Front Matter - Part 03

It is not necessary that nationalism precede and fatefully affect the creation of the nation, nor does the state need to have such influence. The ethno-symbolists have also posed the question: Is the role of the elites overestimated in the creation of the nation? Finally after agreeing that the international order created after World War II is inclusive in its principles of absolute sovereignty of states and the right to self-determination of nations, they asked the question: What if a large number of aspirants for national independence, objectively, found themselves in advance, outside of that order? What if that order with its norms is not shown to be sufficiently permissive to all the subjects in the emancipation? (Smith, 1998, p. 79). Using these

questions, Smith and the ethno-symbolists actually problem-atize all present international political and legal orders, particularly the UN Charter and Statute.

According to A. Smith, nation and ethnicity (he used the French term “ethnie”) are an essential identity or self-identity of a population, one that the same population assigns to itself and others attach to it. It becomes that when it acquires its identification marks, its recognizable name, symbols, and its own myth of common and unique past. For Smith and other ethno-symbolists, no less important is the sharing and preservation of historical memory, tradition (which otherwise must coincide with historical truth), understanding of the “historical territory” of the ethnos as a “homeland”, and finally the elements of common culture, a measure of solidarity, at least at the level of the elites.

Smith saw the importance of political factors, such as the state, armies, churches, etc., as relative because such factors are relevant in the creation of the nation as much as is the importance of creating counter-ethnic, counter-groups. If some social group is building an identity, it would seem to go against or in respect and relation to other groups, which follows the law of dialectics. (Smith, 1998, p. 170; Smith, 2001, p. 57-61). Smith and other ethno-symbolists used this argument to address the issue of history and mythology (or the historical truth) in the creation, survival and development of modern ethnicities, nations and nation states. In fact, according to Smith and according to the literature from almost all modern nations, even the largest nations, and all the modern nation states, most identities were based on myths and mythology. Why is it then okay to deny the new or recently “established” nations and nation states their identity? Is it because nations and nation-states often share the same or similar symbols, myths and mythologies? The one basic question ethno-symbolists, directly or indirectly, often ask is: Why should a nation or ethnic group, or a national state need to prove that it is authentic, historical, cultural and linguistic, or religious based on ethno-genetic information if its population feels different from another or from neighbouring nations? And this is definitely the case with the Macedonian nation and state.

Held and McGrew, in their theoretical approach, have significantly confirmed A. Smith’s assertions. For them, “the nations are above-class collectivities that share a sense of collective identity and political destiny. Their base in the real and imaginary, cultural, linguistic and historical generalities is highly variable and fluid, often resulting in a different expression and contradictory relationship to the state. Nationalism is a force that binds the state with the nation; it reflects on the psychological relationship between the individual and his or her specific national identity and community as much as it reflects on the project and the state in which a nation is dominant (Held and McGrew, 2002, p. 27).

The issue of nationalism can be raised with respect to modern and Balkan terms. Is there, for example, a relationship between state and nation that determines, above all, the status of the nation, the ethnic groups and the national minorities in the country, which are by nature and by definition unique, direct, positive? Or is this ambiguous, imagined, and even contradictory - aggressive towards the other?

The point of this question, it appears, according to the analysis of Anderson, Gellner, Held and McGrew and especially Smith, is to separate form and substance in terms of value. Is there positive and negative nationalism? “Good and bad”? Civil and ethnic? There is a difference. One form and substance relates to nationalism in developed civic societies in which the nation-state, national state, develop in parallel and include; order of human rights and civil liberties, the introduction of an autonomous civil society which includes law and practices in kinds of self-determination for its citizens.

The kind of “nationalism” that prevails today in the developed Western civil world caters to homogenous nations and their positive attitude towards minorities. Held and especially Habermas have advocated for expanding the concept and category even at a supranational level, particularly in relation to the processes of globalization and Europeanization (European unification), to include what Habermas “referred to” as a concept of European constitutional patriotism.

The second form and substance is the kind of nationalism found in newly democratized countries, most of which belong to the Balkan countries and Macedonia’s neighbours. This kind of nationalism seeks to be counted among the modern nationalisms, thus having an alibi for violent and forced assimilation of numerous ethnic groups and minorities, especially the Macedonian, and others. Its specificity is; to proclaim itself as modern and a member belonging to the “builder of modern nations” persistent in denying the existence of other nations, ethnicities, minorities, at the level of violent, illegal and unlawful inclusion and assimilation, declaring all citizens members of its nation-state on the basis of “equal civil rights”.

