THE BULGARIAN STRATEGY

THE BULGARIAN STRATEGY

1. The Bulgarian state clearly and firmly wants to prove to the world and to the diplomatic circles its inability to recognize the existence of a “Macedonian language” and a “Macedonian nation” other than Bulgarian.

2. The Bulgarian state is to conduct a policy of security and protection for the right of self-determination for the Macedonian Bulgarians.

3 Bulgaria to raise the question of full implementation of European norms for the national rights of the Bulgarians in the Republic Macedonia - freedom of speech, the right to self-determination, the right of association in national parties and organizations, the right to access information from Bulgarian sources - newspapers, radio -television, as well as access to scientific institutions in Bulgaria.

4 To organize and to conduct extensive action here inside our country and abroad for the disclosure of falsification of Bulgarian history, language, traditions and the value system. For this purpose:

√ Bulgarian national television is to ensure a signal, via satellite or direct transmission, which will cover the territory of the Republic of Macedonia;

√ Emissions from the Bulgarian National Radio to cover the entire territory of the Republic of Macedonia;

√ Bulgarian books to be printed in order to provide resolute resistance to all slander and falsifications perpetrated by the media in the Republic of Macedonia, as well as all others who support foreign interests at home and abroad;

√ The state to financially help the Macedonians and Macedonian Scientific Institute in Sofia and other international institutes which systematically research and publish papers and important documents on the Macedonian Question. In that respect the world will be presented with enough evidence to debunk unfounded claims propagated by the ruling circles in Macedonia;

√ To issue free newspapers and magazines dedicated to the history and life of the citizens of the Republic Macedonia with Bulgarian ethnic roots.

5 Bulgaria is to adjust constitutional and legislative norms which will gradually equalize the rights of Bulgarians in the Republic of Macedonia with the rights of Bulgarian citizens.

6 To establish mitigating circumstances to provide Macedonian Bulgarians with Bulgarian citizenship.

7 To provide enough scholarships to meet the wishes of all the young people in the Republic of Macedonia wanting to study in Bulgaria.

8. To work on eliminating customs tariffs for goods produced in Macedonia.

9 To significantly increase the presence of the Republic of Bulgaria in Macedonia through investment and participation in cash privatization.

10. To secure ranking of products from the Republic of Macedonia in the Republic of Bulgaria, after activating the work of the Bulgarian-Macedonian Chamber of Commerce and Industry.

11. To seek avenues for disseminating scientific contacts, by providing free specialization to Macedonian scientists and professors at Bulgarian universities and research institutes.

12. To develop cultural ties on both sides by organizing gatherings, holidays, festivals, guest writers, musicians, singers, and other ensembles.

13. To enhance sporting contacts.

14. To increase the number of Bulgarian tourists in the Republic of Macedonia and to establish widespread family ties between the citizens of the Republic of Macedonia and the Republic of Bulgaria.

15. To create conditions for normal relations and cooperation between the Orthodox churches in Bulgaria and Macedonia.

16. To organize and conduct meetings and discussions among intellectuals on both sides, dedicated to various issues of mutual interest.

17. To constantly expand transportation and communication between the two sides.

BULGARIAN POLITICS TOWARDS THE REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA

Recommendations for the development of good neighbourly relations after Bulgaria’s accession into the EU in the context of EU and NATO enlargement in the Western Balkans.

Liubomir Ivanov and others.

Foundation “Manfred Werner”, Sofia, January 2007 / January 2008

This short booklet was published in the Bulgarian, Macedonian and English languages in January 2008 in Sofia. Its author Lubomir Ivanov is a senior associate at the Institute of Mathematics and Informatics of the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences (BAS) and concurrently Chairman of the “Manfred Werner” Foundation and the Atlantic Club of Bulgaria. There are 25 more people associated with this publication who are related to the various BAS institutes. They are diplomats, experts from various ministries, from the National Assembly, etc. The publication has been sent to the various competent Bulgarian authorities. Besides the text, the booklet also contains a Joint Declaration from the Prime Ministers of the Republic of Bulgaria and of the Republic of Macedonia I. Kostov and L. Georgievski from 1999, as well as several different lines of testimonials and quotes.

