PERSONALITIES - Part 04

their duty, by any means possible, to prevent the political right from taking power and follow the directives issued by Sofoulis!” So, when the English sponsored liberal government needed support to legitimize itself in the eyes of the Greek people, the CPG and EAM gave it their support. And because of the general support it received “from all sides”, (which was not the case with previous English creations), it placed itself in a position to perform an “electoral coup” against the political right and lead up to the March 31, 1946, falsified elections. By not participating in the elections, the CPG and EAM, through especially characteristic maneuvers, stopped a large number of democratic people from voting and thus prevented an “undesirable” outcome for the English and the reactionaries and thus transferred the struggle from the streets to parliament. Understandably, “election victory” was granted to the Monarchists of the Populist Party and, thus, the “legalized” path for the restoration of the monarchy and counterrevolution power in Greece was strengthened - a precondition for breaking the political left...

1944 – October 19. Churchill and Eden visited Moscow during which time Molotov and Eden worked on the percentage of influence in their respective spheres which were decided by Churchill and Stalin. When it came to interests both Stalin and Molotov agreed that the Soviet influence in Greece should be 10%. Stalin’s attitude towards Greece and the CPG during the war was unclear, even suspicious. From the available evidence we have there is a general indication that Stalin’s attitude towards Greece was negative. Stalin thought Greece was a small country and perhaps not a good place for conducting micro-strategic practices for the political interests of the Soviet Union. In the period from April to October 1944, while attending meetings with the British and Americans, Stalin did not bring up any substantial objections to British claims of how Greece was going to be governed.

1944 – October 22. The Lerin-Kostur Macedonian brigade was born in the village Dragosh, Bitola Region, Republic of Macedonia. The Lerin-Kostur Battalion, in the presence of Dime Boianovski – Dize the General Headquarters representative of the People’s Liberation Army of the Republic of Macedonia, was reorganized into a brigade called the Lerin-Kostur Region Macedonian brigade (LKRMB). Ilia Dimovski – Gotse was given command of the brigade and Naum

Shupurkovski – Leon was appointed as its political commissar. After the brigade’s formation, brigade command presented a document to the General Headquarters of the People’s Liberation Army of the Republic of Macedonia outlining the Macedonian people’s struggle in Greek occupied Macedonia, the Greek attitude and mistakes made towards the Macedonian People’s national question, etc., which explained the overall situation in Greece and the battalion’s decision and motives for leaving Greece. In the village Graeshintsa, where the seat of command was situated, the brigade conducted exercises to prepare for operations at the roads and highways connecting Lerin and Bitola to Solun. The commandant and commissar of LKRMB, Ilia Dimovski – Gotse and Naum Shupurkovski – Leon, through their new orders, which they received towards the end of October, 1944 from the political leadership of the Republic of Macedonia, wrote a letter addressed to the Communist Party of Greece in which they requested from the Greek Party leadership to allow the formation of a Macedonian army with its own Macedonian headquarters, in which there would also be a representative of ELAS, to allow the formation of a Macedonian organization – a Macedonian Aegean National Liberation Front with a representative from the Greek National Liberation Front as well as to allow a Macedonian representative in EAM. The Macedonian right to self-determination was to be propagated through the press and the right to unification to be propagated only by word of mouth. Unfortunately these requests were rejected by the Greek Communist Party, qualifying them as provocative, unfriendly and nationalistic demands.

1944 – October 31. A large group of English soldiers in armoured vehicles entered Solun before ELAS did. Three days later the BBC in London announced that British troops had liberated Solun.

1944 – November 4. The Lerin-Kostur Region Macedonian brigade takes part in the liberation of Bitola and on November 18, 1944 it added its first all Aegean shock brigade consisting of fighters from the Voden and Lerin-Kostur Region Macedonian battalions, which separated from ELAS in October 1944 and from the detachment of the “Gotse Delchev” brigade. The brigade’s commanders at the time of its formation consisted of Ilia Dimovski – Gotse as its commandant, Naum Peiov as its second commandant, Mihailo

Keramitdzhiev as its commissar, Vangel Aianovski -Oche as its second commissar and Steve Georgiev - Dimov as its chief. During the initiation ceremonies Lazo Kalaidzhiski – Dobri, the commandant of the Bitola Region Military District, surrendered the flag for his brigade to Ilia Dimovski – Gotse and among other things said: “I surrender this flag to you from the Ilinden Uprising and trust that forever you will guard it until the ultimate liberation of all of Macedonia”. Upon receiving the flag Ilia Dimovski – Gotse replied: “We accept this flag and we will protect it to the last drop of our blood”. The first military assignment given to the first all Aegean Shock Brigade was to clean up the Albanian Balisti bands in the village Ostrets, Bitola Region, which it did in the first ten days of December 1944.

