjunction with articles to which attention was drawn in my telegram under reference article in “Trud” of May 1st (see my telegram No. 1138) warrants assumption that Soviet press has received a directive to play up EAM and to discredit new Greek Government by argument that Greek situation is in all essential respects analogous to that prevailing in Yugoslavia. This assumption is supported by detached tone of Molotov’s acknowledgment of Prime Minister’s message about Greece (your telegram No. 1309). It looks therefore as if though attitude of Soviet Government towards Greece is beginning to crystallize in a direction which diverges from our own.

2. When speaking about Balkan situation as instructed in your telegram No. 1261 I shall take opportunity to draw attention to unfortunate impression “Trud”’s article conveys at the time when we are bending our efforts towards restoration of Greek unity. When referring to Macedonia I shall moreover mention article in “Red Star” of April 30th (see my telegram No. 1138) with its favourable references to Tito’s recent promise of an autonomous Macedonia. This last-named article, which goes to show that Tito’s views on this subject are endorsed here is incidentally the first reference we have seen in the Soviet papers to Marshal Tito’s recently proclaimed program.

3. In view of importance of our avoiding serious divergence between Soviet Government and ourselves about Greece it would seem advisable that my own forthcoming representations to Soviet authorities should be reinforced by some plain speaking to Soviet Ambassador in London.

British Embassy Moscow - May 1944

My immediately preceding telegram.

H.M. Minister from his local knowledge of pre-war Balkan problems, has suggested to me that Marshal Tito’s program as disclosed in Sulzberger interview which we have just seen is historical sequence of pre-war movement towards creation of an integrated Ygoslavia. Following are his comments on the subject which may possibly assist in clarifying the present situation.

2. On the Bulgarian side this movement played an important part in the 1934 coup d’etat at Sofia which lead at the same time to the collapse of the Mihailovist Macedonians and their supporters in the army backed by King Boris. Bulgarians responsible for this event, some of whom are presumably still active behind the scenes, were ardent believers in a rapprochement with Yugoslavia and inclined to amalgamation with Yugoslavia in a federal state in which Macedonia would naturally fall into place as an autonomous unit.

3. In Yugoslavia Mr. Balfour found that a similar concept prevailed not on1y amongst Pan-Serbs who argued that a greater Yugoslavia would offer a bulwark to great power domination of the Balkans, but also among the Croats who looked upon fusion of Bulgaria and Yugoslavia as a means of counteracting predominant influence of the Serbs. Leaving aside its Pan-Serb advocates, the greater Yugoslavia concept bore a distinctly agrarian, not to say left wing, complications. It was in any case most disquieting to the Greeks and Romanians and an important factor in their refusal of the Balkan entente to contain Bulgaria.

4. Development of integral Yugoslavia idea was retarded in the pre-war period by existence of separate dynasties in Bulgaria and Yugoslavia, by deep mistrust of Bulgaria in Yugoslav governing circles, and by the interplay of great power rivalry in the Balkans. Martial Tito's present programme, which appears to commend itself to the Soviet authorities, revives the concept in its essential features excepting that it specifically excludes Greek Macedonia from the proposal to give Macedonia full autonomy within a federated greater Yugoslavia. The evident corollary to this exception is that Greece

should be ruled by those elements best qualified to ensure their permanent friendship to the proposed new Slav State.

Bulgaria – Macedonia - Greece

Minutes H.E.

In accordance with foreign office telegram No. 1261 of the 27th April (at 64/4/44) and in the light of subsequent press articles commented upon in Moscow telegram No. 1139 of the 2nd May (at 122/10/44) Y.E. when next seeing M. Molotov might say that you have the following remarks to make about Balkan problems: -

1. Bulgaria

Y.E. might tell M. Molotov you are still awaiting the written answer which M. Vyshinski informed you on the 4th April would be returned to your letter of March 31st asking whether the Soviet Minister at Sofia was coming to Moscow and whether the Soviet Government had any plans for exploiting the situation in Bulgaria to the common advantage.

Y.E. might then remind M. Molotov that, as you told M. Vyshinski in your talk with him on the 4th April, we had heard from our Ambassador at Angora at the end of March that the Bulgarian Military Attaché there was spreading the story that when the ed Army reached the Danube the Bulgarian Government would invoke the aid of the Soviet Government to persuade its Allies to get Bulgaria out of the war in return for them being allowed to keep Greek Thrace and Salonika. Y.E. might then go on to say that H.M.G. are still inclined to think that like drowning men who clutch at straws, the Bulgarians may be counting on some such absurd idea as a means of saving their own skin. Does M. Molotov think that there are any means of disabusing the Bulgarian Government that they have nothing to gain by sitting tight in the hope that they may trade themselves out of the war at the expense of Greece? In general Y.E. might repeat the H.M.G. would welcome any information which the Soviet Government felt able to give them about the attitude of these Balkan Mr. Micawbers who seem to be waiting for something to turn up.

2. Macedonia

Y.E. might say that H.M.G. have noticed that in an interview given to the American journalist Mr. Sulzburger published in the “New York Times” on the 11th April, Dr. Joseph Smodlaka, who deals with foreign affairs on Marshal Tito’s National Committee, spoke of the need to solve the relations between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria by giving Macedonia full autonomy within a federal Yugoslavia. You might then say that you had yourself noticed an article in “Red Star” of the 30th April which approved the declaration about an autonomous Macedonia. Y.E. might go on to say that H.M.G. have asked you to tell him that they assume the Soviet Government share their view that this idea of an autonomous Macedonia, on which we ourselves at present do not wish to commit ourselves, should stand over for eventual discussion at the peace conference when it should be decided in agreement with fully representative Yugoslav and Greek Governments.

3. Greece

Y.E. might say that you have noticed from the reply of M. Molotov to the Prime Minister’s message of the 25th of April about Greece, the text of which you had received from the Foreign Office, that the Soviet Government did not feel able to accept any responsibility for Greek affairs or for measures taken by the British Government. You might go on to say that you hopped that the Soviet Government at any rate fully appreciated that we are spending all our efforts to secure Greek unity.

From Bulgaria to War office - December 13th, 1944

From: A.C.C. Bulgaria To: The War Office