1. BASIC ELEMENTS

… it is difficult to explain to the world why we have so many problems with almost all the countries (around us) and they have so few between them. (Utrinski newspaper - Skopje, December 31, 2007)

As a Balkan country and a member of the European Union and NATO, with direct borders with the Western Balkans, Bulgaria has a special responsibility to ensure (along with Greece) that candidate countries of the region achieve European standards and good neighbourly relations and place a healthy and permanent basis of bilateral relations between Bulgaria and the Republic of Macedonia, which is of interest not only to the citizens of Bulgaria, but no less to the citizens of the Republic of Macedonia, and hence the Balkan region as a modern and prosperous part of a united Europe.

Recently Bulgaria took two important steps in that direction, which marked the end of the old and the beginning of a new stage in its relations with the Republic of Macedonia.

The first important step was taken by President Georgi Parvanov and Foreign Minister Ivailo Kalfin in 2006, to unequivocally warn Skopje that the unconditional credit and support given to it by Bulgaria for the Republic of Macedonia’s membership into the European Union and NATO, has already been exhausted and further support will only be given if the Republic of Macedonia begins to apply a normal policy of good neighbourliness.

The second important step was taken during President George Bush’s visit to Sofia in 2007, when both President Parvanov and Prime Minister Stanishev brought to Bush’s attention the Republic of Macedonia’s unfriendly policy towards its neighbours.

After these clear political messages were highlighted at the highest level it became necessary to elaborate, in greater detail, Bulgaria’s policy regarding the full range of specific problems relating to the

development of bilateral relations between Bulgaria and the Republic of Macedonia regarding the new conditions.

This paper formulates some of the possible starting points for such a policy with a proposal that these points be subject to expert analysis with lasting political solutions and accelerated deployment, and in a form and subject that opens public debate.

Bulgarian attitudes and views on the issues relating to Bulgarian politics towards the Republic of Macedonia, as well as relevant aspects of Bulgaria’s relations with third countries, especially with Greece, Albania, Kosovo and Serbia, have been established during various historical moments and thus are the product of various historical realities that are inherently difficult to overcome, and hence prevent any possible attempt to generate coherent and proactive policies.

These attitudes and views in no way reflect the newest realities after January 1, 2007 when, in addition to its membership in NATO, Bulgaria became part of the European Union, while the Republic of Macedonia is still not. On this occasion, the present analysis and recommendations, which arose from this, were based on a new interpretation and re-evaluation, looking at certain aspects and new approaches.

We should note here that the Macedonian cause is rejoicing (coming across- DM) with the attention it is getting from interested circles and the general public in Europe, the United States and Canada, and that it has its historical explanation. The Republic of Macedonia, in the last twenty years, has been building its arguments and peer effort based on a policy applied more than forty years ago, during which time the Bulgarian state was silent and definitely did not defend the Bulgarian position abroad. Another factor that increased the acceptance of the Macedonian arguments was sympathy for the small post Yugoslav republic publicly spread throughout these countries. The Republic of Macedonia was treated like a child, but also like a victim of the victors of the Cold War.

But, until now, in the pre-annexation period (before the Republic of Macedonia became an independent country) , its bilateral relations

with Bulgaria were not built on a correct and healthy neighbourhood basis, after that Sofia had very few tools with which to defend its cause while the possibilities of Skopje were increasing. Even Bulgaria’s strongest arguments then were intellectually and morally vulnerable. We were silent and passive in the past about giving some explanation. But now that there is the requirement for good neighbourly relations by each candidate in order for them to join NATO and the European Union, it is important for us to access this criterion and break the silence. Let our voice be heard by our partners in NATO, the European Union and by the Republic of Macedonia itself. Make it clear that it has to legitimize its policies and practices. Let it know that no self-respecting country will accept them if they do not show respect for their neighbours - without good neighbourly relations.

This paper deals, primarily, with specific problematic moments in the relations between Bulgaria and the Republic of Macedonia, marking relevant measures in relation to joint infrastructure and other projects (including those funded by the European Union and NATO), Bulgarian investment in the Republic of Macedonia’s economy, obtaining Bulgarian citizenship for the people of Balkan Bulgarian origin and easing their access to Bulgarian high schools etc., measures which undoubtedly will be suitable for solving, but which alone cannot resolve the problematic moments in question.

This paper focuses exclusively on the Bulgarian policy towards Macedonia. Special activities and policies towards third countries, the EU and NATO are considered only if they are essential to achieving the goals associated with the Republic of Macedonia.