1944 – November 14. December 11, damning British diplomatic report surfaces. In a British diplomatic report sent from Leeper to Eden, dated Athens November, 14, 1944, referring to the Macedonian people in Greek occupied Macedonia, among other things Leeper said: “4. The problem of the Western Macedonian Bulgarophones, who are briefly mentioned in paragraph 7 of the paper, also remains serious and formidable, in spite of its limited dimensions. This minority, which extends through the region from Florina and Kastoria through Siatista to the plain of Yannitsa, has proved exceedingly unreliable during the war. Satisfactory data are not available, but it appears from events during the occupation that the dissatisfied minority must be considerably larger than is suggested by Greek census figures; and it is certain that successive Greek Governments have shirked facing the problem and have preferred to persuade even themselves that it did not exist. On the assumptions (1) that the policy of His Majesty’s Government is to treat Greece as the most important Balkan country from the point of view of British interests, and to support those elements in Greece which are most stably pro-British and (2) that Greece does not wish to belong to a Balkan Federation in which there would be a large Slav majority, it would appear to follow that Greece had better not contain any Slav minorities at all. And since the amputation of the Slav areas in Western Macedonia and their annexation to a Slav Federation is a practical impossibility and would also be economically disastrous for Greece. It would follow that, difficult as it may be, a home must be found for perhaps 120,000 Slav

Macedonians north of the Greek frontiers of 1941.” I would like to draw your attention to the sentence “It would follow that, difficult as it may be, a home must be found for perhaps 120,000 Slav Macedonians north of the Greek frontiers of 1941”. This information was discovered in declassified British diplomatic dispatches. British Ambassador to Athens Mr. R.A. Leeper, in November 1944, toyed with the idea of displacing 120,000 Macedonians from Greek occupied Macedonia and moving them north of the Greek border. Mr. Leeper suggested this to Mr. Eden, then UK Foreign Minister, in a letter dated November 24, 1944 in which, among other things, he wrote “…and since the amputation of the Slav areas in Western Macedonia and their annexation to a Slav Federation is a practical impossibility and would also be economically disastrous for Greece. It would follow that, difficult as it may be, a home must be found for perhaps 120,000 Slav Macedonians north of the Greek frontiers of 1941.” (5a) (See: FO 371/43649 XP 00201 R 20431/1009/67.) In doing this the British requested the assistance of the former (fascist) Yugoslav government, before the communists came to power. The British received a positive response from Yugoslavia. The Fascist Yugoslav government in fact agreed to take these Macedonians out of Greece and resettle them on Yugoslav territory. The fascist Yugoslav government, however, fell to the communists before it had a chance to implement the plan. But after the war (WW II) it was difficult to move 120,000 people without causing world attention. So “someone” decided to force them out by other means… by legal means so that there would be no ramifications after the fact and with the CPY/CPM’s cooperation. Their idea was to have the Macedonian people raise arms against Greece so that Greece would have “no other choice but to defend itself against an aggressor who wants to carve out parts of its territory”! Yugoslavia, for the sake of having good relations with the West, naturally prepared the groundwork through the creation and indoctrination of NOF and AFZH with aims at starting an armed uprising in Greek occupied Macedonia. The Macedonian people, however, did not want to fight and initially refused to participate. To get them motivated the Greek right, the Fascists, pitched in and initiated what was later termed the “white terror”. Greeks indiscriminately began to kill people and burn properties and homes. Fearing for their lives many Macedonians fled to the mountains (Vicho and Gramos) where they

were armed and trained to protect themselves. And this is how the conflict was started. This was a war that would be fatal to the Macedonian people; it had to be an ideological war in order to involve the international factor (US and Britain); a war that Greece would have no choice but to fight in order to save its territory. This was going to be a legal genocide because these “Slavs” were prepared to carve out Greek territory! The Macedonians, on the other hand, were told they needed the guns to protect themselves but as soon as the shooting started they were told they were fighting to “re-unite their Macedonia” and after Yugoslavia abandoned them they were told they were fighting for their human rights to gain equality with the Greeks. Then, when the war became very hot, they were told to fight for their lives; “to fight or die!” There was no single Macedonian in those days that not only publicly proclaimed that he or she was fighting to re-unite Macedonia but many Macedonians were made to believe that it was possible to do that! And why do you suppose they believed that? Because the architects of this war, through NOF and AFZH, told them so…, naturally through lies and deception!

