Front Matter - Part 05

Second, the analysis leads to the indication that almost all doctrines, or at least their basic approach, are associated with the Marxist theory of nation and ethnicity, alleged liberty, self-awareness, unity and freedom. But in fact, they are a simple eclecticism of elements of ethno-romanticistic, primordialistic and Marxist interpretations of nation and ethnicity, especially wrapped in a wafer of civil conception of the nation-state or of a national-state. Mostly used are Stalin’s and to some extent Kardeli’s modalities of these theories, with strong emphasis on “freedom” of an ethnic community, which has historically blood-tribal, territorial, cultural and linguistic ties, as well as political identity and continuity. Freedom is reportedly achieved only as long as the nation or ethnicity in unity occupies its “own” territory demographically, linguistically, culturally and politically. Thus, the theory implies that in this historic phase, there is no freedom of the community without recognition of those elements. Even though, basically, Marxist theory does not consider the nation as an agent of liberation of people and labour, but as an inevitable and derivative product of capitalism, which does not interfere in the freeing; but quite the opposite, it becomes part of that general emancipation.

Robustly overstating the historic roots of each nation, their role in history, their belligerence and methods of occupying space, their oppression of other nations and neighbours, their economic and cultural unity… exactly fit modern nationalism and ethno-centrism. However, because all doctrines agree on the definition of a nation in the modern sense of the word, i.e. connecting the nation with freedom and creating national statehood which coincides with civic nationality, at this point they leave not only the Marxist, but all other theories on which they are based; but because of their departure from eclecticism they can not formulate new or different theories. This is because these and many other and more modern theories,

bind the rise of nations to classical capitalism/socialism, state and its dynamics, and reproduction. Not to modern civil societies, democracy, human rights, open market space, etc. Hence there is rejection and animosity toward modernist, ethno-symbolist, identity theories, and towards international legal theories of the nation, ethnicity, etc.

Therefore, the doctrines which are otherwise the meta-theoretical premise, speak about an ethnic state (first degree or stage) which in a historical development that will first give birth to a nation and later to a nation-state. The documents themselves provide many conclusive arguments that the nations they are referring to are reportedly a sprout in the creation of states, in other words the nation, encircled, existed before the state.

They also try to argue as much, if not more, in the fact that the nation, as a primordial category, gave birth to the state. And that’s the concept of primordial-ism and ethno-romanticism. That eclecticism and the mixing of theoretical substances is present in all documents (i.e. in all the documents, directly or indirectly, there are claims that “their” nation created their state, and at the same time their state consolidated the nation, or at least it began to free the nation until it is completely freed).

Here arises the problem of how the Macedonian nation is treated. The Macedonian nation, even if it is understood in an ethno genetic sense, it truly had no state of its own for a long time. How then did that nation originate without its own state? …And hence all the denials… silence… negation… of the Macedonian statehood… for example from Samoil and Vladimir, Radomir, Hris, etc., over Kresna-Razlog and through the Ilinden Uprising, i.e. to the Krushevo Republic and then to ASNOM in 1944. This of course is indicative of how Macedonia and the Macedonian people have been treated by their neighbours. The neighbours are silent on these matters because these are “shameful” or “delicate” moments or periods in their national state history. This is how it has been in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, Serbian predominance in politics, economy and culture. This is how it has been in the last decades in Yugoslavia not to mention the silence about the Greek Civil War, the Second World War in Bulgaria and Albania, the Holocaust in Bulgarian

territory, Serbian rule in Macedonia, between the two World Wars, etc.

And second, truthfully how a Macedonian state and statehood could be created if there was no prior ethnic or national foundation in its population and territorial framework? The doctrines here are caught in a knot of confusion and contradiction and solve the problem in a purely Gordian way by proclaiming that the Macedonian nation and state are artificial entities. In other words they again turn to Marxism, to ethno-romanticism and primordial-ism, but this time they interpret primordial-ism according to the Marxist theory and Stalinist practice - of political engineering the production or liquidation of nations and states. In this sense there are no principal differences in the approach of all four doctrines we are looking at. They directly or indirectly, primarily use Marxist theory, even when they make accusations of influencing in the creation of artificial nations or when influencing territorially or through the population, to “damage” their own nations.