7. Use of theory and history

Writing about the ideological sources of nationalism, Eli Keduri, professor at the London School of Economics, in 1960, in his famous work “Nationalism”, said that language, culture, sometimes even religion, according to the nationalistic doctrine, represent different aspects of the primordial entity – the nation... Namely, beyond any doubt this doctrine divides humanity into separate and different nations, claiming that such nations can create their own sovereign states, and that members belonging to these nations have achieved freedom and self fulfillment by fostering their particular national character, as well as with belonging to the greater whole of the nation (Keduri, 2000., p. 87-87). Keduri has provided sufficient analytical information that follows the nation formation process of European countries since the 16th century, but also believes that the process can create confusion when analyzed in terms of categories of nationalist historiographies. For example, when a particular anthropology and metaphysics is used in the interpretation of the past, then history takes on a completely different and distorted feature. According to Keduri, for example; the people who thought they acted in accordance with God’s directives, in the realization of the truth, or to achieve dynastic interests, or simply to defend the country against aggression, were included in those geniuses of the event and in the construction of a separate nationality... The author here points out the misuse of historiography in nationalistic goals.

Similarly, when nationalist historiography is applied to the European past, we catch a glimpse of nations being created slowly, gradually,

so that at the end their territorial sovereignty as states can be confirmed. As Keduri has indicated, Prussia, Venice, Flanders, etc., were such typical entities, calling that method an irritating scientific anomaly. “Inventors of this doctrine endeavoured to show that nations are the result of the natural division of the human race, invoking history, anthropology and linguistics. But this trend is unsustainable, because regardless of what ethnological or philological doctrines could be shaped, at some point there is no plausible explanation as to why people who speak the same language or belong to the same race etc., should therefore with only that be able to create their own state exclusively...” (Keduri, 2002, p. 93).

What lacks in this doctrine, says Keduri, is people’s right to persist on the differences that divide them from others, whether these differences are real or imagined, important or not, because of these differences they have the right to create their own first political principle.

Following Keduri’s logic (also that of Gellner and Smith in particular) it can be said that nationalism is a doctrine bound to Europe in the last century and a half, as the need to construct states and statehood. And in that statehood, since the French Revolution and onwards, prevailed the politics of human rights, civil liberties and autonomies in civil society. Where then is the fusion of Western or European or American nationalism and democratic order and policy? It is in human rights, in the right to self-determination, including the right to self-determination of ethnic and national collectives. These rights are already regulated by several international legal acts, in particular the UN, the Council of Europe, the European Union. These rights are a blend and symbiosis of identity and self-determination, nationalism converted to patriotism, in sympathy with their country and group, loyalty to their order and readiness for its defense; but without suppressing others. On the other hand, the nationalist doctrine is complex; it sometimes includes universal feelings in a community, such as xenophobic feelings towards foreigners, outsiders, i.e. the “others”. The juncture sometimes creates confusion when the national doctrine is based on specific anthropology and metaphysics, as Eli Keduri once wrote (Keduri, 2002, p. 88). At this point it seems the distinction of

nationalism as patriotism, and nationalism as a policy of suppression, oppression and denial of the rights of “others”, minorities, ethnic groups and all vulnerable and underprivileged groups. Differentiated at this point is “good from bad” nationalism, civic patriotism from ethnic nationalism.

A good part of the Balkan nationalisms, even when declared as nationalisms of the Western type, when references are made to “citizenship in a nation-state” are actually ethnic nationalisms in the service of “specific anthropology and metaphysics”. This is well understood by American historian Tom Gallagher, who paraphrases M. Todorova, in saying that it is not about creating “nation-states” of the Western model, but about creating “ethnically homogenous states”, which are at the root of much of the organized violence, similar to that in Western Europe, in a longer time frame, and in which “external factors” had more impact than the local factors (Gallagher, 2001. p. 3)

