PERSONALITIES - Part 09

sitting there, and another half-dozen or so huddled around the stove at the back of the hall -although in fairness it should be said that Vlahov tended to begin his lectures later than the advertised time, and it has been a habit for people to return. If as these events appear to suggest, the (not very numerous) intellectuals here are not over-impressed by the new Macedonian Idea, what then is their attitude? Some (I should say not very many) are plainly pro-Bulgarian on principle. Most of the students and young people, although probably more interested in their technical studies than in their Macedonian traditions, are, I should say, supporters to a greater or less degree of the present Yugoslav Government in the same way as are most other young Yugoslavs. As Macedonians, they are likely to be far less worried by any submergence of “Western Values” than are their fellow students, say, in Zagreb and Ljubljana. At the same time the Yugoslav Communist Party, by putting an end to the almost colonial policy in Macedonia of successive pre-war Belgrade governments, has at one stroke eliminated the greatest single curse of Vardar Macedonia, and released a good deal of latent energy hitherto suppressed. The Party can also claim, convincingly, that Yugoslavia has done a lot more to liquidate the economic backwardness of Vardar Macedonia in the last three years than Bulgaria is ever likely to do for Pirin. Finally, the Bulgarian Occupation was not a particularly pleasant affair, and the memory of it probably still works as a fairly effective discouragement to pro-Bulgarian sympathies. On the other hand, there is evidently fairly widespread support for a Macedonian autonomist movement - largely, I should say, among older people, though certainly also in certain sections of the youth. As a spokesman of the Yugoslav security service said at the Macedonian Party Congress what opposition groups there have been have consisted “almost entirely of Mihailovists”. It is a commonly held view that the Mihailovists, or IMRO, are really only advocating autonomy as a prelude for incorporation in Bulgaria when the time is ripe. The fact that they seem quite happy to talk the Bulgarian language lends credence to this view, and certainly one of the main tenets of Yugoslav propaganda is that the policies of the Bulgarian Communist Party and of the Mihailovists is virtually indistinguishable. I am inclined to believe, however, that this is an over - simplification, and that there is a body of opinion which seeks a united, independent Macedonia as an ultimate object in itself -quite possibly within some larger federation, perhaps, as is alleged

here, under Anglo-American protection, but probably not under the protection of the Kremlin. Evidence in support of this view comes from Lazo Mojsov’s book, mentioned earlier in this dispatch. Mojsov gives, for the first time, more details of the “Skopje intellectuals” who had been mentioned earlier as criticizing the Manifesto put out by the partisan Headquarters for Macedonia at the end of 1943. These, critics, who appear to have been supporters of the Partisans, were apparently professional politicians with no very great regular following, but their views are interesting none the less. They argued that there could be no final settlement of the Macedonian question within Yugoslavia, as the very name of Yugoslavia was for Macedonians a symbol of slavery; that the future of Vardar Macedonia could not be decided without reference to the other two parts of Macedonia as well; that the first aim of the Macedonian Partisans must be clearly stated as being a United Macedonia, and a joint Macedonian military command must therefore be established with a view to placing the Macedonian Question fairly and squarely “in the diplomatic arena”. Other criticisms put forward by these people were that the Partisan Headquarters were “not competent” to issue any “Manifesto” in the name of the Macedonian People; that they, the “intellectual leaders”, should be consulted more frequently and entrusted with diplomatic missions, etc.; that there was no need publicly to criticize Ckatrov and other “fascists”, as they were completely discredited anyway; that for General Mijalce (or Mise) Apostolski to sign himself “Mihajlo” “smelt of Serbdom” , and so on. Various extracts from Tito’s letters quoted by Mojsov make it clear that he was worried by autonomist tendencies on the fringes of the Partisan movement in Macedonia. No doubt they were a good deal harder to deal with than plain “Greater Bulgarianism”. It seems clear that Metodi Andonov-Cento, the Macedonian nationalist politician who eventually became President of the Presidium of the Antifascist Council of National Liberation of Macedonia, must have been one of these “autonomists”. He must also have been a figure of some standing in Macedonia, otherwise he would scarcely have been given the appointment. This may also explain why the Bulgarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs has proved so eager to sing Andonov’s praises since their hands were freed by the Cominform Resolution. Andonov, of course, tried to escape to Greece with the object of laying, proposals for an independent Macedonia before the Paris Peace Conference,