Namely, be it as it may, truthfully, these doctrines cannot be connected to Marxism, not even to the Austro-Marxist modality (Bauer). In aid comes the Comintern, or Stalin’s stagger-operation-alization of Marxism. According to the SANU Memorandum as well as the Greek and Bulgarian doctrines, exactly that operation-alization in interstate and international politics, has turned the Serbian nation into a minority in Yugoslavia; has in time defrauded the Bulgarian nation; and has artificially created the Macedonian nation. According to Albanian doctrine, again, (even its title is reminiscent of Kardeli and the resolution of the Slovenian national issue), the historical, linguistic, cultural and ethno-cultural compactness and development of those territories, gives them their undeniable sovereignty in which UN documents and international pacts and laws are only a helpful argument and derivative.

These doctrines have almost no association with the modern interpretation of nation and nationalism, especially if we are talking about the positive interpretation of these categories. The most widespread current in this sense, which modernists and ethno-symbolists, who we already have mentioned, such as Smith, Hobsbawm, Gellner, Anderson, Brubeiker and others, speak of, is

identity, ethno-culture and legal qualification of nations and minorities, not their historical origin, blood or clan connections, or distribution of territory, statehood, economies, etc...

Overall, this means that the doctrines have no conceptual consistency or a solid benchmark in political statements. Work is done namely for the eclectic-ness in the conception and in the claims. Where they don’t function, a segment of symbolism and modernism is used; sometimes they turn to primordial-ism or Marxism. But then again, the basis of the doctrines are rooted in ethno-romanticism and primordial-ism with the added Marxist component of state interventionism in the creation of own or negation of other nations (Macedonia, for example), like the added component of modernism (or convenient disasters) of state influence on the nation.

Built on this point are the absurdities and paradoxes of the modern doctrines of Macedonia’s neighbours: They rely on alleged European and world doctrines and democratic practices in building single nations (“nation building”) and national state (“nation state building”) but forgetting, ignoring and dismissing the fact that Western and democratic doctrines and practices (except for the most conservative and nationalistic right) in parallel foster human rights and communities, including the right to self-determination and the protection of individual and collective rights. In the case of Macedonia’s neighbours however, their doctrines directly justify and advocate integration into nations and nation-states, with assimilation and denial of human rights. National doctrines, at this level, are politically engineered, conservative in nature, retrograde in character and much uncivilized.

In the same sense, and in that doctrinal direction, used (in fact abused) are international documents, laws, pacts, conferences, which should confirm the purity of the national, i.e. nationalist aspirations and requirements. Besides the Serbian document (indirectly), all four other documents directly refer to such conferences and laws, which are supposed to support their arguments and requirements (territorial, population, etc.). Those acts and conferences that fit are hailed as great (San Stefano in Bulgaria for example), and those that conceptually do not correspond (the Treaty of Berlin for example)

are ignored. Xhaferi has used such tactics almost as a rule along with his twisted interpretation of international documents. As can be seen, all these documents ignore historical periods and important events, such as the Greek Civil War, the Bulgarian occupation of Macedonia, the genocide of the Macedonian Jews, etc. Even more so ignored is the creation of a Greater Albanian in 1941 to 1943/4, and the Enver Hoxha period in Albania. Enver Hoxha is mentioned but only as a speaker at the Paris Peace Conference. Nothing less is absent from the European documents for ethnic and human rights, with which Macedonia’s neighbours have serious problems or international litigation.

A few common statements and a summary of the analysis of these documents

All documents emphasize a deep concern for the fate of their nation or ethnic group, as well as their responsibility for that fate to further develop favourably. All documents emphasized the need and means for realizing national interests, goals and perspectives, as primary with respect to all other: state, party, international, European, etc. The fate of the nation and perspective become the primordial interests of the doctrines, compared to everything else; for example, for as long as work is done for the logic of European integration, or pluralism and democracy or market economy, NATO etc., then those elements are only auxiliary and instrumental for the emancipation and promotion of that nation.