1944 – November 18. The “First Aegean Brigade” was formed in free Bitola from the fighters of the two battalions that fled Greek occupied Macedonia. This Brigade was deployed on December 28, 1944 in Western Macedonia, mainly in Kichevo, Tetovo and Gostivar, tasked with fighting Dzhemo Mefail’s gang of Balisti formed during the Italian-German occupation. The “First Aegean Brigade” was disbanded by special order number 236 (strictly confidential) issued by Marshal Tito on April 2, 1945. The Brigade’s command was comprised of Commander Ilia Dimovski-Goche, Deputy Commander Naum Peiov, Political Commissar Mihailo Keramitdzhiev, Deputy Political Commissar Vangel Aianovski-Oche and Brigade Chief of Staff Steve Georgiev Dimov. In the beginning Vangel Aianovski-Oche was appointed CPM Brigade Party Secretary but he left for a new position and was replaced by Vasil Makrievski. Mincho Fotev was appointed Brigade Youth (SKOJ) Secretary.

1944 – November 18. Classified report from Brigadier Maclean to Sir Orme Sargent: On the 18th November the Greek Macedonian Brigade held its foundation ceremony at Bitolj to cries of “Give us

the right to live within the framework of federal Yugoslavia.” Yugoslav partisan leaders appear to have attempted to moderate popular enthusiasm and Pasanko, representative of the Macedonian National Liberation Front, reminded his listeners that “this is a delicate diplomatic question in which the co-operation of our allies England, Russia, and America is essential. The Greek Macedonian Brigade appears to have been formed partly of refugees resident in Bulgaria and partly from former adherents of E.A.M. who disagreed with E.A.M.’s minority policy. Keremediciev, Political Commissar of the new brigade, accused E.A.M. of harbouring certain elements who refused to accord the Greek Macedonians their cultural rights and own military formations. E.A.M. he added, finally issued instructions for the Macedonians to be disarmed and it was to avoid this that they crossed the border to Yugoslavia. There they were probably joined by volunteers recruited from amongst Macedonian refugees previously living in Bulgaria. Yugoslav sources claim that there are some 700,000 of these refugees in Bulgaria, most of them having been transferred there as a result of agreements made after the last war for the exchange of population in the Balkans. The Yugoslav partisan newspaper Nova Makedonija for the 14th November, 1944, gave the following account of their present attitude: “These Macedonian refugees realize that the independence and liberation of the Greek part of Macedonia depends not a little on its direct participation in the operations against the German Fascists. Committees are therefore being formed in every village and town in Bulgaria where Macedonians are living. It is to be expected that the response to volunteering will assume very large proportions and will include all those able to bear arms, and that whole units will be formed from the refugees alone.” F. H. R. MACLEAN, Brigadier, British Military Mission. Belgrade, 21st, January, 1945.

1944 – November 24. Mr. Leeper to Mr. Eden Athens 24th November, 1944. Sir, I HAVE the honour to submit the following comments on Research Department paper of the 26th August, 1944, on the subject of Macedonia. 2. The two formidable Macedonian problems in which Greece is concerned are: (a) that of Greek relations with the Slav world as represented by Serbia and Bulgaria, both of whom must be expected in the immediate future to be under strong Russian influence and to

have Russian sympathy for their aspirations; and b) that of the surviving Bulgarophone minority in Western Macedonia. 3. The former problem turns chiefly on that of Serbian and Bulgarian access to the Aegean, the subject discussed in paragraphs 35-40 and 41-43 of the paper under reference. There is clearly no case (or handing over to Slav Powers any part of the North Aegean coast, which in 1940 had nowhere anything but an infinitesimal minority of Slav inhabitants. On the other hand, the strategic position of Greece here, even with Turkish backing, is very weak, vis-à-vis the Slav world, so that even in her own interests it behooves Greece to come to terms with her northern neighbours. The only possible solution-however difficult in practice under present conditions-seems to be that referred to in paragraph 51, namely, a return to, and preferably an extension of, the system of free zones. A Serbian free zone at Salonica is not difficult, but a Bulgarian zone at Kavala, or even at the outlying Alexandrupolis, would probably be out of the question for a considerable period to come, in view of the passions aroused by the atrocious conduct of the Bulgarians in Northern Greece since 1941. It remains, nevertheless, a Greek no less than a Bulgarian interest that Bulgaria's desire for access to an Aegean port should be satisfied so far as possible; since otherwise Bulgaria's southward political aspiration, which are now largely artificial, will be kept alive by the real and continual irritation of an unsatisfied economic need. (How far this need might be met by the alternative of a free zone at Durazzo is a matter for separate study.) It may further be pointed out that the grant of free zones at her northern ports would, in fact, be of direct financial benefit to Greece herself through the revivifying influence of increased trade on the life of those ports in general and through the restoration of a natural degree of intercourse between these Greek ports and their Slav hinterland. 4. The problem of the Western Macedonian Bulgarophones, who are briefly mentioned in paragraph 7 of the paper, also remains serious and formidable, in spite of its limited dimensions. This minority, which extends through the region from Florina and Kastoria through Siatista to the plain of Yannitsa, has proved exceedingly unreliable during the war. Satisfactory data are not available, but it appears from events during the occupation that the dissatisfied minority must be considerably larger than is suggested by Greek census figures; and it is certain that successive Greek Governments have shirked