1.1 The Republic of Macedonia

The Macedonian nation and state were created during the process of realization and evolution of the Serbian political construct, first published in 1889, supported by a decision from the Communist International in Moscow in 1934, and achieved between 1944 and 1991 in terms of the historical and geographical regions of Macedonia (about 36% of its total territory), known as Vardar Macedonia incorporated into Yugoslavia and governed by the Communist Party of Yugoslavia. This idea proclaims that the

Bulgarians in Macedonia, who have lived in those regions since the VII century AD, have nothing to do with the Bulgarian state and with the Bulgarian nation, a claim that contradicts the predominant historical truth around the world.

The Macedonian doctrine was enforced in Vardar Macedonia by totalitarian communist state methods and tools: terror and repression against those who considered themselves Bulgarians (30,000 executed and 120,000 sent to camps and prisons); rewriting history through education and the media; falsifying authentic historical evidence and artifacts, and remodeling historic monuments (inscriptions in churches, monasteries and tombs etc.).

Similar activities in one form or another exist today in the modern Macedonian statehood. The reason for this is to further develop the newly established Macedonian nation which was created in terms of the newly independent Republic of Macedonia in the early 1990s. One possibility (current to this day) was to identify the objective parameters of this development, as they are: independent statehood within the borders of the Republic of Macedonia (joint state of ethnic Macedonians and Albanians); changes in the ethnic consciousness of much of the population of Vardar Macedonia after 1944; centuries of historical development of the population in the countries of today’s Republic of Macedonia as part of the Bulgarian nation; the preserved Bulgarian ethnicity of some of the citizens of the Republic of Macedonia. The alternative, sadly preferred by the political elite of the state, was the Serbo-Yugoslav project, applied without changes, always anti-Bulgarian, now in a different environment and partly with new protagonists and carriers.

In other words, establishing a separate and independent Macedonian nation had not been done on the basis of recognizing and appreciating the real historical evidence of Vardar Macedonia, but rather on persisting in falsifying the past and designing processes that relate certain territory and a certain period (Vardar Macedonia within Yugoslavia, 1944-1991) to other territories and other periods. If the history of the population of the Republic of Macedonia has something in common with the population in neighbouring countries, then the project of prescribing history (back to the renaissance, middle ages, and even to antiquity) done to adjust the

historical and ethnic identity of the population of the Republic of Macedonia to the present one, affects both trying to some extent to redefine history, and hence to redefine the modern national identity of neighbouring nations and mostly of Bulgarians - something that normal people consider to be outrageous.

A new, important circumstance in the prolonging of the old project is that its bearers and promoters today are not only politically but also ideally-politically and biographically associated with the former Yugoslav nomenclature, and so are their ideological opponents, including those who were repressed like the Bulgarians or the Bulgarophils of the past.

The very name “Republic of Macedonia”, later, due to Skopje’s neighbourly unfriendly policy, will create problems in the use of the name “Macedonia” in other important parts of the geographical region with the same name - Bulgarian (Pirin) and Greek (Aegean) Macedonia.

In this sense, given the initial credit of trust and the unconditional recognition of the new state in 1992, Bulgaria made an investment in good neighbourly relations between the two countries which, unfortunately, was not reciprocated. In hindsight the early recognition was done without requiring the new state to demonstrate clear standards for friendly neighbourly relations. There was no incentive for it to stop the continuation of the old Yugo-Macedonian policy and to replace it with better bilateral relations.

These relations today, to a significant extent, are insincere (representatives from Skopje say one thing during their visit to Sofia and another at home or with third parties) and, given the significant incongruity between public opinion in Bulgaria and the Republic of Macedonia, there is potential for further deterioration, for which there should be no place between two European states, even less between two (in perspective) European member states.

Therefore, given its possible invitation to join NATO at the upcoming negotiation process for the Republic of Macedonia’s accession into the European Union, Bulgaria can not help but ask for the following - directly, and/or with the use of the opportunities

provided by the technology of the process of annexation, as well as from Bulgaria’s status as full member:

1.1.1. Strict compliance on the part of the Republic of Macedonia in the Joint Declaration of February 22, 1999, which outlines the fundamental principles of good neighbourly relations between the two countries, with registration and open reference to all established violations of the Declaration. Strict monitoring of its implementation needs to become an integral part of the Bulgarian and EU assessment of the Republic of Macedonia’s progress in achieving the standards and regulatory requirements (including the requirement to pursue good neighbourly relations) for the EU and for NATO alike.