Ethno-symbolism, in its own critique of ethnic nationalism, actually built and affirmed the identity theory of nation and ethnicity. Z. Kramarich, prominent Croatian culture-ologist, linguists and Macedon-ist, conceptually and analytically followed B. Anderson, A. Smith’s (and others) line of ethno-symbolism, especially the problems of “self-identification” and “double identity” of ethnicities, analyzing cases of Macedonian literature, culture and national consciousness. And for him, equating “ethnicity” to “nationality” was purely a matter of converting one dominant or ruling political elite in state structure and then objectively standardizing the group, jointly, eventually – to ethnic memory and a sense of close connection... That together becomes a culture, a national consciousness or self-awareness; it is a sense of solidarity, a sense of belonging to a country that has political power, sovereignty, governing regulation... The cultural identity (language, ethnic identity, a sense of unity, a sense of community, of shared history, myths, etc.) for Kramarich was essentially a base for statehood. This in turn formalizes, institutionalizes, and standardizes those official elements dominating national consciousness. And what happens when there is no state or the state is “forbidden”? The cultural basis for national identity and consciousness becomes a sense of

community which the state significantly strengthens somewhere to the extent of nationalism.

Exploring this using the Macedonian and Greek identity as an example, Loring Danforth concluded the following: “The relatively late establishment of the Macedonian state, compared with other Balkan countries, does not mean, as the Greek nationalists argue, that the Macedonian nation is “artificial” while the Greek nation is “authentic”... The Macedonian national identity and the Greek national identity are constructed equally”. (Danforth, 1995 p. 108).

Following the same line of argument, Kramarich, in a recently published study called “Identity, Text, Nation” (Kramarich, 2010), suggested that it is important in the creation of modern nation to use “material”, i.e. cultural, historical and other heritage from the pre-nationalist era (according to Gellner), but after that the material loses significance. Kramarich leaned more towards the opinion of Anderson and Smith who believed that the “umbilical cord” between the pre-national community and the modern nation remain unbroken, and that it mainly consist of: the name, myths, symbols, values, memories. The nation that was in the past must remain in the future... an irreversible memory and an unlimited future. The vacuum between the nation and the state can be filled, as long as that emptiness is reduced to nationalism, in the Balkan conditions it can be progressive and that much more traditional.

Kramarich paid great attention to M. Hroh and his explanation of the difficult process of emancipation and promotion of the so-called small nations (those “without history”, which in their pre-capitalist past were not independent political centres and those which from the Middle Ages had their own political entities and feudal ruling classes, but lost their political independence, before developing into modern nations). The situation in the Balkans today is typical of that. The ruling class of the larger nations had more people around which gravitated the potential ruling classes of the smaller nations. This means that these smaller nations had no opportunity to build complete social structures typical of this stage of social development; they lacked “their own ruling class”. Hence there were resulting inequalities in their development and in their national existence, not to mention in their experiences with the assimilatory

processes and state intervention. The level of “submission” substantially differed in the new people and ranged from cases at the margins of national existence to cases of political and economic dependence and cultural stagnation.

“This failure to deliver is characteristic of some ethnicities even after the formation of an independent state. In fact, even with a national state, conditions begin to surface for the realization of economic, cultural and political sovereignty, which manifest themselves in a clear and firm ‘will’ to take over power... And here, wrote Kramarich, is apparently the delay: all this is happening at the ‘wrong’ time, because ‘the concepts of homogenous national cultures, for compact stories of national cultures or ‘organically’ fused communities today can no longer count on cultural comparisons’...” (Kramarich, 2010, p. 81). But, self-identification remains strong, maybe the strongest pillar of national existence; it over-rules the unclear, double or multiple identities.

This opinion is also shared by John Fine in his study of ethnic groups in the Balkans in the early middle ages, published 15 years earlier. “It is obvious that in this period a broad ethnic mix of Slavs and Greeks appeared; it is likely that few Greeks remained purebred, if such a thing had even existed before the Slavic invasions. Several centuries later, many Albanians also migrated to these regions and further increased the ethnic mixing. So, it is not reasonable to believe that the Greeks of now are any more pure-blooded than any of the other Balkan nations. But of course, what plays a role here is culture, not blood lines.” (Fine, 1994).