facing the problem and have preferred to persuade even themselves that it did not exist. On the assumptions (1) that the policy of His Majesty’s Government is to treat Greece as the most important Balkan country from the point of view of British interests, and to support those elements in Greece which are most stably pro-British and (2) that Greece does not wish to belong to a Balkan Federation in which there would be a large Slav majority, it would appear to follow that Greece had better not contain any Slav minorities at all. And since the amputation of the Slav areas in Western Macedonia and their annexation to a Slav Federation is a practical impossibility and would also be economically disastrous for Greece. It would follow that, difficult as it may be, a home must be found for perhaps 120,000 Slav Macedonians north of the Greek frontiers of 1941. 5. I have sent copies of this dispatch to the Resident Minister at Caserta, to Mr. Houstoun-Boswall at Sofia and to Mr. Broad at Bari. I have, &c. R. A. Leeper.

1944 – November 29. In order to avoid a conflict the EAM government coalition Ministers made every effort to submit a proposal for the full implementation of the Lebanon Agreement, but unfortunately Papandreou refused to accept it.

1944 – December. After the expulsion of the occupiers in Greece in the fall of 1944, although EAM was a hugely massive organization and ELAS was a many times larger armed force than the others, numbering about 70,000 fighters, it was unable to convince the other parties that it should lead the “government of national unity”. Therefore the resistance movement, in December 1944, heading for an armed conflict in Athens, agreed to capitulate and disarm.

1944 – December 1. British Commander Scobey issued an order demanding that members of ELAS surrender their weapons. At the same time Papandreou declared that: “He could not accept the proposal put forth by EAM Ministers for the simultaneous disarmament of all volunteer units and for the formation of a unique grouping.” That same evening on December 1, 1944, late at night, all EAM ministers resigned which then opened the doors for further conflict.

1944 - December 2. The Papandreou government resigned. Just barely two months after the Germans left Greece, the Leftist ministers in the Papandreou government quit after being unable to agree on the composition of the new police force and who should control the armed forces.

1944 – December 3. Classified report from Brigadier Maclean to Sir Orme Sargent: On the 3rd December another meeting was held in Bitola to elect “a Political Commission to lead the fight of the Macedonian people in Greek Macedonia.” The commission appointed Filip Velkov as its representative to the Presidium of A.S.N.O.M. (i.e. the Anti-Fascist Assembly for the National Liberation of Macedonia) and J.A.N.L., H.Q., for Macedonia. At the second session of A.S.N.O.M. held at the end of December Velkov stated: “We Macedonians from Aegean Macedonia have a grim struggle before us to realize the age-old ideal of our people, the liberation of our part of Macedonia which is still beneath a foreign yoke.” At the same session of A.S.N.O.M., Atanas Atanasovski spoke in the name of the Bulgarian Macedonians. “The entire population of Pirin Macedonia,” he asserted, “is waiting for the happy hour when we shall be included with our brothers in Macedonia in Tito’s democratic, federal Yugoslavia.” 6. These claims for union between the Macedonian population of Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Greece had already been advanced some weeks previously by authoritative Yugoslav partisan leaders, such as General Dzilas, General Tempo and Dimitar Vlahov. Though some of the more categorical of these claims may have been made in a burst of momentary exuberance, it is worth while examining the career of the most experienced of these politicians, Vlahov, for indications as to the more permanent aims and principles determining their policy. Dimitar Vlahov was born in Kilkis in Greek Macedonia in 1878, and joined the original I.M.R.O. as early as 1903, collaborating closely with the famous Macedonian leader Goce Delcev. In 1908 he was elected to the Turkish Parliament as a deputy of the Popular Federal party, whose object was to work constitutionally for an autonomous Macedonia. In 1907, after Macedonia had been annexed by Bulgaria, Vlahov became Governor of the Pristina district and after the Great War, served as Bulgarian Consul-General first in Odessa and then in Vienna. In 1924 he signed the Aleksandrov-Protogerov manifesto which