and since that attempt (as on several occasions before the war) he has been inside a Yugoslav gaol. Lazo Mojsov, of course, argues (or rather states categorically again and again -it cannot be called argument) that these Macedonian autonomists were really “tools of Bulgarian Chauvinism”. If that were so, then it would of course be easier for Mojsov to discredit them in the eyes of the public. But his “arguments” are not convincing, and clearly beg the question. There seems to be no doubt that IMRO, if it plaid its cards carefully, could count on the support of most politically conscious anti-communists among the Macedonian intelligentsia, in addition to the more-or-less fascist following it has always had -in present circumstances there would appear to be no other alternative to communism, whether Titoist or Stalinesque. It is certainly a fact that autonomist bands were active in both Vardar and Aegean Macedonia during the war, and at least in Vardar Macedonia for a considerable time after the war, until they were dispersed by Yugoslav security troops. It is scarcely likely that the ideas for which they stood in 1945 have been so easily disposed of. But IMRO has often been described with some justice as mainly an affair of the bourgeois intelligentsia, with little mass support. The same is probably true today, and autonomist tendencies are likely to be limited to certain groups of Macedonian intellectuals (not a very numerous body, in any case). The state of opinion among workers and peasants is altogether a different matter. My impression is that the Macedonian workers’ main feeling is one of dissatisfaction with living conditions as they are at present -they are certainly very bad -and that they are a good deal more interested in their standard of life than in ideological or national disputes. Town workers here suffer more than those elsewhere as a result of the inevitable, but none the less frightening inefficiency of Management in their People’s Republic, which can be observed at its worst in the State commercial network. As a result, housewives here have had to put up with a good deal more in the way of queuing and shortages than elsewhere, and the free market-prices of essential food are painfully higher than they are only a few kilometers away in Serbia (particularly in Kosmet). “It was better than when the Bulgarians were here” is a typical comment, but it is not a political judgment; in fact, most people know well enough the rations in the Bulgarian People’s Republic are appreciably worst than they are here. “Yes, we suppose things will get better – but WHEN?” probably best expresses the resigned attitude of most town worker.

While housewives struggle to make ends meet, many of their husbands have to work in extremely bad conditions, and workers are constantly leaving their jobs in the (slender) hope of finding something better. This again seems to be very largely due to inefficiency and thoughtlessness, resulting once more, to some extent, from Macedonian inexperience in management and administration. In the once British-owned chrome mines at Radusa, to take one fairly typical example, workers have been standing all day in several inches of water although it is said that gum-boots are in fact available if someone will only do something about it. One thing is certain, and that is that in general (although a few branches do manage to assist their members to some extent, as for instance in getting them extra rations and firewood) the Trade Unions are of almost no help at all in improving working conditions. It is scarcely likely that the scandals revealed in the recent purge of the Trade Union leadership will do much to increase their reputation. Nevertheless, there are, signs that the living conditions of ordinary workers will improve this year, and I should say that most of them would give their more-or-less willing support to the present authorities unless somebody else can offer them, convincingly, a standard of life dramatically better than the one they suffer at present. It seems very unlikely that advocates of union with Bulgaria could hope to make such an offer. Whether Macedonian autonomists could make their proposals more attractive with an offer of Anglo-American spam and circuses is another matter. I should be inclined to think it extremely doubtful. Probably, apart from other factors, very few of the thousands of Greek Macedonian refugees here are likely to be good propagandists for Anglo-American support. Opinion among the peasants (the great majority of Macedonians, of course) is a different matter again. As I have reported on an earlier occasion, many (if not most) of the country districts of Vardar Macedonia are so backward that it is difficult to conceive of any but a few individuals having any sort of coherent political opinion at all. But Bulgarian (and perhaps more particularly Albanian) occupation was certainly no pleasant business for the Macedonian peasants, and I should say that by the end of the war the Partisans were regarded genuinely as liberators in many country districts where the peasants neither knew nor cared anything about communism. Macedonia possesses an unusually high proportion of really poor peasants, and many (particularly among the Albanians in the south-west, it