It should be pointed out that failing to solve problems connected with the implementation of the 1999 EU Declaration will result in serious problems in bilateral relations, and the Republic of Macedonia’s membership in the EU will be revoked.

Placed at Bulgaria’s request in the solution itself, which recommends starting the negotiation process for the Republic of Macedonia’s accession into the EU, should be strict obligations for Skopje to fulfill the 1999 Declaration.

During the negotiations Bulgaria needs to familiarize the European Commission with its assessment of the implementation of the Declaration and evidence of its failure, in general, must be reported in the European Commission’s annual reports dealing with the Republic of Macedonia in meeting its criteria for membership. And no negotiation chapters must be opened and / or closed without the appropriate conditions being met.

Evaluations should apply only to the actual Republic of Macedonia’s activities, not published in good faith (failures of such intentions being attributed to “old forces”, “Serbian influence”, etc. Of course, it would be naïve to think that such declarative intentions are anything but conjectural relationships, considered necessary for accession to the EU and NATO).

1.1.2. Harassment of the citizens of the Republic of Macedonia who self-identify as Bulgarians. This harassment includes: hours of police interrogations of Macedonian citizens who have not committed any offense only because somewhere they identified themselves as Bulgarians; dismissal from their job; pressure on public Bulgarian organizations, etc.

1.1.3. The Bulgarians in the Republic of Macedonia (all who clearly self-identified as such) along with the other ethnic groups, in accordance with the local national legislation, which requires their cataloging in the preamble to the Constitution of that country; in addition to the aforementioned Albanians, Turks, Vlachs and Roma, and then some added Serbs and Bosnians, we should also find Bulgarians, irrespective of their number, officially declared in the country.

In that sense, it is important to consider the thesis that today’s ethnic Macedonians (non-Bulgarians) and ethnic Bulgarians in Macedonia are “one and the same”, and that there is no difference between them; and in an opposite sense: one to imply that they are all Macedonians (non-Bulgarians), while the other consider them to be all Bulgarians (or according to some, at least in the process of “being Bulgarized”).

Both interpretations of this thesis are unacceptable because they grossly violate the basic principle of ethnic self-determination: everyone alone determines who they are, which means no one else can make that determination for them, and not even they for someone else. Bulgaria must strictly adhere to this principle, and in no way cause interpretations that deviate from it. Given that there are Macedonians who identify as non-Bulgarians (of course we are talking here only about the descendants of the Macedonian Bulgarians, and not of the Albanians, Vlachs, Turks and other ethnic groups in Vardar Macedonia), one can not claim that Macedonians and Bulgarians are the same. Given that there are Macedonians who identify as Bulgarians, one cannot then claim that Macedonians amount to non-Bulgarians.

(While such views normally exist within the framework of ethnic self-identification of certain individuals within the framework of the

freedom of citizens and non-governmental environments, they have no place in the state).

Neither interpretation corresponds to the contemporary realities since the majority of the descendants of the Macedonian Bulgarians in Macedonia today self-identify as ethnic Macedonians (non-Bulgarians). This happened on the one hand, as a result of changes in the last sixty years, but on the other, the fact is that part of the population kept its Bulgarian ethnicity. It is clear that the first and the second have no means of being the same, because they differ in their ethnic self-identification. In other words, this argument is factually untrue. Moreover, the ratio between the two groups is considerably in favour of the first, the denial of the existing difference means joining the cause of anti-Bulgarian Macedon-ism which, above all, is to the detriment of the Bulgarians.

Therefore, it is mandatory and perfectly normal, according to European standards, for the ethnic Bulgarians in Macedonia not to be placed at a disadvantage compared to the other ethnic groups.

This kind of care by the Bulgarian state for the Bulgarians, who are citizens of the Republic of Macedonia, is in accordance with the 1999 Joint Declaration. It is noteworthy to mention here that in this important aspect, the Declaration is essentially asymmetrical and excludes Skopje from protecting the status of persons in Bulgaria who are not citizens of the Republic of Macedonia.

As for the eventual number of people included in the Bulgarian minority in the Republic of Macedonia and the fear that official recognition would reveal their numbers to be small, the Bulgarian policy should be based on the realities as they are. Our previous approach, to avoid the issue of recognizing the Bulgarian minority, allows for two possible interpretations.