At the completion of the identity of nation theory, Z. Kramarich analyzed and made reference to the Slovenian philosopher Slavoj Zhizhek, who believed that you don’t need a nation to represent a “linguistic community”. Of course, according to Zhizhek and Kramarich, homogenization and national identification does not automatically mean acceptance of each and of any identity. Kramarich calls Zhizhek’s critique of the nation a purely discursive category.

It is, namely, necessarily fixed with an unspoken, un-linguistic nucleus of pleasure of the canonized aspiration: “Nationalism is a

privileged outburst of enjoyment in the social field. The national goal, ultimately, is nothing more than a way that subjects a given ethnic community to organize its enjoyment from its national myths.” (Zhizhek, 1996. p. 13).

The problem with nationalism is that it encroaches on the identity of “other or others”. Just like “nationality”. Modern political nationalism cannot be understood without reference to former ethnic ties and memories (in some cases even the memories of pre-modern identities and communities). Kramarich fully agrees with Smith on this that “the ethno-symbolic approach can help us understand why nationalism has often such a broad support from the people, i.e. why nationalist agitation by the intelligentsia encountered such an echo among “the masses”...” (ibid. p. 173). The intelligentsia, for reasons already described, chooses “selective use and abuse of history and historiography”, about which Kramarich quotes from E. Keduri’s famous analysis fragment: “Selective use of history... leads intellectuals to read the past through political glasses. The ideology that is shaped by that means encourages and conducts violence, and the people affected by its achievements, managed to mobilize only when history ‘harnesses’ the national cause...” (Kramarich, p. 173). This is a mechanism which functions on the long road of ethno-romanticism and noble ideas about ethno-empowerment of the rigid forms of ethno-nationalism and violence.

It seems particularly important for the Balkans, and its nations and states, and especially the national minorities and their rights, including entities in Macedonia as a country and as a mother of many minorities in neighbouring and distant countries, to follow the logic of free base, expression and institutional, be it political-national, political-cultural, ethno-cultural and normative expression of nations, ethnicities and their interests and identity symbols, of course, in the measure that it is political and ethno-psychological, which is internationally legal and politically regulated in terms not to the detriment and against the rights and interests of others. There is no theoretical, abstract or conceptual-legal basis that would justify opposition to it. Exactly from that aspect are analyzed the typical national-doctrinal sources of Macedonia’s neighbours published here. They, however, are operational and truly function in the foreign and domestic policy in most neighbouring countries.

Our analysis shows that, first, most of Macedonia’s neighbours deny or prohibit the right to self-identification for minorities in general, and in our case - the Macedonian national minority. They are in sharp contradiction with today’s pre-governing modernist and ethno-symbolic doctrine that prescribes - if a nation, nation state, national minority, ethnic group, etc., feels and self-identifies as distinctively different from others, it has the right to feel that way and be distinct. And, there is no obligation or duty for it to prove why it is feeling that way and why it wants to self-identify. Also, it does not have to prove historically, culturally, linguistically, religiously, or by any other acts, that it exists as a group different from others.

Second and more important is a good foundation and body of provisions in international public law documents and acts, which guarantee, protect and promote the right of identity and self-identity of national minorities and ethnic entities. That is, the human rights of an identity, at an individual, national and cultural identity level. Here is a good place to also mention the UN charter and acts, the European Charter on Human Rights (articles 8, 9, 10, 11) also articles 1and 3 of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities concerning human dignity, as well as articles 1 and articles 21 and 22 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, which relate to non-discrimination of cultural, religious and language identity.

8. The Albanian national doctrine

Published in October 1998, as a platform to address the Albanian national question, it is, according to its introductory explanation, an official product of the Albanian Academy of Sciences, “concerned not only with the status of Kosovo, but also with the future of the entire Albanian nation”. The draft platform was initially discussed at the Academy Assembly and then embedded in it were justified objections and suggestions from Albanian intellectuals from Albania, Kosovo and Macedonia. The document was eventually adopted by the Academy Assembly. The Academy’s thoughts were, reportedly, to organize a National Assembly in which scholars from all regions and the ethnic Albanian Diaspora participate in its adoption and then “together try and achieve it”. This is actually an

indication of the outcome of the Kosovo issue and the events that followed in Serbia and Macedonia. The entire Platform is a salient fact of the synchronization of Albanian ethno-radicalism in the Balkans, but also abroad, including the Albanian lobbyists in Europe and the United States.