appears) were either without land or hopelessly in debt. For these people -a very numerous class -the Agrarian Reform came as a godsend, and subsequent resistance to the idea of Producer Cooperatives was far less than in districts with a higher proportion of richer peasants. The Macedonian Communist Party, compared with the parties in the rest of Yugoslavia, had comparatively little influence in the towns, where the Bulgarians were naturally able to develop far more effective anti-communist (or at any rate anti-Yugoslav -communist) propaganda than German or Italian occupiers elsewhere. The Macedonian Partisans, therefore, were based almost exclusively on the villages, and it seems clear that the Macedonian Communist Party is well aware of the source of most of its strongest and most effective potential support nowadays. The Party appears to consist of a not very large group of intellectuals who in earlier days might have been Macedonian nationalists, a group (again, I should say, not large) of Macedonian workers who for one reason or another were less influenced by anti-Serb opinion than their fellows, plus the usual admixture of flamboyant “1941 Partisans” and warriors, together with an unusually high proportion of time-servers with rather murky records. The latter, although they do no occupy the highest positions, are obviously the most unstable element in present circumstances. The Party is both young and (except as regards Partisan warfare) very inexperienced. As pressure on it becomes stronger (and the leaders are obviously very nervous about the possible effects of Bulgarian propaganda, especially since it increased in vehemence at the beginning of the year), the Party is trying to consolidate its position in the most promising (and, in Macedonia, the most decisive) sector; namely, in the villages. In my opinion, the Party is likely to be successful in its policy, given time. There is to be ideological work on a very big scale where pre-conceived political notions are few; the party’s wartime record is mostly in its favour; loyal peasants of the more influential kind are to be admitted as members of the Party with little or no regard to the purity of their Marxist-Leninist ideology (if indeed they understand it at all). In this way, the Party will build up a firm basis of influential villagers committed to its support. Many of them will undoubtedly be (already are) opportunists and yes- men, but the policy in general is likely to be effective. The main weapon in this drive for increased support in the countryside is of course the extension of the Producer Cooperatives. On this issue (as I have

suggested earlier in this dispatch) Kolishevski, who, as a worker born and bred, probably takes a less novel view of the social category from which a communist party should draw its main support, appears to have been over-ruled. There is no doubt that Macedonia, compared with the rest of Yugoslavia, offers very favourable conditions for the establishment of Producer Cooperatives with the minimum of peasant opposition. It is, after all, the home of “pecalbarstvo” -the system under which the men of a village unable to support its inhabitants would go abroad to earn their living, and send their savings home. In the case of the mountain village of Galicnik, near Debar (and others too) the entire male population used to go abroad to work as crafts men or yoghurt makers, and returned once a year in July for about a fortnight (or every other year, if they had been to America). The month of July was thus filled with celebrations and weddings, and the newlywed husbands would look forward to seeing their three-months-old children the following July. Such a way of life was extremely picturesque for foreign visitors, but not very satisfactory for the villagers themselves. Now, Galicnik has a very large and flourishing cooperative engaged in stock-breeding and carpet-making. It has libraries, electric light, a cinema. I am told by a man who has just spent a few months there teaching the carpet makers the secret of wool-dyeing that the women and young people are delighted with the new arrangements, although some of the older men who had got used to the idea of going “on pecalba” every year are still inclined to hanker after foreign parts. The case of Galicnik, of course, is so startling that it can scarcely be called typical. I believe, for example, that government loans to this particular cooperative have been unusually large. Nevertheless, it does serve to illustrate the fact that the cooperative idea is likely to become increasingly popular in the very large number of poor, backward and barren villages of Macedonia. It is therefore clear that if “the population of Bulgaria is to be increased from 7 million to 10 million” (as has apparently been said in Sofia), it will not be as the result of a popular rising in Vardar Macedonia in the foreseeable future. Propagandists here have not much difficulty in disposing of Greater Bulgarian Chauvinism. They can point to the fact that there is not likely to be any autonomy for Macedonians inside Bulgaria -and some sort of autonomy would certainly be demanded even by Macedonians who might not press their claim to a language of their own distinct from

Bulgarian. The “Kolishevski clique” can even make a convincing enough counter-claim for the inclusion of Pirin in the Macedonian people’s Republic. Neskovic, at the Macedonian party Congress, strongly denied that Yugoslavia had ever claimed Pirin except as part of a general settlement in an eventual South Slav Federation. This seems, if not an actual misstatement, to be at least misleading. Mojsov’s book makes it quite clear that at one stage the union of Pirin and Vardar Macedonia within Yugoslavia and without regard to an ultimate South Slav Federation was agreed to in principle by the Bulgarian Communist Party, though without enthusiasm. They are scarcely likely to have agreed to this unless the Yugoslavs had been pressing them very strongly (and unless, one might perhaps add, they had had instructions from Moscow in this sense). Mojsov and his fellow publicists will have a far harder task, though, to counter proposals for some sort of Macedonian autonomy with no special Yugoslav association. The Bulgarian Party appears, wisely enough, to have given up the attempt to persuade Macedonians that they are really Bulgars, or that they would be happier as citizens of the Bulgarian People’s Republic. Nor can they convincingly propose Pirin as a basis for some sort of autonomous Macedonia. But if they are still thinking in terms of an autonomy based on Aegean Macedonia, then they touch the Yugoslav Communist party in general, and Lazo Mojsov in particular, on a very weak spot indeed. Publicists here have surely been thinking of this possibility when driving home the not entirely convincing argument that all Macedonian autonomists without exception are the dupes or agents of Sofia. As I have indicated the autonomists can in no sense be described as the agents of Sofia; whether they will in due course become their dupes will depend on the skill and subtlety of the Bulgarian propaganda machine. Less convincing still is Skopje’s secondary argument that, pending a form of South Slav Federation acceptable to the Yugoslav Communist Party, a united Macedonia not; based on the People’s Republic within the framework of Federal Yugoslavia is “unthinkable”. At this point Mojsov completely abandons reasoned statement in favour of a mystical wrath and categorical assertion. He claims that those Macedonians (i.e. the Yugoslav Macedonians) who fought for and won their national independence within Yugoslavia have a natural right to lead the way to Macedonian unity, and that since Yugoslavia is in itself a federation of South Slav peoples, the incorporation of the rest of