One interpretation is that despite the growing number of people receiving Bulgarian citizenship, there is virtually no such minority. Here we are talking about the “hidden-Bulgarians” whose number will decrease with the change of generations. The other interpretation is based on the notion that the Bulgarians in the Republic of Macedonia are more than just a minority; that there is,

apparently, a comprehensive process of “re-Bulgarization” which, in the near future, will return the people of Vardar to the road of their historical continuity which is inherent in neighbouring Pirin Macedonia. Obviously, these two grades have different directions, based on accepting certain cases, both in general and not on objective data representative of the processes, but in every case in their referral of assumed future realities, it is not conducive for the realization of current policy.

Misplaced is the fear that recognizing the Bulgarian minority would “encapsulate” a category separate from the large number of residents (perhaps two hundred thousand according to some rough expert estimates) in the Republic of Macedonia who have dual consciousness; ethnic Macedonian and Bulgarian simultaneously.

The most notable Bulgarians in Macedonia repeatedly declare that they feel the need for more robust and active support from Bulgaria. Undoubtedly an important element of such support would be to take care of the Bulgarian minority whose recognition, visible presence and in the utmost confidence would bolster, not weaken their Bulgarian sentiments in them especially those who self-identify as both Bulgarians and Macedonians. (For comparison, it is worth noting that those who self-identify as ethnic Macedonians, and not as Bulgarians in Bulgaria, are not afraid of any kind of “encapsulation” in their distinction from the Bulgarians, and their cause is well represented internationally.)

1.1.4. Correcting history textbooks that completely falsify history and contain offensive qualifications about the Bulgarian state and nation, borders on open racism.

The Bulgarian request, regarding textbooks, must be officially approved by the competent authorities in the Republic of Macedonia, and must express the Bulgarian national affiliation (accepted by historians) of prominent figures in our common history such as St. Clement of Ohrid, King Samoil, the brothers Miladinovtsi, Gotse Delchev, etc.

The educational system (from primary school to university) is an essential tool for creating powerful and massive anti-Bulgarian

attitudes among the population in the Republic of Macedonia (the belief that Bulgaria is an occupier, an assimilator and a separator of the Macedonian ethnos), views which remain hostage to the politics of the Republic of Macedonia regardless of political or government changes.

It is important to stress that the elimination of counterfeit textbooks and the termination of the anti-Bulgarian media propaganda would not deprive the Republic of Macedonia of its foundations and its existence. The state must continue to exist on the basis of the present realities without projecting retrospectively to building some kind of unfulfilled past. The state must recognize the Bulgarian historical realities exactly as Bulgaria is prepared to recognize today’s realities without transferring the past to the present.

1.1.5. Restoration of the destroyed or falsified articles in churches, monasteries, icons, frescoes, fountains, bridges, etc., in accordance with relevant international standards in this area.

1.1.6. Help for the restoration or removal of obstacles to the restoration of 471 Bulgarian military cemeteries - a particularly sensitive issue for Bulgaria.

1.2. Albania and Kosovo

1.3. Greece

(This was followed by two and a half pages of text, which referred to the alleged existence of the Bulgarian minority in Albania, Kosovo and to some extent in Greece, which Bulgaria appealed (regardless of their numbers) for their recognition, positioning them according to EU standards and activating this Bulgarian policy through education, assistance, scholarships, etc.; it is interesting that the Bulgarians think that due to their historical memory, Greeks, and Albanians alike, were aware of the Bulgarian ethnic character of Vardar Macedonia in the past and its evolution in recent decades.)

2. Action Plan

2.1. Frame

The practical implementation of the new Bulgarian policy towards Macedonia requires elaboration and the acceptance of an action plan with a clearly defined framework, which should include:

2.1.1 Instruments for applying Bulgarian politics (institutions -ministries, state agencies, municipalities, embassies, as well as scientific institutions, lobbyists, politicians and others.)

2.1.2. Take concrete steps to achieve the objectives set out;

2.1.3. The form under which Bulgarian statesmen and politicians need to publicly expose the damages caused by the Republic of Macedonia’s policies, in the course of their visits or in international forums, is through repeated Bulgarian requests to maintain good neighbourly relations;

2.1.4. Necessary political and financial resources will need to be invested in lobbying for international support for implementing an open and active campaign against the negative propaganda in the Republic of Macedonia.