attempted to patch up a truce between the rival I.M.R.O. leaders and he was repudiated by the Bulgarian Government. Disapproving of the terrorist methods of I.M.R.O. which was now falling increasingly under the domination of Ivan Mihajlov and degenerating into the tool of Bulgarian and Italian designs of disruption in the Balkans, Vlahov founded his own organization, the United (Obidinena) I.M.R.O., in 1925, and expounded his ideas in his well known book “Balkan Federation”. Vlahov looked neither to Bulgaria nor to Yugoslavia (which was then pursuing a policy of rigid centralism) but to the Soviet Union, with whose support he hoped to achieve a union of the South Slav peoples in which Macedonia would form a separate, autonomous federal unit. Though Vlahov still continued to lay great stress on non-violent methods for the achievement of his aims, his organization was broken up by the Government of the Military League in Bulgarian in 1934, and its members sentenced to long terms of imprisonment on a charge of Communist conspiracy and planning of an armed revolt. Vlahov himself settled in Moscow in 1936 and appears to have remained there until returning to Yugoslavia at some point to join the partisans. Observant readers have been able to secure an interesting side light on his activity in Moscow from an article in a recent partisan newspaper which wrote that Vlahov had “liven in Moscow, where he worked tirelessly in the International Agrarian Institute” – the latter phrase being substituted for the blocked-out but still legible word “Comintern”. Although the energy with which the authorities appear to have quelled the anxiety of certain of their troops to march on Salonica (see my telegram No.63 of the 16th January) bears out Tito’s repented assurances that he intends to take no premature action over the Macedonia problem, there is every reason to suppose that it is his intention to unite in due course the Macedonian provinces of Greece and Bulgaria to Yugoslav Macedonia, and that this project has the approval of the Soviet Union. Dr. Smodlaka has stated that the Bulgarian Government (no doubt under pressure from Moscow) have already agreed to cede Bulgarian Macedonia (see my telegram No.88 of the 21st January). The Greek attitude towards this problem must be regarded as less assured and will doubtless depend on the eventual complexion of the Greek Government, although, as will be seen by my telegram No.2 of the 7th December, even E.A.M. do not appear to have proved quite as amenable on this question as Tito would have wished. It is

however, difficult to see how Greece, whatever her attitude, would be able successfully to resist the wishes in this matter of an overwhelmingly strong South Slav bloc under Soviet tutelage. F. H. R. MACLEAN, Brigadier, British Military Mission. Belgrade, 21st, January, 1945.

1944 – December 3. Britain began its military intervention against ELAS in Athens. Given the situation the fighters and officers of the Macedonian brigade in the Republic of Macedonia could not remain indifferent about what was happening in Greece, being aware that defeat of the democratic forces in Greece would worsen the situation of the Macedonian people. They were all in agreement that there was a need to explore all means to help ELAS, which meant first hand involvement of the brigade in the conflict. At this point the Aegean Macedonian leadership contemplated around this question searching for conditions under which to become involved. Naum Shupurkovski, a member of the Secretariat of the Macedonian Political Commission under Greece, in his report addressed to the Political Bureau of the Greek Communist Party commented that on December 3, 1944 on the day of the formation of the Political Commission, at a meeting attended by Mohailo Keramitdziev, Naum Peiov, Paskal Mitrevski, Dimitar Vlahov, Petse Traikov and himself, Lazar Kolishevski addressed the preoccupied Macedonians from Aegean Macedonia, according to Naum Shupurkovski – Leon, as follows: “Leave immediately for down there (Greek occupied Macedonia). Get agreement from the Greek Communist Party and fight like democrats under its leadership without pretensions…” Several days later, Liliana Chalovska, a member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Greece in the accommodations of the Political Commission of the Macedonians under Greece, in Bitola, addressed Paskal Mitrevski, Naum Peiov, Mihailo Keramitdzhiev and Naum Shupurkovski – Leon and among other things told them the following: “You need not wait to be pacified by the parties. Take your own initiative and go down there without asking for anything from the Communist Party of Greece. As long as you stay here you tolerate liability. Down there (Greece) it is not only Greece’s and Macedonia’s fate that is decided, but that of all the Balkan nations…” Four or five days later a joint meeting was held between the brigade’s headquarters and the political committee to discuss the circumstances under which it would be

appropriate for the brigade and all the Macedonians from Greek occupied Macedonia who were presently in Yugoslavia to return to Greece and to engage in the struggle on the side of ELAS and how to communicate these circumstances to the Communist Party of Greece. Naum Peiov, Lazo Poplazarov, Paskal Mitrevski and Mihailo Keramitdzhiev, keeping in mind what had happened in the past, insisted on going to Greece as a distinct people; they insisted that the brigade should have its own headquarters, its own flag with the five ray star and be recognized by Greece as a Macedonian army. Contrary to that, Naum Shupurkovski – Leon figured that such conditions were not necessary. Paskal Mitrevski intervened and insisted on having the political committee situated inside the city Lerin.