Macedonia in it, along with the Macedonian People’s Republic, is an obvious next step. Vardar, says Mojsov, is in any case the natural heart of a united Macedonia, gliding calmly over what I believe to be a fact -namely, the existence of a fairly general feeling in Aegean Macedonia that the people of Vardar are backward and uncouth. Perhaps as a natural reaction on the part of the latter there is, I believe, a slight tendency here (certainly in other parts of Yugoslavia) to regard Aegean Macedonians as slackers. Mojsov’s assertion that Vardar is the natural heart and head of any united Macedonia is not likely to go unchallenged. His language at this stage of his “argument” is cautious and in rather general terms. He probably realizes he is skating on very thin ice which may expose him to the charge of Belgrade Chauvinism. Reading most of the Yugoslav Communist Party’s Macedonian propaganda one might be excused for supposing the Macedonians quite entitled, if they so wish, to form a united Macedonia of their own. But this is just what Mojsov will not countenance, and he only just manages not to say in so many words that South Slav Federation is of less importance than the need to keep the Macedonian people’s Republic firmly attached to Yugoslavia, and to add the rest of Macedonia to it as soon as the opportunity arises. It is difficult to see what else a Yugoslav publicist could say, given the post- Cominform situation in the Balkans, but this is certainly the weakest part of Mojsov’s (and therefore of the Yugoslav Communist party’s) case as far as Macedonians are concerned. In the light of recent developments, it looks as if the first shots in what must surely develop into a high powered Macedonian propaganda campaign were in fact fired by Mito Hadzi Vasilev in his article in “Nova Makedonija” on 24 February (i.e. some days before Mosa Pijade opened up with his big guns on 6 March).Vasilev revealed, rather innocently, in a single brief sentence adduced in support of his charge of Bulgarian hypocrisy, that Mr. Visinsky’s reference in Paris to the “Macedonian and Albanian minorities” in Greece had been reported by Tass and Pravda as “Bulgarian and Albanian” minorities. Since when, asked Vasilev curtly, had Tass been a mouthpiece for Bulgarian Chauvinism? - and in the rest of a nine-column article made no further reference to Soviet Policy or to Greece. He charged the Bulgarian Government with encouraging talk in Pirin (he did not say Aegean) Macedonia of a “free Macedonia not in Yugoslavia but in a South Slav Federation”, and hinted darkly at the possible

significance of the alleged Bulgarian claim that “Bulgaria’s population will soon be increased from 7 m. to 10 m.” If the Bulgarian leaders did not realize they were making a big mistake and mend their ways, said Vasilev, “invincible Life will teach them a cruel lesson to-day or to-morrow”. I do not know whether this is in fact the article which is said to have been quoted indirectly by The Times on 21 March (I have not yet seen the Times report but if so, then Vasilev certainly got no nearer to anything that could be called a threat of war than this prophecy about “invincible Life”. It may not be irrelevant to conclude this general review of the position in Macedonia by mentioning a conversation I had last December with an officer of the Yugoslav Army Engineers in Djevdjelija. He was a Bosnian, from a remote village in Krajina. I asked him whether there were many Macedonians in his unit on the frontier, and how he liked service in Macedonia. “Macedonians?”, he replied, “of course not – we’re mostly Bosnians and Montenegrins – you can’t expect a Macedonian to be any good at fighting. Wild people too - just savages – take the girls, they just run away when you chaps appear – as for dancing…… Give me Zagreb any day”.