2.1.5. Priority of objectives must be separated in accordance with the resources necessary for their achievement and their importance to change the negative attitudes of the citizens of the Republic of Macedonia.

2.2. Activities

The proposed basic elements of the Bulgarian policy towards the Republic of Macedonia requires a thorough review of the whole range of Bulgarian foreign policy relations, in which the problematic “Bulgaria - Republic of Macedonia” to review the significance of this write-up:

2.2.1. To begin with, it is necessary to be internally prepared with a solid package of Bulgarian historical, cultural, political, geographical, ethnographic, economic and other arguments in favour of the above thesis. The package would be the base of the country’s foreign policy position. For the purpose of this we have recent

experiences and some from before 1989. The package is to mainly emphasize our positive attitude towards the Republic of Macedonia and to rely on the understanding that a state has prospects for development based on constructive activities and accomplishments, without requiring support from some fictional past.

2.2.2. The Bulgarian package should be well balanced with Athens’s consistent policy for the protection of Greek interests from the unfriendly-neighbourly policy of the Republic of Macedonia, in a way that its general application can be cooperative towards Skopje, and preferably - cumulative and coordinated. With regards to Greece, the long and difficult period of Bulgaria’s transition during which the national political priority and resources were oriented towards achieving full membership in NATO and the EU, as the cause of the current passive Bulgarian stance towards the Republic of Macedonia, should be pointed out. It is not necessary to search for a basis for specific cooperation with Greece other than our regional responsibility to both the EU and NATO and to make sure Skopje applies and upholds European standards. However, if in the event Greek pretensions towards Skopje contradict European standards, Bulgaria is to fortify the position of the Republic of Macedonia, which will show that the Bulgarian position on the Republic of Macedonia is principled and strong. There is no need for the international community or the public in the three countries to be left with the impression that the Bulgarian foreign instrumentation, with respect to the Republic of Macedonia, is a replicated imitation to that of Greece.

2.2.3. Sixteen years since the recognition of the sovereignty of the Republic of Macedonia, is enough time to outlast the paternal treatment of the smaller neighbouring country, as well as to confirm that Bulgaria, who is a member of NATO and the EU, has no possible territorial claims.

2.2.4. The key diplomatic concept should be the integration of the Western Balkans into the EU and NATO as an occasion for the affiliation of Bulgarians from Macedonia, Serbia, Albania and Kosovo to the Bulgarian nation through achieving the required standards for national and ethnic minorities in the EU.

2.2.5. New Bulgarian activities must be prepared in advance and based on the critical analysis of the 1999 Declaration and its application on the grounds of a comprehensive concept for the future of our relations with the people and state of the Republic of Macedonia, all seen through expectations for ethical and positive relations with the Republic of Macedonia as a future member of NATO and the EU. This requires comprehensive and methodical coordination of Bulgaria’s position with the United States and with other allies in NATO and the EU, starting with the most important among them, then after developing positive reactions move on to special cases such as Greece and other relevant Balkan countries such as Romania, Cyprus, Slovenia and Turkey. Due attention should be paid to countries like Poland, Slovakia and the Czech Republic (and to some extent Russia) where politicians and scientists have provided some support to the Yugoslav Macedonian issue. Finally we need to elaborate on a specific approach with each country with which we have diplomatic relations and attract them to the Bulgarian thesis.

2.2.6. It is very important that our version, our view, be widely publicized in the European media, which is to including examples using well-known citizens of the EU, such as in Germany and Austria, Romania and Moldova, where building new nations on the basis of independent statehood is not accompanied by negativism of the Macedonian type.

2.2.7. On specific occasions it is necessary to place pressure on international human rights institutions, including through non-governmental organizations that are active on the issue.

2.2.8. Detailed “records” of the longstanding Skopje obstructionist activities, which prevent the development of a constructive relationship, despite Bulgaria’s good measures, must be kept.

2.2.9. There is a need to highlight the specific actions and events that prompted Bulgaria to activate its critical position towards the Republic of Macedonia.

2.2.10. It is good to clarify the motivation of the prominent members of the Republic of Macedonia who are working for the deterioration

of relations with Bulgaria, and who still maintain contact with the secret services of the former Milosevic regime, as well as with other anti-democratic factions in Serbia today.