The documents were designed to appeal to statesmen, politicians, intellectuals, international factors and bodies, but also directly to the masses - to unite, to associate, to perform joint actions, to take concrete measures to achieve national interests, mythical ideals, ambitions and often - pretensions and aspirations. Hence, all doctrines are - aspiration-al and irredentist in their substrate, and directly or indirectly amount to unification schemes, mergers, unifications, territorial unity, even homogenization and assimilation of nations. Regardless of their rhetoric which calls for creating civic nation-states, or the rhetoric for European integration (typical of the Bulgarian and Albanian doctrines), or democratic socialism or market economy principles or civil and human rights (SANU Memorandum), the doctrines are truly about posturing and

ambitions. The doctrines in this section have a visible nationalistic-action component.

All doctrines, without exception (though the Serbian is more indirect, with references to countries and regions where there is a Serbian minority population), plead and keep in their sight the idea of “combining and uniting” the nation in their historical and geographical territory which practically covers the entire Balkans. In other words, the “ethno-memory” territory is viewed as the nation’s own territory, provided for which are arguments, maps and charts, sources and selected documents that show that this territory is theirs and only their ethnic territory. The Serbian doctrine, not directly (but some of its authors in their later works, of course), and other doctrines directly, have pretensions on the central Balkan territory, i.e. Macedonia; what is funny about this is when their selected ethno-geographic cards are placed one on top of another: first, Macedonia does not exist, and second, if it does exist it is a province of their nation-states. But then, according to some Macedonian individual sources and publications, the ethnic Macedonian territory and the “nationally amorphous or seduced” population, should also be stretched out to “large pieces” of the territory in our neighbourhood today. These are the Balkan Dreams of mega-ethnicity. There are no substantial differences in “Balkan” territorial claims and appetites.

In cases where there are no members of the respective nation in such a territory (a typical case is the Albanian platform looking at the situation from 2000 years ago), or if there were some members of that nation - they would be declared a majority supposedly because pre-historically they were manipulated (Greek doctrine), or, again, they say that members of their nations were unaware and amorphous of their national feelings and thus needed a little help to get back on track (Bulgarian and Greek doctrines). The SANU Memorandum however is working on a different context and through other purposes, requiring no more territories or no immediate aspirations. It is asking for special rights for the Serbian nationality in the other Yugoslav republics, and requires domination of those territories. Several Serbian academics have translated that into their literature and have directly elaborated on Milosevic’s political program calling on all Serbians to live in one state; that Belgrade should be

the capital of all Serbs and that they all should have one leader, etc. The idea of all members of a nation needing to live in one country is an open principle not only in the Serbian but also in the Albanian and Bulgarian doctrines, somehow obliged by the current UN and EU principles. It is interesting to note that in several places in the texts, European integration is synonymous with “open borders” in which ethnic territories can be integrated into one whole.

The idea was to anger their own people with their sense of so-called victimization: the doctrines, almost as a rule, elevate people, ethnic groups or the entire nation, in relation to others, i.e. neighbours or minorities – to epic historical dimensions. This was the situation with the Bulgaria doctrine leading the pack and the others following not far behind. Adjectival qualifications such as - courage, endurance, resilience, sacrifice, intelligence, creativity, high value of “genetic capital” (Bulgarian doctrine), etc., are only reserved for their people, which typically are “victims of the others”, their neighbours, of aggressors, of circumstances etc., and thus they suffer suppressed, oppressed, deprived… And thus, the superlatives for their historical merits and victims need to provide a foundation for their supremacy in their own country and unite it with the parts outside of that country, but also for the return of historic claims, debts and rights taken away.

The factors which supposedly defrauded, damaged, took away rights, stunted development, stole territory, took away standards and reduced the greatness of the people..., are mostly foreign factors: historic circumstances, other people or surrounding nations, the Great Powers, the Comintern and Stalin or Tito, the European Union, the UN, but also internal factors: the elites, incompetent leadership, the disunited, the unconscious national and ethnic -politicians, or again historical circumstances: war, balance of power, unification with other countries, geo-political location, propaganda and many other factors.