1949 – April 8. KKE and NOF, Belgrade, Yugoslavia, No. 82. Since sending my dispatch No. 66 of March 22nd regarding Macedonia and a South Slav Federation I have read the texts of the KKE and NOF (National Liberation Front of Macedonia) Resolutions given in dispatch No. 174 of March 23rd from the Canadian Ambassador in Athens, as well as the account of the KKE and NOF denials that a separate unified Macedonia state within the South Slav Federation (but dominated by Bulgaria) was envisaged. Macedonia is very much in the limelight at the moment but the situation is far from clear, and speculation, though enriched by the dismissal of Kostov in Bulgaria, is still guess work while the evidence gradually accumulates. By reviving the idea of a Macedonian state Bulgaria has been able to spearhead the Cominform offensive against the CPY and at the same time to further her own traditional “Greater Bulgarian” interests. Yugoslavia and Greece have a common interest in thwarting Bulgarian ambitions in Macedonia but at the moment the Yugoslav Government can go little further than to reduce their anti-Greek propaganda campaign and their complaints to UNO (steps which already appear to have been taken) and to cease aiding the Greek guerillas. I understand that the Yugoslavs have discreetly

let it be known in Western quarters that they can go no further as long as Tsaldaris remains Prime Minister. I think you will be interested in the attached extract from a lengthy dispatch from Mr. Hilary King, British Consul in Skopje, who possesses a good knowledge of Macedonia. Mr. King examines the success achieved by the CPY in Macedonia with its policy based on the thesis of a distinct Macedonian language and national tradition. He feels that the idea or a "Macedonian National tradition" has not attracted a large following amongst the Macedonian intelligentsia, which in its younger branches probably supports the present Yugoslav Government. Pro-Bulgarian sentiment is not widespread. He has, however, found evidence of fairly strong support for a Macedonian autonomous movement, perhaps under Anglo-American protection but probably not under the Kremlin's wing. Autonomous tendencies, Mr. King thinks, are limited to some Macedonian intellectuals who form a very small group. Amongst the workers and peasants the situation is quite different. Although the workers complain of bad economic conditions and the low standard of living, they would give their support to the present authorities unless offered a dramatically better standard, which advocates of union with Bulgaria are unable to do. The peasants, of whom a high proportion are very poor, have benefited by the land reform carried out by the Communist Party. For this reason, because of its war record, and through its establishment of producer cooperatives the Party will be able, in Mr. King's opinion, to secure the support of the peasant masses. Mr. King concludes that there will be no popular pro-Bulgarian rising in Vardar Macedonia but that there will remain considerable support for some sort of Macedonian autonomy with no special Yugoslav association. I am sending copies of this dispatch, with enclosure to London, Moscow, Warsaw, Prague and Athens. I have the honour to be, Sir, Your obedient servant, (can’t make out the signature), Secretary of State, for External Affairs, Ottawa

1949 – May. The Greek government national army general staff began preparation for a military strike against DAG. The operation was code named “Pirsos”. The National Army military structures and numbers at that time were as follows: 150,000 regular soldiers, 50,000 national defense forces, 25,000 gendarmerie forces,

7,500 police, 50,000 special units, 14,300 navy, 7,500 aviation. Thus, the sum of the armed forces possessed by the Athens regime was more than 300,000. The military forces possessed by DAG numbered no more than 25,000 soldiers.

1949 – May 5. Prerequisite to McLean’s mission, after Tito’s break with Stalin, a meeting took place between Fitzroy McLean and Marshal Tito. It was a dinner meeting during which many issues and layers of issues were discussed concerning Yugoslavia and its position, i.e. relationship with the West. Some of these issues applied to Greece. Tito did not hide the fact that he was of great help to the Andartes (DAG) in past years. But now the situation had changed and he said that Yugoslavia could not by itself refuse the right of asylum to political refugees. But those refugees were now kept deep inside the country and beyond the borders. It was understood that Tito could promise that in future he would not allow these people to return to Greece to resume fighting. And he would no longer provide any help to the Andartes (DAG). He also said that this information must not be revealed to the public because it would result in a very complex situation. Tito’s promise about this was kept top secret. No one was allowed to know about it because it would have damaged the Yugoslav Marshal’s reputation.

1949 – June 6. AFZH passes resolution to induct more Macedonian women into the war effort. The AFZH women’s Executive Board, led by Evdokia Foteva - Vera, passed a resolution to induct Macedonian women en masse into the fighting force in defense of the Vicho frontline.

1949 – June 20. Full equality was granted to the “Slavo-Macedonians” just before DAG (Democratic Army of Greece) was liquidated. Final extermination of the Macedonian people; “Fight for your lives or die!”