2.2.11. As a donor country working for the millennium goals of the United Nations, Bulgaria has decided to concentrate its efforts and resources in several priority beneficiary countries, included among which is the Republic of Macedonia. As part of this assistance (which will amount to 0.17% of its gross domestic product in 2010 to 0.33% by 2015) Bulgaria will develop a special program to provide the Republic of Macedonia useful experience, assistance and partnership in reforms which will aid its Euro-Atlantic integration. Moreover, civil society in the country, local government, business administration, etc., will accumulate much valuable experience in the preparation for joining the EU, experience which will be absolutely relevant to the conditions and to the initial position for a country such as the Republic of Macedonia (and some other countries of the Western Balkans). This kind of strategic investment is good for neighbourly relations and it would be a failure to leave it to others.

2.2.12. In the framework of the general practice of issuing EU visas, let us uncover all the possibilities which facilitate access to Bulgaria for the citizens of the Republic of Macedonia, where the Bulgarian visa regime, for them as a minimum, will be no less liberal than the Greek one. We will facilitate trans-border cooperation and connections through opening more border crossings.

2.2.13. To create conditions for preserving and expanding the scope of educating students from the Republic of Macedonia in Bulgarian colleges and universities; to create appropriate forms for maintaining further contact with them as natural Bulgarian lobbyists in their own country, and to welcome potential participants in the increasingly attractive Bulgarian labour market.

2.2.14. To build administrative capacity for easier and more rapid issuance of Bulgarian citizenships, and to shorten the duration procedure from years to months. Bulgaria is on the threshold of a new stage in its socio-economic and demographic development, which will be an important feature for mass immigration into the

country, caused by the needs of Bulgarian business - spontaneous or managed through proactive policies to attract and integrate immigrants. The Bulgarian citizens in the Republic of Macedonia are an important resource in this regard. And, of course, Bulgarian citizenship in the Republic of Macedonia is already a substantial and growing population which, by all international legal grounds, guarantees Bulgarian intervention to protect their rights and interests.

2.2.15. To activate the Bulgarian cultural information centre in Skopje to promote Bulgarian culture and politics in the country by investing in necessary resources. To create Bulgarian cultural and information centres in Tirana and Pristina.

2.2.16. To encourage Bulgarian NGOs and businesses to become partners with Republic of Macedonia residents, become involved in their local initiatives and promote Bulgarian cultural and educational activities (creating Bulgarian reading rooms, clubs, etc.) in various towns in the neighbouring country.

2.2.17. To support prominent cultural, political and media leaders of the Bulgarian community in the Republic of Macedonia, facilitating their work in both countries.

2.2.18. To request the assistance of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church, in the spirit of its historical traditions and opportunities to contribute to the rapprochement between the two peoples.

2.2.19. There is no doubt that in recent years one of the most serious irritants in bilateral relations was the issue of registering OMO Ilinden. Skopje and rights organizations such as the Helsinki Committee put this topic in the international context, from which Bulgaria has no benefit. Refusal to register OMO Ilinden will become difficult to defend, especially after the future membership of the Republic of Macedonia in NATO and the EU. Of course, the reason for that, above all, is legal, but the Bulgarian position and the Bulgarian cause would undoubtedly be stronger if we find a solution to this problem.

2.2.20. Regardless of the policies pursued by the governments of Bulgaria and the Republic of Macedonia, there are certain independent intellectuals, media and civil society groups in both countries who promote the idea that there is nothing in common between us and our neighbours.

These local factors have the ability to influence public opinion, form attitudes toward our neighbour and sometimes exert political influence. The strength that stems from them is that they usually have no opponent. Their ideas are a monologue; there is no dialogue, debate, conflicting facts, arguments and interpretations. The worst thing about this situation is that the general public in Bulgaria and the Republic of Macedonia does not understand the reasons, history and arguments of the other side. Therefore it is imperative that the Bulgarian side initiate and maintain public forums and debates in Bulgaria and the Republic of Macedonia with wide resonance in the media, with openness, good faith and a better knowledge of the other side, and of all disputed cultural and historical topics.

To build a policy towards the Republic of Macedonia to the level of today’s challenges - it would be national irresponsibility to miss out on this present historic opportunity - it is urgent to adequately prepare the Bulgarian public, the media and official institutions in order to provide favourable conditions for success.

Sent to competent Bulgarian authorities on January 24, 2008

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