Pervading at the end of each text is optimism, confidence and faith in correcting these historical errors, injustices, adverse dispositions, especially when it comes to national awakening, unity and homogeneity, with an obvious action component; ethno-political mobilization, above all, of the politicians, of the statesmen, of the

intelligentsia and so on. Since it is clear that the international community has firmly set up some barriers - against repeated political and territorial changes and limitations, the doctrines often see the future of their nation or minority in a “borderless” Europe after joining the EU, or in a separate and autonomous status or rights for its parts in other countries. Unfortunately these very same states make no such concessions for the minorities of other countries living on their territory because of their widely used assimilation tactics for their need to create a “civic nation”.

13. The Mega-Ethnos

The documents found here are another testament to the ethno mental image of the Balkans, though the documents do not seem to be typical, objective and a realistic picture of the region. They, as we have already stated, are not official, state-recognized, political or operational documents. But then again they have not been officially or realistically rejected, denied or criticized, at least not in the countries of origin. On the contrary, influential circles, even government agencies, academic circles, the media and public institutions in those countries - have accepted and acted according to their directions. It is rare that there would be the occasional interlocutor or author in those countries who will not agree or who will decide that the documents are outdated, irrelevant; belonging to a narrow circle of people who are non-influential, etc. However, most of the documents played or are still playing a significant political role in the contemporary Balkan ethno-political and national-political scene.

At the very least, the documents were responsible for the ethno-identification of some of the Balkan peoples, even when they contained no direct pretensions or irredentist goals. Today, as we have noted, one of the widespread doctrinal and theoretical frameworks in the science of nation and nationalism, the one that belongs to the modernists and the ethno-symbolists and to the often quoted Anthony Smith, defines nation and nationalism on the basis of identity. Namely, as a social category and as a course of action aimed at internal (intra) population groups that self identify; certainly compared to the others but not necessarily against the others. Of course, there are in it and for it defined identities;

historical, ethno-distinctive, linguistic, cultural and even mythic-symbolic predispositions or bases.

Individual and collective self-identification, for ethno-symbolism and identity conception of the nation, is a significant statement for the direction of forms of social organization of communities, and the state organization. It, of course, does not place a specific statement in the real-political situation, in relation to or in the balance of forces in the international or regional entities such as the Balkans. Also, it was not a priority of science and theory, which itself has a high value. That is because it justifies and builds a foundation for the modern principles of international human rights, and national and ethnic rights. In what sense?

First, if a community or population group separates or feels special or distinct from the others, from its neighbours, from those with whom it communicates, or is affiliated in a political sense, let it feel that way on an ethno-symbolic basis (myths, mythology historically created symbols and distinctions), it has the right to feel that way and to acquire all the rights of self-identification and self-determination; it has no obligation or duty to prove to anyone why it feels that way or why it has separated.

Second, these doctrines are very much out of touch with the modern and important international legal acts regulating the human right of an identity. This in turn is defined in the more binding provisions of international legal acts and documents. Among other things, in the first Articles (8, 9, 10, 11) of the European Convention on Human Rights, in Article 3 of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, and in several Articles of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. The right to one’s own identity and self-identification is already deeply rooted in the corpus of international law and in that regard, there is no turning back.

Third, understanding the theory of identity of a nation somewhat underestimates the effect i.e. of so-called ethno-political engineering, especially by the states, and in the shaping of national consciousness, and otherwise - of lack of awareness and symbols especially if the states of those ethnicities doesn’t exist. And finally, they neglect or simply do not problem-atize the global factor on

cultural values, on the rights and freedoms of people and citizens, and on the methods and means of achieving identity of ethnic rights and positions. The globalization factors today are playing an increasingly important role, in international law, in international policy, in international morals, etc. in the founding of positions of minorities and ethnic groups. Is it then the same or not, in the globalization and in the integration frameworks and trends, as is with the others basing their claims on the “romantic history of their people” (Petar Stoyanov, Bulgarian President), or the “demographic explosion of their people” (Albanian doctrine) or the “current position of their people” (Serbian and Greek doctrines)? Yet, the problem is not in the understanding of the modernist, or ethno-symbolic or identity nation theory. The problem is in their inception and contact with the theory of human rights under international public law and joint statement and contact mechanisms and regulations to protect and promote the rights of peoples, self-defined ethnicities, without violating the rights of others.