1949 – July 1. During its 6th Plenum the CPG Central Committee abandoned the Macedonians when it admitted that, for the sake of “national unity”, the “Macedonian Question” did not exist for

Greece. This was one of the requirements for the CPG joining the Papandreou “national unity” program.

1949 – July 3. Greek government royal troops began their decisive offensive against the DAG 24th Brigade units in Mount Kaimakchalan. After four hard and bloody days of fighting, the Brigade was overpowered and forced to withdraw into Yugoslav territory. The CPG and DAG leaderships, in order to justify the tragic losses in Kaimakchalan and put the blame elsewhere, insisted that a secret agreement had been reached on July 4, 1949 between Yugoslav and Greek royal officers in Kaimakchalan so that Yugoslavian authorities would allow Greek government troops to attack DAG units from behind. It was alleged that, according to this agreement, on July 5, 1949, Greek government units using Yugoslav space would attack from behind and rout out units of the DAG 24th Brigade. And thus the fictional “attack from behind” was invented. After the disastrous defeat at Kaimakchalan, the fighters from the DAG 24th Brigade moved to Yugoslavia and in the statements they made they denied claims made by the CPG and DAG leaderships about being attacked from behind in that sector. It was also uncovered that the alleged attack from behind was an invented lie and a provocation to justify DAG’s defeat.

1949 - July 16. AFZH Executive Board passes resolution to activate the Macedonian women and mobilize them to defend the Vicho front. This was in response to the “Pirsos” strategic plan developed and implemented by US General Van Fleet’s staff in preparation for the liquidation of the guerillas in Greece. And it is well known what happened to the Macedonian women after that, when they were shoved in the trenches to defend the frontline. Their patriotism, love for their homeland, for their fathers, husbands and brothers, drew them into this terrible war which, unbeknown to them, was waged for the benefit of strangers and against their own interests. And in the end they too faced the same humiliation… being labeled “traitors” and “wrongdoers”… and worse than that, they too were driven out of their homes and homeland and torn away from their families…

1949 – July 29. It was announced that the Yugoslav Government had delivered a note to the Greek Government protesting against the

bombing of the Yugoslav village of Kotsimir by a Greek aircraft. The note called for sanctions against those responsible for the alleged incident and demanded damages for the destruction which had been cause. The Yugoslav also protested because of a Greek military officer, on being notified of the incident, declined an invitation from the Yugoslav authorities to enter Yugoslav territory to ascertain on the spot the damage which the bombing had done to the village. The Greek authorities claimed that the Yugoslavs had been unable to put forward any proof whatever that the aircraft in question was actually Greek, and pointed out that the local Yugoslav authorities did not even allege to have established the markings of the plane. The Greeks pointed out that, on the contrary, the records of the Royal Hellenic Air Force showed conclusively that on the day of the alleged “incident” no Greek plane flew over the sector in question. Whatever the merits of the case may be, the Greeks undoubtedly made a mistake in refusing to accept the Yugoslav invitation to inspect the damage to the village. UNSCOB has been trying repeatedly to obtain Yugoslav permission to investigate incidents on the Yugoslav side of the border and the Greek refusal to the Yugoslav invitation would appear unfortunate from a tactical point of view, especially since the Greeks would not acknowledge responsibility for the bombing merely by visiting the village in question.

1949 - August 10. The Greek Monarcho-Fascist army launched a major offensive against DAG and its units in the DAG free territory in Greek occupied Macedonia. By August 17, 1949 it poked a hole in DAG’s positions and evicted two DAG divisions and several smaller units and occupied Mount Vicho and Prespa. The Macedonian civilian population in that region was pounded by the Greek Monarcho-Fascist artillery and aviation. With fanatical hatred, the DAG divisions stationed at the Greek-Yugoslav border prevented refugees from fleeing into the territory of the People’s Republic of Macedonia and coerced them to withdraw to the territory of Albania. Any Macedonian who attempted to cross the Yugoslav border was shot. There were many such incidents. The Monarcho-Fascists carried out a violent and hellish attack against DAG on August 10-14 with unprecedented air support supplied by the United States. The poet Atso Shopov was right when he wrote the poem “Gramos” telling us that “no bird can fly in Vicho from