1944 – December 3. A countrywide rally was organized during which the police shot at demonstrators, killing several people and wounding many others. What followed after that was thirty-three days of bloodshed in Athens dubbed as the “1944 December events”. The EAM organized demonstration broke out in Athens and began to march towards Constitutional Square. The police opened fire and killed a number of demonstrators. Fighting at the time was isolated to Athens and continued until January 1945 when both sides agreed to talk. Meetings were held at Varkiza, a seaside resort near Athens, and a treaty was signed on February 12, 1945. Signed by the Right, Left and the British, among other things, the Varkiza Treaty called for (a) EAM to disband ELAS, (b) legalize the Communist Party of Greece (CPG) and (c) hold a referendum on the return of the monarchy. ELAS troops were to be given political amnesty for the return of their weapons, people were to be guaranteed free speech, martial law was to be lifted and people were to be given amnesty for all political crimes.

1944 – December 14. Andreas Dzhimas, representative of the Communist Party of Greece and ELAS in Yugoslavia, came to Bitola and asked for the brigade to be disbanded and its fighters to enlist in the ELAS units, or at least to surrender its arms to ELAS. The Aegean leadership did not agree with this recommendation. To solve the problem Andeas Dzhimas, Naum Peiov and Paskal Mitrevski went to Skopje to discuss the situation with the Vardar Macedonian leadership. In the meantime orders came from Tito

prohibiting the brigade from going to Greece because the brigade was part of the Yugoslav army.

1944 – December 26. The December events in Greece were rekindled with the arrival of Churchill in Athens, accompanied by British Foreign Minister Eden, Commander of the Middle East forces Alexander and by Minister for the Middle East McMillan. Under the protection of British tanks the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs, on December 26 and 27, 1944, held a conference attended by representatives of the various political parties, the president of the Greek government that was resigning, George Papandreou, the regent candidate Archbishop of Athens Damaskinos and Nikolaos Plastiras (candidate for President of the Greek government). Attending from the CPG and EAM side were EAM Secretary and member of the CPG Central Committee Politburo Dimitrios Partsalidis. The meeting was also attended by representatives of the two allied Great Powers: US ambassador to Athens McCabe and representative of the Soviet Union Colonel Popov.

1945 - LAW 697 enacted more regulations on renaming toponyms in Greek occupied Macedonia.

1945 – January 2. The Aegean brigade received orders from General Headquarters of the Macedonian-Vardar National Liberation Front to go to Tetovo and eliminate the remnants of the Balisti bands that were active in the Gostivar and Tetovo Regions. After about two months of campaigning in the Gostivar and Tetovo Regions (January-February 1945) the brigade completed its assigned task. Then in the beginning of March 1945 the brigade was relocated to Skopje with orders from the General Headquarters to again relocate to Bitola and Gevgelia.

1945 – January 31. Classified Telegram 182 – London. From the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to the Secretary of State for External Affairs Canada. CIRCULAR D. 182. My telegram circular D. 159 of January 26th. Macedonia: In light of the information regarding Bulgarian Government readiness to cede Bulgarian Macedonia to Yugoslavia, contained in my telegram under reference, we instructed Brigadier MacLean to speak to Tito and convey to him our views on questions of Macedonia and Yugoslav-

Bulgarian Federation as set out in my telegram Circular D. 1 of January 1st. At the same time, Brigadier MacLean was to inform Tito that we have noted with satisfaction the assurance he has already given (see my telegram Circular D. 1796 of December 12th, paragraph 3). That he has no aggressive intention against Macedonia and that any Yugoslav claims will be raised in an orderly fashion at the Peace Conference. Brigadier MacLean spoke to Tito as instructed on January 26th. Tito reported that he was convinced that this was not the time to try to establish a federation with Bulgaria or any other neighbours of Yugoslavia and that he had no intention of attempting to do so in present circumstances. He also indicated once again that he had no intention of trying to annex territory from Greece or Bulgaria before the Peace Conference when he would put forward any claim he might have in the proper way. Acting on instructions, British Political Representative at Sofia has also informed Bulgarian Government of our views as follows; while we should welcome a confederation between all Balkan States both Allied and enemy, and including possibly Turkey, we could not approve an exclusive union or federation between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria. Moreover, while we are prepared to agree to the creation of a Macedonian State in the future Federal Yugoslavia, we should be strongly opposed to the creation of a greater Macedonian State involving claims on Greek territory. We, therefore, look with disfavour on the activities of Macedonian propagandists in Bulgaria which the Bulgarian Government appear to have condoned and we do not recognize the rights of the Bulgarian Government to transfer, without the consent of the United Nations, any part of Bulgarian territory to the Yugoslav Federal State of Macedonia. SECRETARY OF STATE FOR DOMINION AFFAIRS