The Balkan mega-ethnos is a people that exist ideally, by doctrine, and latent if not real. It is not purely a fictional people; it has not disappeared, like the people of Atlantis, or like the Mayan and Aztec people, or like the Khazars and Phoenicians. Similarly, the Balkan people are not the people of Utopia, or of the City of the Sun, or of Orwell’s Animal Farm. The Balkan people have their historical and geographical identity and location, their own memory and cultural symbols but, unfortunately, they are incomplete and underdeveloped. Instead of achieving full development in a civil union and society, with human rights, economy, communications, open culture and mentality, they continue to endure their mythology and struggle against each other to expand at the expense of the others.

Circumstances conditioned the Balkan people to develop a European or continental periphery, to have an uneven and rough rhythm of production and cultural development, to even have a stagnant and stunted rhythm in economic trends, in a rapid shift of immature historical, political and social formations. The mixing of historical formations of the Middle Ages with modernity, the absence of industrialism, market, civil society, with the abstract and cultural matrix that is responsible for creating a contemporary civic nation as

a primary identity social group, not as a social group or a competitive alternative, even pitted against other groups, influencing one people to grow slowly and differently from the other modern nations.

Of course, there are many instances throughout history with such uneven development of nations and even whole regions and continents, burdened with material, political and cultural encumbrances. The Balkan mega-ethnos is, however, specific in that which the time-lag, burden and social conditions were seen as causes by other people, by external factors, wars, foreign regimes in power and by imposed forms of life, not of their own production of conditions of life or of life circumstances. This difference is reflected in the consciousness of the search for the identity that was taken or prohibited. As a result the reaction is turned into a quest, looking into history and into the idea of the mega-ethnos. It seems like the mega-ethnos, population wise, territory wise, demographic wise, resource and culture wise, can restore everything that was lost; the development to modernize production and social structures and to dignify and humanize survival. The ideological statement in that consciousness is in ethno-centrism, in the ethno-megalomania and in the ethno-conflict-alizm.

Social and developmental differences between these Balkan nations encourage a strong national and nationalist ideology which, in turn, becomes an obstacle in the rise of industrialism, civil society, democracy, the rule of law and the values of a modern civilization. For as long as any and all Balkan nations are not emancipated from their mega-ethnic ideas for their own future, and even reality; for as long as they are not looking at their own reality and future; to look for and build in relation to themselves and for themselves, then nationalism will create obstacles in their development which will lead to conflict, frustration and inter-group contrasts.

October 2012

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Note:

In October 1998, after many internal discussions, the Albanian Academy of Sciences adopted and published a paper called “Platform for solving the Albanian national question”, a document which, with its content, messages and recommendations certainly reflects the policy of the country and makes suggestions for subsequent events in the region, but it also explains a great deal about Albanian internal political attitudes. There is a striking similarity in its approach and from the title to Edward Kardeli’s Marxist analysis in his pre-war work entitled “Development of the Slovenian National Question”, however Kardeli’s, version lacks the “Greater-State” statements or messages. The text was published integrally, with very small cuts marked in it.

Shortly after the platform of the Albanian Academy of Sciences was released via the Albanian American Civic League in New York website (http://aacl.com, October 1998) Xhaferi, who then was coordinator of the Albanian “cause” in this part of the region, declared the AAS platform an action plan in neighbouring countries and even foresaw these actions and developments. The text is left in its original form. On the same website, one and a half months after the start of the armed conflict in Macedonia, he published the so-called “The Non-Paper of DPA”, in which were precisely defined the position, attitudes, and political steps of the Albanian factor in Macedonia as a specification of the AAS platform. (http://aacl.com/Non-Paper.htm. 6 / 5:01) The text was not published for reasons of space, but is available.