the hail of bombs and grenades”. This struggle has been objectively presented in two volumes by Greek historian Giorgos Margaritis, a professor at the University of Crete. Margaritis has relied on the memoirs of prominent anti-Fascists for his source material. The information presented is the best example I have read that describes why DAG fighters aborted Vicho and pulled out of Gramos, leaving the population unprotected and running for its life. One hundred and thirty bombing runs were made on August 10, 1949 by the American supplied air support using “Dakota” and “Spitfire” military aircraft to bomb units of DAG and columns of fleeing refugees. The next few days the military aircraft did the same, at the same pace, providing air support for the Monarcho-Fascist artillery and infantry. There was not a square foot of space that had not been bombed on Mount Vicho, on Lisets, on Mount Malimadi and in Prespa along the Albanian and Yugoslav border. The entire area had been bombed with aerial bombs, grenades, napalm bombs and rockets and was garnished with machine gun fire by the dive-bombing aircraft. This clearly describes the conditions under which DAG was placed and the kind of pot its fighters were put in to boil. There was an insurmountable amount of pressure and worry placed on the fighters not only for saving their own lives but also for caring for the wounded and for saving the huge columns of fleeing refugees. DAG was again attacked in Gramos with the same vigour. It was under these circumstances, created mainly by foreign intervention, that the “freedom-loving democrats” of Gramos dropped the “last flag”. The Greek government offensive initiated against DAG had a force of 60,000 Greek government troops, commanded by General Van Fleet of the U.S.A., organized in 6 divisions from all branches of the military, with 200 tanks and armoured cars and with about 100 aircraft of all types, was unleashed on Mount Vicho. Opposing this force was commander Michos Vlandas of the resistance with 9,863 fighters and 40 cannons. DAG was defeated in the period during August 13 and 14 with 1,859 dead, wounded, missing and captured fighters. The Government side sustained only 256 dead and 1,336 wounded.

1949 – August 13. DAG command ordered its units to start leaving Vicho.

1949 - August 15-16. DAG units retreated into Albania but in the following days about 6,000 were transferred to reinforce the fighting in Mount Gramos.

1949 - August 17. On the first day of the offensive (August 10) the government forces breached the DAG defensive line and achieved great success. Within six days DAG lost about 800 fighters and another 600 went missing. On August 17, 1949 the last DAG unit withdrew. The majority of the units crossed over into Albanian territory.

1949 - August 20. The CPG promises victory in Gramos. The CPG Central Committee Politburo held a meeting and promised its fighters that “Gramos has all the means necessary to deliver the enemy a death blow” and coined the slogan “Gramos will become the tomb of the Monarcho-Fascists Government troops”. That, however, never happened! All Zahariadis wanted to do was kill more Macedonians.

1949 - August 24-29. Greek government attacks Gramos. During the night of August 29-30, government troops began a new campaign against Gramos. Commanded by U.S. General Van Fleet, this force was larger by three battalions than that of Vicho. Placed in charge, of the resistance side in Gramos and of Gramos DAG General headquarters, was General Georgios Vontisios-Gusias with about 12,500 fighters (6,000 were transferred from the battlefields of Vicho). The Greek government artillery and aviation alternately bombed DAG positions continuously. It was a hellish situation for DAG and its units. The last battles took place on August 29 and the retreat for Albania began on August 30. DAG losses amounted to 922 dead, 944 captured, 650 wounded and about 400-450 voluntarily surrendered. Losses on the government side amounted to 243 dead and 1,452 wounded. The DAG 6th and 7th Divisions withdrew to Bulgaria during September and October 1949. The last DAG remnants, located in the southern parts of Greece, withdrew in early 1950.

1949 – August 30. The Greek Civil War ended. DAG was defeated by the Monarcho-Fascists on Mount Gramos with Anglo-American support. After Vicho fell to enemy hands, Nikos Zahariadis, General