1945 – February 12. Varkiza agreement is signed requiring all Partisan and other bands to demobilize and surrender their weapons. The British, once again, confirmed their allegiance to the Greek Government by giving Athens full political and military support, committing their willingness to fight to prevent a Partisan victory. The biggest losers of the Varkiza agreement were the Macedonians. As soon as the agreement was signed, all anti-Macedonian laws were back in force and the Macedonian people lost all that they had gained during the German occupation, including the right to form their own state as per the Atlantic Charter. The Greek Communist

Party made absolutely no effort to safeguard Macedonian rights in the agreements with Britain. This was not only a betrayal to the Macedonian people but it also left them vulnerable to persecution from the Greek Fascists. The Varkiza Agreement was signed in a resort located near Athens. The Agreement was signed by the leadership of the resistance movement, i.e. the CPG and EAM on one side and the Plastiras government and British General Scobey on the other. With that Agreement EAM and ELAS practically handed power to the political right. After the monarchist regime was established in Greece, to which the CPG leadership gave legitimacy by signing the Varkiza Agreement on February 12, 1945, the Macedonian people in Greek occupied Macedonia found themselves in a worse situation than before the war. It was as if they were thrown back to the Metaxas dictatorship and systematically terrorized by the Greek police and the gendarmerie, but this terror was tougher, more horrifying and more violent and was committed by the Greek paramilitary and by Greek armed terrorist gangs. These gangs were composed of fascist and destructive elements which, until yesterday, had cooperated with the occupiers. They were led by Frantsiskos Kolaras-Tsezos, a Turkish colonist from Asia Minor, who initially settled in the village Gorentsi and then in Rupishcha, Kostur Region. During the occupation he terrorized the Kostur population then, after the occupiers withdrew, he was arrested and imprisoned. At the beginning of 1945 after the Varkiza Agreement was signed, he was released, armed and, along with other leaders of paramilitary and armed gang members, sent to terrorize the Macedonian population in Greek occupied Macedonia. Others who collaborated with the German, Italian and Bulgarian occupiers such as the troops belonging to Kolaras, Papadopoulos, Anton Chaush and other well-known traitors who were more than willing to rob, terrorize and murder Macedonians, were also recruited. It was a truly evil campaign with which future historians will have to deal. It was also a skillful maneuver on the part of the Greek bourgeoisie to create much hatred between the Greek and Macedonian people in order for the Greek element to take a foothold in Greek occupied Macedonia.

1945 - February 12. 18 citizens from the city Gumendzhe were jailed in Solun. Included among those jailed were Giorgi Kostraki, Vangel Kostraki, Iovan Popnikov, Kostadin Korov, Traiko Kalinov,

Hristo Michiorov, Hristo Hadzhigioriov, Vangel Hr. Nichev, Dimitar Shaldev and Hristo Chiakov.

1945 – February 20. Greek armed bands attacked the Macedonian village Volak, in the Drama district, where they killed seven villagers, burned 40 houses, looted the village and drove 350 villagers across the frontier. The same day a similar armed band attacked the village of Tsutsuligovo, in the Seres district, where they arrested 15 villagers, plundered the village and drove 33 families across the frontier. From February 12 to April 12 the bands of Andon Chaush killed 29 Macedonian villagers, imprisoned 3,100 Macedonians, looted a dozen Macedonian villages and drove several hundred Macedonians across the frontier.

1945 – February 22. The Secret Macedonian Liberation Organization – TOMO was created. TOMO’s existence confirmed in the consciousness of the Macedonian people that the transfer of the Voden battalion to the Republic of Macedonia was done to save it and not what they were hearing from the other side.