This Albanian Academy platform is a repetition and renewal of the romanticism for creating a Greater Albania from the time of the League of Prizren. However, in relation to the 1877-78 League of Prizren program, the analysis should separate its national-emancipatory and liberating character of its large Albanian and expansionist character. Five years after the publication of the Platform (2003), in a speech at Woodrow Wilson Centre in Washington, Ambassador Girt Ahrens (first Special Representative of the Presidency of the EU in Macedonia, and then a representative of the OSCE Presence in Albania), said that today Greater Albania is basically a means of unifying Albania with Kosovo, and that none of the leading politicians from Albania, Kosovo and from wherever, are for that because it certainly separates Albania from the Euro-Atlantic structures.

Ahrens confirmed that this did not mean that the idea of a Greater Albania was dead forever. When the Yugoslav crisis began, most of the Albanian speakers were innocently making noises about it. But in October 1998, the Albanian Academy of Sciences announced that a “platform for solving the Albanian national question” was available and would go in that direction, and that once the Albanians would go in the EU direction, states without borders, it would become irrelevant. Of course, the question was; what would happen if their integration into Europe failed to materialize?” (Ahrens, 2003, c. 133). About a year after the Platform was released, the so-called Kosovo crisis began, and three years after that the Macedonian amplitude began in the Albanian crisis.

The platform of the Albanian Academy is not pretentious, theoretical or a scientific text. Its starting point is that the ethnic, historical and territorial identity of the Albanians in the Balkans is not disputed and that it can be proven scientifically and historically; but it is not necessary. Quite incidentally, it has been cited in several historical and bibliographical sources, however, the Platform does

not depend on any sources or evidence, only on priori claims. Priori-ism is unconditionally reliant on the primordial Marxist theory of the nation - which is supposedly historically shaped, and even years before capitalism, which has community-based organic-blood, linguistic, religious, cultural and economic ties, developed in a compact ethnic territory. What then is the hypothetical construction on which the Platform is based?

First, beyond any doubt, the part of the Balkans north and east to Nish and Pirot, then down through Kumanovo, including Skopje as the capital of Kosovo Vilayet, over Shtip, Prilep and Bitola, Voden and Kostur to Ioannina etc., was (allegedly) Albanian ethnic territory. It belonged to the Albanians from time immemorial from their ancestors onwards - the Southern Illyrians and Dardanians. If at some time, there were other countries in these territories, for example, Byzantine, Serbian, Greek, they were only political authorities and occupiers. If there were migrations of nations (as was the time of Charnoevich, late 17th century), such migrations were Albanian population migrations (in Italy). For the current, tragic division of Albanians and Albanian ethnic territories, against which the Albanian national movement has always fought, not only were “the centuries-old Ottoman occupiers guilty, but also the nationalist circles of the neighbouring countries, and together with them the lack of interest by the Great Powers”. So today, among the nations of Europe, the largest territorial fragmentation is suffered exactly by the Albanians (first sentence of the platform).

It was extremely unfortunate and tragic that the Great Powers, for example, at the 1912 ambassadorial conference in London, partitioned Albania, as they did in Versailles in 1920. Consequently, the Albanian nation was always torn apart and oppressed, until the disintegration of Yugoslavia (1991-1998), when Albanians were found in five different countries. In four of them, the Albanians were without, or with very minor ethnic rights (Macedonia) and were subject to denial, oppression and genocide. The fact that Hitler unified Greater Albania is only partially correct, because he gave it to Italy to manage. It was quite similar to the assessment of fascism in the Bulgarian doctrine. The strongest argument for the fragmentation and genocide of the Albanians, however, was the

Milosevic regime (1987-1998) and its tolerance by the international community.

Hence, the document has clearly asked for and accurately anticipated the NATO intervention in Kosovo and Serbia, which suggests there was synchronization of policies with the external factor: the pro-Albanian and anti-Milosevic forces. At that point, the document is openly aggressive. Namely, as is in the Serbian and Bulgarian doctrine, it expresses concern, “not only on the status of Kosovo, but on the future of the entire Albanian nation” and calls for solving the Albanian Question in general... Of course, the document suggests: “Gradual resolution with today’s international political conditions and processes that lead to the integration of the Balkans into the European Community”. But besides the option for a peaceful solution, especially in relation to the principles of the UN and the EU, for example the un-changeability of state borders by violent means, for peaceful resolution of conflict, etc., the Platform also stands for “military intervention” (the Kosovo- DM) as a rapid solution to prevent an Albanian humanitarian disaster.