Secretary of the CPG Central Committee, said: “Gramos will be the tomb of the Monarcho-Fascists.” But that did not turn out to be the case. DAG suffered numerous casualties but had it not backed down and fled to Albania, the opposite would have been true. Gramos would have been the tomb for DAG. For the longest part, after removing General Markos Vafiadis from his command and after abandoning the proven military strategies of the so-called “Supreme War Council Law”, Zahariadis worked personally with his Politburo, which had absolutely no relevant experience, implementing new “military strategists”. Units of DAG from Gramos and from other places withdrew to Albanian territory. The main culprits for DAG’s defeat naturally were Nikos Zahariadis, General Secretary of the CPG Central Committee and his Politburo. But that’s not who they found guilty. Instead of laying blame where it squarely belonged, Zahariadis and his clique pointed their fingers at the Macedonians, specifically at the NOF and AFZH leadership and at the Provisional Democratic Government of Greece. In Bureli, a town in Albania, Zahariadis staged a fake political trial, similar to those staged by Informburo countries. He had the last word. While the last battles in Gramos were still raging on, DAG General Headquarters ordered all DAG units to withdraw claiming that their intended task was now completed. What intended tasks were they completing? With this DAG was declared liquidated and its units were ordered to go to Albania. The great Greek offensive began on August 10, 1949 but the war did not end until August 30, 1949. Following is a list of battles that took place during the Greek Civil War. These were frightful battles where the opponents had forces as high as ten times larger and much better equipped: 1. Battle at North Pindos, (June 26 to July 22, 1947); 2. Battle for the city Konitsa (December 24, 1947 to January 4, 1948); 3. Battle in Kailiari, (October 18, 1948); 4. Battle in Bukovik (November 10 to 14, 1948); 5. Battle for the reception of the heroic unarmed phalanx from Rumeli to Mount Pieria, (March 16, 1948); 6. Battles in Agrafa: Villages Karoplesi, Smokovo, Kerasovo and Mount Niala (April 8 to 22, 1947); 7. Battle at Ilia, Furka, Taburi-Greko, (July 31, 1948); 8. Battle at Golio-Kamenik, (June 21, 1948); 9. Battle at Klevti (June 28 to August 1, 1948);

10. Battle at Taliaro-Likokremasma and Eastern Smolika, (July 31, 1948); 11. Battle at Alevitsa, (June 14, 1948); 12. Battles to conquer the cities Voden, Sobotsko and Negush, (December 22, 1948 to January 14, 1949); 13. Battle for the conquest of Lerin, (February 12, 1949); 14. Battles in Kaimakchalan, (June 4, 1949); 15. Major battles for the re-taking of Gramos (April 1 & 2, 1949); 16. Battles at the heights of Bulgara, Kotelsko-Gramos, (April 4, 1949); 17. Battles at Patoma-Gramos, (June 2, 1949); 18. Battles for Vicho. The fiercest battles were fought at Lisets and at Iamata, (August 10 to 14, 1949); 19. Dramatic battle fought at Kulata - Prespa between the two lakes, (August 14, 1949); 20. Battles at Black-Gramos, (August 24 1949); 21. The last battles of Gramos, (August 24 to 29, 1949); 22. Battles at Kiafa (elevation 2322) in Gramos, (August 30, 1949, just less than 10 hours before DAG’s defeat). On this day, history will witness a terrible event; the heroic death of Petso Romev, commander of the 426 battalion within brigade 118. He was born in the village Gornichevo, Lerin Region, in 1919. Hundreds of fighters, members of the CPG and much of the democratic force that took part in this disastrous war, have wondered why the CPG continued the fighting in August 1949 after its defeat on the Vicho and Gramos frontlines.

1949 – September 9. General Michos Vlandas, Minister of War in the Provisional Democratic Government of Greece and member of the CPG Central Committee Politburo, held a meeting with his military and political staff in the Albanian camp. There were about 3,000 fighters and DAG officers, including Macedonians fighters and officers. The CPG Central Committee Politburo, in the presence of 200 officers, announced its conclusion as to why DAG was defeated and that blame was placed squarely at Yugoslavia and NOF as being the main culprits for losing the war. General Michos Vlandas said: “When our Party opted for an armed struggle it relied on Yugoslavia for its unwavering support promised to us. We relied on Yugoslavia because of its radiant glory in its victory in the People’s Liberation War and Revolution. But here we are, at the

most critical and decisive moment of our struggle, Tito turned his back on us… he sold us out… he surrendered us and, through his agents (alluding to NOF), he undermined our national-movement and DAG”. After that, all NOF leaders were systematically watched around the clock by the DAG Security Services and their activities were recorded in pre-existing files. Since 1945, the CPG had open files and followed the life and activities of all the NOF leaders. CPG representatives in the People’s Republic of Macedonia have been monitoring NOF activities since NOF was created in the spring of 1945. They have been spying on both NOF and the People’s Republic of Macedonia.” It would appear that the CPG Greeks were preparing “a court case” against the Macedonian activists and supporters well in advance of losing the war.

1949 – September 30. Ioanidis Ioannis from the CPG officially asked Stalin to provide DAG and the CPG two bases, one in Bulgaria and the other in Albania. Stalin did not provide one in Albania.

1949 – September 30. The CPG Central Committee Politburo adopted a decision to arrest the leaders and activists of NOF, NOMS and AFZH. Over 100 Macedonians, 30 of them women, DAG fighters and NOF activists were arrested and handed over to the Albanian police. Nothing is known of their fate. They were detained without being tried and carried off to the concentration camps.