1945 – February 27. From Washington to Foreign Office: Earl of Halifax. No. 1527. IMPORTANT. Your telegram No. 10825. Following is text of substantive part of the State Department’s reply to my aide memoir on your telegram under reference. The United States Government holds the view that the pre-war frontiers of Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Greece in the Macedonian area must be considered as the legal boundaries, and that revision of any of them should be permitted only if it conforms to the freely expressed will of the populations directly concerned and has international sanctions as a part of the general peace settlement. If in the reconstitution of Yugoslavia, the government and the people of that country desire to set up a regional and de-centralized administration under which the area of South-eastern Yugoslavia would have a certain autonomous character there would of course be no grounds for objection on the part of the United States Government. This Government concurs however in the view of the British Government that there is no legitimate basis for any claim made on behalf of "Macedonia" whether as an independent State or as a part of Yugoslavia, or of a larger South Slav federation to territory within the boundaries of Greece on the ground that such territory is “Macedonian”. With

regard to the frontier between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, the United States Government favour the retention of the present boundary but would not be inclined to object to any settlement calculated to contribute to the peace, stability and general welfare of the region if reached through free negotiations on the part of those two states at such time as it may become clear that their respective governments are in a position to represent the real desire of the people involved, including also those inhabitants of parts of Yugoslavia still under enemy occupation. It is in the view of this government that changes in territorial boundaries of Bulgaria should not be made during the period proceeding the general settlement with Bulgaria as an enemy state. The United States Government believe that union of Yugoslavia and Bulgaria to constitute a single unit [grp. under? or a] federation would under present circumstances be a disturbing rather than a stabilizing factor in south-eastern Europe since the neighbouring non-Slavic States, including Turkey, would consider it a threat to their security. In the opinion of the Government such a union in any case should not be permitted before the conclusion of peace between Bulgaria and the United Nations. This Government would be willing however to give consideration to a plan for regional understandings to include all States of southeastern Europe rather than an exclusively Slavic bloc, should all these States decide, with the concurrence of the principal Allied Governments that such a grouping represent a contribution to the welfare and progress of that area. Foreign office please pass to Belgrade and Sofia as my telegrams Nos. 18 and 13 respectively. OTP.

1945 – March. Control of the Ber prison was given to the English.

1945 - March 8. English and Greek soldiers conducted a raid in the village Radomir in Andzhivardar Region and arrested a large number of villagers. They took the villagers outside of the village near the river and severely tortured them. Included among those arrested were Atanas Kapasuzov, Risto Kozarov, Bozhin Stamenkovski and Sotir Zhupov.

1945 – March 16.Clasified report by Sir Reginald Leeper, K.C.M.G., C.B.E., His Majesty’s Ambassador, Athens to British Consulate-General, Salonica: I have the honour to report that I toured Eastern Macedonia and Thrace by car from March 8th -11th

last, visiting in particular the towns of Serres, Drama, Kavalla, Xanthi and Komotini, making Kavalla my headquarters. I was accompanied throughout by Mr. Wm. M. Gwynn, American Consul-General in Salonica. Traveling by road presented no difficulties whatsoever, and the surface everywhere was better than could have been expected. Only on the stretch from Salonica to the Struma was any destruction evident, but a temporary wooden bridge has now been constructed across the Struma and other bridges and culverts repaired in a rough and ready fashion so that traveling time between Salonica and Serres is now almost normal. From Serres onwards there were practically no signs of blown bridges or damaged roads. The railway is also functioning on a reduced scale from Rodhopolis to Alexandroupolis, lignite from Serres being used as fue1. Throughout Eastern Macedonia and Thrace communications and public utilities have remained large1y intact, the chief material damage caused by the Bulgarian occupation being the burning of mountain villages and the carrying off of cattle, draught animals and agricultura1 produce. Conditions ere thus much more favourable for a rapid economic recovery than in Western Macedonia. We were everywhere received with the utmost friendliness, sometimes to the point of embarrassment and not a single untoward incident marred our journey. Only a brief stay was made at Serres, but it was sufficient to impart an impression of considerable poverty, malnutrition and insufficient clothing in what should normally be a prosperous town. Most shops wore shut, and the few that were open were but poorly stocked with articles or very inferior quality. British troops had not yet occupied the town, but security was reported to be good. More time was spent in Drama on both the outward and return journeys. It gave signs of much greater animation and economic conditions seemed definitely better. A company of the Gurka Rifles had arrived there the previous day (March 7th), and I was able to obtain the impressions of the Officer commanding, Captain Aurick, who had already formed severa1 local contacts. He had not found the ELAS officer in charge of the guard company by any means as co-operative as he could have wished. He held, it appeared, the mistaken view that he was responsible for disarming the Nationalist Bands, and likewise that he could continue to carry out his functions in his own way until the National Guard arrived to relive him. He was also maintaining a force of some 200 armed guards instead of the one hundred laid down in the Agreement of Varkiza. Captain