What happens if the international community does not intervene? According to the Platform, “Albanians in these circumstances should be able to use all the tools and all the opportunities offered to them by the international community at the present stage. It is essential that they demonstrate the necessary determination and take the kind of action that will encourage the international political factors to overcome the current hesitation to adopt the necessary decisions...” This became a strategic decision, which later was used in the crisis in Macedonia. Encouraged along with that was military action as was the case in Kosovo - KLA, until the creation of the Republic of Kosovo, as well as the appeal for action to the State political leadership and to the Albanian national movement as a whole. After several months, the intervention in Kosovo was realized.

What are the Platform’s plans in relation to Macedonia? The same old story is repeated about the territory and about the population, which alleges at least 35% Albanians and 55% Macedonians, together with those who feel like Bulgarians; and unfortunately, even though they enjoy some rights, the Albanians, it alleges, are

discriminated against under police torture, inequality in the judiciary, education, forbidden to fly their flag, symbols, to use their language in official acts and so on. But with the population growth, “if the pace continues there will be a distant day when the Albanian population will catch up, and even surpass the Macedonian population”. With this demographic threat in turning the Macedonian population into a minority, the Platform sees only two options for “the porous state” that tries to “stand on its feet with crutches from the international military forces”, stationed on ethnic Albanian territories: Or a bi-ethnic state like the type of Austro-Hungary, or an Albanian autonomous province in Macedonia.

And with their European integration, there will be no boundaries... The Platform also deals with the status of the Albanians in Montenegro, where reportedly, due to intense assimilation of Orthodox Albanians, discrimination and emigration, the Albanian population has been reduced to only 8% of the total population, but it remains compact in its own ethnic territory with Ultsini as its capital. Then, there is the status of the Albanians in Greece – Chameria Region with Kostur and Voden, and finally the status of the Albanian communities in the Diaspora; treated separately in Italy and Greece, but also in other countries, in communities where ethno-cultural or linguistic identities are protected.

At the end the document again makes the assertion for “fair aspiration of all Albanians who since the last century have yearned for the unification of all Albanian territories into a single nation state”. The political status of these regions in the present phase, proposed in the paper is as follows: a) the Republic of Albania; b) An independent and sovereign Republic of Kosovo; c) the Republic of Macedonia as a bi-national state of Albanians and Macedonians with an ethnically divided sovereignty, or as an autonomous province of Albanians in Macedonia; d) the Republic of Montenegro with a local autonomous Albanian territory, with its capital in Ultsini; e) Measures to be taken by the Albanian government in Greece, i.e. Chameria to introduce the Albanian language to school children and provide restitution to the migrants after 1945.

A month after the release of the Platform, in November 1998, Arben Xhaferi uploaded the text under the title “Challenges of democracy

in multiethnic states” in the New York website belonging to J. DioGuardi of the Albanian American Civic League. The text represented the operation-alization of the Academy Platform. The text’s editor was Shirley Klois, Balkan Affairs Adviser who had included many more specific requirements than those in the Platform, particularly in relation to Macedonia. This document, as a directive for action, was issued one month before Xhaferi’s party entered the ruling coalition in Macedonia and it is probable that the coalition partners were aware of it. They may have even had it reviewed as a coalition. According to the rhetoric, content and proposals in Xhaferi’s text, it was in “intellectual symbiosis” with the platform. Xhaferi otherwise systematically used the terms FYROM, Slavo-Macedonians, and other offensive terms and statements (for example “Slavo-Macedonian power structure”, “in this view there was no essential difference between the politics of Milosevic and the politics of Kiro Gligorov in Macedonia”, etc.).

Besides the familiar claims made about Macedonia being a bi-national state and a state that deprives Albanians of fundamental political, civil, ethnic, cultural and other rights, Xhaferi twisted the facts and their meaning, especially about Macedonia violating international laws. For example, UN acts and resolutions, the right to self-determination, civil and political rights, economic and cultural rights, international agreements for the former Yugoslavia, especially Carrington’s document, etc. In all this there is not a single reference to an international body which reported on these, and hides the fact that in its admission to the UN, in the Council of Europe, OSCE and in its partnership with the EU, Macedonia was subjected to rigorous monitoring, which did not show such deviations, and least of all “ethnic engineering” and the marginalization of the Albanians in Macedonia.

Also hidden is the fact that the Macedonian constitution, adopted in 1991, was, from the draft phase up until its implementation - subject to strict supervision by the Badinter Commission and the EU, the Council of Europe, the Venice Commission, etc. No less twisted are the facts that the right to self-determination (the right to secede, according to the Marxist definition to which Xhaferi was inclined), does not apply to minorities, ethnic, linguistic and other such communities, it only concerns nations and nation states. Probably

because of that, Xhaferi insisted that the text and strategy identify two kinds of people living in Macedonia. In the same sense, at the end of the text, Xhaferi abused the work of prominent American political scientist Arendt Liphart from the University of California, who in his famous study “Democracy in plural societies”, described multiple options for the prospects of democracy, for example a con-social system that assumes consensual agreement of communities in decision-making, of course, with the right to veto. Xhaferi took that to mean proportional representation everywhere, and a sovereign and equal voice in decisions. He was openly against Milosevic’s slogan of one man-one vote, for no other reason than because the Albanians were diacritic (like the earlier representatives of other nations in Yugoslavia). There were a number of other problematic issues raised in the text, such as local government representation in the administration, the judiciary, education, etc. But those were issues triggered by everyone in Macedonia and not just Xhaferi.

What if the propositions in Xhaferi’s text (i.e. from the AAS Platform) were not met? About that, Xhaferi wrote; in FYROM dangerous confrontations between the two peoples, Albanians and Macedonians, exist today, the output of which can be constructive or destructive. Ideally, the confrontation should be resolved by peaceful, civilized means, but it must not be peace at any cost. The maxim “it is shortsightedness to have bad peace rather than a good war because inevitably bad peace will lead to a terrible war”. And exactly in accordance with this cataclysmic maxim of Xhaferi’s, events and the crisis unfolded in 2001 in Macedonia.

That crisis proved that the Platform, specified by Xhaferi, assumed a combination of violent and non-violent, democratic and non-democratic means, with the ultimate purpose of achieving the radical ethno-political and demographic-territorial ambitions of its authors. The crisis and its resolution with the Ohrid Framework Agreement as well as with the constitutional changes in 2001-2002, showed that the ethnic Albanian community in Macedonia was truly faced with real problems in their position and rights, and that these problems could be resolved within the institutional order, without violence, heavy casualties and material damage that usually occur in serious crises and conflicts; constitutional changes were adopted, with significant emphasis on multiculturalism. Political expressions

were improved and traditions and multicultural coexistence were enriched in our society. Finally, exit from the crisis was achieved with visible and expressed participation from the international community, which shows that solutions imposed by force and violence are not acceptable. And neither are principles of self-determination for minority ethnic groups in a wider community and even in a state, where there is no unilateral acceptance of changing state boundaries.

At the end of the text, even though it applied strategically to the entire postulated “Albanian national-territorial problem”, an agreement was proposed between Albanians and Macedonians to change the national system to a bi-national system, with ten points, six of which were cosmetic-commercial and four accurately reflected the substance of the AAS platform: a) statehood, languages and flags; b) the referendum (D.M.-recognition.); c) constituting a bicameral parliament; d) free movement of the Albanian people, ideas and goods across Albanian territories;

These articles and this approach have been implemented and are still in use today. No one and nowhere did anyone contest, deny or criticize them. Western and public politics, with all its liberalism, including its technological web-liberalism, with the exception of individuals like G. Ahrens, took absolutely no notice of their implementation. Almost no one noticed even in this country

9. The Bulgarian doctrine

Part of the Bulgarian doctrine was published in 1997 in the form of a scientific study, during a difficult time in the country (the collapse of the economy and the currency, instability, the rise of organized crime), but also during the time of dedication to European integration. Even though it was compiled by an independent collective of authors and published by an independent publisher, the names of the authors, reviewers and participants in the “project” as well as financial donations made, suggest that the Doctrine was directly linked to the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences, BAS, and to senior military, government and church circles .Only the first part was published that year under the title “Foundation of the Bulgarian National Doctrine”, which dealt mainly with conceptual issues and

with history, until recent times. The following year the second part was published under the title “National programs related to Bulgarian national ideals and national interests”. Both parts concentrated on a nationalist ideology, hidden behind the veil of academism, modern rhetoric and “historical science”.

The Doctrine as a motif has apparently followed the fact that all modern states (mentioning the United States, France, Germany, Japan, etc.), including their neighbours, have national doctrines, but Bulgaria did not have one. (This so-called fact however is incorrect, just like many other solid “facts” listed throughout the text). Outside of that, here we will find mention of the need for unity and the unity of the entire nation in difficult times, leading its politics on a “scientific basis” rather than on intuitions, and having a road map for the development of the nation and the state in the 21st century, and that definition is found in the national doctrine, ideals, interests, etc. What follows, and is emphasized, is that this doctrine is supra-social, trans-party, class, ethnic, religious, which means it takes precedence over all others, just as the national ideals and interests take precedence over all others, including the state.

According to the introduction, the purpose of the doctrine, as is in the SANU Memorandum, is an appellative guide to “statesmen and politicians” to act actively and in compliance aimed at achieving the Bulgarian national ideal and Bulgarian national interests, and at the same time it calls on the entire nation to direct its creative energy and will towards those aims. Again, in the introductory section, the paper tries to ascertain scientific justification and theoretical basis for its approach, again starting off from the alleged “fact” that in the world today there are two understandings of the nation: one that goes beyond, on whose basis is the “ethnos” in the narrow sense of the word, that is, the so-called ethno-nation conception, or conception of ethno-nation; and the other is supposedly what French educators today call, as was said in the text, the basis for state regulation as most of the countries in the world function (France, USA, Switzerland, Spain and many others); this is the concept of a socio-cultural (political) nation, the definition of which is attributed (without a source) to the French educators: “society of citizens, united by a common idea of statehood”. The doctrine is resolute, of course, by this second conception.

Besides that, this great surprise is followed by the definition of the Bulgarian nation in a clean and strict Marxist formulation (ethnicity-nationality-national consciousness – for creating its own church and state) - historical - and - territory with full and compact political, economic and spiritual space. When it again starts with the ethnic, meaning nation-genesis of the Bulgarians, the doctrine does not rely on any Marxist conception, but rather on the most archaic concepts of ethno-romanticism and ethno-determinism.

Yet, basically, these two doctrinal texts follow - Marxism. In general, even today, Bulgarian academics, largely suffer from Marxism and Leninism when looking at their national question. These two texts are in complete continuity and argumentation with the famous BAS Institute of History pamphlet from 1968 regarding the Macedonian Question, which allegedly should have had clearer views of the Bulgarian stand towards Macedonia, and for the imminent improvement of Yugoslav-Bulgarian relations and regarding the Tito- Zhivkov and Krste Tsrvenkovski-Zhivkov talks. There was not even a milimetre of movement, except for the criticisms against Dimitrov for “improperly” understanding Lenin’s take and Stalin’s “abusive” politics - the right of nations to self-determine up to secession (Mlakedonskij vpros, 1968).

However, it was clear even to the Bulgarian academics that theoretically, the doctrine was quite shallow and bare and required reinforcing. In 2000, the Sofia publisher “Paradigm”, in support of the doctrine, published the book entitled “Ethnicity, nation, nationalism” by historian V. Todorov. It is interesting that Todorov, after a solid analysis of the works of A. Smith, B. Anderson and E. Gellner and others, from the circle of modernists and ethno-symbolists, in his conclusions he was totally confused. First, in his preface he criticized former President Zheliu Zhelev, who in 1993 allowed his book about “Fascism” to be translated and published in the Macedonian language and later came to Skopje to launch the book. Todorov said that he was more of a philosopher than a historian, and that he somewhat mixed up history with politics. But in his fourth part of the book, Todorov was determined not to recognize Macedonia as a nation. He named them - non-Albanian political forces in Macedonia, as a Christian majority and leadership